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Any effort to gather evidence may prove pointless without ensuring 
its admissibility. Nevertheless, the EU, while developing instruments 
for smooth gathering of evidence in criminal matters, is not taking 
much effort to enhance its admissibility. Due to the lack of common 
rules in this matter, gathering and use of evidence in the EU cross-
border context is still governed by the domestic law of the member 
states concerned. This may lead to situations where, given the 
differences between legal systems across the EU, evidence collected 
in one member state will not be admissible in other member states. 
Due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty opened the possibility to 
adopt minimum rules concerning, among other things, the mutual 
admissibility of evidence, this research investigates the concept of 
minimum standards designed to enhance mutual admissibility of 
evidence in the EU. Through a study of two investigative measures, 
telephone tapping and house search, the author examines whether 
coming to various common minimum standards is feasible and 
whether compliance with these standards would finally shape 
the as yet nonexistent concept of the free movement and mutual 
recognition of evidence in criminal matters in the EU.
Essential reading for both national and EU policy makers, scholars 
and practitioners involved in cross-border gathering of evidence in 
the EU.
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Abbreviations  and  Acronyms   
  
Abbreviations  and  Acronyms  
1959  ECMA   European   Convention   on   Mutual   Assistance    
in  Criminal  Matters  
1959   ECMA   Explanatory  
Report  
Explanatory   Report   to   the   European  
Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  
Matters  
2000  EU  MLA  Convention   Convention   of   29   May   2000   on   Mutual  
Assistance   in   Criminal   Matters   between   the  
Member  States  of  the  European  Union  
2000   EU   MLA   Convention  
Explanatory  Report  
Explanatory   Report   on   the   Convention   of   29  
May   2000   on  Mutual   Assistance   in   Criminal  
Matters   between   the   Member   States   of   the  
European  Union  
2005  Hague  Programme  
  
The   Hague   Programme:   Strengthening  
Freedom,   Security   and   Justice   in   the  
European  Union  
2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol   Second   Additional   Protocol   to   the   European  
Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  
Matters  
2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol  
Explanatory  Report  
Explanatory  Report   to   the  Second  Additional  
Protocol   to   the   European   Convention   on  
Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  
2001   EU   MLA   Convention  
Protocol  
Council   Act   of   16   October   2001   establishing,    
in   accordance   with   Article   34   of   the   Treaty    
on   European   Union,   the   Protocol   to   the  
Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  
Matters   between   the   Member   States   of   the  
European  Union  
2001   EU   MLA   Convention  
Protocol  Explanatory  Report  
Explanatory  report  to  the  Protocol  to  the  2000  
Convention   on  mutual   assistance   in   criminal  
matters   between   the   Member   States   of   the  
European  Union  
2010  Stockholm  Programme   The   Stockholm   Programme:   An   Open   and  
Secure   Europe   Serving   and   Protecting  
Citizens    
CCP           Code  de  Procédure  Penale    
CoE   Council  of  Europe  
EAW      European  Arrest  Warrant  




EAW  Proposal   Proposal  for  a  Council  framework  decision  on  
the   European   arrest   warrant   and   the  
surrender   procedures   between   the   Member  
States  
ECHR   European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  
ECJ   The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  
ECtHR      European  Court  of  Human  Rights  
EIO   European  Investigation  Order  
EIO  Directive   Directive   2014/41/EU   of   the   European  
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  3  April  2014  
regarding   the   European   Investigation   Order  
in  criminal  matters  
EIO  Explanatory  
Memorandum  
Initiative   of   the   Kingdom   of   Belgium,   the  
Republic  of  Bulgaria,  the  Republic  of  Estonia,  
the   Kingdom   of   Spain,   the   Republic   of  
Austria,   the   Republic   of   Slovenia   and   the  
Kingdom   of   Sweden   for   a   Directive   of   the  
European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council  
regarding  the  European  Investigation  Orderin  
criminal  matters  -­‐‑  Explanatory  Memorandum  
  
EIO  Proposal   Initiative   of   the   Kingdom   of   Belgium,   the  
Republic  of  Bulgaria,  the  Republic  of  Estonia,  
the   Kingdom   of   Spain,the   Republic   of  
Austria,   the   Republic   of   Slovenia   and   the  
Kingdom   of   Sweden  for   a   Directive   of   the  
European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council   of  
regarding   the   European   Investigation   Order  
in  criminal  matters  
EEW   European  Evidence  Warrant  
EEW  Explanatory  
Memorandum  
Explanatory   Memorandum   for   the   Proposal  
for   a   Council   framework   decision   on   the  
European   Evidence   Warrant   for   obtaining  
objects,   documents   and   data   for   use   in  
proceedings  in  criminal  matters  
EEW  Proposal   Proposal  for  a  Council  framework  decision  on  
the  European  Evidence  Warrant  for  obtaining  
objects,   documents   and   data   for   use   in  
proceedings  in  criminal  matters  
EP   European  Parliament  
EU   European  Union  
EU  Charter   Charter   of   Fundamental   Rights   of   the  
European  Union  
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EPPO  Proposal   Proposal   for   a   Council   Regulation   on   the  









Council  Framework  Decision  of  13   June  2002  
on   the   European   arrest   warrant   and   the  
surrender   procedures   between   Member  
States,  18.7.2002,  OJ  L  190/1  
FD  EEW   Council   Framework   Decision   2008/978/JHA    
of   18   December   2008   on   the   European  
evidence  warrant  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  
objects,   documents   and   data   for   use   in  
proceedings  in  criminal  matters  
FD  FO   Council   framework   decision   2003/577/JHA    
of   22   July   2003     on   the   execution   in   the  
European   Union   of   orders   freezing   property  
or  evidence  
FO   Freezing  Order    
FO  Proposal   Initiative   of   the   Governments   of   the   French  
Republic,   the   Kingdom   of   Sweden   and   the  
Kingdom  of  Belgium  for   the  adoption  by   the  
Council   of   a   Framework   Decision   on   the  
execution   in   the   European   Union   of   orders  
freezing  assets  or  evidence  
FRA      Forum  regit  actum  
KPK      Kodeks  Postępowania  Karnego  
LECrim   Ley  de  Enjuiciamiento  Criminal  
LOPJ   Ley  Orgánica  del  Poder  Judicial  
MLA   Mutual  Legal  Assistance  
MR   Mutual  Recognition  
MR  offences   Offences  listed  in  art.  2.2  FD  EAW  
PACE   Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  
Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10   Council   of   Europe,   Recommendation   No.   R  
(85)   10   of   the   Committee   of   Ministers   to  
Member   States   concerning   the   practical  
application   of   the   European   Convention   on  
mutual   assistance   in   criminal   matters   in  
respect  of  letters  rogatory  for  the  interception  
of  telecommunications  




RIPA   Regulation  of  Investigatory  Powers  Act  2000  
SIC   Schengen  Implementation  Convention  
Sv   Strafvordering  
TFEU   Treaty   on   the   Functioning   of   the   European  
Union  
UK   United  Kingdom  
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Executive  summary    
Background  to  the  study  
  
Any   effort   to   gather   evidence   may   prove   pointless   without   ensuring   its  
admissibility.  Despite  this  fact,  the  EU,  while  developing  instruments  for  smooth  
evidence-­‐‑gathering  in  criminal  matters,  is  not  taking  much  effort  to  enhance  its  
admissibility.  Thus  far,  the  EU  has  been  operating  under  the  assumption  that  the  
differences   between   national   procedures   can   be   accommodated   by   the   forum  
regit   actum   principle,   originally   developed   in   the   framework   of   traditional  
mutual   legal  assistance.  However,   the  simple  copying  and  pasting  of   the   forum  
regit   actum   principle   from   mutual   legal   assistance   to   mutual   recognition  
instruments  raises  numerous  doubts  in  terms  of  its  efficiency  and  its  compliance  
with   the   philosophy   of   mutual   recognition.   Moreover,   the   forum   regit   actum  
principle  is  not  capable  of  overcoming  problems  related  to  existing  evidence.  At  
the   same   time   the   lack   of   common   rules   on   admissibility   leaves   the   decision  
whether  or  not  to  recognise  a  piece  of  evidence  gathered  in  an  EU  cross-­‐‑border  
context   to   the  domestic   law  of   the  member   states   concerned.  This  may   lead   to  
situations   when,   given   the   differences   between   national   procedures,   evidence  
gathered   in  one  member  state  will  not  be  per   se   admissible   in  another  member  
state   because   the   way   the   information   was   obtained   does   not   fit   the   latter’s  
procedural  requirements.    
The   Lisbon   Treaty   offers   an   alternative   for   the   forum   regit   actum   principle,  
opening  the  possibility  to  adopt  minimum  rules  concerning,  among  other  things,  
the  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence.  Adoption  of  these  rules  would  mean  that,  
in  the  context  of  EU  cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  evidence  would  have  to  be  
gathered   according   to   commonly   agreed   minimum   standards,   complemented  
with  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  accordingly.  Hence,  the  main  goal  
of   this   research   is   to   verify   whether   it   is   feasible   to   achieve   common   EU  
minimum  standards  for  evidence-­‐‑gathering,  and  whether  compliance  with  these  
standards   could   finally   shape   the   as   yet   nonexistent   concept   of   the   mutual  
recognition  of  evidence  in  criminal  matters  in  the  EU.    
  
Scope  of  the  study    
  
This  research  deals  with  two  distinct  measures:  telephone  tapping  and  house  
search.   This   limitation   of   the   scope   of   the   study   follows   from   the   fact   that  
different   investigative   measures,   given   their   diverse   nature   and   the   different  
potential  violations  of  human  rights  that  they  may  cause,  will  potentially  require  
different,   measure-­‐‑specific   standards.   The   choice   of   telephone   tapping   and  





intrusive  character  which  means  they  deserve  special  focus,  including  at  the  EU  
level,   in   order   to   minimise   the   risk   of   abuses   following   from   cross-­‐‑border  
cooperation.  Second,  the  potentially  harmful  nature  of  both  measures  allows  one  
to   ask   comparable   research   questions   and   to   carry   out   a   joint   investigation  




In  order  to  overcome  evidentiary  issues  in  the  EU  it  is  necessary  to  combine  
various   methodological   techniques,   in   view   of   the   need   to   take   into   account  
diversities  between  legal  systems  across  the  EU,  the  current   instruments  which  
have  been   introduced   for   the  purposes  of   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation   in   criminal  
matters,   and  human   rights.  Therefore,   three  different   techniques   are   combined  
in  this  research:  a  comparative  study,  an  investigation  of  Council  of  Europe  and  
EU  legislation  and  policy  documents,  and  an  analysis  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  
ECHR.   The   comparative   study   consists   of   an   analysis   of   domestic   norms  
concerning   telephone   tapping   and  house   search   in   six   selected  member   states:  
England   and  Wales,   France,   Ireland,   the   Netherlands,   Poland   and   Spain.   The  
member   states   were   selected   with   regard   to   variety   of   legal   systems   and  
different   approaches   to   evidentiary   issues,   in   order   to   illustrate   the   potential  
problems   that  may   occur   in   the   field   of  mutual   admissibility   of   evidence.   The  
second  methodological  technique  comprises  an  analysis  of  legislation  and  policy  
documents   regarding   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation   in   criminal  matters,   developed  
both  within  the  EU  and  with  the  Council  of  Europe’s  cooperation.  The  outcomes  
of   this   analysis   help   in   understanding   the   extent   to   which  member   states   are  
willing   to   establish   rules   for   the   purposes   of   EU   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation.  
Finally,  due   to   the   fact   that  all  EU  member  states  are  signatories  of   the  ECHR,  
any  common  EU  minimum  standards  should  be  based  on  or,  at  least,  drafted  in  
line  with,  the  common  fundamental  rights  and  norms  developed  by  the  ECtHR.  
Consequently,  this  research  also  investigates  the  relevant  case-­‐‑law  of  the  Court.  
This   combination   of   methodological   techniques   proved   useful   firstly   in  
reporting   the   current   state   of   play   and   secondly   in   reporting   how   far  we   can  
move   towards   deriving   common   EU   minimum   standards   to   enhance   mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence.    
  
  
Diversity  between  the  member  states  
  
Significant   differences   still   exist   between   member   states   in   the   field   of  
evidence-­‐‑gathering.   These   differences,   which   follow   from   their   various   legal  
systems  and  approaches   to   evidentiary   issues,  may  have  a  negative   impact  on  
mutual  trust  between  member  states,  raise  questions  as  to  the  status  of  evidence  
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gathered   in   EU   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation,   and   hamper  mutual   admissibility   of  
evidence  across  the  EU.  The  most  striking  differences  which  may  cause  obstacles  
and,   therefore,   require   coming   to   common  minimum   rules,   were   identified   in  
the  following  fields:    
- rules  governing  evidence-­‐‑gathering  related  to  ratione  auctoritatis,  ratione  
materiae,  ratione  loci,  ratione  temporis  and  ratione  personae;     
- the   procedural   rights   related   to   the   respective   measures,   namely,   the  
right  to  be  notified  of  them  and  the  right  to  legal  remedies  against  their  
application;  
- approaches  to  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  irregularly.  
Moreover,  member  states  do  not  tend  to  rule  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence  
gathered   in   the  EU  cross-­‐‑border   context.  Together  with  a   lack  of   any   common  
rules   in   this   matter,   this   leaves   it   completely   unclear   how   to   assess   the  
lawfulness   of   the   way   that   evidence   was   gathered   abroad   and,   therefore,   the  
possibility  of  its  use  in  criminal  proceedings.    
  
  
Minimum   standards   to   enhance   per   se  
admissibility  of  evidence    
Minimum   standards   with   regard   to   rules   governing  
telephone  tapping  and  house  search    
  
Ratione  auctoritatis    
  
Both   telephone   tapping   and   house   search  may   seriously   affect   the   right   to  
respect   for   private   life.   Thus,   it   is   necessary   to   ensure   that   these  measures   are  
taken   in   accordance  with  principles  of  necessity   and  proportionality,   and  with  
adequate  protection  against  abuses  of  power.  One  of  the  guarantees  thereof  is  a  
designated  authority  responsible  for  granting  permission  for  both  measures.  The  
lack  of  common  EU  standards  in  this  matter  may  cause  obstacles  in  the  field  of  
mutual   admissibility   of   evidence,   since   different   member   states   empower  
different  authorities  to  order  the  measures.  Consequently,  evidence  gathered  in  
a  house  search  where  the  warrant  was  issued  by  a  prosecutor  may  be  questioned  
in  member   states  which   require   a   search  warrant   to   be   issued   by   a   judge   etc.  
That   obstacle   could   be   overcome   by   adopting   common   requirements   for  
competences  of  authorities  designated  to  issue  the  measures,  and  their  capability  
of  ensuring  protection  against  abuses  of  power.  In  other  words,  operating  under  
the   same   level  of  protection  against   arbitrary   interferences  has   the  potential   to  
enhance   mutual   trust   and,   consequently,   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence  
gathered  from  both  measures.  This  common  level  could  be  achieved  by  ensuring  
that  both  measures  are  reviewed  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  by  a  judicial  authority  or  





states  would  be  safe  to  assume  per  se  that,  irrespective  of  how  the  foreign  issuing  
authority   is   named,   it   ensures   commonly   agreed,  minimum   standards   against  
the   risk  of  abuses  of  power.  That  could  help  member  states   to  accept  evidence  




Currently  each  member  state  itself  sets  the  grounds  for  ordering  investigative  
measures   in   accordance   with   its   domestic   law.   This   results   in   a   variety   of  
provisions  which,  consequently,  may  hamper  smooth  evidence-­‐‑gathering  at  the  
EU  level.  Dilemmas  arise  especially  when  the  requested  measure  would  not  be  
available  in  a  similar  domestic  case  in  the  executing  state,  due  to  the  fact  that,  for  
example,   the   use   of   the   investigative   measure   is   restricted   to   certain  
preconditions  and  the  foreign  order  does  not  fit  these  national  requirements.  The  
materiae  issues  could  be  tackled  by  applying  the  concept  of  ‘alternative  use  of  the  
32  MR  offences  list’,  originally  developed  under  the  framework  decision  on  the  
European   evidence   warrant.   Introduction   of   this   approach   would   ensure   the  
mutual   admissibility   of   both   measures   in   cases   where   the   offence   being  
investigated   relates   to   one   of   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘Euro   crimes’.   Operating   under   an  
exhaustive   list   of   offences   would   free   member   states   from   context-­‐‑sensitive  
double  availability  of  the  measures  and  contribute  to  the  smooth  gathering  and  
use  of  evidence.  For  other  offences,  which  are  not   included   in   the  MR  offences  
list,   the   general   provisions   would   still   apply.   In   other   words,   in   cases   not  
concerning  the  MR  offences,  the  member  states  might  still  subject  the  execution  
to  the  domestic  admissibility  requirement.  
  
Ratione  loci    
  
Inconsistencies   of   locus   may   arise   when   execution   of   an   investigative  
measure   indicated   by   another  member   state   surpasses   the   ratione   loci   scope   of  
the   executing   state   because   the   locations   or   places   where   the  measure   can   be  
taken   or   ordered   are  more   limited   in   the   domestic   context.   Consequently,   for  
telephone   tapping,   it  may   be   the   case  when   the   location   of   the   telephone   is   a  
determining  factor,  e.g.  home,  office  or  publicly  available  telephones.  In  all  these  
cases   the   key   factor   is   the   location   of   the   telephone,   and  member   states   have  
different   measures   regarding   the   availability   of   this   measure   to   investigative  
agencies.  Therefore,  with  the  aim  of  overcoming  diversity  as  to  the  legitimacy  of  
the   measure,   it   is   recommended   that   member   states   clearly   permit   telephone  
tapping   targeted   by   location,   if   it   is   necessary   for   the   purposes   of   EU   cross-­‐‑
border  cooperation.  That  would  do  away  with  discussions  as  to  the  legitimacy  of  
the  measure  and  the  admissibility  of  any  evidence  gathered  therein.  With  regard  
to   house   search   it   is   necessary   to   consider   what   constitutes   a   ‘house’   in   the  
context  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  evidence-­‐‑gathering.  After  cross-­‐‑referencing  domestic  
approaches  with  the  EU  norms  and  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR,  it  transpires  that  
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the   common  understanding  of   ‘house’   in   this   context   is   based  on  a   reasonable  
expectation  of  privacy  and  on  the  inaccessibility  of  the  place  to  the  public.  This  
means   that   ‘house’   can   encompass,   inter   alia,   business   offices,   including   those  




Differences  between  member  states  as  to  temporis  concerns  may  also  hamper  
mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context.   In   cases   of   telephone   tapping   it  may   be  
problematic   if   the  period  of   time   for  which  permission   is   issued   surpasses   the  
ratione   temporis   scope   of   the   executing   state   because   the   time   limits   in   the  
executing   state   are   shorter   or   because   the   measure   is   subject   to   intermediate  
renewal  where   it   lasts   for   the   duration   ordered.  With   regard   to   house   search,  
problems  may  arise  from  the  time  of  the  search,  especially  searches  conducted  at  
night  and  at  ‘unreasonable  hours’.  It  thus  appears  that,  with  regard  to  telephone  
tapping,   mutual   trust   could   be   enhanced   by   member   states   adopting  
straightforward   rules   regarding   the   time   limits   of   the   measure,   namely,  
maximum   duration   and   conditions   for   its   renewal.   That   could   allow  member  
states  to  execute  orders  with  various  durations  of  the  measures,  even  if  different  
from   those   that  would  apply   in   a   similar  domestic   case.  With   regard   to  house  
search,  mutual  trust  could  be  taken  to  a  higher  level  by  member  states  ensuring  
that   searches   can   be   conducted   at   night   or   at   unreasonable   hours   only   in  
exceptional   cases   and   if   necessary   due   to   the   particular   circumstances   of   the  
case.   In   this   scenario   member   states   would   per   se   trust   that,   irrespective   of  
temporis   incompatibilities   between   their   respective   domestic   laws,   the  measure  
would  be  carried  out  according   to  commonly  agreed  minimum  standards,  and  
would  not  carry  a  risk  of  abuses  of  power.    
  
Ratione  personae    
  
The   ratione   personae   issues   in   EU   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation  may   arise  when  
evidentiary  measures  can  only  be  taken  in  member  states  for  a  limited  category  
of   persons   and   when   these   categories   vary   depending   on   the   member   state  
concerned,   or   when   domestic   provisions   provide   special   rules   relating   to   the  
gathering  of  evidence  from  specific  persons  or  professions.  This  may  relate,  for  
example,   to   persons   covered   by   immunities,   persons   obliged   not   to   disclose  
information  classified  as   ‘privileged’  or   ‘confidential’,  or  confidentiality   related  
to  some  professions  or  functions,  such  as  lawyers,  journalists  and  doctors.  Extra  
dilemmas   may   arise   with   regard   to   the   targeting   of   third   persons   by   the  
measures,   as   well   as   the   status   of   third   persons   affected   by   chance,   and  with  





The   issues   concerning   ratione   personae   cannot   be   fully   overcome   without  
common  understanding  of  privileges  and  immunities  which  constitute  grounds  
for  refusal  under  the  MR  instrument  and  represent  one  of  the  biggest  obstacles  
when  it  comes  to  EU  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation.  However,  given  the  fact  that  the  
EIO  Directive   explicitly   refers   to   legal,   journalistic   and  medical  privileges,   it   is  
necessary   to   consider  whether   common  EU  minimum   standards   is   feasible,   at  
least   with   regard   to   these   privileges,   especially   in   light   of   the   domestic  
provisions  which   also   give   special   consideration   to   the   professions   concerned.  
Accordingly,  with  regard  to  lawyers,  mutual  trust  between  member  states  could  
be   enhanced   by   introducing   clear   rules   regarding   the   inviolability   of   client-­‐‑
lawyer  confidentiality  and,  consequently,  the  inadmissibility  of  evidence  gained  
via   the   tapping   of   lawyers’   telephones   and   searches   of   law   firms   in  pursuit   of  
information   which   falls   within   the   scope   of   the   right   of   defence.   The   mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence  obtained  from  journalists  and  medical  specialists  could  
be  taken  to  a  higher  level  if  member  states  were  to  ensure  that  the  measures  are  
carried   out   only   if   necessary   in   the   circumstances   of   the   case   and   are  
proportionate   to   the   aim   being   pursued   and,  moreover,   that   the   disclosure   of  
protected  sources  is  limited  to  an  unavoidable  minimum.  It  would  be  left  to  the  
member   states   how   they   effectuate   these   requirements.   Mutual   trust   between  
member  states  could  also  be  enhanced  with  regard  to  the  third  parties  who  may  
be   affected   by   the   measures   by   providing   clear   rules   as   to   the   gathering,  
examination,  storage  and  use  of  the  data  concerning  third  parties  and  ‘necessary  
participants’.  Finally,  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  could  also  be  facilitated  if  
member   states   uniformly   permit   the   targeting   of   legal   persons   with   the  
measures.  However,  as  in  the  case  of  third  parties,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  
measures  to  be  accompanied  by  clear  rules  for  examining,  screening  and  sorting  
data  gathered  by  chance.  
  
Minimum   standards   with   regard   to   the   procedural   rights  
associated  with  telephone  tapping  and  house  search    
  
It   is   safe   to   say   the  mutual   recognition   of   evidence   gathered   through   such  
harmful   measures   as   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   can   only   work   if  
member   states   trust   per   se   that   evidence   obtained   abroad   has   not   violated   the  
fundamental   rights   of   the   persons   concerned.   Consequently,   it   is   necessary   to  
ensure   that   the   cross-­‐‑border   context   of   evidence-­‐‑gathering   neither   deprives  
individuals  of  their  rights  nor  reduces  the  accessibility  and  effectiveness  of  those  
rights.    
Among   fundamental   rights   enshrined   at   the   EU   level,   both   telephone  
tapping   and   house   search   strongly   affect   the   right   to   respect   for   private   life.  
Therefore,  in  order  to  minimise  the  risk  of  violations  of  this  right,  the  use  of  both  
measures   is   strictly   limited   and   may   apply   only,   inter   alia,   if   necessary   in   a  
democratic   society   in   the   interests   of   national   security,   for   the   prevention   of  
disorder   or   crime,   for   the   protection   of   the   rights   and   freedoms   of   others   etc.  
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Moreover,   both   the   ECHR   and   the   EU  Charter   grant   to   persons  whose   rights  
guaranteed   therein   are   violated   the   right   to   an   effective   remedy   in   order   to  
protect  and  pursue  these  rights.  In  the  case  of  the  right  to  respect  for  private  life,  
these   remedies   aim   at   verifying   the   use   of   measures   which   carry   a   risk   of  
violations  of  this  fundamental  right.  In  this  light  it  stands  out  that  ensuring  that  
the   cross-­‐‑border   context   does   not   deprive   the   person   whose   privacy   was  
infringed   of   the   possibility   to   challenge   the   measure   effectively   could  
significantly   contribute   to   enhancing  mutual   trust   and  mutual   admissibility   of  
evidence  across  the  EU.  
  
Right  to  legal  remedies    
  
The   mutual   trust   between   member   states   and,   consequently,   the   mutual  
admissibility   of   evidence,   could   be   enhanced   by   ensuring   that   member   states  
provide  effective  legal  remedies  against  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  for  
the  persons  whose  right  to  privacy  was  affected  by  the  measures  carried  out  in  a  
cross-­‐‑border   context.   This   effective   apparatus   would   give   any   person   whose  
right  to  respect  for  privacy  was  infringed  a  legal  remedy  to  challenge:    
- the   substantive   reasons   underlying   the   decision   to   obtain   evidence,  
including  whether  the  measures  are  necessary  and  proportionate;  
- the  manner  in  which  the  measure  was  issued  and  exercised.    
Accordingly,   depending   on   the   circumstances   of   the   case   and   person  
concerned,   these   remedies  may   vary   significantly   between  member   states   and  
apply,   inter   alia,   in   criminal,   civil   or   administrative   proceedings.   However,   it  
should  be  noted  that  if  the  legal  remedy  is  granted  to  the  entitled  person  and  it  is  
effective,   the  available  procedure   is  of   secondary   importance.  Operating  under  
this  standard  would  significantly  enhance  mutual  trust  between  member  states,  
even   though   effective   remedies   may   differ   between   member   states,   apply   in  
different   proceedings   and   entail   different   consequences.   What   is   of   utmost  
importance   is   that   persons   who   believe   their   fundamental   rights   have   been  
infringed  are  granted  an  effective  measure   to  enforce   their   rights,   and   that   the  
cross-­‐‑border  context  of  proceedings  does  not  hamper  them.  The  key  here  is  the  
‘effectiveness’   of   the   right   to   remedy,  which   can  be   ensured  differently  within  
the  legal  systems  across  the  EU.    
  
Right  to  notification  
  
The   right   to   notification   of   the   measures   plays   an   important   role   in  
enhancing   mutual   trust   between   member   states,   complementing   the   right   to  
legal   remedies   by   enabling   their   enforcement.   Consequently,   to   tackle  
procedural  rights  in  cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of  evidence  fully  and  completely,  it  
is   also   necessary   to   come   to   common  minimum   standards  with   regard   to   the  





achieved   by   member   states   ensuring   that   persons   entitled   to   legal   remedies  
against   the  measures   carried   out   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context   are   also   effectively  
informed   about   the   fact   the  measure  was   carried   out   and   that   a   legal   remedy  
against   its  exercise   is  available.   In   the  case  of  both  measures   it  would  be  up  to  
member  states  to  ensure  the  effective  performance  of  such  notification.  In  cases  
concerning  telephone  tapping,   it  could  be  effectuated  as  a  separate  decision,  or  
through   access   to   the   case   files,   depending   on   the   legal   system   and   way   of  
conducting  proceedings.  With  regard  to  house  search,  the  right  to  be  notified  of  
the  measure   could   consist   of   delivering  notification   (preferably  written)   of   the  
search,  which  explains  the  reason  for  the  search,  the  objects,  documents  or  data  
seized,  and  the  legal  remedies  available.  However,  member  states  could  provide  
other   ways   of   providing   the   notification,   as   long   as   it   ensures   detailed  
information   explaining   the   principles   and   scope   of   the   search,   sufficient   for  
effective  questioning  of  the  measure.  
 
Minimum   standards   for   admissibility   of  
irregularly  obtained  evidence    
  
Even  if  all  member  states  have  developed  complex  and  protective  domestic  
approaches   to   irregularly   obtained   evidence,   these   domestic   rules   are   not  
scrupulously   applied   when   it   comes   to   evidence   gathered   abroad.   First,   this  
follows  from  the   fact   that  member  states  usually   lack  domestic  rules  regarding  
the   admissibility   of   evidence   collected   abroad.   Second,   it   is   safe   to   say   that  
domestic   courts   are   usually   more   tolerant   and   flexible   in   their   approaches   to  
foreign  items  of  evidence.  The  lack  of  transparent  rules  concerning  admissibility  
of   irregular   evidence   may   lead   to   evidentiary-­‐‑laundering   and   violations   of  
fundamental   rights,   and   intensify   mutual   distrust   between   member   states.  
Therefore,   if  mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   in   criminal  matters   in   the  EU   is  
the  goal,  then  progress  towards  minimum  standards  on  the  basis  of  which  it  can  
be  decided  when   evidence  gathered   irregularly   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context   from  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search   will   be   per   se   inadmissible   or   non   per   se  
admissible   is   also   required.   Operating   under   minimum   standards   for  
admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   irregularly   could   consist   of   breaking   with  
both   locus   and   forum   standards   for   admissibility   of   irregular   evidence,   if  
gathered   in   the   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context,   and   basing   the   use   of   irregular  
evidence   on   commonly   agreed   standards   relating   to   fundamental   rights  
enshrined   in   the   ECHR   and   the   EU   Charter.   In   other   words,   the   decision  
whether   or   not   to   recognise   irregular   evidence   would   be   determined   by   the  
consequences  of  violation  of  a  particular  fundamental  right.  Due  to  the  fact  that  
telephone  tapping  and  house  search  are  linked  to  the  right  to  respect  for  private  
life,   these   minimum   rules   should   correspond   with   the   consequences   of  
violations  of  this  fundamental  right,  which  entail  per  se  inadmissibility  or  non  per  
se  admissibility  of  evidence.    
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Per  se  inadmissibility    
  
Thus  far,  neither  the  EU  nor  the  ECtHR  has  developed  any  exclusionary  rule  
of   absolute   character   other   than   that   relating   to   evidence   gathered   through  
torture.  The  case-­‐‑law  of  the  Court  makes  it  clear  that  violations  of  Art.  8  ECHR,  
to   which   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   belong,   do   not   entail   per   se  
inadmissibility   of   evidence   gathered   by   such  means.   None   of   the   existing   EU  
instruments   gives   cause   to   conclude   otherwise.   Moreover,   any   abuses   or  
breaches  committed   in   the  course  of   telephone   tapping  or  house  search  would  
not   have   such   a   significant   impact   on   their   probative   value,   as   would,   for  
instance,  torture  or  interrogation  in  the  absence  of  a  lawyer.  Therefore,  one  may  
conclude   there   is   a   lack   of   common   standards   on   per   se   inadmissibility   of  
evidence  in  cases  concerning  telephone  tapping  and  house  search.  
 
Non  per  se  admissibility    
  
Due  to  the  lack  of  minimum  standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility  the  next  step  
involves   the   determination   of   the   standards   on   the   basis   of   which   it   can   be  
decided   when   irregular   evidence   will   be   admissible   after   all.   Following   the  
ECtHR,  this  can  be  determined  by  using  a  balancing  test  to  verify:    
- whether  the  right  to  defence  was  preserved,  in  particular,  whether  
the   defendant   has   been   presented   with   adequate   opportunity   to  
invoke   defence   rights   in   challenging   the   manner   in   which   the  
evidence  was  obtained,  as  well  as  its  use  in  the  proceedings;  and  
- whether   the   conviction   was   not   based   solely   on   the   irregularly  
obtained  evidence.    
This  examination  will  aim  at  verifying  the  fairness  of  the  procedure,  and  the  
potentially   negative   impact   of   the   use   of   irregular   evidence   on   other  
fundamental  rights,   in  particular,   the  right  to  defence.  Depending  on  the  result  
of   this   test,  evidence  will  be  recognised  as  admissible  after  all,  or   inadmissible.  
Operating   under   these   standards   would   ensure   the   preservation   of   EU  
fundamental  rights  in  any  event,  and  the  mutual  effect  of  the  balancing  test  due  
to  the  fact  that  fundamental  rights  are  the  same  elsewhere.   
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I. Introduction 
1. Background  to  the  study    
Discussions   on   the   free   movement   and   use   of   evidence   throughout   the  
European  Union  (hereafter:  EU)  are  far  from  being  new.  The  concept  of  mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence,  set  up  in  the  Tampere  conclusions1,  has  already  been  
addressed   both   by   the   EU   institutions2   and   by   academic   scholars3.   However,  
                                                                                                                            
1  Evidence  lawfully  gathered  by  one  Member  State’s  authorities  should  be  admissible  before  the  courts  of  
other   Member   States,   taking   into   account   the   standards   that   apply   there,   European   Council,  
Presidency  Conclusions,  Tampere,  15  and  16  October  1999,  p.  36.    
2   See,   inter   alia,   2005   Hague   Programme,   point   3.3.1,   p.12;  COUNCIL   OF   THE   EUROPEAN  
UNION,  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  Council  and  Commission  Action  Plan  implementing  the  
Hague   Programme   on   strengthening   freedom,   security   and   justice   in   the   European   Union,  
12.8.2005,   OJ   C   198,   p.19;   2010   Stockholm   Programme,   point   3.3.1,   p.12;   EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION,   Communication   from   the   Commission   to   the   European   Parliament,   the  
Council,   the   European   Economic   and   Social   Committee   and   the  Committee   of   the  Regions   –  
Delivering   an   area   of   freedom,   security   and   justice   for   Europe'ʹs   citizens.   Action   Plan  
Implementing  the  Stockholm  Programme,  Brussels,  20.4.2010,  COM(2010)  171  final,  p.  5,18.  
3   See,   in   particular,   the   study   on   cross-­‐‑border   gathering   and   use   of   evidence   carried   out   at  
Ghent   University:   G.   VERMEULEN,   W.   DE   BONDT,   Y.   VAN   DAMME,   EU   cross-­‐‑border  
gathering  and  use  of  evidence  in  criminal  matters.  Towards  mutual  recognition  of  investigative  measures  
and   free  movement  of   evidence?,  Maklu  2010,  and:   I.  ARMADA,  The  European   Investigation  Order  
and  the  Lack  of  European  Standards  for  Gathering  Evidence.  Is  a  Fundamental  Rights-­‐‑Based  Refusal  the  
Solution?,   New   Journal   of   European   Criminal   Law,   Vol.   6,   Issue   1/2015;   L.   BACHMAIER  
WINTER,  European  investigation  order  for  obtaining  evidence  in  the  criminal  proceedings.  Study  of  the  
proposal   for   a   European   directive,   Zeitschrift   für   Internationale   Strafrechtsdogmatik,   9/2010;   C.  
CLAVERIE-­‐‑ROUSSET,  The  admissibility  of  evidence  in  criminal  proceedings  between  European  Union  
Member   States,   European   Criminal   Law   Review   11/2013;   S.   DEPAUW,   A   European   Evidence  
(Air)Space?  Taking  Cross-­‐‑Border  Legal  Admissibility  of  Forensic  Evidence  to  a  Higher  Level,  European  
Criminal  Law  Review,  1/2016;    C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility  of  Evidence  Obtained  
from  Abroad   into  Criminal  Proceedings  –  The   Interpretation   of  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Treaties   and  
Use   of   Evidence   Irregularly   Obtained,   European   Journal   of   Crime,   Criminal   Law   and   Criminal  
Justice  1996,  Vol.  4,  Issue  2;  S.  GLESS,  Free  movement  of  evidence  in  Europe,  [in:]  El  derecho  procesal  
penal  en  la  Unión  Europea.  Tendencias  actuals  y  perspectivas  de  futuro,  T.A.  DEU,  F.G.  INCHAUSTI,  
M.C.   HERNEN,   Madrid   2006;   C.   HEARD,   D.   MANSELL,   The   European   Investigation   Order.  
Changing   the   Face   of   Evidence-­‐‑   Gathering   in   EU   Cross-­‐‑Border   Cases,   New   Journal   of   European  
Criminal   Law,   Vol.   2,   Issue   4(2011);   C.   JOUBERT,   Judicial   Control   of   Foreign   Evidence   in  
Comparative   Perspective,   Amsterdam   2005;   L.   KLIMEK,   Free   movement   of   evidence   in   criminal  
matters  in  the  EU,  The  Lawyer  Quarterly  4/2012;  H.  KUCZYŃSKA,  Wspólny  obszar  postępowania  
karnego   w   prawie   Unii   Europejskiej,  Warszawa   2008,   p.   120-­‐‑150;   H.   KUCZYŃSKA,  Zagadnienia  
dopuszczalności  materiału   dowodowego  w   sprawach   karnych  na   obszarze  Unii  Europejskiej,   Przegląd  
Prawa  Europejskiego   i  Międzynarodowego,  1   (28)  2012;  A.  LACH,  Europejska  pomoc  prawna  w  
sprawach  karnych,  Toruń  2008;  A.  LACH,  Transnational  Gathering  of  Evidence  in  Criminal  Cases  in  
the   EU   de   lege   lata   and   de   lege   ferenda,   EUCRIM   3/2009;   A.   MANGIARACINA,   A   New  
Controversial  Scenario  in  the  Gathering  of  Evidence  at  the  European  Level.  The  Proposal  for  a  Directive  
on   the   European   Investigative   Order,   Utrech   Law   Review,   Vol.   10,   Issue   1;   B.   NITA-­‐‑
ŚWIATŁOWSKA,   Wykorzystywanie   dowodów   pozyskanych   za   granicą   [in:]   Pozaprocesowe  
pozyskiwanie  dowodów  i  ich  wykorzystanie  w  procesie  karnym,  P.  HOFMAŃSKI,  P.  CZARNECKI,  D.  
SZUMIŁO-­‐‑KULCZYCKA  (eds.),  C.H.  Beck  2015;  S.  RUGGERI   (ed.),  Transnational  Evidence  and  




despite   the   fact   that   the   concept   of   the  mutual   recognition   of   evidence   in   the  
Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and   Justice   is  one  of   the   top  demands  coming   from  
Brussels4,   the   EU   still   lacks   rules   which   directly   address   admissibility   of  
evidence  gathered  or  transferred  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context5.  Recent  steps  in  
the   evidentiary   field,   such   as   the   framework   decision   on   freezing   order  
(hereafter:  FD  FO),   the   framework  decision  on   the  European  evidence  warrant  
(hereafter:   FD   EEW),   or   the   Directive   regarding   the   European   Investigation  
Order  (hereafter:  EIO  Directive),  are  aimed  at   facilitating  evidence-­‐‑gathering  in  
the  EU,  and  do  not  make  much  of  an  effort  to  enhance  its  admissibility.    
Given   the   absence   of   common   EU   rules,   evidence   in   the   EU   cross-­‐‑border  
context   is   still   gathered   in   accordance   with   the   domestic   regulations   of   the  
member   states   concerned,   which   may   significantly   differ   from   one   system   to  
another6.   As   a   result   of   the   incompatibilities   between   national   procedures,   in  
some   cases   evidence   gathered   in   one  member   state   cannot   be   used   in   another  
member   state   because   the   way   the   information   was   obtained   does   not   fit   the  
national  procedural  requirements7.  These  incompatibilities  may  relate,  inter  alia,  
to   the  authorities   involved  in  evidentiary  proceedings,   the  allowance  of  certain  
investigative  techniques,  the  specific  requirements  for  evidence-­‐‑taking,  the  scope  
of  targeted  persons,  procedural  rights  associated  with  evidentiary  measures  etc.  
Extra   dilemmas  may   rise  with   regard   to   the  mutual   admissibility   of   evidence  
gathered  irregularly.  Due  to  the  fact  that  this  issue  is  regulated  differently  across  
the  domestic  legislation  of  member  states,  the  lack  of  a  common  approach  in  this  
matter  may   lead   to  evidential   ‘process-­‐‑laundering’8  or   forum  shopping9  within  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Multicultural  Inquiries  in  Europe,  Springer  2014;  S.  PEERS,  The  proposed  European  Investigation  
Order:  Assault  on  human  rights  and  national  sovereignty,  <www.  statewatch.org>;  A.  RYAN,  
Towards  a  System  of  European  Criminal   Justice.  The  problem  of   admissibility  of   evidence,  Routledge  
2014;  J.  R.  SPENCER,  The  Concept  of  ‘European  Evidence’,  ERA  Forum  2003,  Volume  4,  Issue  2;  J.  
R.   SPENCER,   The   Problems   of   Trans-­‐‑border   Evidence   and   European   Initiatives   to   Resolve   Them,  
Cambridge  Yearbook   of   European  Legal   Studies,   2007/9;  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free   gathering   and  
movement  of  evidence  in  criminal  matters  in  the  EU.  Thinking  beyond  borders,  striving  for  balance,   in  
search  of  coherence,  Maklu  2011.  
4  S.  GLESS,  Free  movement…,  p.  122,  L.  KLIMEK,  Free  movement…,  p.  251.    
5   Save   for   the   Convention   on   mutual   assistance   and   cooperation   between   customs  
administrations,   23.01.1998,   OJ   C   24/2.   Its   art.   14   reads:   Findings,   certificates,   information,  
documents,  certified  true  copies  and  other  papers  obtained  in  accordance  with  their  national  law  by  
officers   of   the   requested   authority   and   transmitted   to   the   applicant   authority   in   the   cases   of   assistance  
provided  for  in  Articles  10  to  12  may  be  used  as  evidence  in  accordance  with  national  law  by  the  
competent  bodies  of  the  Member  State  where  the  applicant  authority  is  based.  Accordingly,  the  
instrument  provides  an  opening  towards  per  se  admissibility  of  gathered  items.    
6   See:  M.   DANIELE,   Evidence   Gathering   in   the   Realm   of   the   European   Investigation   Order.   From  
National  Rules  to  Global  Principles,  New  Journal  of  European  Criminal  Law,  Vol.  6,  Issue  2,  2015,  
p.   181-­‐‑182;   S.   GLESS,  Transnational   Cooperation   in   Criminal  Matters   and   the   Guarantee   of   a   Fair  
Trial:  Approaches  to  a  General  Principle,  Utrecht  Law  Review,  Vol.  9,  Issue  4  (2013),  p.  95  et  seq.  
7  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  41-­‐‑42.  
8  This   terms  refers   to   the  situation  where  evidence  which   is   illegally  obtained   in  one  member  
state  is  ‘laundered’  through  the  admissibility  rules  of  a  foreign  jurisdiction,  where  the  standard  
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the   EU.   The   issues   listed   above,   together   with   the   lack   of   common   EU   rules,  
carry  a  risk  that  the  entire  effort  towards  the  free  gathering  of  evidence,  without  
rules  enhancing  its  admissibility,  may  be  rendered  superfluous10.  Therefore,  this  
research  is  dedicated  to  the  question  of  how  to  enhance  the  mutual  admissibility  
of  evidence  that  travels  across  the  borders  within  the  EU.  
  
2. The   state   of   play:   Criticism   of   the   FRA  
principle    
  
Thus   far,   the   EU   still   operates   under   the   assumption   that   domestic  
incompatibilities   between   national   rules   for   evidence-­‐‑taking   may   be  
accommodated   by   the   forum   regit   actum   principle   (hereafter:   FRA),   which   has  
governed  EU  cooperation  for  evidence-­‐‑gathering  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  
2000   EU   MLA   Convention11.   According   to   this   principle,   the   member   state  
receiving   a  mutual   legal   assistance   request  must   in   principle   comply  with   the  
formalities  and  procedures  expressly  indicated  by  the  requesting  member  state,  
unless  they  cause  incompatibilities  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  law  of  
the  executing  member  state12.  This  principle  has  been  subsequently  incorporated  
from  mutual  legal  assistance  (hereafter:  MLA)  to  mutual  recognition  (hereafter:  
MR)  instruments,  and  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  system  of  gathering  of  evidence  still  
relies  on  its  provisions13.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of   admissibility   is   lower;   see   in  more   detail:   C.   GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The   Admissibility…,  
p.113-­‐‑114.  
9  S.  GLESS,  Transnational  Cooperation….,  p.  97-­‐‑98.  
10  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  41.    
11  See  art.  4.1  of  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention:  Where  mutual  assistance   is  afforded,   the  requested  
Member   State   shall   comply  with   the   formalities   and   procedures   expressly   indicated   by   the   requesting  
Member   State,   unless   otherwise   provided   in   this   Convention   and   provided   that   such   formalities   and  
procedures  are  not  contrary  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  law  in  the  requested  Member  State;  and  the  
explanatory   comments   associated   thereto:   Paragraph   1   lays   down   the   general   principle   that   a  
requested  Member  State  which   is  executing  a  request  must  comply  with  the   formalities  and  procedures  
expressly  indicated  by  the  requesting  Member  State.  The  reason  for  this  provision  is  to  facilitate  the  use  of  
the   information   gathered   by   mutual   assistance   as   evidence   in   the   subsequent   proceedings   in   the  
requesting  Member  State.  The  words  ‘formalities  and  procedures’  should  be  interpreted  in  a  broad  sense  
and  may  include,  for  example,  the  situation  where  a  request  indicates  that  a  representative  of  the  judicial  
authorities   of   the   requesting  Member   State   or   defence   representative   must   be   permitted   to   attend   the  
taking  of  evidence  from  a  witness.  On  account  of  the  burden  this  might  place  on  the  requested  Member  
State,   the   requesting   Member   State   should   set   out   only   those   formalities   and   procedures   which   are  
indispensable  for  its  investigations,  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  Explanatory  Report,  p.  11.  See  also:  
G.   VERMEULEN,   EU   Conventions   enhancing   and   updating   traditional   mechanisms   for   judicial  
cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  Revue  Internationale  de  Droit  Pénal,  2006/1,  Vol.  77,  p.  82-­‐‑83.  
12  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  42.  It  is  noteworthy,  that  the  FRA  principle  replaced  the  
locus   regit   actum   principle,  which   provides   that   the   location  where   the   investigative  measure  
takes  place  is  a  decisive  element  in  determining  the  applicable  law.  
13  Art.  5.1  FD  FO;  art.  12  FD  EEW;  art.  9.2  EIO  Directive.  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  
The   European   Union   Convention   on   mutual   assistance   in   criminal   matters   [in:]   Vers   un   espace  




However,  the  simple  copying  and  pasting  of  the  FRA  principle  from  MLA  to  
MR   instruments   raises   doubts   about   its   compliance   with   the   philosophy   of  
mutual  recognition14  and  capability  of  accommodating  admissibility  concerns  in  
the   EU.   In   the   academic   literature   the   following   conceptual   flaws   and  
weaknesses  of  FRA  have  been  reported:    
- FRA   does   not   commit   to   accepting   the   admissibility   of   evidence  
gathered   accordingly,   which   means   that   a   request   to   take   certain  
formalities   or   procedures   into   account   does   not   ensure   that   the   effort  
applied  in  gathering  evidence  will  be  rewarded  with  admissibility;      
- it  has  very  limited  effect  on  the  level  of  admissibility  due  to  the  fact  that  
it   applies   only   in   a   one-­‐‑on-­‐‑one   relationship   and   has   no   potential   to  
ensure  admissibility  within  the  entirety  of  the  EU;    
- it  lacks  transparent  rules  in  terms  of  the  lawfulness  of  the  way  evidence  
is  gathered;  
- the  principle  of  FRA  may  apply  only   in   the  case  of  gathered  evidence,  
meaning  that  already  existing  evidence  cannot  fall  within  its  scope15.  
All   the   above   mentioned   weaknesses   prove   that   the   FRA   principle   is   not  
capable  of  maximising  the  chances  of  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered   in   the  
EU   cross-­‐‑border   context.   This   pessimistic   conclusion   gives   rise   to   the   question  
whether   there  are  other  means   to   facilitate  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence   in  
criminal  matters  in  the  EU.    
 
 
3. Alternative:   Common   EU  minimum   standards  
for  evidence-­‐‑gathering  
  
TFEU   offers   an   alternative   to   the   FRA  principle,   opening   the   possibility   to  
adopt  minimum  rules  concerning,  among  other  things,  the  mutual  admissibility  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
judiciaire   pénal   européen,   G.   DE   KERCKHOVE,   A.   WEYEMBERGH,   E.   GUIGOU,   M.  
VERWILGHEN,  A.  VITORINO  (eds.),  Brussels  2000,  p.  186.  
14  From  an  academic  perspective,  allowing  the  issuing  or  requesting  member  state  to  order  formalities  to  
be   taken   into   account,   is   highly   controversial   in   a   pure  mutual   recognition   philosophy   (…)  After   all,  
mutual   recognition   should   not   only   be   looked   at   from   the   perspective   of   the   executing   member   state  
and  its  obligation  to  execute  an  order,  but  also  from  the  perspective  of  the  issuing  member  state  to  accept  
(i.e.   mutually   recognise)   the   way   the   request   is   being   executed   in   the   other   member   state,   W.   DE  
BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  movement  of  scientific  expert  evidence  in  criminal  matters   [in:]  EU  
Criminal  Justice,  Financial  and  Economic  Crime:  new  perspectives,  M.  COOLS  et  al.,  Maklu  2011,  p.  
71-­‐‑72;  see  also:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  
p.  11;  I.  ARMADA,  The  European  Investigation  Order  ...,  p.  20;  M.  DANIELE,  Evidence  Gathering  …  
p.  182.    
15  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  42-­‐‑43;  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  
(eds.),   Rethinking   international   cooperation   in   criminal   matters   in   the   EU.   Moving   beyond   actors,  
bringing  logic  back,  footed  in  reality,  Maklu  2012,  p.  446-­‐‑447.    
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of   evidence16.   It  means   that,  using  art.   82.2  TFEU  as   a   legal  basis,   there   can  be  
adopted  minimum  standards  for  the  gathering  of  evidence  complemented  with  
per   se   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   accordingly,   as   well   as   minimum  
standards  for  admissibility  of  evidence  obtained  irregularly.  
It   is   noteworthy   that   the   concept   of   common   minimum   standards   for  
evidence-­‐‑gathering   has   been   already   adverted   to   both   by   the   EU   institutions17  
and  in  the  academic  literature18.  Thus  far,  progress  towards  common  standards  
has   been  made   with   regard   to   the   following  measures:   expert   evidence19   and  
forensic  evidence20.    
Undoubtedly,  coming  to  these  standards  will  be  challenging.  Firstly,  it  would  
require   balancing   of   the   search   for   common   standards   to   overcome   national  
diversities,  on  the  one  hand,  and  accepting  the  fact  of  international  diversity  on  
the   other.   Secondly,   it   would   require   that   member   states   introduce   these  
standards   into   domestic   legislation   and   use   them   for   the   purposes   of   EU  
                                                                                                                            
16  Art.   82.2  TFEU:   To   the   extent  necessary   to   facilitate  mutual   recognition   of   judgments   and   judicial  
decisions   and  police   and   judicial   cooperation   in   criminal  matters   having   a   cross-­‐‑border   dimension,   the  
European   Parliament   and   the   Council   may,   by   means   of   directives   adopted   in   accordance   with   the  
ordinary   legislative   procedure,   establish   minimum   rules.   Such   rules   shall   take   into   account   the  
differences  between  the  legal  traditions  and  systems  of  the  Member  States.  They  shall  concern:  (a)  mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence  between  Member  States  (…).  
17   See:   EUROPEAN   COMMISSION,   Green   paper   on   obtaining   evidence   in   criminal   matters  
from   one   Member   State   to   another   and   securing   its   admissibility,   Brussels,   11.11.2009,  
COM(2009)   624   final,   which   reads:   There   is   therefore   a   risk   that   the   existing   rules   on   obtaining  
evidence  in  criminal  matters  will  only  function  effectively  between  Member  States  with  similar  national  
standards   for  gathering  evidence   (…)  The  best  solution  to  this  problem  would  seem  to   lie   in  the  
adoption  of  common  standards  for  gathering  evidence  in  criminal  matters,  p.  5-­‐‑6;  EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION,   Communication   from   the   Commission   to   the   Council   and   the   European  
Parliament:  Communication  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  judicial  decisions  in  criminal  matters  
and  the  strengthening  of  mutual  trust  between  Member  States,  19.5.2005,COM  (2005)  195  final,  
point   3.1.1.3,   p.   7;   EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  Communication   from   the  Commission   to   the  
European  Parliament   and   the  Council   –  An   area   of   freedom,   security   and   justice   serving   the  
citizen,  Brussels,  10.6.2009,  COM  (2009)  262  final,  point  4.4.2,  p.17;  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  
Economic   and   Social   Committee   and   the   Committee   of   the   Regions   –   Delivering   an   area   of  
freedom,   security   and   justice   for   Europe'ʹs   citizens.  Action   Plan   Implementing   the   Stockholm  
Programme,  Brussels  20.4.2010,  COM(2010)  171  final,  p.  18.  
18   See:   S.  ALLEGREZZA,  Critical  Remarks   on   the  Green  Paper   on  Obtaining  Evidence   in  Criminal  
Matters   from   one   Member   State   to   another   and   Securing   its   Admissibility,   Zeitschrift   für  
Internationale  Strafrechtsdogmatik  9/2010,  p.  574;  W.  DE  BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  First  things  
first.   Characterising   mutual   recognition   in   criminal   matters   [in:]   M.   COOLS   et   al.,   EU   Criminal  
Justice,   Financial   and   Economic   Crime:   new   perspectives,   Maklu   2011,   p.   31;  W.   DE   BONDT,   G.  
VERMEULEN,  Free  movement  of  scientific…,  p.  71-­‐‑72;  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  44-­‐‑45;  
J.R.  SPENCER,  The  Problems…,  p.  479-­‐‑480;  J.R.  SPENCER,  The  Green  Paper  on  obtaining  evidence  
from   one  Member  State   to   another   and   securing   its   admissibility:   the  Reaction   of   one  British  Lawyer,  
Zeitschrift   fu ̈r   internationale   Strafrechtsdogmatik   9/2010,   p.   605-­‐‑606;   G.VERNIMMEN-­‐‑VAN  
TIGGELEN,   L.   SURANO,  Analysis   of   the   future   of   mutual   recognition   in   criminal   matters   in   the  
European  Union.  Final  Report,  Brussels  2008,  p.  34.    
19  W.  DE  BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  movement  of  scientific….,  p.  69-­‐‑79.    
20  S.  DEPAUW,  A  European  Evidence  (Air)Space…,  p.  82-­‐‑98.  




cooperation  in  criminal  matters.  Thirdly,  it  would  mean  breaking  with  the  FRA  
principle  and  relying  on  a  new  system  of  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  in  
the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context,  which  may  be  difficult   for  practitioners   to  accept.  
Despite  these  difficulties,  the  idea  of  common  EU  minimum  standards  is  worth  
exploring  for  the  following  reasons.  
First  of  all,  the  concept  of  common  EU  minimum  standards  fully  corresponds  
with   the   pure   mutual   recognition   philosophy.   Operating   under   commonly  
agreed   standards   could   significantly   contribute   to   mutual   recognition   of  
evidence   by   enhancing  mutual   trust   between  member   states   as   to   the  way   of  
evidence-­‐‑gathering.   Secondly,   it   would   make   it   easier   for   an   issuing   state   to  
accept  the  way  that  the  evidence  is  being  taken  in  the  executing  state,  and  that  
could   finally   result   in   mutual   recognition   of   evidence.   Moreover,   minimum  
standards  have  the  potential  to  accommodate  the  weaknesses  of  FRA  reported  in  
the  preceding  paragraph:  
- gathering   of   evidence   under   commonly   agreed   minimum   standards  
would   be   complemented  with   per   se   admissibility,  which   resolves   the  
problem   of   uncertainty   of   FRA   and   facilitates   cooperation   since   the  
rules  would  not  be  variable  depending  on  the  member  states  concerned;  
- due  to  the  fact  that  the  common  standards  would  be  applicable  within  
the  entirety  of   the  EU,   the  evidence  gathered  accordingly  would  enjoy  
per   se   admissibility   status   in   all  member   states,   not   only   in   one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  
relations  as  in  the  case  of  FRA;  
- minimum   standards  would   consist   of   transparent   rules   as   to   the  way  
the  evidence   is  gathered,  which  can  do  away  with  dilemmas  as   to   the  
lawfulness  of  the  evidence-­‐‑taking  and  eliminate  evidentiary-­‐‑laundering;  
- if   applicable   also   in   a  merely   domestic   situation,  minimum   standards  
could  also  resolve  the  issue  of  evidence  gathered  in  a  domestic  context  
and  transferred  upon  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation.  Art.  82.2  TFEU  permits  
the   introduction   of   minimum   standards   where   such   standards   are  
necessary   to   facilitate   EU   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation,  which  means   that  
evidence  gathered  in  a  merely  domestic  context  falls  outside  this  scope.  
However,  the  current  adoption  of  a  number  of  instruments  in  criminal  
procedure   shows   that  member   states   are   not   too   strict   in   interpreting  
Art.  82.2  TFEU  and  adopt  minimum  rules   that  are  applicable  also   in  a  
merely  domestic  context21.  Applying  minimum  standards  to  evidentiary  
measures   in   the   domestic   context   would   also   facilitate   the   use   of   the  
EIO   Directive,   which   regulates   the   transfer   of   already   existing  
evidence22.   Otherwise,   there   would   be   a   frustrating   distinction   in   the  
admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   and   transferred   in   the   EU   cross-­‐‑
border  context.    
  
                                                                                                                            
21  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free  gathering…,  p.  45-­‐‑47.  
22  See  art.  1  of  the  EIO  Directive:  The  EIO  may  also  be  issued  for  obtaining  evidence  that  is  already  in  
the  possession  of  the  competent  authorities  of  the  executing  State.    
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Another   added   value   of   adopting   common  minimum   standards   is   the   fact  
that   operating   under   these   standards   could   also   maximise   procedural  
guarantees   for   persons   involved   in   evidentiary  measures23.  Hence,   besides   the  
impact   on   admissibility   issues,  minimum   standards   could   also   contribute   to   a  
higher  level  of  protection  for  individuals.  
When  appreciating  the  concept  of  minimum  standards  for  evidence-­‐‑taking  it  
is  also  necessary  to  verify  its  political  feasibility.  As  the  current  practice  shows,  
member  states  are  willing  to  adopt  rules  concerning  the  major  procedural  issues  
associated  with  trans-­‐‑border  cooperation.  Thus  far,  the  EU  has  adopted  several  
directives   introducing   common   standards   on   various   aspects   of   the   criminal  
process24   and   still   carries   out   other   projects   in   this   matter25.   These   initiatives  
provide  for  numerous  rules  on  procedure,  containing  guidelines  on  how  certain  
acts,   parts   or   phases   of   criminal   proceedings   shall   be   conducted26.   It   is  
noteworthy  that,  with  regard  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  for  evidence-­‐‑
gathering,   the   research   on   cross-­‐‑border   gathering   of   evidence   within   the   EU  
shows  that  many  member  states  are  in  favour  of  this  concept27.  
                                                                                                                            
23   These   issues   were   stirred   up   after   the   adoption   of   the   EIO   Directive,   see   inter   alia:  
EUROPEAN  UNION  AGENCY  FOR  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS,  Opinion  of  the  European  Union  
Agency   for   Fundamental   Rights   on   the   draft   Directive   regarding   the   European   Investigation   Order,  
Vienna  2011;  D.  SAYERS,  The  European   Investigation  Order-­‐‑travelling  without   a   'ʹroadmap'ʹ,  CEPS  
Liberty  and  Security  in  Europe,  Brussels  2011.  
24  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Directive  2010/64/EU  
on   the   right   to   interpretation   and   translation   in   criminal   proceedings,   26.10.2010,  OJ   L   280/1;  
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Directive   2012/13/EU  
on   the   right   to   information   in   criminal   proceedings,   1.6.2012,OJ   L   142/1;   EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT,   COUNCIL   OF   THE   EUROPEAN   UNION,   Directive   2012/29/EU   of   the  
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  October  2012  establishing  minimum  standards  on  
the   rights,   support   and   protection   of   victims   of   crime,   and   replacing   Council   Framework  
Decision   2001/220/JHA,   14.11.2012,   OJ   L   315/1;   EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT,   COUNCIL   OF  
THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Directive  2013/48/EU  on  the  right  of  access  to  a  lawyer  in  criminal  
proceedings  and  in  European  arrest  warrant  proceedings,  and  on  the  right  to  have  a  third  party  
informed  upon  deprivation  of  liberty  and  to  communicate  with  third  persons  and  with  consular  
authorities   while   deprived   of   liberty,   6.11.2013,   OJ   L   294/1;   EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT,  
COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Directive  (EU)  2016/343  of  the  European  Parliament  
and  of  the  Council  on  the  strengthening  of  certain  aspects  of  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  
of  the  right  to  be  present  at  the  trial  in  criminal  proceedings,  9.3.2016,  OJ  L  61/1.  
25  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  procedural  safeguards  for  children  
suspected   or   accused   in   criminal   proceedings,   27.11.2013,   COM(2013),   822/2;   EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION,   Proposal   for   a   Directive   on   provisional   legal   aid   for   suspected   or   accused  
persons  deprived  of   liberty  and   legal  aid   in  European  arrest  warrant  proceedings,  27.11.2013,  
COM(2013)824;   EUROPEAN   COMMISSION,   Draft   Recommendations   on   procedural  
safeguards   for   vulnerable   persons   suspected   or   accused   in   criminal   proceedings,   C(2013)  
8178/2.  
26  M.  CAIANIELLO,  To  Sanction  (or  not  to  Sanction)  Procedural  Flaws  at  EU  Level?  A  Step  forward  
in  the  Creation  of  an  EU  Criminal  Process,  European  Journal  of  Crime,  Criminal  Law  and  Criminal  
Justice,  No.  22  (2014),  p.  317-­‐‑318.  
27  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  104-­‐‑105.  




Having  appreciated  the  idea  of  common  minimum  standards,  the  next  steps  
undertaken   in   this   research   involve   an   in-­‐‑depth   study   on   the   content   of   these  
standards.  Therefore,  the  main  objective  of  this  research  is  to  find  out  whether,  
in   view   of   enhancing  mutual   admissibility   of   evidence,   it   is   feasible   to   devise  
various  types  of  common  EU  minimum  standards.  
  
4. Scope  of  the  study  and  limitations    
  
The   study   deals  with   two   distinct  measures:   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search.   This   limitation   of   the   scope   of   the   study   follows   from   the   fact   that  
different   investigative   measures,   given   their   diverse   nature   and   the   potential  
abuses   that   they   may   cause,   will   therefore   also   require   different,   measure-­‐‑
specific   minimum   standards.   Consequently,   separate   studies   were   carried   out  
with  regard  to  various  types  of  evidence.    
It   is   not   the   objective   of   this   study   to   deal  with   all   varieties   of   evidentiary  
measures.  Telephone  tapping  and  house  search  were  selected  as  subjects  for  this  
research   for   the   following   reasons.   Firstly,   both   measures   are   of   a   highly  
intrusive  character  which  means  they  deserve  special  focus,  including  at  the  EU  
level,   in   order   to   minimise   the   risk   of   abuses   following   from   cross-­‐‑border  
cooperation.   Secondly,   the   potentially   harmful   nature   of   the   measures   allows  
one   to   assume   that   an   analysis   of  minimum   standards  will   be   conducted   in   a  
similar  fashion  and  might  result  in  identical  conclusions.    
It   is   worth   highlighting   that   the   analysis   focuses   on   classic   forms   of   both  
measures  and  does  not  refer  to  the  interception  of  Internet  communications,  on-­‐‑
line  searches  of  computers  or  any  electronic  methods  of  investigation.  That  is  a  
deliberate   choice,   because   dealing  with   these   concerns   –   even   if   linked   to   the  
main  focus  of  this  research  –  at  many  points  may  require  separate  investigation  
and,  potentially,  a   technical  background.  Moreover,   it   is   still  not  clear  whether  
“e-­‐‑gathering”   of   evidence   should   be   governed   by   means   of   already   existing  
measures,   or  whether   it   deserves  modified   versions   of   investigative  measures  
accompanied  by  certain  procedural  requirements  and  guarantees.    
It  is  also  necessary  to  delineate  that  this  research  refers  to  evidence  gathered  
with  respect  to  criminal  proceedings  by  judicial  authorities,  and  does  not  cover  
the   aspects   of   evidence   gathered   by   intelligence   actors   from   surveillance   acts.  
This   limitation   follows   from   the   fact   that   the   gathering   and   use   in   criminal  
proceedings  of  evidence  gathered  by  intelligence  is  controversial  not  only  in  the  
EU,  but  also  in  member  states.  Therefore,  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  issue  and  
legal  acts  regulating  it,  it  deserves  a  separate  analysis  that  falls  outside  the  scope  
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5. Goal  of  the  study    
  
The  main  objective  of  the  study  is  to  find  out  whether,  in  view  of  enhancing  
mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search,   it   is   feasible   to   arrive   at   various   types   of   common   EU   minimum  
standards:  
- minimum  standards  to  enhance  the  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence.  To  
that  end,  it  is  examined  whether  it  is  feasible  to  come  to  minimum  rules  
for  telephone  tapping  and  house  search,  in  particular,    
a) as  far  as  the  scope  of  both  measures  is  concerned  ratione  auctoritatis,  
ratione  materiae,  ratione  loci,  ratione  temporis  and  ratione  personae;  and  
b) as  far  as  the  procedural  rights  related  to  the  respective  measures  are  
concerned,  namely,  the  right  to  be  notified  of  them  and  the  right  to  
legal  remedies  against  the  exercise  of  them.  
- minimum   standards   with   regard   to   the   admissibility   of   evidence  
obtained   irregularly,   in   casu   collected   through   telephone   tapping   or  
house  search  respectively,  divided  into:  
a) common  minimum  standards  for  non  per  se  admissibility;  
b) common  minimum  standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility.  
  
Therefore,   through   a   double   case   study   of   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search,   this   study   examines   whether   the   adoption   of   the   standards   reported  
above  is  feasible  and  whether  compliance  with  these  minimum  standards  would  
finally   shape   the   so   far   nonexistent   concept   of   the   free  movement   and  mutual  
recognition  of  evidence  in  criminal  matters  in  the  EU.  
  
6. Central  research  questions  
  
The  study  was  conducted   in  order   to   find  answers   to   three  central  research  
questions:  
- Is   it   feasible   to   come   to   common   EU  minimum   standards   in   view   of  
enhancing   per   se   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  (per  se  admissibility)?  
- Is  it  feasible  to  come  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  on  the  basis  of  
which   it   can   be   decided   when   irregular   evidence   collected   through  
telephone  tapping  or  house  search  respectively,  which  obviously  cannot  
constitute   per   se   admissible   evidence,  will   be   admissible   after   all   (non  
per  se  admissibility)?  
- Is  it  feasible  to  come  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  on  the  basis  of  
which   it   can   be   decided   when   irregular   evidence   collected   through  
telephone  tapping  or  house  search  will  be  inadmissible  in  any  event  (per  
se  inadmissibility)?  
  




These  central  questions  give  rise  to  a  series  of  secondary  research  questions,  
subsequently  listed  in  the  introductions  to  particular  chapters.    
 
7. Methodology  and  structure  of  the  study  
7.1. Methodology  levels  
Due   to   the   fact   that   the   goal   of   this   research   is   to   investigate   common   EU  
minimum  standards  to  overcome  evidentiary  differences  throughout  the  EU  and  
result   in   mutual   recognition   of   evidence,   it   is   necessary   to   combine   various  
methodologies   in  order   to   take   into   account  differences  between   legal   systems  
across   the   EU,   the   current   instruments   which   have   been   introduced   for   the  
purposes   of   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation   in   criminal   matters,   and   human   rights.  
Therefore,   three   different   techniques   were   combined   in   this   research:   a  
comparative  study,  an  investigation  of  Council  of  Europe  and  EU  legislation  and  
policy   documents,   and   an   analysis   of   the   jurisprudence   of   the   ECtHR.   This  
combination  of  methodologies  helps,  firstly,  in  reporting  the  current  state  of  play  
and,  secondly,  in  reporting  how  far  we  can  move  towards  deriving  common  EU  
minimum  standards  to  enhance  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence.    
  
- Member  state  level  analysis  
The   goal   of   this   methodology   is   to   report   the   most   striking   differences  
between  member  states,  which  may  hamper  mutual  trust  in  evidentiary  matters  
and  raise  doubts  as  to  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  abroad.  Therefore,  this  
level   consists   of   an   analysis   of   domestic   norms   concerning   telephone   tapping  
and  house  search  in  six  selected  member  states,  as  follows:    
a) England  and  Wales,  
b) France,  
c) Ireland,  
d) The  Netherlands,  
e) Poland,  
f) Spain.  
These  member   states   were   selected   to   represent   a   variety   of   legal   systems  
and  different  approaches  to  evidentiary  issues,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  potential  
problems  which  may  occur  in  the  field  of  mutual  recognition  of  evidence  in  the  
EU.   Hence,   in   order   to   enhance   the   results   and   report   various   categories   of  
domestic   approaches,   the   research   also   includes   two   common   law   systems.  
Accordingly,   the   research   reports   the   differences   between   member   states   and  
selects   those   characteristics   that   may   negatively   affect   mutual   recognition   of  
evidence   and,   therefore,   deserve   to   be   mitigated   by   means   of   common  
standards.  In  other  words,  on  the  basis  of  six  various  jurisdictions,  the  research  
shows  which  dots  should  be   joined  up   if  mutual  admissibility   in   the  EU   is   the  
goal.    
The   objective   of   this   research   is   not   to   investigate   the   legislation   of   member  
states   in   detail,   to   compare   criminal   justice   systems   in   total   or   to   propose  
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concrete   solutions   for   selected   jurisdictions.   Consequently,   the   comparative  
study   solely   encompasses   concrete  pieces  of   law  or   jurisprudence,   relevant   for  
the  purposes  of   this  research  (brief  overviews  of   the   investigated   legal  systems  
are   annexed   to   this   book).   It   should   be   stressed   that   searching   for   answers   to  
detailed  questions  in  foreign  regulations  is  not  always  feasible  for  one  researcher  
herself.   That   is   why   the   methodology   used   in   this   section   combines   a   classic  
study   based   on   foreign   legal   acts   and   literature,   as   well   as   scientific  
consultations   with   the   representatives   of   four  member   states   (France,   Ireland,  
the   Netherlands   and   Spain)   carried   out   at   Eurojust   in   November   2015.   These  
research  meetings  helped  significantly  in  filling  legal  information  gaps,  clarified  
the  interpretation  of  some  provisions,  showed  some  at  first  sight  invisible  links,  
provided  a  personal  explanation  of  issues  which  are  not  explicitly  expressed  in  
the   law,   and   also   provided   references   to   adequate   jurisprudence.   The  
consultations  were  held  with  templates  prepared  individually  for  each  desk.  The  
list   of   the   issues   discussed   with   the   experts   varied   in   scope   and   detail,  
depending  on   the  member   state   concerned  and   information   sought.         It   is   also  
important   to   stress   that   the   member   states   investigated   in   this   research,   save  
Poland,   do   not   explicitly   regulate   the   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered  
abroad28.   Therefore,   the   research   does   not   provide   a   comparative   overview   in  
this  respect.    
  
- EU/CoE  level  analysis  
The   second   methodological   technique   comprises   an   analysis   of   legislation  
and  policy   documents   regarding   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation   in   criminal  matters,  
developed   both  within   the   European  Union   and  with   the  Council   of   Europe'ʹs  
cooperation.  The  outcomes  of  this  analysis  help  in  understanding  to  what  extent  
member  states  are  willing  to  establish  rules  for  the  purposes  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  
cooperation.   This   method   consists   of   compiling   an   overview   of   existing   legal  
frameworks   of   the   MLA   and   MR,   which   address   concerns   crucial   for   the  
purposes  of   this  research.  The  added  value  of   this  methodological   technique   is  
that  the  minimum  standards  derived  in  this  research  are  not  disconnected  from  
current  frameworks  and  correspond  to  EU  policy  in  criminal  matters.  Due  to  the  
fact  that  particular  stages  of  the  research  tackle  different  research  questions,  the  
analysis   of   legislation   and   policy   documents   may   vary   in   scope   and   detail  
depending  on  the  issue  concerned.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  study,  the  following  
chapters,   where   possible,   provide   separate   analysis   for   MLA   and   MR  
instruments.  
 
                                                                                                                            
28  With  regard   to   the  status  of  evidence  obtained   in   the  EU  see:  T.  HOWSE,  England,  p.173;   I.  
PEÇI,   The   Netherlands,   p.   123;   A.   RYAN,   Ireland,   p.   352-­‐‑353;   J.   TRICOT,   France,   p.   225;   L.  
BACHMAIER,  Spain,  p.  710,  C.  NOWAK,  S.  STEINBORN,  Poland,  p.  529-­‐‑530  [all   in:]  Toward  a  
Prosecutor   for   the   European   Union.   Volume   1.   A   Comparative   Analysis,   K.   LIGETI   (ed.),   Hart  
Publishing  2013.    




- The  ECtHR  level  analysis    
Finally,  due  to  the  fact  that  all  EU  member  states  are  party  to  the  ECHR,  any  
common  EU  minimum  standards   shall   be  based  on  or,   at   least,  drafted   in   line  
with   the   common   fundamental   rights   and   norms   developed   by   the   ECtHR.  
Therefore,   at   each   stage   of   the   research   the   relevant   case-­‐‑law   of   the   Court   is  
reported   and   analysed.   It   should   be   highlighted   that   analysis   of   the   ECtHR’s  
standards   that   refer   to   the   admissibility   of   evidence   is   challenging,   since   the  
Court  does  not  attempt   to  provide   the  rules   in   this  area,  but  rather  determines  
whether   the  procedure   applied   in   each   case  was   fair   as   a  whole.   Therefore,   at  
any   stage   of   the   study   it   was   necessary   to   detect   and   analyse   the   case-­‐‑law  
relevant   for   the   minimum   standard   being   examined,   in   order   to   provide   the  
ECtHR’s  approach  to  various  aspects  of  both  measures  which  could  constitute  a  
basis  for  certain  common  standards.    
  
7.2. Twofold  structure 
  
The   research   is   divided   into   two  main   parts.   In   the   first   part,   common  EU  
minimum  standards  to  enhance  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  are  investigated.  
This  part  of  the  study  is  divided  into  two  steps:  
- minimum  standards  with  regard   to  rules  governing   telephone   tapping  
and  house  search;  
- minimum   standards   with   regard   to   the   procedural   rights   associated  
with  telephone  tapping  and  house  search.  
In   the   second  part   the   focus   is   centred   on   common   standards   for   evidence  
gathered  irregularly.  This  part  also  consists  of  two  steps:  
- standards   for  non  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered   irregularly,  
and  
- standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility  of  evidence  gathered  irregularly.  
Each   of   the   standards   is   elaborated   on   and   examined   in   the   separate  
chapters,  structured  in  the  same  fashion:  
- introduction   and   research   questions   –   a   prelude   to   the   issue   being  
investigated   in   the   chapter   and   its   relevance   in   the   field   of   mutual  
admissibility   of   evidence,   accompanied   with   research   questions   that  
will  be  explored;    
- member  states  level  analysis  –  an  overview  of  domestic  provisions  with  
regard  to  the  standard  being  investigated;  
- MLA/MR   level  analysis  –  an  analysis  of  existing   legislation  and  policy  
documents  regulating  or  referring  to  the  standard  being  investigated;  
- ECtHR   case-­‐‑law   analysis   –   an   analysis   of   the   case-­‐‑law   related   to   the  
standard  being  investigated;  
- deriving   of   the   minimum   standard   –   conclusions   and   proposal   for  
certain  minimum  standards.  
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II. Common   EU   minimum   standards   to   enhance  
per  se  admissibility  of  evidence 
1. Minimum   standards   with   regard   to   rules  
governing  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  
  
This   part   of   the   study   examines   the   feasibility   of   coming   to   common  
minimum  standards  with  regard  to  the  way  that  the  evidence  is  collected,  which  
encompass:   ratione   auctoritatis,   ratione   materiae,   ratione   loci,   ratione   temporis   and  
ratione  personae.  The  reason  for  selection  of  these  particular  standards  is  that  both  
measures   seriously   affect   the   right   to   respect   for   private   life   and,   therefore,  
require  certain  criteria  for  issue  and  execution,  in  order  to  provide  an  adequate  
level   of   protection   against   abuses.   The   above   reported   factors   are   frequently  
analysed  by   the  ECtHR  with   respect   to  both  measures  and,  moreover,  most  of  
the   differences   that   hamper   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   across   member  
states   are   apparent.   That   allows   one   to   assume   that   there   is   a   high   impact   of  
these  factors  on  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence.  Therefore,  the  goal  of  this  part  
of  the  research  is  to  investigate  how  to  take  the  mutual  trust  with  regard  to  these  
elements  to  a  higher  level  by  coming  to  common  minimum  standards,  in  view  of  
per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  therein.    
1.1. Ratione  auctoritatis  
  
The   lack   of   common   standards   for   ratione   auctoritatis   can   lead   to   many  
dilemmas   concerning   the   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone  
tapping   and   house   search.   These   dilemmas   may   follow   from   the   fact   that  
different   member   states   may   empower   different   authorities   to   order   the  
measures,   such   as   judges,   investigative   judges,   prosecutors,   police   etc.   Due   to  
the  fact  that  an  issuing  authority  is  one  of  the  guarantees  that  the  measure  is  not  
conducted   haphazardly,   domestic   incompatibilities   in   this  matter  may   lead   to  
deep  mutual  distrust.  Hence,  evidence  gathered  within  a  house  search  issued  by  
a   prosecutor   may   be   questioned   in   member   states   which   require   a   search  
warrant  issued  by  a  judge29.  Therefore,  questions  as  to  the  authorities  designated  
to  issue  the  measures  are  of  crucial  importance  for  this  research.  Consequently,  
this  part  of  the  research  deals  with  the  following  core  question:  
  
Which  authorities  should  be  designated  to  issue  the  permission  to  carry  out  telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  in  an  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context,  in  order  to  enhance  the  mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  therein?  
                                                                                                                            
29  G.  VERMEULEN,  Free   gathering…,   p.   32;   P.   J.   P.   TAK,  Bottlenecks   in   International   Police   and  
Judicial  Cooperations  in  the  EU,  European  Journal  of  Crime,  Criminal  Law  and  Criminal  Justice,  






Given   the   intrusive   nature   of   telephone   tapping   and   house   search,   it   is  
necessary   to   examine   the   obligatory   involvement   of   the   judicial   authorities   in  
granting  both  measures30.  However,  what  may  cause  significant  problems  at  the  
EU   level   are   the   various   classifications   of   the   ‘judicial’   protection  of   telephone  
tapping   and   house   search   in   member   states31.   Whereas   some   states   involve  
‘judicial’   bodies   initially,   in   the   issuing   phase,   others   rely   on   ‘judicial’  
supervision,  or  on  a  posteriori   control  of   the  measures.  On   top  of   that,   the   term  
‘judicial   authority’   has   an   ambiguous   and   non-­‐‑coherent   meaning   across   the  
EU32.  Consequently,   the   core   research  question  of   this   chapter  gives   rise   to   the  
following  secondary  research  questions:  
  
Should  the  permission  to  carry  out  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  be  a  decision  
for  judicial  authority?  
  
What   is   conceived   as   a   judicial   authority   in   the   context   of   EU   cooperation   in  
criminal  cases?    
  
All  these  research  questions  are  examined  below.    
  
1.1.1. Ratione  auctoritatis  in  domestic  legislation 
1.1.1.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
A  comparative  overview  of  the  domestic  legislation  shows  that  the  majority  
of  member  states  included  in  this  research  designate  judicial  authorities  to  order  
the  measure.   In  France,   the  measure  may  be   issued  by  an   investigative   judge33  
or,   in  some  cases,  by  a   judge  of   liberties  and  detention34.  Telephone   tapping   in  
Ireland  may  be  granted  by  a  judge  of  the  District  Court  upon  the  application  of  a  
superior  officer35.  The  measure  may  be  carried  out  in  the  Netherlands  upon  the  
order  of   the  public  prosecutor,  with   the  prior   authorisation  of   an   investigative  
                                                                                                                            
30  In  cases  concerning  telephone  tapping  the  ECtHR  ruled  that:  The  Court  considers  that,  in  a  field  
where   abuse   is   potentially   so   easy   in   individual   cases   and   could   have   such   harmful   consequences   for  
democratic  society  as  a  whole,  it  is  in  principle  desirable  to  entrust  supervisory  control  to  a  judge,  Klass  
v.  Germany,  §§  56.  
31  Such  as  ordering,  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  authorisation  or  review  of  a  measure.  
32  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking...,  p.  65  
et   seq.;  Z.  ÐURDEVIĆ,   Judicial  Control   in  Pre-­‐‑Trial  Criminal  Procedure  Conducted  by   the  European  
Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  [in:]  Toward  a  Prosecutor  for  the  European  Union.  Volume  1.  A  Comparative  
Analysis,   K.   LIGETI   (ed.),   Hart   Publishing   2013,   p.   989   et   seq.;   I.   ARMADA,   The   European  
Investigation  Order  ...,  p.  11  et  seq.    
33  Art.  100  CCP.  
34  Arts.  706–773  CPP.  
35   A.   CRAS,   Y.M.   DALY,   Ireland:   A   Move   to   Categorical   Exclusion?   [in:]   Exclusionary   Rules    
in  Comparative  Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  p.  49.    
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judge36.   In   Poland,   it   is   exclusively   in   the   court’s   competence   to   issue   the  
interception  order.  Pursuant  to  art.  237  KPK,  the  court,  at  the  request  of  a  public  
prosecutor,  may  order  the  surveillance  and  recording  of  the  content  of  telephone  
conversations  by  way  of   telephone   tapping.  According   to   the  Spanish  LECrim,  
only  the  judicial  authority,  which  is  the  investigating  magistrate,  is  competent  to  
order   telephone   tapping37.   Unlike   in   other   countries   covered   by   the   research,  
interception  of  communication  in  England  and  Wales  may  be  carried  out  with  a  
warrant   from   the   Secretary   of   State,   at   the   request   of   authorised   officials.   The  
competent   authorities   to   apply   for   the   issue   of   an   interception   warrant   are  
indicated  in  Section  6  RIPA,  and  cover,  among  others:    
- the  Director-­‐‑General  of  the  Security  Service,  
- the  Chief  of  the  Secret  Intelligence  Service,  
- the  Commissioner  of  Police  of  the  Metropolis,  
- the  Chief  of  Defence  Intelligence,  
- a  person  who,   for   the  purposes  of   any   international  mutual   assistance  
agreement,   is  the  competent  authority  of  a  country  or  territory  outside  
the  United  Kingdom38.    
  
1.1.1.2. House  search  
  
A  warrant  to  search  premises  in  England  and  Wales  may  only  be  issued  by  a  
court39.   In  France,   the  measure   is  usually  granted  by   the  examining  magistrate  
or,   in   a   preliminary   inquiry,   the   detention   and   liberty   judge40.   Most   search  
warrants   in   Ireland   are   issued   by   District   Court   judges   upon   the   hearing   of  
evidence   on   oath   given   by   a   member   of   the   police   not   below   the   rank   of  
inspector41.  In  the  Netherlands,  house  search  must  be  conducted  where  possible  
by  the  investigating  magistrate42.  In  Poland,  a  competent  body  to  issue  a  search  
warrant   is   a   prosecutor   or   court,   depending   on   the   stage   of   proceedings43.   In  




                                                                                                                            
36  M.  J.  BORGERS,  L.  STEVENS,  The  Netherlands:  Statutory  Balancing  and  Choice  of  Remedies  [in:]  
Exclusionary  Rules  in  Comparative  Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  p.  193-­‐‑194.    
37  Art.  588  bis  b  LECrim.    
38  Section  6  RIPA;  Interception  of  Communications.  Code  of  Practice,  p.  7-­‐‑8.  
39  T.  HOWSE,  England   [in:]  Toward  a  Prosecutor  for  the  European  Union.  Volume  1.  A  Comparative  
Analysis,   K.   LIGETI   (ed.),   Hart   Publishing   2013,   p.   158;   P.   OZIN.   H.   NORTON,   P.   SPIVEY,  
PACE:  A  Practical  Guide  to  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984,  Oxford  2010,  p.  24.  
40  R.  VOGLER,  France  [in:]  Criminal  Procedure  in  Europe,  R.  VOGLER,  B.  HUBBER  (eds.),  p.  247-­‐‑
248.    
41  Section  7  Criminal  Justice  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1997.  
42  Art.  110  Sv;  M.  J.  BORGERS,  L.  STEVENS,  The  Netherlands…,  p.  192.    
43  Art.  220  KPK.    







As  the  overview  of  domestic   legislation  shows,  besides  England  and  Wales,  
the   member   states   covered   by   this   research   entrust   judges,   courts   or  
investigative   judges   with   granting   authority   when   it   comes   to   the   issue   of  
telephone   tapping.  None   of   the   investigated  member   states   authorise   a   public  
prosecutor   to   do   so.   In   the   case   of   house   search,   only   Poland   authorises   the  
public   prosecutor   to   issue   a   search   warrant   at   pre-­‐‑trial   stage.   Other   member  
states   entrust   judges,   investigative   judges   or   courts  with   granting   authority   in  
this  matter.  What   is  noteworthy   is   that   in   the  majority  of  states   the   issuance  of  
permission   for   telephone   tapping   requires   a   two-­‐‑step   procedure,   namely   the  
submission  of  an  application  to  the  relevant  authority,  followed  by  the  decision  
of  that  authority.  
    
Table  1:  Ratione  auctoritatis  in  domestic  legislation  
  
1.1.2. Ratione  auctoritatis  in  MLA  and  MR  instruments 
 
One   of   the   research   questions   of   this   chapter   is  whether   the   permission   to  
carry  out  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  should  be  a  decision  for  a  judicial  
authority.  This  question  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  member  states  
investigated  in  this  research  entrust  courts,  judges  or  investigative  judges  in  this  
matter,   which   gives   rise   to   the   hypothesis   that   the   auctoritatis   issue   could   be  
tackled   by   simple   reference   to   ‘judicial’   authority.  However,   the   term   ‘judicial  
authority’   has   an   ambiguous   meaning   in   the   context   of   EU   cooperation   in  
criminal   matters.   It   refers   to   the   criminal   justice   system   as   a   whole   and,  
consequently,  relates  to  all  authorities  working  in  it,  such  as  prosecutors,  central  
authorities,  police  or  even  administrative  authorities45.  Hence,   it   is  necessary  to  
verify  who  is  conceived  as  a  ‘judicial’  authority  in  the  context  of  EU  cooperation  
in  criminal  matters,  in  order  to  provide  a  common  standard  coherent  with  both  
national  and  supra-­‐‑national  approaches  to  this  term.  
Therefore,  the  following  analysis  presents  an  overview  of  the  development  of  
the   term   ‘judicial’   within   MLA   and   MR   instruments.   Special   consideration   is  
                                                                                                                            
45  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (ed.),  Rethinking  …,  p.  65  
et  seq.;  Z.  ÐURDEVIĆ,  Judicial  Control…,  p.  990.  
   Court,   judge   or   investigative  
judge  
Public   prosecutor,   other  
authorities  
Telephone  tapping   Ireland,   France,   Poland,   The  
Netherlands,  Spain  
England  and  Wales  
House  search   England   and   Wales,   Ireland,  
France,  Poland   (trial   stage),  The  
Netherlands,  Spain  
Poland  (pre-­‐‑trial  stage)  
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given  to  the  provisions  which  explicitily  refer   to  authorities  competent   to   issue  
telephone  tapping  and  house  search  for  purposes  of  EU  cooperation.    
 
1.1.2.1. ‘Judicial’  authorities  in  MLA  instruments   
  
- 1959  ECMA  
  
The   ‘mother   treaty’   uses   the   term   ‘competent   judicial   authority’46   without  
defining   it   and  –   according   to   art.   24  of   the  ECMA47   –   leaves   the   scope  of   this  
term  to  the  national  law  of  member  states.  As  a  result,  member  states  are  given  
considerable   freedom   to   indicate   which   authority   they   appoint   as   judicial48,  
which  is  also  highlighted  in  the  Explanatory  Report  to  the  Convention:    
  
As  mentioned  in  the  commentary  on  Article  1,  paragraph  1,  the  term  “judicial  
authorities"ʺ   has   a   different   connotation   in   different   countries.   In   some  
countries  "ʺPublic  Prosecutors"ʺ  come  within  the  term,  whereas  in  others  they  do  not.  
Accordingly,   it   was   agreed   that   any   country   could   at   the   time   of   signature   or   of  
deposit   of   its   instruments   of   ratification   define   how   it   would   construe   "ʺjudicial  
authorities"ʺ   for   the   purposes   of   the   Convention,   so   as   to   allow,   if   considered  
desirable,  for  the  inclusion  of  "ʺPublic  Prosecutors"ʺ49.  
  
Therefore,   the   1959   ECMA   gives   member   states   the   freedom   to   indicate  
which   authority   they   appoint   as   judicial   for   purposes   of   application   of   the  
Convention.   This   results   in   a   broad   understanding   of   the   term   ‘judicial  
authority’,  which   –   depending   on   the   domestic   provisions   of  member   states   –  
may   differ   from   one   state   to   another   and,   moreover,   does   not   refer   only   to  
judges   and   courts.   Consequently,   ‘judicial   authorities’   assigned   by   member  
states  can  be  central,  governmental  or  even  police  authorities50.    
  
                                                                                                                            
46   See,   inter   alia:   art.   1.1   of   the   ECMA:   The   Contracting   Parties   undertake   to   afford   each   other,   in  
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this   Convention,   the   widest   measure   of   mutual   assistance   in  
proceedings  in  respect  of  offences  the  punishment  of  which,  at  the  time  of  the  request  for  assistance,  falls  
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judicial  authorities  of  the  requesting  Party;  art.  3.1.  The  requested  Party  
shall  execute  in  the  manner  provided  for  by  its  law  any  letters  rogatory  relating  to  a  criminal  matter  and  
addressed   to   it   by   the   judicial   authorities   of   the   requesting   Party   for   the   purpose   of   procuring  
evidence   or   transmitting   articles   to   be   produced   in   evidence,   records   or   documents;   art.   10.1.   If   the  
requesting  Party  considers  the  personal  appearance  of  a  witness  or  expert  before  its  judicial  authorities  
especially  necessary,  it  shall  so  mention  in  its  request  for  service  of  the  summons  and  the  requested  Party  
shall  invite  the  witness  or  expert  to  appear.  
47  Art.   24  of   the  ECMA:  A  Contracting  Party,  may,  when   signing   the  Convention   or   depositing   its  
instrument  of  ratification  or  accession,  by  a  declaration  addressed  to  the  Secretary-­‐‑General  of  the  Council  
of   Europe,   define   what   authorities   it   will,   for   the   purposes   of   the   Convention,   deem   judicial  
authorities.    
48  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (ed.),  Rethinking  …,  p.  68.  
49  1956  ECMA  Explanatory  Report,  p.  12.  





- 2000  EU  MLA Convention  
  
The  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  uses   the   term   ‘competent’  authorities.  As   in  
the  case  of  1959  ECMA,  the  instrument  leaves  the  specification  of  this  term  to  the  
member  states,  according  to  their  domestic  law51.    
Given   the   scope   of   this   research,   the   specific   provisions   dealing   with  
interception  of  telecommunications  cannot  be  overlooked  here.  According  to  art.  
17  of  the  Convention:  
  
Art.  17.  For  the  purpose  of  the  application  of  the  provisions  of  Articles  18,  19  and  
20,   ‘competent   authority’   shall  mean  a   judicial   authority,   or,  where   judicial  
authorities   have   no   competence   in   the   area   covered   by   those   provisions,   an  
equivalent  competent  authority,  specified  pursuant  to  Article  24(1)(e)  and  acting  
for  the  purpose  of  a  criminal  investigation.    
  
Consequently,  the  Convention  does  not  require  the  authorities  competent  for  
dealing   with   cross-­‐‑border   interceptions   to   be   judicial,   which   is   additionally  
pointed  out  in  the  Explanatory  Report  on  art.  17  of  the  Convention:  
  
This  Article  allows  a  Member  State,  where  no  judicial  authority  has  competence  
for   applying   Articles   18,   19   and   20,   to   specify   pursuant   to   Article   24(1)(e)   an  
equivalent   competent   authority   acting   for   the   purpose   of   a   criminal   investigation.  
This  provision  means  that  under  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Articles  18,  19  and  20,  
the   other  Member   States   accept   interception   requests   from   a   competent   authority  
acting  for  the  purpose  of  a  criminal  investigation,  but  which  is  not  necessarily  a  
judicial  authority52.    
  
In   conclusion,   as   in   the   case   of   the   1959   ECMA,   the   2000   EU   MLA  
Convention  gives  member  states  the  freedom  to  indicate  which  authorities  they  
deem   to   be   judicial,   however   –   as   explained   in   the  Explanatory  Report   –   their  
‘judicial’   nature   is   not   required.   At   the   same   time,   the   term   ‘judicial’   is   not  
precisely  defined  by  the  Convention.    
  
                                                                                                                            
51  Art.  24  of  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention:  When  giving  the  notification  referred  to  in  Article  27(2),  
each  Member   State   shall  make   a   statement   naming   the   authorities  which,   in   addition   to   those  
already   indicated   in   the   European   Mutual   Assistance   Convention   and   the   Benelux   Treaty,   are  
competent  for  the  application  of  this  Convention  and  the  application  between  the  Member  States  of  
the  provisions   on  mutual   assistance   in   criminal  matters   of   the   instruments   referred   to   in  Article   1(1),  
including  in  particular:  (a)  the  competent  administrative  authorities  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3(1),  
if  any;    (b)  one  or  more  central  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  applying  Article  6  as  well  as  the  authorities  
competent   to   deal   with   the   requests   referred   to   in   Article   6(8);     (c)   the   police   or   customs   authorities  
competent   for   the   purpose   of  Article   6(5),   if   any;     (d)   the   administrative   authorities   competent   for   the  
purposes   of  Article   6(6),   if   any;   and     (e)   the   authority   or   authorities   competent   for   the  purposes   of   the  
application  of  Articles  18  and  19  and  Article  20(1)  to  (5).      
52  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  Explanatory  Report,  p.  21.  
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- Conclusion:  a  ‘non-­‐‑coherent  authorities  landscape’  
  
The  member  states’  freedom  to  define  and  appoint  ‘competent’  and  ‘judicial’  
authorities   results   in   a   ‘non-­‐‑coherent   authorities   landscape’   for   cooperation   in  
criminal   matters   based   on   MLA   instruments.   Hence,   ‘judicial’   cooperation  
within   the   meaning   of   these   instruments   in   practice   also   covers   prosecutors,  
central,  governmental  and  police  bodies53.  To  illustrate  this,  the  following  tables  
present   which   authorities   are   competent   to   deal   with   telephone   tapping   and  
house  search  upon  MLA  instruments:  
  
Table  2:  ‘Judicial’  authorities  deemed  to  receive  requests  upon  MLA  instruments  
  
      England  
and  
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1.1.2.2. ‘Judicial’  authorities  in  MR  instruments    
  
A   new   quality   of   cooperation   based   on   the   mutual   recognition   principle  
brings   up   a   new   approach   to   ‘judicial’   authorities.   The   MR   instruments  
introduce   the   terms   ‘issuing’   and   ‘executing’   member   states   instead   of  
‘requested’  and  ‘requesting’  member  states  and,  step  by  step,  seek  to  specify  the  
meaning  and  scope  of  the  word  ‘judicial’.   
                                                                                                                            






- FD  FO  
  
The   FD   FO   is   the   first   instrument   based   on   the   principle   of   mutual  
recognition,  which  deals  with  a  narrow  spectrum  of  EU  cooperation  with  respect  
to  evidence.  The   instrument  bases  cooperation  on  the  direct  contact  of   ‘judicial  
authorities’,   without,   however,   defining   what   is   perceived   as   ‘judicial’.  
According  to  its  provisions:    
  
Art.   1.   The   purpose   of   the   Framework  Decision   is   to   establish   the   rules   under  
which   a  Member  State   shall   recognise   and   execute   in   its   territory   a   freezing   order  
issued   by   a   judicial   authority   of   another   Member   State   in   the   framework   of  
criminal  proceedings.  (…).    
  
As   mentioned   above,   the   FD   FO   uses   terms   such   as   the   ‘issuing’   and  
‘executing’  state,  which  are  typical  for  mutual  recognition,  and  defines  them  as  
follows:    
  
Art.   2a):   ‘issuing   State’   shall   mean   the   Member   State   in   which   a   judicial  
authority,   as   defined   in   the   national   law   of   the   issuing   State,   has   made,  
validated   or   in   any   way   confirmed   a   freezing   order   in   the   framework   of   criminal  
proceedings.  
Art.  2b):  ‘executing  State’  shall  mean  the  Member  State  in  whose  territory  the  
property  or  evidence  is  located.    
  
Given   the   language   of   the   above-­‐‑mentioned   provisions,   one  might   assume  
that   the  FD  FO  only   requires   the  authorities  of   the   issuing  member   state   to  be  
judicial.   However,   further   articles   concerning   recognition   and   execution   of   a  
freezing   order   also   make   references   to   the   ‘judicial’   nature   of   the   executing  
authorities,  as  follows:  
  
Art.   5.1.   The   competent   judicial   authorities   of   the   executing   State   shall  
recognise   a   freezing   order,   transmitted   in   accordance   with   Article   4,   without   any  
further  formality  being  required  and  shall  forthwith  take  the  necessary  measures  for  
its  immediate  execution  in  the  same  way  as  for  a  freezing  order  made  by  an  authority  
of  the  executing  State  (…).      
Art.   5.3.  The   competent   judicial   authorities   of   the   executing   State   shall  
decide   and   communicate   the   decision   on   a   freezing   order   as   soon   as   possible   and,  
whenever  practicable,  within  24  hours  of  receipt  of  the  freezing  order.    
Art.  6.3.  The  judicial  authorities  of  the  issuing  State  shall   forthwith  notify  
the   judicial  authorities  of   the   executing  State   that   the   freezing   order  has   been  
lifted.   In   these   circumstances   it   shall  be   the   responsibility  of   the   executing  State   to  
lift  the  measure  as  soon  as  possible.    
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In   this   light   it   becomes   apparent   that   the   FD   FO   refers   to   cooperation  
between   ‘judicial   authorities’,   both   on   the   issuing   and   executing   side.   At   the  
same  time,   the   instrument   lacks  any  definition  of   the   term  ‘judicial’  and   leaves  
specification   of   its   meaning   to   member   states.   This,   as   in   the   case   of   MLA  
instruments,   results   in  a  wide  variety  of   types  of  bodies  appointed  by  member  
states   to   issue   and   execute   the   freezing   order,   including   judges,   investigative  
magistrates,  prosecutors  and  central  and  police  authorities54.    
  
- FD  EEW  
  
The   EEW   Proposal   clarifies   the   scope   of   the   term   ‘judicial’   significantly.  
Referring   to   procedural   guarantees   and   minimum   safeguards,   the   document  
limits  the  scope  of  ‘judicial’  authorities  to   judges,  investigating  magistrates  and  
prosecutors:  
  
It   is   important   to   note   that   the   issuing   authority   must   be   a   judge,  
investigating   magistrate   or   prosecutor.   Other   competent   authorities  
(including  police,  customs  and  administrative  authorities)  are  not  permitted  
to  issue  a  European  Evidence  Warrant.  Such  authorities  must  seek  the  decision  of  
a  judge,  investigating  magistrate  or  prosecutor  in  order  to  have  a  European  Evidence  
Warrant  issued55.      
 
Consequently,  art.  2  of  the  EEW  Proposal  stipulates  that:  
Art.  2  a)  "ʺissuing  authority"ʺ  shall  mean  a  judge,  investigating  magistrate  or  
                                                                                                                            
54   It   is   noteworthy   that   when   discussing   the   instrument   some   member   states   postulated  
specification  and  definition  of  the  term  ‘judicial’  for  the  purposes  of  its  application,  see  in  more  
detail:  R.A.  MORÁN  MARTÍNEZ,  Decisión  marco  de  22  de  julio  de  2003,  relativa  a  la  ejecución  en  la  
unión  europea  de  las  resoluciones  de  embargo  preventivo  de  bienes  y  aseguramiento  de  pruebas,  Estudios  
de  Derecho  Judicial  2007,  no.  117,  p.  189-­‐‑190.    
55  EEW  Explanatory  Memorandum,  para.   71;   see  also:  EEW  Explanatory  Memorandum,  para.  
47:   In   the   issuing   State,   the   issuing   judicial   authority   is   limited   to   judges,   investigating  
magistrates   or   prosecutors.   There   is   also   a   need   to   ensure   equivalence   with   the   domestic   criminal  
procedural   law  of  the   issuing  State  when  dealing  with  evidence  obtained  in  another  Member  State.  For  
this  reason,  the  judicial  authority  issuing  a  European  Evidence  Warrant  must  be  satisfied  that  it  would  
be  able  to  obtain  the  objects,  documents  or  data  in  similar  circumstances  if  they  were  on  the  territory  of  
its   own  Member   State.   This   prevents   the  European  Evidence  Warrant   from   being  used   to   circumvent  
national   safeguards   on   obtaining   evidence.   As   an   example,   this   would   preclude   using   the   European  
Evidence  Warrant  to  obtain  objects,  documents  or  data  from  the  executing  State  that  would  be  impossible  
to  obtain  in  the  issuing  State  because  it   is  protected  by  legal,  medical  or  journalistic  privileges;  Recital  
(8)   of   the   EEW   Proposal:   The   principle   of   mutual   recognition   is   based   on   a   high   level   of  
confidence   between   Member   States.   In   order   to   promote   this   confidence,   this   Framework  
Decision   should   contain   important   safeguards   to   protect   fundamental   rights.   It   should  
therefore   be   issued   only   by   judges,   investigating  magistrates   and   prosecutors,   and   only   when  
certain   minimum   conditions   have   been   satisfied.   These   should   include   the   tests   of   necessity   and  
proportionality.  There  is  also  a  need  to  prevent  the  issuing  State  from  circumventing  its  national  law  by  
obtaining  objects,  documents  or  data  that  it  would  not  be  able  to  obtain  in  similar  circumstances  if  they  





prosecutor   with   competence   under   national   law   to   issue   a   European   Evidence  
Warrant;    
b)  "ʺexecuting  authority"ʺ  shall  mean  an  authority  with  competence  under  
national  law  to  execute  a  European  Evidence  Warrant.    
  
Thus,   within   the   meaning   of   the   EEW   Proposal,   the   term   ‘judicial’   covers  
either   judges,   investigative   magistrates   or   prosecutors.   At   the   same   time,   the  
EEW   Proposal   does   not   require   the   executing   authorities   to   have   judicial  
nature56,  except  for  certain  decisions  concerning  execution  of  the  warrant57.    
However,   the   final   version   of   the   FD   EEW   significantly   broadens   the  
definition  of   issuing   authorities58.  According   to   art.   2   (c)   FD  EEW,   the   ‘issuing  
authority’  can  mean:  
- a  judge,  a  court,  an  investigating  magistrate,  a  public  prosecutor,  or  
- any  other   judicial  authority  as  defined  by  the   issuing  State   and,   in   the  
specific   case,   acting   in   its   capacity   as   an   investigating   authority   in   criminal  
proceedings  with  competence  to  order  the  obtaining  of  evidence  in  cross-­‐‑border  
cases  in  accordance  with  national  law.  
  
Accordingly,   the   FD   EEW   provides   an   open   definition   of   issuing   ‘judicial’  
authorities,  the  scope  of  which  may  differ  significantly  from  one  member  state  to  
another59.    
                                                                                                                            
56  Contrary  to  the  FD  FO,  which  refers  to  the  ‘competent  judicial  executing  authority’,  the  EEW  
Proposal   uses   the   terms   ‘executing   authority’   (see   arts.   11,   12.1(a)   and   14)   and   ‘competent  
authority  for  execution’  (see  art.  7.1).  
57   Art.   15   of   the   EEW   Proposal:   1.   A   judge,   investigating   magistrate   or   prosecutor   in   the  
executing  State  shall  oppose  the  recognition  or  execution  of  the  European  Evidence  Warrant  if  this  would  
infringe   the   ne   bis   in   idem   principle   according   to   the   Framework   Decision   20037.../JHA   on   the  
application  of   the  principle  of  ne  bis   in   idem.  2.  A   judge,   investigating  magistrate  or  prosecutor   in   the  
executing  State  may  also  oppose  the  recognition  or  execution  of  the  European  Evidence  Warrant  if:  (a)  its  
execution  would  infringe  the  ne  bis  in  idem  principle  with  respect  to  proceedings  in  a  third  State;  or  (b)  
there   is   an   immunity   or   privilege   under   the   law   of   the   executing   State   which  makes   it   impossible   to  
execute   the   European   Evidence   Warrant;   see   also   EEW   Proposal,   para   102:   A   decision   of   non-­‐‑
recognition   or   non-­‐‑execution   is   explicitly   limited   to   a   judge,   investigating   magistrate   or  
prosecutor  in  the  executing  State.  This  avoids  the  situation  in  which  a  police  or  administrative  authority  
would  have  the  power  to  overturn  a  judicial  decision.  In  cases  where  a  police  or  administrative  authority  
is   responsible   for   the   execution   of   the  warrant,   that   authority  must   nevertheless   seek   the   decision   of   a  
judge,  investigating  magistrate  or  prosecutor  in  order  to  refuse  to  recognise  and  execute  the  warrant.    
58   However,   see   amendments   of   the   European   Parliament  which   advocated   limitation   of   the  
definition  of  issuing  authority,  as  follows:  one  of  the  most  important  guarantees  for  the  public  is  that  
evidence   should   only   be   collected   by   the   judicial   authorities,   or   in   other   words   judges,   investigating  
magistrates  and  public  prosecutors,  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  Resolution  T6-­‐‑0486/2008.  
59  See  also  Recital  (8)  of  the  FD  EEW:  The  principle  of  mutual  recognition  is  based  on  a  high  level  of  
confidence  between  Member  States.  In  order  to  promote  this  confidence,  this  Framework  Decision  should  
contain  important  safeguards  to  protect  fundamental  rights.  The  EEW  should  therefore  be  issued  only  by  
judges,   courts,   investigating   magistrates,   public   prosecutors   and   certain   other   judicial   authorities   as  
defined  by  Member  States  in  accordance  with  this  Framework  Decision.    
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With  regard  to  the  ‘executing  authority’  the  FD  EEW  states  that  it  shall  mean  
‘an  authority  having  competence  under  the  national  law’.  Hence,  the  instrument  
does  not  require  the  executing  state  to  be  ‘judicial’,  except  for  authorities  entitled  
to   refuse   recognition   or   execution   and   postponement   of   recognition   or  
execution60.    
It   is  worth  highlighting   that,  besides  clarifying   the   term   ‘judicial  authority’,  
the   FD   EEW   also   refers   to   potential   problems   concerning   ratione   auctoritatis  
incompatibilities  in  light  of  search  and  seizure.  According  to  its  art.  11.4:  
  
Art.  11.  4:  If  the  issuing  authority  is  not  a  judge,  a  court,  an  investigating  
magistrate  or  a  public  prosecutor  and  the  EEW  has  not  been  validated  by  one  of  
those  authorities  in  the  issuing  State,  the  executing  authority  may,  in  the  specific  
case,  decide   that  no  search  or   seizure  may  be   carried  out   for   the  purpose  of  
the  execution  of  the  EEW.  Before  so  deciding,  the  executing  authority  shall  consult  
the  competent  authority  of  the  issuing  State.    
  
This   provision   clearly   shows   that   in   cases   of   such   intrusive   measures   as  
search   and   seizure,   the   FD   EEW   regards   issuances   undertaken   by   ‘judicial’  
authorities  as  preferable,  and  it  also  includes  public  prosecutors61.  
  
- EIO  Directive  
  
The  EIO  Directive  goes  further  in  defining  the  term  ‘judicial’  authority  than  
the  former  instruments.  According  to  its  art.  2:  
  
Art.  2  c)  issuing  authority’  means:    
(i)   a   judge,   a   court,   an   investigating   judge   or   a   public   prosecutor  
competent    
in  the  case  concerned;  or      
(ii)  any  other  competent  authority   as  defined  by   the   issuing  State  which,   in  
the   specific   case,   is   acting   in   its   capacity   as   an   investigating  authority   in   criminal  
                                                                                                                            
60  See:  art.  13.2  FD  EEW:  The  decision  to  refuse  the  execution  or  recognition  of  the  EEW  pursuant  to  
paragraph   1   shall   be   taken   by   a   judge,   court,   investigating   magistrate   or   public   prosecutor   in   the  
executing  State.  Where  the  EEW  has  been  issued  by  a  judicial  authority  referred  to  in  Article  2(c)(ii),  and  
the  EEW  has  not  been  validated  by  a   judge,  court,   investigating  magistrate  or  public  prosecutor   in  the  
issuing  State,  the  decision  may  also  be  taken  by  any  other  judicial  authority  competent  under  the  law  of  
the   executing   State   if   provided   for   under   that   law;   art.   16.3   FD   EEW:   The   decision   to   postpone  
recognition   or   execution   of   the   EEW  pursuant   to   paragraphs   1   or   2   shall   be   taken   by   a   judge,   court,  
investigating  magistrate  or  public  prosecutor  in  the  executing  State.  Where  the  EEW  has  been  issued  by  a  
judicial  authority  referred  to   in  Article  2(c)(ii),  and  the  EEW  has  not  been  validated  by  a   judge,  court,  
investigating  magistrate  or  public  prosecutor  in  the  issuing  State,  the  decision  may  also  be  taken  by  any  
other  judicial  authority  competent  under  the  law  of  the  executing  State  if  provided  for  under  that  law.    
61  However,  the  introduction  of  this  ground  for  refusal  of  ratione  auctoritatis  in  the  cooperation  
instruments  was  questioned  as  hampering  the  concept  of  EU  cooperation,  see:  G.VERMEULEN,  





proceedings  with   competence   to  order   the  gathering  of   evidence   in  accordance  with  
national  law.  In  addition,  before  it  is  transmitted  to  the  executing  authority  the  EIO  
shall  be  validated,  after  examination  of  its  conformity  with  the  conditions  for  issuing  
an  EIO  under  this  Directive,  in  particular  the  conditions  set  out  in  Article  6.1,  by  a  
judge,  court,  investigating  judge  or  a  public  prosecutor  in  the  issuing  State.  Where  
the   EIO   has   been   validated   by   a   judicial   authority,   that   authority   may   also   be  
regarded  as  an  issuing  authority  for  the  purposes  of  transmission  of  the  EIO;      
d)   ‘executing   authority’   means   an   authority   having   competence   to   recognise    
an   EIO   and   ensure   its   execution   in   accordance   with   this   Directive   and   the  
procedures  applicable   in  a   similar  domestic   case.  Such  procedures  may  require  a  
court  authorisation  in  the  executing  State  where  provided  by  its  national  law62.      
  
The  distinction  between  ‘a   judge,  a  court,  an  investigative   judge  or  a  public  
prosecutor’  and   ‘any  other  competent  authority’   is  more  precisely  explained   in  
the  EIO  Proposal  Explanatory  Memorandum:  
    
(...)   most   Member   States   will   probably   use   point   (i)   which   provides   for   the  
designation  of  a  judge,  a  court,  an  investigating  magistrate  or  a  public  prosecutor  as  
the  authority  competent  to  issue  an  EIO.  However,  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  
various   national   systems,   point   (ii)   allows   for   the   designation   of   another   type   of  
judicial   authority,   as   long   as   it   is,   in   the   specific   case,   acting   in   its   capacity   as   an  
investigating   authority   in   criminal   proceedings   with   competence   in   the   case  
concerned   to   order   the  gathering  of   evidence.  A  Member  State  may   for  example  
designate  a  police  authority   as   an   issuing   authority   for   the   purpose   of   the  EIO  
but   only   if   that   police   authority   has   the   power   to   order   the   investigative  measure  
concerned   at   national   level.   This   solution   is   in   line   with   existing   mutual   legal  
instruments  as  well  as  with  the  FD  on  the  EEW.  The  latter,  however,  is  less  flexible  
as   it   contains   a   validation   procedure   through   which   the   Member   States   which  
designated,  for  example,  police  authorities  as  issuing  authorities,  may  be  required  by  
the  executing  State  to  have  the  EIO  validated  by  a  judicial  authority  stricto  sensu  
(a   judge,   prosecutor,   court   or   investigating   magistrate).   This   validation  
procedure   is   among   the   additional   complexities   brought   by   the   EEW   compared   to  
mutual   legal   assistance   and   a   simplification   is   therefore   necessary.   Moreover,   the  
solution  proposed  in  the  draft  Directive  is  in  conformity  with  the  principle  of  mutual  
recognition63.  
  
Hence,  the  Directive  provides  a  distinction  between  judicial  authorities  sensu  
stricto   which   are   a   judge,   prosecutor,   court   or   investigating   magistrate,   and  
                                                                                                                            
62  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  EIO  Proposal  speaks  of  ‘any  other  judicial  authority’  instead  of  ‘any  
other  competent  authority’,  see  art.  2  (a)  (ii)  of  the  EIO  Proposal:  (…)  any  other  judicial  authority  
as   defined   by   the   issuing   State   and,   in   the   specific   case,   acting   in   its   capacity   as   an   investigating  
authority  in  criminal  proceedings  with  competence  to  order  the  gathering  of  evidence  in  accordance  with  
national  law.    
63  EIO  Proposal  Explanatory  Memorandum,  p.  4.  
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judicial   authorities   sensu   largo,   for   example,   police   authorities.   What   follows  
from   art.   2   (c)   EIO   Directive   is   that   not   only   judges,   courts   and   investigating  
magistrates  but  also  prosecutors  are  seen  as  ‘judicial’  bodies  sensu  stricto.  These  
‘judicial’  authorities  are  also  designated  to  lead  a  validation  procedure  in  cases  
where   the  order   is   issued  by   ‘any  other  competent  authority’,  as  set  out   in  art.  
2(c)(ii)  of  the  EIO  Directive64.  With  regard  to  the  authorities  competent  to  execute  
the   order,   member   states   are   free   to   designate   their   competent   national  
authorities   in   accordance   with   national   law.   However,   as   a   result   of   the   EP’s  
intervention,   ‘judicial’   authorisation   is   needed   where   the   national   law   of   the  
executing   state   requires   it65.   It   is   noteworthy   that   this   final   solution   is   still  
criticised  as  unsatisfactory  in  terms  of  ensuring  compliance  with  human  rights66.  
 
- FD  EAW  
  
While  looking  into  auctoritatis  concerns  it  is  also  necessary  to  consider  the  FD  
EAW,   in   order   to   ascertain   how   the   instrument   overcomes   the   problem   of  
different  authorities  competent  under  domestic  law  to  issue  the  warrant.      
The  FD  EAW  Proposal  defines  ‘judicial’  authorities  as  follows:  
- “issuing   judicial   authority"ʺ  means  the   judge  or   the  public  prosecutor   of   a  
Member  State,  who  has  issued  a  European  arrest  warrant      
- "ʺexecuting  judicial  authority"ʺ  means  the  judge  or  the  public  prosecutor  of  a  
Member   State   in  whose   territory   the   requested   person   sojourns,  who   decides  
upon  the  execution  of  a  European  arrest  warrant67.  
As   explained   in   the   Explanatory   Memorandum   attached   to   the   EAW  
                                                                                                                            
64   In   this   respect   see   I.   ARMADA,   The   European   Investigation   Order…,   p.   11-­‐‑12,   and   critical  
remarks   relating   to   validation   carried   out   by   a   prosecutor   or   investigative   magistrate:  
EUROPEAN  UNION  AGENCY   FOR   FUNDAMENTAL   RIGHTS,  Opinion  …,   p.   13.   See   also  
sceptical   comments   in:   F.  ZIMMERMANN,   S.  GLASER,  A.  MOTZ,  Mutual  Recognition   and   its  
Implications  for  the  Gathering  of  Evidence  in  Criminal  Proceedings:  a  Critical  Analysis  of  the  Initiative  
for  a  European  Investigation  Order,  European  Criminal  Law  Review,  No.  6/2011,  p.  74.  
65   Unsurprisingly,   negotiations   on   the   nature   of   the   executing   authority   also   proved   difficult.   The  
original  proposal  defined  executing  authority  as  “an  authority  competent  to  undertake  the  investigative  
measure  mentioned  in  the  EIO  in  a  similar  national  case”,  therefore  leaving  the  issue  to  national  law.  The  
fact   that   the   national   authority   competent   to   undertake   the   investigative   measure   would   often   be   the  
police   did   not   please   the   European   Parliament,   which   wished   to   render   the   executing   authorities  
“judicial”.   The   compromise   found   reads   as   follows:   “executing   authority   means   an   authority   having  
competence   to   recognise   an   EIO   and   ensure   its   execution   in   accordance   with   this   Directive   and   the  
procedures  applicable   in  a  similar  domestic  case.  Such  procedures  may  require  a  court  authorisation   in  
the   executing   State   where   provided   by   its   national   law.”,   I.   ARMADA,  The   European   Investigation  
Order…,  p.  12-­‐‑13.  
66  Equally,  what  of  the  judicial  nature  of  the  executing  authority?  At  present,  the  executing  authority  is  
only  defined  by  its  competence  to  execute  the  order.  There  is  a  good  argument  for  judicial  intervention  on  
either  side  to  ensure  compliance  with  human  rights  and  the  fundamental  principles  of  national  law  and  
for  proper  consideration  of  the  grounds  for  refusal  given  the  scope  of  the  instrument  (…)  An  element  of  
judicial   validation   needs   to   be   in   place   on   both   sides   –   issuing   and   executing,   D.   SAYERS,   The  
European…,  p.  9,  16.    





Proposal,  this  approach  corresponds  to  the  1957  Extradition  Convention,  which  
covers  the  judiciary  and  public  prosecutors,  but  excludes  police  authorities68.    
However,   the   final   version   of   the   FD   EAW   does   not   provide   the   above-­‐‑
mentioned  definitions  and  uses  the  term  ‘judicial  authority’,  without  its  further  
definition  or  specification69,  as  follows:  
    
Art.   6.1.  The   issuing   judicial  authority  shall  be   the   judicial  authority  of  
the  issuing  Member  State  which  is  competent  to  issue  a  European  arrest  warrant  by  
virtue  of  the  law  of  that  State.  
6.2.  The  executing  judicial  authority  shall  be  the  judicial  authority  of  the  
executing  Member  State  which  is  competent  to  execute  the  European  arrest  warrant  
by  virtue  of  the  law  of  that  State.  
  
This   ‘strong   judicial’   approach   is  worth   exploring,   especially   in   light  of   the  
diversity   of   legal   systems.   According   to   the   Annex   to   the   Report   from   the  
Commission,  most  member  states  indicated  judges  or  courts,  whether  as  issuing  
or  executing  authorities70.  However,  some  member  states  designated  the  police,  
administrative   central   bodies   or   prosecutors   as   ‘judicial   authorities’71.   Hence,  
within   the   scope   of   ‘judicial’   authorities   indicated   by  member   states   one  may  
find:  
                                                                                                                            
68  The  procedure  of  the  European  arrest  warrant  is  based  on  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  of  court  
judgments.   State-­‐‑to-­‐‑State   relations   are   therefore   substantially   replaced   by   court-­‐‑to-­‐‑court   relations  
between   judicial  authorities.  The   term  “judicial  authority”  corresponds,  as   in   the  1957  Convention  (cf.  
Explanatory  Report,  Article  1),  to  the  judicial  authorities  as  such  and  the  prosecution  services,  but  not  to  
the  authorities  of  the  police  force.  The  issuing  judicial  authority  will  be  the  judicial  authority  which  has  
authority  to  issue  the  European  arrest  warrant  in  the  procedural  system  of  the  Member  State  (Article  4).  
  With  regard  to  the  executing  judicial  authority,  several  procedural  mechanisms  are  possible  depending  
whether  the  simplified  procedure  applies  or  not  (Article  16).  It  will  be  the  prosecution  service  or  a  judge,  
depending  on  the  procedure  applicable  in  the  Member  State.  The  term  “executing  judicial  authority”  will  
cover  one  or  the  other,  as  the  case  requires.  But  it  must  always  be  the  authority  that  takes  the  decision  to  
execute  the  warrant.  Even  if  Article  5  enables  the  Member  States  to  confer  powers  on  a  central  authority  
in  a  series  of  circumstances,  that  authority  will  not  be  covered  by  this  definition,  EAW  Proposal,  p.  7-­‐‑8;  
see  also:  The  term  "ʺcompetent  authorities"ʺ  in  the  English  text  corresponds  to  autorités  judiciaires  in  the  
French  text.  These  expressions  cover  the  judiciary  and  the  Office  of  the  Public  Prosecutor  but  exclude  the  
police  authorities,  COUNCIL  OF  EUROPE,  Explanatory  Report   to   the  European  Convention  on  
Extradition,  Paris,  13.12.1957,  European  Treaty  Series  –  No.  30,  p.  4.    
69   In   this   respect   see   comments   of   A.   SUOMINEN,   The   principle   of   mutual   recognition   in  
cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  Bergen  2010,  p.  21-­‐‑22.  
70   EUROPEAN   COMMISSION,   Annex   to   the   Report   from   the   Commission   on   the  
implementation  since  2005  of  the  Council  Framework  Decision  of  13  June  2002  on  the  European  
arrest  warrant  and  the  surrender  procedures  between  Member  States,  11.7.2007,  COM(2007)  407  
final  (hereafter:  Annex  to  the  ENA  Report).     
71  A.  GÓRSKI,  P.  HOFMAŃSKI  (eds.),  A.  SAKOWICZ,  D.  SZUMIŁO-­‐‑KULCZYCKA,  Europejski  
nakaz   aresztowania  w   teorii   i   praktyce   państw   członkowskich  Unii   Europejskiej,  Warszawa   2008,   p.  
112;  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN   (ed.),  Rethinking  …,  p.   81;   see   also:  A.  
GÓRSKI,   P.   HOFMAŃSKI   (eds.),   The   European   Arrest   Warrant   and   its   Implementation   in   the  
Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  Warsaw  2008.  
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- an  investigative  magistrate  (Austria),  
- a  regional  court  in  a  panel  composed  of  one  judge  (Sweden),  
- a   District   Court   in   a   panel   composed   of   three   professional   judges  
(Poland),  
- a  District  Court  in  a  panel  composed  of  one  judge  (Cyprus),  
- a  District  Court  in  a  panel  composed  of  one  professional  judge  and  two  
lay  judges  (Finland),  
- an  appeal  court  (Italy),  
- a  High  Court  (Ireland)72.  
It   is  worth  pointing  out   that,  according   to   the  Commission,   the  diversity  of  
authorities  designated   as   ‘judicial’   issuing   and   executing  bodies   should  not   be  
problematic   as   long   as   the   procedural   guarantees   and   the   fairness   of   the  
proceedings  are  not  hampered73.    
  
- Conclusion:  ‘judicial’  authorities  sensu  stricto  and  sensu  largo  
  
MR   instruments,  unlike  MLA  ones,   seek   to  make  more  precise   the  scope  of  
the  term  ‘judicial’  authorities.  From  the  FD  EEW  and  the  EIO  Directive,  it  clearly  
follows   that   prosecutors   are   seen   as   ‘judicial’   authorities   together  with   courts,  
judges  and  investigative  magistrates.  The  EIO  Directive  explicitly  distinguishes  
between  judicial  authorities  sensu  stricto  and  sensu  largo.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  
scope   of   judicial   authorities   sensu   largo   is   still   open   and   may   cover   various  
domestic  authorities.  All  these  approaches  are  presented  in  Table  3:  
 
Table  3:  ‘Judicial’  authorities  in  MR  instruments  
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72   A.   GÓRSKI,   P.   HOFMAŃSKI   (eds.),   A.   SAKOWICZ,   D.   SZUMIŁO-­‐‑KULCZYCKA,  
Europejski…,  p.  113-­‐‑115.  
73  Annex  to  the  ENA  Report,  p.  17-­‐‑18;  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (ed.),  
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It  is  worth  highlighting  that  the  EU  instruments  deal  only  with  the  decision  
whether  or  not  to  issue  the  order/warrant.  Consequently,  the  instruments  do  not  
interfere   with   domestic   rules   regarding   authorities’   competences   in   the  
gathering   of   evidence  which   are   provided   in   national   law.   In   other  words,   in  
light   of   the   EIO  Directive,   non-­‐‑‘judicial’   authorities  may   also   be   competent   to  
authorise   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   at   the   domestic   level,   if   the  
national   law  stipulates   this.   In   this   case,   ‘judicial’   intervention   is   required  only  
for   issuing   the  EIO.  Both   the   initial,   domestic   decision   concerning   the   issue   of  
the   measures   and   further   decisions   concerning   their   execution   may   be  
undertaken  without  any  ‘judicial’  contribution.    
 
1.1.3. Ratione  auctoritatis  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR 
1.1.3.1. Meaning  of  the  word  ‘judicial’    
  
The  ECHR  presents  a  different  approach  to  ‘judicial’  authorities  than  the  EU  
instruments.   First   of   all,   the   Convention   does   not   use   the   term   ‘judicial  
authority’;  instead,  it  refers  to  the  court,  the  judge  and  the  tribunal74.  Moreover,  
Art.   5.3   ECHR,  which   deals  with   arrest   and   detention,  makes   reference   to   the  
term  ‘judicial  power’,  as  follows:  
                                                                                                                            
74  The  Court  pointed  out  that:  It  is  true  that  the  Convention  uses  the  word  “court”  (French  “tribunal”)  
in  several  of  its  Articles.  It  does  so  to  mark  out  one  of  the  constitutive  elements  of  the  guarantee  afforded  
to  the  individual  by  the  provision  in  question  (see,  in  addition  to  Article  5  (4),  Articles  2  (1),  5  (1)  (a)  and  
(b),  and  6  (1)  (tribunal)  (art.  5-­‐‑4,  art.  2-­‐‑1,  art.  5-­‐‑1-­‐‑a,  art.  5-­‐‑1-­‐‑b,  art.  6-­‐‑1).   In  all   these  different  cases   it  
denotes   bodies   which   exhibit   not   only   common   fundamental   features,   of   which   the   most   important   is  
independence  of  the  executive  and  of  the  parties  to  the  case  (see  Neumeister  judgment  of  27th  June  1968,  
Series   A,   p.   44,   paragraph   24),   but  also   the   guarantees   of   judicial   procedure.   The   forms   of   the  
procedure  required  by  the  Convention  need  not,  however,  necessarily  be  identical  in  each  of  the  
cases  where   the   intervention   of   a   court   is   required.   In   order   to   determine   whether   a   proceeding  
provides  adequate  guarantees,  regard  must  be  had  to  the  particular  nature  of  the  circumstances  in  which  
such  proceeding  takes  place,  De  Wilde,  Ooms  and  Versyp  (“Vagrancy”)  v.  Belgium,  §§  78.  
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Art.   5.3.   Everyone   arrested   or   detained   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of  
paragraph   1   (c)   of   this  Article   shall   be   brought   promptly   before  a   judge  or   other  
officer  authorised  by  law  to  exercise  judicial  power  (…).    
  
Both   the   components   ‘officer’   and   ‘judicial   power’   have   been   subsequently  
clarified  by  the  ECtHR  in   its  case-­‐‑law75.  The  essential   judgment  on  this   issue   is  
Schiesser  v.  Switzerland,  in  which  the  Court  stated  that    
  
the  term  ‘officer’  is  not  identical  with  the  ‘judge’  but  must  nevertheless  have  
some  of   the   latter’s   attributes,   that   is   to   say   he  must   satisfy   certain   conditions  
each   of   which   constitutes   a   guarantee   for   the   person   arrested   76.  The   first   of   such  
conditions   is   independence  of   the   executive  and  of   the  parties   (…).  This   does  
not  mean  that  the  “officer"ʺ  may  not  be  to  some  extent  subordinate  to  other  judges  or  
officers  provided  that  they  themselves  enjoy  similar  independence77.  
  
Accordingly,   the   Court   is   of   the   position   that   the   essential   components   of  
‘judicial  power’  are:  
- independence  of  the  executive,  and    
- impartiality.    
Hence,  although  in  many  states  as  well  as  in  the  EU  instruments,  the  position  
of   public   prosecutor   is   considered   a   ‘judicial   authority’,   it   cannot   be  
automatically   considered   to   exercise   judicial   power   in   the   light   of   the  
Convention78.   In   other   words,   the   ECtHR   assumes   that   although   the   wider  
meaning  of  the  word  ‘judicial’  exists  (e.g.  in  the  EU  instruments),  this  meaning  is  
not  valid   for   the   interpretation  of   the  Convention.  For   the  Court,   the   adjective  
‘judicial’   in   the  context  of   ‘judicial  authority’,   ‘judicial  power’,   ‘judicial  control’  
and  ‘judicial  review’  pertains  only  to  judges  and  the  courts,  as  bodies  which  are  
independent   of   the   executive,   impartial   of   any   interested   parties   and   able   to  
conduct   procedures  with   judicial   character.   Exceptionally,   ‘judicial   power’   can  
be   exercised   by   other   bodies   provided   these   bodies   possess   judicial   attributes,  
that  is  to  say,  independence  of  the  executive  and  of  the  parties.  
  
Given   the   Court’s   definition   of   the   word   ‘judicial’,   it   is   necessary   to  
                                                                                                                            
75  See  among  others:  Nikolova  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  49-­‐‑50;  Assenov  and  Others  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  149-­‐‑150.  
76  Schiesser  v.  Switzerland,  §§  25-­‐‑28,  §§  38.    
77   In   addition,   under   Article   5   para.   3   (art.   5-­‐‑3),   there   is   both   a   procedural   and   a   substantive  
requirement.  The  procedural  requirement  places  the  "ʺofficer"ʺ  under  the  obligation  of  hearing  himself  the  
individual   brought   before   him   (…);   the   substantive   requirement   imposes   on   him   the   obligations   of  
reviewing  the  circumstances  militating  for  or  against  detention,  of  deciding,  by  reference  to  legal  criteria,  
whether   there   are   reasons   to   justify   detention   and   of   ordering   release   if   there   are   no   such   reasons,  
Schiesser  v.  Switzerland,  §§  31.    
78  Z.  ÐURDEVIĆ,  Judicial  Control...,  p.  989-­‐‑990  and  quoted  case-­‐‑law:  Nikolova  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  49-­‐‑






investigate   its   approach   to   the   authorities   involved   in   granting   permission   for  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search.   Accordingly,   the   following   analysis  
examines   the   requirements   for  authorities  empowered   to  grant   such  measures,  
in  particular,  where  the  Court  requires  them  to  be  ‘judicial’  decisions.    
  
1.1.3.2. Telephone  tapping  
  
In  cases  concerning  telephone  tapping,  the  ECtHR  highlights  that  what  is  of  
utmost   importance   is   sufficient   protection   against   the   risk   of   abuse.   This  
requirement  has  a  strong  link  with  ratione  auctoritatis,  as  the  issuing  authorities  
are   entrusted   with   ensuring   that   the   measure   is   not   ordered   haphazardly79.  
Thus,  the  Court  leaves  the  decision  of  which  authorities  are  competent  to  permit,  
carry   out   and   supervise   the   measure   to   member   states,   and   these   authorities  
may  be  of  judicial  but  also  executive  nature80,  as  long  as  they  provide  adequate  
and  effective  guarantees  against  abuses81.  However,   in   cases  where   the   issuing  
authority  is  non-­‐‑judicial,  the  Court  requires  the  involvement  of  judicial  bodies  in  
the  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  review  of  the  measure  in  order  to  constitute  a  guarantee  
of  an  appropriate  procedure  designed  to  ensure   that  measures  are  not  ordered  
                                                                                                                            
79   See,   inter   alia:  Malone  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  70:  The   issue   to   be   determined   is   therefore  whether,  
under  domestic  law,  the  essential  elements  of  the  power  to  intercept  communications  were  laid  down  with  
reasonable  precision  in  accessible  legal  rules  that  sufficiently  indicated  the  scope  and  manner  of  exercise  of  
the  discretion  conferred  on  the  relevant  authorities;  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  93:  The  domestic  
law  must  be  sufficiently  clear  in  its  terms  to  give  citizens  an  adequate  indication  as  to  the  circumstances  
in  which  and  the  conditions  on  which  public  authorities  are  empowered  to  resort  to  any  such  measures.  
§§  94.  Consequently,  the  law  must  indicate  the  scope  of  any  such  discretion  conferred  on  the  competent  
authorities  and  the  manner  of  its  exercise  with  sufficient  clarity  to  give  the  individual  adequate  protection  
against  arbitrary  interference;  see  also:  Bykov  v.  Russia,  §§  78.  
80  Dragojević  v.  Croatia,  §§  82:  In  particular,  since  the  implementation  in  practice  of  measures  of  secret  
surveillance   of   communications   is   not   open   to   scrutiny   by   the   individuals   concerned   or   the   public   at  
large,  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  rule  of  law  for  the  legal  discretion  granted  to  the  executive  or  to  a  judge  
to  be   expressed   in   terms  of   an  unfettered  power.  Consequently,   the   law  must   indicate   the   scope  of   any  
such   discretion   conferred   on   the   competent   authorities   and   the   manner   of   its   exercise   with   sufficient  
clarity  to  give  the  individual  adequate  protection  against  arbitrary  interference.  
81  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany,  §§  49:  As  concerns  the  fixing  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  system  
of   surveillance   is   to   be   operated,   the   Court   points   out   that   the   domestic   legislature   enjoys   a   certain  
discretion.  It  is  certainly  not  for  the  Court  to  substitute  for  the  assessment  of  the  national  authorities  any  
other  assessment  of  what  might  be  the  best  policy  in  this  field  (…).  Nevertheless,  the  Court  stresses  that  
this  does  not  mean  that  the  Contracting  States  enjoy  an  unlimited  discretion  to  subject  persons  
within   their   jurisdiction   to   secret   surveillance.   The  Court,   being   aware   of   the   danger   such   a   law  
poses   of   undermining   or   even   destroying   democracy   on   the   ground   of   defending   it,   affirms   that   the  
Contracting  States  may  not,  in  the  name  of  the  struggle  against  espionage  and  terrorism,  adopt  whatever  
measures  they  deem  appropriate.  §§  50:  The  Court  must  be  satisfied  that,  whatever  system  of  surveillance  
is   adopted,   there   exist   adequate   and   effective   guarantees   against   abuse.   This   assessment   has   only   a  
relative  character:  it  depends  on  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  such  as  the  nature,  scope  and  duration  
of  the  possible  measures,  the  grounds  required  for  ordering  such  measures,  the  authorities  competent  
to  permit,  carry  out  and  supervise  such  measures,  and  the  kind  of  remedy  provided  by  the  national  
law.  
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haphazardly,   irregularly   or   without   due   and   proper   consideration82.   This  
review,   according   to   the   Court,   may   intervene   at   three   stages:   when   the  
surveillance   is   first   ordered,   while   it   is   being   carried   out,   or   after   it   has   been  
terminated83  and,  as  a  rule,  should  be  reserved  to  judicial  bodies84.    
However,   this   judicial   control   competence   is   not   exclusive   and   may   be  
extended.   In  Dumitru   Popescu   v.   Romania   the   ECtHR   expressed   the   view   that  
there  must  be  either:  
- judicial  control,  or    
- control  by  an  independent  body  over  the  issuing  body'ʹs  activity85.  
Similarly,   in   Klass   and   Others   v.   Germany   the   Court   concluded   that   the  
exclusion   of   judicial   control   does   not   automatically   lead   to   violation   of   the  
Convention   and   accepted   a   posteriori   review   carried   out   by   non-­‐‑judicial  
authorities,  stating  that  the  German  procedure  ensured  effective  control86.  
                                                                                                                            
82  Dragojević  v.  Croatia,  §§  94:  (…)  verification  by  the  authority  empowered  to  authorise  the  use  of  secret  
surveillance,   inter   alia,   that   the   use   of   such   measures   is   confined   to   cases   in   which   there   are   factual  
grounds  for  suspecting  a  person  of  planning,  committing  or  having  committed  certain  serious  criminal  
acts  and  that  the  measures  can  only  be  ordered  if  there  is  no  prospect  of  successfully  establishing  the  facts  
by  another  method  or  this  would  be  considerably  more  difficult,  constitutes  a  guarantee  of  an  appropriate  
procedure  designed  to  ensure  that  measures  are  not  ordered  haphazardly,  irregularly  or  without  due  and  
proper  consideration  (…).    
83   In  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany   the  Court   found:  §§  55:   (…)  As  regards   the   first   two  stages,   the  
very   nature   and   logic   of   secret   surveillance   dictate   that   not   only   the   surveillance   itself   but   also   the  
accompanying   review   should   be   effected   without   the   individual’s   knowledge.   Consequently,   since   the  
individual  will  necessarily  be  prevented  from  seeking  an  effective  remedy  of  his  own  accord  or  from  taking  
a  direct  part  in  any  review  proceedings,  it  is  essential  that  the  procedures  established  should  themselves  
provide  adequate  and  equivalent  guarantees  safeguarding  the  individual’s  rights.  In  addition,  the  values  
of   a   democratic   society  must   be   followed   as   faithfully   as   possible   in   the   supervisory   procedures   if   the  
bounds  of  necessity,  within  the  meaning  of  Article  8  para.  2  (art.  8-­‐‑2),  are  not  to  be  exceeded.  One  of  the  
fundamental   principles   of   a   democratic   society   is   the   rule   of   law,  which   is   expressly   referred   to   in   the  
Preamble  to  the  Convention  (see  the  Golder  judgment  of  21  February  1975,  Series  A  no.  18,  pp.  16-­‐‑17,  
para.   34).  The   rule  of   law   implies,   inter  alia,   that  an   interference  by   the   executive  authorities  
with  an  individual’s  rights  should  be  subject  to  an  effective  control  which  should  normally  be  
assured  by  the  judiciary,  at  least  in  the  last  resort,  judicial  control  offering  the  best  guarantees  
of  independence,  impartiality  and  a  proper  procedure.  
84  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany,  §§  56:  The  Court  considers  that,  in  a  field  where  abuse  is  potentially  so  
easy  in  individual  cases  and  could  have  such  harmful  consequences  for  democratic  society  as  a  whole,  it  is  
in  principle  desirable  to  entrust  supervisory  control  to  a  judge.  
85  Dumitru  Popescu  v.  Romania,  §§  70-­‐‑73;  see  also:  Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova,  §§  40  and  §§  51.  
In  this  case  the  Court  concluded  that  the  fact  that  the  decision  in  this  case  had  been  left  to  the  
public   prosecutor’s   discretion   cannot   satisfy   the   requirement   of   independence   from   the  
executive   and   does   not   provide   sufficient   guarantees   against   the   risk   of   abuse.   Because   the  
Romanian  legislation  relied  on  the  prosecutor  to  issue  the  measure  and  lacked  posteriori  control  
of   the  measure,  which  would   be   enforced   by   an   independent   authority,   the   Court   held   that  
there   had   been   a   violation   of   Art.   8   ECHR,   see:  M.A.   NOWICKI,  Dumitru   Popescu   przeciwko  
Rumunii   (nr   2)   -­‐‑  wyrok  ETPC  z   dnia   26   kwietnia   2007   r.,   skarga  nr   71525/01   [in:]  M.A.  Nowicki,  
Europejski  Trybunał  Praw  Człowieka.  Wybór  orzeczeń  2007,  Oficyna  2008,  p.  133.  
86  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany,  §§  56:   (…)  having  regard   to   the  nature  of   the   supervisory  and  other  
safeguards  provided  for  by  the  G  10,  the  Court  concludes  that  the  exclusion  of  judicial  control  does  not  





In   conclusion,   the   Court   first   and   foremost   requires   that   authorities  
designated   to   issue   the   interception   order   ensure   adequate   protection   against  
abuses   and   haphazard   decisions.   Therefore,   the   Court   requires   review   of   the  
measure   to  be  carried  out  preferably  by  a   judicial  authority,  or  –  under  certain  
conditions   –   an   authority   independent   of   the   issuing   body'ʹs   activity87.   This  
review,   according   to   the   Court,   may   intervene   at   three   stages:   when   the  
surveillance   is   first   ordered,   while   it   is   being   carried   out,   or   after   it   has   been  
terminated.  
  
1.1.3.3. House  search  
  
In  cases  concerning  house  search,  the  ECtHR  neither  defines  the  scope  of  nor  
the  nature   of   the   bodies   that   should  be   empowered   to   issue   a   search  warrant.  
Instead,  the  Court’s  analysis  aims  at  examining  whether  the  authorities  carrying  
out   criminal   proceedings   shall   be   empowered   to   order   and   effect   the   searches  
themselves,   or   only   under   a   judicial   warrant88.  With   reference   to   the   relevant  
case-­‐‑law,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  issuance  does  not  necessarily  have  
to   be   a   judicial   decision,   however,   any   absence   of   an   a   priori   judicial   warrant  
must  be  counterbalanced  by  the  availability  of  an  ex  post  factum  judicial  review89.  
It   is  worth  highlighting   that   the  Court   –   as   in   the   case   of   telephone   tapping   –  
refers  also  to  ‘independent  or  judicial  supervision’.  In  Heino  v.  Finland  the  Court  
stated:  
  
Turning  to  the  present  case,  the  Court  reiterates  that  it  has  already  found  in  the  
Sallinen   and   Others   case   (…),   that   there   was   no   independent   or   judicial  
supervision  when  granting  the  search  warrant  as  the  decision  to  authorise  the  order  
was  taken  by  the  police  themselves90.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the  G   10  Commission   are   independent   of   the   authorities   carrying   out   the   surveillance,   and   are   vested  
with  sufficient  powers  and  competence  to  exercise  an  effective  and  continuous  control.  Furthermore,  the  
democratic  character  is  reflected  in  the  balanced  membership  of  the  Parliamentary  Board.  The  opposition  
is  represented  on  this  body  and  is  therefore  able  to  participate  in  the  control  of  the  measures  ordered  by  
the   competent  Minister   who   is   responsible   to   the   Bundestag.   The   two   supervisory   bodies  may,   in   the  
circumstances  of  the  case,  be  regarded  as  enjoying  sufficient  independence  to  give  an  objective  ruling.  
87   See  also:  As   regards   the   authority   competent   to   authorise   the   surveillance,   authorising  of   telephone  
tapping   by   a   non-­‐‑judicial   authority   may   be   compatible   with   the   Convention   (…),   provided   that   that  
authority  is  sufficiently  independent  from  the  executive,  Zakharoąv  v.  Russia,  §§  258.  
88   W.   JASIŃSKI,  Dowodowe   czynności   wykrywcze   a   ingerencja   w   prawo   do   prywatności-­‐‑standardy  
strasburskie,  Europejski  Przegląd  Sądowy  2015,  Vol.1,  p.  17-­‐‑25.  
89   See,   inter   alia:  Misan   v.   Russia,   §§   57:   (…)   in   the   absence   of   a   requirement   for   prior   judicial  
authorisation   at   the  material   time,   the   investigation   authorities   had   unfettered   discretion   to   assess   the  
expediency  and  scope  of  the  search  and  seizure.  §§  58:  The  Court  further  finds  that  the  absence  of  a  prior  
judicial  authorisation  was  not  counterbalanced  by  the  availability  of  an  ex  post  factum  judicial  review.  In  
the   present   case   the   judicial   review  was   limited   to   verifying  whether   the   search   and   seizure   had   been  
ordered   by   a   competent   prosecutor.   (…)   The   Court   is   therefore   not   convinced   that   the   search   of   the  
applicant’s  home  was  justified  by  “relevant”  and  “sufficient”  reasons.    
90  Heino  v.  Finland,  §§  44.  
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Consequently,  the  Court  accepts  as  authorities  competent  to  issue  permission  
to  carry  out  the  measure,  inter  alia,  prosecutors91,  border  guard  officers92  or  even  
public   servants93,   ruling   that   an   effective   judicial   or   independent   a   posteriori  




The   overview   of   ECtHR   case-­‐‑law   leads   to   the   conclusion   that   the   Court,  
instead   of   labelling   competent   authorities,   focuses   on   analysing   whether   the  
authorities   designated   to   issue   permission   for   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search  ensure  adequate  protection  against  arbitrary  interference  and  haphazard  
decisions.  Hence,  the  Court  takes  the  position  that  in  the  case  of  both  measures  it  
is  essential  that  either  an  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  review  is  carried  out  by:  
- a  judicial  authority,  or  
- an  authority  independent  of  the  issuing  body’s  activity.  
Moreover,   the   ECtHR   operates   under   a   definition   of   ‘judicial   authorities’  
different   from   that   presented   in   the   EU   instruments,   which   preferably   cover  
judges   and   courts,   and   exceptionally   other   bodies   provided   they   are  
independent   of   the   executive,   impartial   towards   interested   parties   and   able   to  
conduct   the   procedure   with   judicial   character.   It   is   noteworthy   then,   in  
contradiction   to   MR   instruments,   that   this   approach   usually   excludes  
prosecutors  from  the  scope  of  ‘judicial’.    
  
                                                                                                                            
91  Smirnov  v.  Russia,  §§  45:  In  the  present  case,  however,  the  absence  of  a  prior  judicial  warrant  was,  to  a  
certain   extent,   counterbalanced   by   the   availability   of   an   ex   post   factum   judicial   review.   The   applicant  
could,  and  did,  make  a  complaint  to  a  court  which  was  called  upon  to  review  both  the  lawfulness  of,  and  
justification  for,  the  search  warrant.  The  efficiency  of  the  actual  review  carried  out  by  the  domestic  courts  
will  be  taken  into  account  in  the  following  analysis  of  the  necessity  of  the  interference.    
92  Harju  v.  Finland.  In  this  case,  concerning  a  search  warrant  issued  and  effected  by  the  Finnish  
Border  Guard,  the  Court  stated  that  the  applicant’s  right  to  respect  for  her  home  was  violated  
by   the   fact   that   there  was   no   prior   judicial  warrant   and   no   possibility   to   obtain   an   effective   judicial  
review  a  posteriori  of  either  the  decision  to  order  the  search  or  the  manner  in  which  it  was  conducted  (§§  
44).   It   is  noteworthy  that   the  Court  again  pointed  out   that  here  the  absence  of  a  prior   judicial  
warrant  may  be  counterbalanced  by  the  availability  of  an  ex  post  factum  judicial  review  (§§  44).  
93  Camenzind  v.  Switzerland,  §§  46-­‐‑47.  In  this  case  the  Court  did  not  find  problematic  the  fact  that  
under  Swiss  legislation  a  search  can  be  issued  by  designated  senior  public  servants.  The  Court  
stated   that   having   regard   to   the   safeguards   provided   by   Swiss   legislation,   especially   to   the  
limited  scope  of  the  search  and  post  factum  judicial  control,  the  interference  was  in  line  with  Art.  
8  ECHR.    
94  As  an  example  to  the  contrary  see:  Funke  v.  France,  §§  57:  (…)  the  customs  authorities  had  very  
wide  powers;  in  particular,  they  had  exclusive  competence  to  assess  the  expediency,  number,  length  and  
scale  of  inspections.  Above  all,  in  the  absence  of  any  requirement  of  a  judicial  warrant  the  restrictions  and  
conditions   provided   for   in   law,  which  were   emphasized   by   the  Government   (see   paragraph   54   above),  
appear  too  lax  and  full  of  loopholes  for  the  interferences  with  the  applicant’s  rights  to  have  been  strictly  





1.1.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  ratione  auctoritatis    
  
The   goal   of   this   chapter   is   to   devise   a   minimum   standard   which   could  
enhance  mutual  trust  between  member  states   in  terms  of  authorities  appointed  
to  issue  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  in  the  context  of  EU  cooperation  in  
criminal  matters.   The   overview  of   both  MLA  and  MR   instruments   shows   that  
various  authorities  are  competent  to  act  in  the  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  in  
the   EU,   and   that   member   states   are   left   to   appoint   ‘judicial’   authorities   in  
accordance   with   their   domestic   legal   systems.   Moreover,   the   EIO   Directive  
makes   a   distinction   between   judicial   authorities   sensu   stricto   and   sensu   largo,  
providing   an   exhaustive   list   of   the   former   group   and   leaving   open   the   latter.  
Given   the   domestic   provisions,  which   in  most   cases   appoint   courts,   judges   or  
investigative   judges   to   issue   the  measures,  one  may  wonder  whether  reference  
to  sensu  stricto  judicial  authorities  could  be  an  option  and  constitute  a  minimum  
standard.   However,   on   the   other   hand,   the   ECtHR   in   cases   concerning   both  
measures  rules  that  the  issuing  authority  should  be  a  guarantee  that  the  measure  
is   not   ordered   haphazardly.   Consequently,   the   Court   does   not   focus   on  
specifying   competent   authorities,   but   on   determining   the   components   that  
ensure  adequate  protection  against  arbitrary  interference.    
From   the   Court’s   case-­‐‑law   the   conclusion   clearly   follows   that   what   is   of  
utmost   importance  when   it   comes   to   the   question   of   authorities   appointed   to  
authorise  such  intrusive  measures  as  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  is  that  
these  authorities  ensure  protection  against  risk  of  abuses  of  power.  Accordingly,  
if  mutual  trust  between  member  states  is  aimed  at,  then  it  is  necessary  to  focus  
on  authorities’   competences  and   their   capability  of   ensuring  protection  against  
abuses  instead  of  naming  them  as  judicial  authorities  sensu  stricto  or  sensu  largo.    
This   approach   prioritises   protection   against   abuses   over   defining   the  
authorities.   That   could   also   help   to   overcome   the   diversity   of   national   legal  
systems  which  may   entrust   different   authorities  with   authority   in   this  matter.  
Moreover,  it  is  fully  in  line  with  the  mutual  recognition  philosophy,  especially  in  
light  of  the  FD  EAW  which  accepts  different  authorities  designated  to  deal  with  
the   EAW,   as   long   as   the   procedural   guarantees   and   the   fairness   of   the  
proceedings   are   not   hampered.   Finally,   this   approach   does   not   require   a  
definition   of   a   judicial   authority,   which   helps   to   overcome   the   dichotomy  
apparent   between   the   EU   and   ECtHR   approaches   to   the   scope   of   the   term  
‘judicial’,  especially  in  terms  of  public  prosecutors.    
Hence,   given   the   standards   produced   by   the   Court,   mutual   trust   between  
member   states   could  be   enhanced  by  ensuring  under  domestic  provisions   that  
both  measures  are  reviewed  either  a  priori  or  a  posteriori  by:  
- judges  or  courts,  or    
- in  exceptional  cases  by  other  bodies  as  long  as  they  are  independent  of  
the  executive,   impartial   towards   interested  parties  and  able  to  conduct  
the  procedure  with  judicial  character.  
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In  conclusion,  auctoritatis  obstacles  could  be  overcome  by  adopting  common  
requirements   for   competences   of   authorities   designated   to   issue   the  measures,  
and   their   capability   of   ensuring   protection   against   abuses   of   power.   In   other  
words,   operating   under   the   same   level   of   protection   against   arbitrary  
interferences   has   the   potential   to   enhance   the  mutual   trust   and,   consequently,  
mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   both   measures.   In   the   new  
scenario,   member   states   would   assume   per   se   that,   irrespective   of   how   the  
foreign   issuing  authority   is  named,   it   ensures   the   commonly  agreed  minimum  
standards  against   the   risk  of  abuses  of  power.  This  conclusion  also  means   that  
the   ‘judicial’   nature   of   the   ratione   auctoritatis,  which   has   different   connotations  






1.2. Ratione  materiae  
  
Thus   far,   there   is  no  such   thing  as  common  grounds   for  evidence-­‐‑taking   in  
the  EU.  Consequently,  each  member  state  sets  these  grounds  itself,  in  accordance  
with  national   law.  This  may  lead  to  significant   incompatibilities  when  it  comes  
to  cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of  evidence.  Problems  may  arise  especially  when   the  
measure   requested   by   the   issuing   member   state   would   not   be   available   in   a  
similar  domestic  case  in  the  executing  state,  due  to  the  fact  that,  for  example,  the  
use  of   the   investigative  measure   is   restricted   to  specific  preconditions  or  cases.  
These  materiae   incompatibilities  may  hamper  smooth  evidence-­‐‑gathering  across  
the  EU  and  constitute  an  obstacle  in  the  field  of  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence.  
In  other  words,  diversity  of  grounds  across   the  EU  may  cause  mutual  distrust  
between   member   states   as   to   the   preconditions   for   issuing   such   intrusive  
measures  as  telephone  tapping  or  house  search  and,  therefore,  lead  to  dilemmas  
regarding  admissibility  of  evidence.    
Thus,   this   chapter   investigates   materiae   concerns   in   view   of   coming   to  
common   EU   minimum   standards   for   ordering   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search.  The  central  research  question  of  this  part  of  the  research  is  the  following:  
  
Is   coming   to  common  grounds   for  ordering   telephone   tapping  and  house  search   for  
the  purposes  of  EU  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  feasible?  
  
Before   embarking   on   a   detailed   study,   some   terminology   and   conceptual  
concerns  have  to  be  clarified.  Firstly,  the  research  uses  the  terms  ‘double/mutual  
admissibility’   interchangeably   with   the   terms   ‘double/mutual   availability’   of  
measures.  All  these  terms  describe  a  situation  where  the  measure  is  available  in  
the   specific   case  both   in   the   issuing  and   the  executing   state.  Secondly,  materiae  
concerns   investigated   in   this   chapter   have   a   strong   link   with   the   double  
criminality  principle95,  because  –  as  reported  below  –  the  majority  of  the  EU/CoE  
instruments  reserve  the  right  of  execution  of  the  investigative  measure  indicated  
by   another  member   state   dependent   on   the   double   criminality   of   the   relevant  
offence.   It   has   to   be   stressed   that   this   research   distinguishes   between   double  
criminality  and  double  admissibility.  This   is  because   the   former  deals  with   the  
right   to   refuse   the   execution   of   the   foreign   request/order   if   the   offence   being  
investigated  does  not  meet  the  double  criminality  requirement  in  the  executing  
state.  The  latter,  on  the  other  hand,  deals  with  the  availability  of  the  measure  in  
                                                                                                                            
95  The   requirement  of  double   criminality  was  developed  as   a  protection  mechanism  aimed  at  
preventing  member  states   from  being  obligated   to  cooperate   in   the  enforcement  of  a  decision  
contrary   to   their   own   legal   system.   In   spite   of   its   indisputable   importance,   the   double  
criminality   requirement   is   nowadays   considered   an   obstacle   for   smooth   cooperation  
throughout   the  EU  and,   consequently,   the  EU  attempts   to   limit   its  use,   see   in  more  detail:  G.  
VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  30.  
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the  executing  state,  which  may  cause  problems  if   the  domestic  requirements  of  
member   states   differ   and   the   issued   measure   does   not   fall   within   domestic  
preconditions  or  could  not  be  effected   in  a  comparable  domestic   case.   In  other  
words,   even   if   the   double   criminality   requirement   is   fulfilled   and   the  
request/order   may   be   executed,   it   does   not   guarantee   that   the   investigative  
measure  concerned  will  be  automatically  executed  due  to  the  fact  that  domestic  
grounds   for   the   measure   in   the   executing   state   may   involve   different  
requirements.   To   sum   up,   whereas   double   criminality   applies   to   the   EU  
cooperation   level,   double   admissibility   refers   to   domestic   provisions   as   to   the  
availability   of   the   investigative   measures.   Therefore,   for   the   foreign  
request/order   to   succeed,   it   is   necessary   to   comply   with   both   requirements,  
unless  the  instruments  governing  evidence-­‐‑gathering  provide  otherwise  which,  
as  reported  below,  is  usually  not  the  case.    
1.2.1. Ratione  materiae  in  domestic  legislation   
 
As   an   important   preliminary   it   has   to   be   pointed   out   that   none   of   the  
investigated   jurisdictions   provide   special   grounds   for   issuing   the  measures   on  
the   basis   of   foreign   requests.   Consequently,   the   member   states   use   domestic  
ratione   materiae   preconditions   also   for   the   purposes   of   EU   cross-­‐‑border  
cooperation.  A  brief  overview  of  these  provisions  is  presented  below.  
  
1.2.1.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
In  England  and  Wales,  pursuant  to  Section  5  RIPA,  telephone  tapping  can  be  
carried  out  if  it  is  necessary:    
- in  the  interests  of  national  security;  
- for  the  purpose  of  preventing  or  detecting  serious  crime96;  
- for  the  purpose  of  safeguarding  the  economic  well-­‐‑being  of  the  United  
Kingdom;  or    
- in  circumstances  which  appear  to  the  Secretary  of  State  to  give  effect  to  
the  provisions  of  any  international  mutual  assistance  agreement.    
Accordingly,   in   England   and   Wales   the   gravity   of   the   offence   is   not   a  
criterion97,  however,  the  measure  must  fulfil  the  requirements  of  proportionality  
and  necessity98.  Grounds  for   the  measure   in  France  are  set  out   in  art.  100  CCP.  
According   to   this   article,   the   measure   is   permissible   for   the   investigation   of  
felonies   and  misdemeanours   for   which   the   penalty   incurred   is   equal   to   or   in  
                                                                                                                            
96  Serious  crime  is  defined  as  an  offence  for  which  a  person  who  has  reached  the  age  of  21  and  
who  has  no  prior   convictions   could   reasonably  be   expected   to  be   sentenced   to   three  years  of  
imprisonment  or  more.  
97  T.  HOWSE,  England…,  p.  151.  
98  P.  DARBYSHIRE,  Criminal  Procedure  in  England  and  Wales  [in:]  Criminal  Procedure  in  Europe,  R.  





excess  of   two  years’   imprisonment99.   In   Ireland,  grounds  for   telephone  tapping  
are  laid  down  in  Sections  4  and  5  of  the  Criminal  Justice  (Surveillance)  Act  2009.  
Under  the  legislation,  an  application  is  allowed  only:  
- where  the  applying  Garda  has  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  as  
part   of   an   operation   or   investigation   being   conducted   by   the   Garda  
Síochána  concerning  an  arrestable  offence,  the  surveillance  is  necessary  
for  the  purposes  of  obtaining  information  as  to  whether  the  offence  has  
been  committed  or  as  to  the  circumstances  relating  to  the  commission  of  
the   offence   or   obtaining   evidence   for   the   purposes   of   proceedings   in  
relation  to  the  offence,  
- the  measure  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  commission  
of  arrestable  offences  or  of  maintaining  the  security  of  the  State100.      
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  arrestable  offence  is  defined  as  any  offence  which  is  
potentially  punishable  by  at  least  five  years  imprisonment101.  In  the  Netherlands  
the  measure  is  allowed  only  in  cases  where  there  is:  
- reasonable   suspicion   that   a   criminal   offence   for   which   detention   on  
remand  is  allowed  has  been  commited;  
- suspicion   of   an   offence   that   constitutes   a   serious   breach   of   the   legal  
order;  
- suspicion  that  an  organisation  is  plotting  or  committing  serious  crimes;  
- indications  of  a  terrorist  crime.  
There  must  also  be  real  urgency  for  the  measure  to  be  approved102.  Given  the  
Dutch  provisions,   the  degree   of   suspicion   required   for   the  use   of   the  measure  
depends  on   the   context   in  which   the  measure   is  deployed103.   It   should   also   be  
noted   that   offences   which   constitute   a   serious   breach   of   the   legal   order   are  
defined   as   offences   which   are   potentially   punishable   by   at   least   four   years  
imprisonment104.   The   Polish   KPK   relies   on   an   exhaustive   list   of   offences.  
Accordingly,  telephone  tapping  in  Poland  is  allowed  only  when  the  proceedings  
in   progress,   or   the   justified   concern   that   a   new   offence  might   be   perpetrated,  
pertain  to  one  of  the  19  offences  listed  in  art.  237  §  3  KPK,  which  include,  among  
others:   homicide,   kidnapping,  people   trafficking   and  armed   robbery.   In   Spain,  
pursuant   to   art.   588   ter   a)   LECrim,   permission   for   interception   of   telephone  
telecommunications   can  only  be  granted  when   the   inquiry   focuses  on   some  of  
the   offences   referred   to   in   art.   579.1   LECrim,   namely:   intentional   crimes   with  
deprivation   of   freedom   of   at   least   three   years,   terrorism   cases,   crimes  
perpetrated  by  a  criminal  group  or  organisation.  
                                                                                                                            
99   J.   TRICOT,   France   [in:]  Toward   a   Prosecutor   for   the   European  Union.   Volume   1.   A  Comparative  
Analysis,  K.  LIGETI  (ed.),  Hart  Publishing  2013,  p.  239.    
100  Section  4  Criminal  Justice  (Surveillance)  Act  2009.    
101  Section  8  Criminal  Justice  (Mutual  Assistance)  Act  2006.    
102  M.  J.  BORGERS,  L.  STEVENS,  The  Netherlands…,  p.  193-­‐‑194.    
103   I.   PEÇI,   The   Netherlands   [in:]   Toward   a   Prosecutor   for   the   European   Union.   Volume   1.   A  
Comparative  Analysis,  K.  LIGETI  (ed.),  Hart  Publishing  2013,  p.  112.  
104  Art.  67  Sv.    
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1.2.1.2. House  search  
  
Search   warrants   for   premises   in   England   and   Wales   are   issued   under   a  
variety  of  acts,  therefore  the  preconditions  may  vary  slightly105.  As  an  example,  
Section  8  of  the  PACE  requires  the  following  grounds  for  the  interference:    
- an  indictable  offence  has  been  committed106;  
- material  on  the  premises  mentioned  which  is  likely  to  be  of  substantial  
value   (whether   by   itself   or   together   with   other   material)   to   the  
investigation  of  the  offence;  and  
- that  the  material  is  likely  to  be  relevant  evidence,  and  relevant  evidence  
is  anything  that  would  be  admissible  at  trial  for  the  offence;  
- it  is  not  practicable  to  communicate  with  a  person  entitled  to  grant  entry  
and  access  to  the  material;  and    
- it  does  not  consist  of  or  include  items  subject  to  legal  privilege,  excluded  
material  or  special  procedure  material107.    
In  France,  the  grounds  for  house  search  are  determined  by  the  purpose  of  the  
measure,   which   may   be   carried   out   in   any   premises   in   order   to   find   objects  
which  could  be  useful  to  the  discovery  of  the  truth.  The  minimum  imprisonment  
threshold   of   five   years   is   required   only   for   searches   conducted   without   the  
consent  of  the  person  in  whose  house  they  take  place108.  In  Ireland,  grounds  for  
searches   are  distributed   across   various   statutes.   In  principle,   a   house   search   is  
permitted   if   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   suspecting   that   a   person   or  
evidence   in   relation   to   the   investigation  of   a   relevant  offence   is   to  be   found  at  
that  place.   For   example,   Section   10  of   the  Criminal   Justice   (Miscellaneous)  Act  
1997   provides   that   a   search   is   permitted   if   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for  
suspecting  that  evidence  of,  or  relating  to  the  commission  of:  
- an   indictable  offence   involving   the  death  of  or  serious  bodily   injury   to  
any  person,  
- an  offence  of  false  imprisonment,  
- an  offence  of  rape,    
is  to  be  found  in  any  place.    
Another  example  is  the  Misuse  of  Drugs  Act  1977,  which  permits  a  search  if  
there   are   reasonable   grounds   to   suspect   that   a   controlled   drug   is   on   the  
premises109.   Pursuant   to   the   Child   Trafficking   and   Pornography   Act   1998,   the  
measure   is   permissible   when   a   District   Court   judge   is   satisfied   that   there   are  
reasonable   grounds   for   suspecting   that   evidence   connected   with   an   offence  
                                                                                                                            
105  T.  HOWSE,  England…,  p.  158.  
106  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  phrase  ‘indictable  offence’  is  an  extension  from  the  most  serious  
offences   (‘serious   arrestable   offences’)   to   a  wider   class   of  more   serious   offences:   P.  OZIN,  H.  
NORTON,  P.  SPIVEY,  PACE…,  p.  24.  
107  Section  8  PACE.    
108  J.  TRICOT,  France…,  p.  244.  





under   this   act   is   to   be   found   on   the   premises110.   According   to   the   Dutch  
Strafvordering,   the   measure   is   permitted   only   with   regard   to   crimes   with   a  
minimum  imprisonment  of   four  years  or  where  there   is  a  reasonable  suspicion  
that  such  a  crime  has  been  committed111.  It  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  there  is  no  
requirement   that   the   search  warrrant  must   state   the  address  of   the  place   to  be  
searched,   provided   the   information   is   sufficient   to   identify   the   premises.  
Moreover,   the   warrant   does   not   have   to   specify   the   items   to   be   seized112.  
Grounds   for   searches   in   Poland   are   set   out   in   art.   219   KPK.   The   measure   is  
permitted  for  all  offences  provided  the  objectives  of  the  measure  are:  
- detection,  detention  or  forcible  arrest  of  a  suspected  person,  or  
- the   finding   of   objects   which   might   constitute   evidence   in   a   case   or  
which  are  subject  to  seizure  in  criminal  proceedings.    
A   search   of   premises   or   other   places   may   be   conducted   if   there   are   justified  
grounds   for   the   belief   that   either   a   suspected   person   or   specified   objects   are  
there.  
The   Spanish   LECrim   does   not   provide   detailed   requirements   for   house  
searches.   Therefore,   the   measure   is   determined   by   the   object   which   may   be  
collected  as  evidence:  instruments,  objects,  papers,  documents  or  relevant  items  
or   information   in   a   wider   sense.   According   to   Spanish   jurisprudence,   house  
search  is  permissible:  
- for  the  purposes  of  arrest  or  detention,    
- in  cases  of  serious  crime,  




The  comparative  study  exhibits  striking  differences  between  the  investigated  
jurisdictions   in   their  approaches   to   the  preconditions   required   for   issuing  both  
measures.  The  most  common  approaches  apparent  among  these  six  jurisdictions  
are  as  follows:    
- an  exhaustive  list  of  offences;  
- a  minimum  imprisonment  threshold;  
- general  grounds  or  reference  to  the  objective  of  the  interference.    
This  mix  of  grounds  does  not  automatically  mean  that  the  scope  of  offences  
is  incoherent  and  that  an  offence  which  is  listed  in,  for  example,  the  Polish  KPK,  
does  not  comply  with  the  requirement  for  a  sentence  of  four  years  imprisonment  
in   the   law   of   the   Netherlands.  What   is   problematic,   however,   is   the   different  
                                                                                                                            
110  Section  7  Child  Trafficking  and  Pornography  Act  1998.    
111   I.  PEÇI,  The  Netherlands…,  p.   110.   It   is  noteworthy   that   the   search  may  also  be   carried  out  
under  special  powers  laid  down  in  specific  acts,  see:  ibid.,  p.  111.  
112  A.  GRUBER,  V.  DE  PALACIOS,  P.  HEIN  VAN  KEMPEN,  Practical  Global  Criminal  Procedure.  
United  States,  Argentina  and  The  Netherlands,  Durham  North  Carolina  2012,  p.  150.    
113   T.   ARMENTA   DEU,   Lecciones   de   derecho   procesal   penal.   Quinta   edición,   Madrid-­‐‑Barcelona-­‐‑
Buenos  Ares  2010,  p.  143.    
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system   of   classification   of   these   offences,  which  may   cause   practical   problems  
when   it   comes   to   EU   cross-­‐‑border   cooperation.   In   order   to   facilitate   further  
analysis,   Tables   4   and   5   present   the   variety   of   grounds   reported   in   the  
investigated  member  states.  
  
Table  4:  Grounds  for  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation    
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Table  5:  Grounds  for  house  search  in  domestic  legislation  
  
   England  
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1.2.2.  Ratione  materiae  in  MLA  and  MR  instruments  
  
The   European   Union   may   be   considered   a   ‘laboratory’   in   which   several   new   and  
interesting  ideas  have  developed  and  some  ‘experiments’  have  been  carried  out  in  the  
field  of  international  cooperation  in  criminal  matters114.    
  
This  quote  may  be  used  as  an  excellent  introduction  to  an  overview  of  how  
dual   criminality   and   dual   availability   of   investigative   measures   have   been  
tackled   within   instruments   governing   criminal   cooperation   in   the   EU.   It   is  
noteworthy   that   these   issues   have   always   been   hotly   debated   and   the   final  
solutions  have  usually  been  the  result  of  compromises  between  member  states.  
Therefore,  the  following  overview  examines  which  grounds  give  rise  to  limit  by  
member   states   either   double   criminality   or   double   availability   for   purposes   of  
cooperation   in  criminal  matters   in   the  EU.   In  doing  so,  various  approaches  are  
presented,   since   different   instruments   attempt   to   tackle   the   cross-­‐‑border  
allowance  for  certain  investigation  techniques  in  different  ways.  
  
1.2.2.1. Double  criminality  and  double  availability  in  MLA  instruments  
  
- Extraditable  offences  
  
This  subsection  explains  double  criminality  and  double  availability  concerns  
across   extradition-­‐‑related   instruments115.   Undoubtedly,   the   ‘extradition   saga’  
plays   an   important   role   in   the   central   research   question   of   this   chapter,   since  
extradition-­‐‑related  instruments  elaborate  on  categories  of  grounds  governing  the  
use   of   extradition   between   member   states.   These   grounds   are   based   on   the  
concept   of   extraditable   offences   which   complement   the   availability   of  
extradition  with  sanction  thresholds116.  
The   basic   extradition-­‐‑related   instrument   which   addresses   the   issue   and  
elaborates  on  the  concept  of  extraditable  offences  is  the  European  Convention  on  
                                                                                                                            
114  M.  PŁACHTA,  European  Arrest  Warrant:  Revolution  in  Extradition?  European  Journal  of  Crime,  
Criminal  Law  and  Criminal  Justice,  2003  v.  11/2,  p.  179.    
115  With   regard   to   extradition   and  mutual   assistance   in   criminal  matters   see:   E.  DENZA,  The  
2000   Convention   on  Mutual   Assistance   in   Criminal  Matters,   Common  Market   Law  Review,  No.  
43/2003,  p.  1047-­‐‑1048.  
116   It   is   noteworthy   that   the   concept   of   extraditable   offences  has   always  been  widely  debated  
when   developing   extradition   instruments,   see   in   more   detail:   G.   VERMEULEN,   EU  
conventions…,  p.  72  et  seq.  
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Extradition   (hereafter:   CoE   Extradition)117.   With   regard   to   the   provisions  
regulating   the   double   criminality   requirement,   the   instrument   distinguishes  
between:  
- the  situation  where  the  person  still  has  the  status  of  a  suspect,  in  which  
case  the  threshold  in  the  issuing/requesting  member  state  is  assessed  in  
an  abstract  way,  looking  at  the  sanction  that  might  be  imposed;  and    
- the  situation  where  the  person  has  already  been  convicted,  in  which  case  
the   threshold   in   the   issuing/requesting   member   state   is   assessed   in   a  
concrete  way,  looking  at  the  sanction  that  was  imposed118.    
Consequently,  art.  2.1.  of  the  CoE  Extradition  sets  a  threshold  of:  
- one   year   of   imprisonment   in   abstracto   as   a   requirement   for   the  
requesting  state;  
- four  months   of   imprisonment   in   concreto  as   a   requirement   for   the  
requesting  state;  
- one   year   of   imprisonment   in   abstracto   as   a   requirement   for   the  
requested  state.    
It  is  noteworthy  that  at  the  same  time  the  Benelux  Extradition  Treaty  requires  
only   a   six-­‐‑month   threshold   in   abstracto   in   both   states119.   The   latter   instrument  
was  a  means   to   lower   the  Convention’s   threshold.  This  problem  was   triggered  
again   when   drafting   the   1996   Convention   relating   to   Extradition   between  
Member   States   of   the   European  Union   (hereafter:   EU   Extradition)120,   in  which  
art.  2:  
- maintained   the   in  abstracto   threshold  of  one  year   in   the  requesting  
state;  
- raised  the  in  concreto  threshold  in  the  requesting  member  state  from  
four  to  six  months121;  
                                                                                                                            
117  COUNCIL  OF  EUROPE,  European  Convention  on  Extradition,  Paris,   13.12.1957,  European  
Treaty  Series  –  No.  24.  
118   W.   DE   BONDT,   Overcoming   offence   diversities   in   EU   policy   making.   Needs   and   feasibility  
assessment,  Maklu  2012,  p.  141-­‐‑142;  A.  GÓRSKI,  Europejskie  ściganie  karne.  Zagadnienia  ustrojowe,  
Warszawa  2010,  p.  187-­‐‑188.  
119   See   Art.   2.1   of   the   Treaty   between   the   Kingdom   of   Belgium,   the   Grand   Duchy   of  
Luxembourg   and   the   Kingdom   of   the   Netherlands   concerning   extradition   and   mutual  
Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters,  27.6.1962,  <www.consilium.europa.eu>.  
120  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Council  Act  of  27  September  1996  drawing  up  of  
the  Convention  relating  to  extradition  between  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  OJC  
313/11,  23.10.1996.  
121  In  this  respect  see  the  comments  of  W.  De  Bondt:  This  means  that  (…)  the  in  concreto  threshold  
was  raised  from  four  (in  Art.  2.1.  CoE  Extradition)  to  six  months  (in  Art.  2.1.  EU  Extradition),  without  
any   form   of   justification,   not   even   when   compared   to   existing   regional   instruments.   The   Benelux  
Extradition  Treaty  for  example  lowered  the  in  abstracto  CoE  threshold  by  rendering  offences  extraditable  
as   soon   as   they   are   punishable  with   a   deprivation   of   liberty   of   at   least   six  months   or   punished  with   a  
detention  order   if  a  maximum  period  of  at   least   four  months   (…)  The  coexistence  of   these   instruments  
created   the   rather   complex   situation   in   which   the   sanction   threshold   and   therefore   the   scope   of   the  
extraditable  offences  was  dependent  on   the  ratification  process   in  each  of   the   individual  member  states,  





- lowered   the   in   abstracto   threshold   in   the   requested   state   to   six  
months.  
It  is  noteworthy  that  initially  all  delegations  were  uniformly  willing  to  lower  
the   threshold   in   the   requesting   state   to   the   level   of   six   months,   as   with   the  
already   mentioned   Benelux   Extradition   Treaty122.   Moreover,   during   the  
negotiations   on   extraditable   offences,   a   variety   of   suggestions   and   proposals  
were   considered,   such   as   making   the   absence   of   double   criminality   only   an  
optional  ground  for  refusal  or  allowing  extradition  for  crimes  only  punishable  in  
the  requesting  state123.    
  
- 1959  ECMA  and  2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol  
  
The  1959  ECMA  and   its  2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol  explicitly  address   the  
double  admissibility  of  measures  referring  to  double  criminality,  ordre  public  or  
the   extraditable   nature   of   the   offence.   The   1959   ECMA   deals  with   the   double  
admissibility   of   the   measure   indicated   in   the   MLA   request   in   the   context   of  
search   and   seizure   and   makes   this   measure   dependent   either   on   the   double  
criminality   of   the   offence   being   investigated,   the   extraditable   nature   of   the  
offence  or  the  general  ordre  public  rule.  Art.  5  provides:  
 
Art.  5.1.  Any  Contracting  Party  may,  by  a  declaration  addressed  to  the  Secretary  
General   of   the  Council   of   Europe,  when   signing   this  Convention   or   depositing   its  
instrument  of  ratification  or  accession,  reserve  the  right  to  make  the  execution  of  
letters  rogatory  for  search  or  seizure  of  property  dependent  on  one  or  more  of  
the   following   conditions:   a)   that   the   offence   motivating   the   letters   rogatory   is  
punishable  under  both  the   law  of  the  requesting  Party  and  the   law  of  the  requested  
Party;  b)  that  the  offence  motivating  the  letters  rogatory  is  an  extraditable  offence  in  
the  requested  country;  c)  that  execution  of  the  letters  rogatory  is  consistent  with  the  
law  of  the  requested  Party124.    
 
It   has   to   be   stressed   that   almost   all   states   made   a   declaration   under   this  
article125.    
                                                                                                                            
122   Nevertheless,   the   maintaining   of   a   higher   threshold   was   acknowledged   as   a   fortunate  
decision  due  to  the  fact  that  (…)  making  extradition  possible  for  minor  offences  or  for  offences  regarded  
as   less   serious   even   in   the   requesting   state  would  definitely  not  have  been  held  an   improvement  of   the  
extradition   relations   between   the   EU   Member   States,   G.   VERMEULEN,   T.   VANDER   BEKEN,  
Extradition   in   the  European  Union:   State   of   the  Art   and  Perspectives,   European   Journal   of  Crime,  
Criminal  Law  and  Criminal  Justice,  1996/3,  vol.  4,  p.  215-­‐‑217.  
123  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  T.  VANDER  BEKEN,  Extradition…,  p.  216.  
124  As  explained  in  the  1959  ECMA  Explanatory  Report,  the  introduction  of  this  requirement  is  
necessary  due  to  the  fact  that  mutual  assistance  under  the  ECMA  is  not  subject  to  the  rules  of  
extradition   or   to   those   of   culpability   in   both   countries,   see:   1959   ECMA  Explanatory   Report,   
p.  6. 
125  Off  all   the  EU  member  states  twenty-­‐‑four  made  the  execution  of   letters  rogatory  for  search  
and  seizure  subject  to  the  conditions  laid  down  in  art.  5.1  ECMA:  one  under  subparagraph  (b),  
three   under   subparagraph   (c),   thirteen   under   subparagraphs   (a)   and   (c),   four   under  
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More  links  between  investigative  measures  and  their  double  availability  may  
be   found   in   the   2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol.   Accordingly,   art.   8   of   the   2001  
ECMA   Second   Protocol   introduces   the   general   ordre   public   requirement,   as  
follows:  
  
Art.  8.  (…)  where  requests  specify  formalities  or  procedures  which  are  necessary  
under  the  law  of  the  requesting  Party,  even  if  unfamiliar  to  the  requested  Party,  
the   latter   shall   comply   with   such   requests   to   the   extent   that   the   action  
sought  is  not  contrary  to  fundamental  principles  of  its  law,  unless  otherwise  
provided  for  in  this  Protocol.      
  
Thus,  the  2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol  opens  new  frontiers  to  judicial  cross-­‐‑
border  cooperation,  giving  the  requested  member  state   the  right   to  execute   the  
foreign  request  even  if  the  indicated  investigative  measure  is  not  provided  by  its  
domestic   law126.   However,   as   stressed   in   the   2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol  
Explanatory  Report,   ‘there  must  be   a   limit   and   that   limit   is   to  be   found   in   the  
requirement  that  the  action  sought  is  not  contrary  to  fundamental  principles  of  
the   legal   system   of   the   requested   party’127.   The   document   also   specifies   that  
‘fundamental   principles   of   law’   means   ‘fundamental   principles   of   the   legal  
system’,  which  suggests  that  this  term  shall  be  interpreted  broadly128.    
Reference   to   ordre   public   may   be   also   found   in   art.   9   which   deals   with  
hearings  by  video  conference:  
Art.   9.2.   The   requested   Party   shall   agree   to   the   hearing   by   video   conference  
provided   that   the   use   of   the   video   conference   is   not   contrary   to   fundamental  
principles  of  its  law  and  on  condition  that  it  has  the  technical  means  to  carry  out  
the   hearing.   If   the   requested   Party   has   no   access   to   the   technical   means   for   video  
conferencing,   such  means  may   be  made   available   to   it   by   the   requesting   Party   by  
mutual  agreement.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
subparagraphs   (a),   (b)   and   (c),   and   three   under   subparagraphs   (b)   and   (c);   Reservations   and  
Declarations   for   Treaty   No.030   -­‐‑   European   Convention   on  Mutual   Assistance   in   Criminal   Matters,  
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-­‐‑on-­‐‑treaties/-­‐‑/conventions/treaty/030/declarations>,  
status  as  of  12.10.2016.  
126  Presently,  the  need  is  recognised  by  all  to  open  new  frontiers  to   judicial  co-­‐‑operation.  The  first  such  
new  frontier  consists  in  coming  back  to  basics  and  executing  what  is  requested,  as  opposed  to  executing  
equivalent   actions.  What   is   requested   is   often  no  more   than  what   is   legally   required   in   the   requesting  
Party   for   evidentiary   purposes.   Equivalent   action   executed   instead   of   what   is   requested   often   is   not  
admissible   in   the   requesting   Party   for   evidentiary   purposes,   2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol  
Explanatory  Report,  para.  62,  p.  7.      
127  Obviously,  States  cannot  undertake  to  carry  out  action  in  just  any  manner  requested.  There  must  be  a  
limit.  That  limit  is  to  be  found  in  the  requirement  that  the  action  sought  is  not  contrary  to  fundamental  
principles  of   the   legal   system  of   the   requested  Party.  Such  a   limit   is  broad  enough   to   ensure   that  most  
requests  will  be  executed;  yet   it   fulfills   its   role  of   freeing  States   from  any  obligation   to   take  action   that  
would  go   against   their   "ʺnature"ʺ,   2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol  Explanatory  Report,  paras.   63-­‐‑64,   
p.  7.    





It   is  noteworthy   that   this  article   seeks   to  ensure  double  admissibility  of   the  
measure   both   when   the   domestic   conditions   of   the   requested   state   are   not  
fulfilled  and  when  the  measure  is  not  provided  under  its  law  at  all129.    
However,   these   widely   opened   frontiers   according   to   art.   8   of   the   2001  
ECMA   Second   Protocol   are   limited   by   the   Protocol   itself.   For   some  measures,  
such   as   cross-­‐‑border   observation   (art.   17)130   and   controlled   delivery   (art.   18),  
member  states  undertake  to  ensure  that  the  measures  may  be  permitted  but  only  
in  the  framework  of  criminal  investigations  into  extraditable  offences.  It  should  
be   noted   that   extraditable   offences   within   the   meaning   of   the   Protocol   are  
offences  with  respect  to  which,  in  abstracto,  extradition  is  possible  either  under  a  
treaty  or  under  domestic  legislation131.    
In   conclusion,   the  1959  ECMA  and   its   2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol   rely  on  
the  ordre   public   rule  when   it   comes   to   the  double   admissibility  of   investigative  
measures   indicated   in   the   request.   However,   both   documents   provide   some  
specific  provisions  with   regard   to   search  and  seizure,   cross-­‐‑border  observation  
and  controlled  delivery,  which  link  double  admissibility  with  double  criminality  
or  the  extraditable  nature  of  the  offence  being  investigated132.  
 
- 2000  EU  MLA  Convention 
 
The   2000   EU  MLA   Convention   duplicates   many   provisions   from   the   1959  
ECMA,  including  those  on  the  double  admissibility  of  the  measures.    
As   in   the  case  of   the  1959  ECMA,  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  states   that  
hearing  by  video  conference  would  be  permitted   insofar  as   the  measure   is  not  
contrary   to   fundamental   principles   of   the   law   of   the   requested   state133.  
Controlled  deliveries  may  be  permitted  in  each  member  state  in  the  framework  
                                                                                                                            
129  In  the  context  of  paragraph  2,  the  reference  to  "ʺfundamental  principles  of  law"ʺ  implies  that  a  request  
may  not  be  refused  for  the  sole  reason  that  the  hearing  of  witnesses  and  experts  by  videoconference  is  not  
provided  under  the   law  of  the  requested  Party,  or  that  one  or  more  detailed  conditions   for  a  hearing  by  
videoconference   would   not   be   met   under   national   law,   2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol   Explanatory  
Report,  para.  76,  p.  8.  
130   In   cases   of   cross-­‐‑border   observation,   the   2001   ECMA   Second   Protocol   also   provides   a  
procedure   for   urgent   cases   for   investigations   of   offences   listed   in   art.   17.6   which   cover  
assassination;  murder;  rape;  arson;  counterfeiting;  armed  robbery  and  receiving  of  stolen  goods;  
extortion;  kidnapping  and  hostage  taking;  traffic  in  human  beings;  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs  
and   psychotropic   substances;   breach   of   the   laws   on   arms   and   explosives;   use   of   explosives;  
illicit  carriage  of  toxic  and  dangerous  waste;  smuggling  of  aliens;  sexual  abuse  of  children.  
131  Extraditable   offences   are   offences   with   respect   to   which,   in   abstracto,   extradition   is   possible   either  
under   a   treaty   or   under   domestic   legislation.   The   concrete   circumstances   of   the   case,   such   as   the  
nationality  of  the  person  concerned,  may  not  be  used  in  order  to  characterise  an  offence  as  extraditable  or  
not,  2001  ECMA  Second  Protocol  Explanatory  Report,  para.139,  p.13.  
132  With  regard  to  telephone  tapping  see  also  provisions  of  Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10,  art.  
1:  The  execution  of  such  letters  rogatory  should  be  refused  only  for  the  following  reasons:  (...)  if,  in  view  
of  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  interception  would  not  be  justified  according  to  the  law  of  the  
requested  Party  governing  the  interception  of  telecommunications  in  that  state.    
133  Art.  10  of  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention.  
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of  criminal  investigations  into  extraditable  offences134,  and  these  offences  should  
be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  the  EU  Extradition135.    
It   is   noteworthy   that   the   2000   EU   MLA   Convention   introduces   specific  
provisions   with   regard   to   the   interception   of   telecommunications,   which   also  
address   the   problem   of   double   admissibility.   Art.   18.5   (b)   lays   down   the  
conditions   under   which   a   requested   state   must   comply   with   a   request   to  
intercept  telecommunications  with  immediate  transmission  to  the  requested  side  
where  the  subject  of  the  interception  is  present  on  its  territory,  as  follows:  
    
Art.   5.1.   The   requested  Member  State   shall   undertake   to   comply  with   requests  
(…):  
b)   (…)  where   the   requested  measure   would   be   taken   by   it   in   a   similar  
national   case.   The   requested  Member   State  may  make   its   consent   subject   to   any  
conditions  which  would  have  to  be  observed  in  a  similar  national  case.    
  
Consequently,  the  Convention  requires  that  telephone  tapping  is  available  in  
such  a  particular  case  both  in  the  requesting  and  requested  member  state,  which  
is  also  clearly  pointed  out  in  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  Explanatory  Report:    
 
Should  this  be  the  case,  the  requested  Member  State  must  agree  to  the  measure  if  
such  a  measure  would  be  taken  by  it  in  a  similar  national  case.  It  may  also  make  its  
consent   subject   to   any   conditions  which  would,   under   its   national   law,   have   to   be  
observed   in   a   similar   national   case.   These   could,   for   example,   be   conditions  which  
exclude  certain  categories  of  person   from  the  measure  or  which  cover  the  use  of   the  
intercepted  material  (…)136.    
  
Another  example  of  how  to  deal  with   the  double  admissibility  of  measures  
may  be  found  in  the  2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol  with  regard  to  mutual  
assistance   in   respect   of   information   held   by   banks.   Accordingly,   art.   1.3  
introduces  the  double  criminality  requirement  for  information  on  bank  accounts  
and  stipulates  that  the  measure  only  applies  to  certain  forms  of  offences,  which  
must  be  covered  by  at  least  one  of  three  alternatives:  
- penalty   threshold   of   four   years   imprisonment   in   the   requesting  
state  and  two  years  in  the  requested  state;  
- an  offence  listed  in  the  Europol  Convention;  
- an  offence  covered  by  the  instruments  relating  to  the  protection  of  
the   European   Communities’   financial   interests,   to   the   extent   they  
                                                                                                                            
134  Art.  12  of  the  2000  EU  MLA  Convention.  
135  The  concept  of  what  constitutes  an  extraditable  offence  at  the  level  of  the  Union  was  addressed  in  the  
1996  Convention  on  Extradition  between  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  Under  Article  2  of  
the  said  Convention,  an  extraditable  offence   is  one  which   is  punishable  under  the   law  of  the  requesting  
Member  State  by  deprivation  of  liberty  or  a  detention  order  for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  12  months  
and   under   the   law   of   the   requested   Member   State   by   deprivation   of   liberty   or   a   detention   order   for    
a  maximum  period  of  at  least  six  months,  2000  EU  MLA  Convention  Explanatory  Report,  p.  12.    





are  not  already  covered  by  the  Europol  list137.  
It   is  worth   noting   that   the   imprisonment   threshold   set   out   in   this   article   is  
quite   strict,   especially   if   confronted  with   the   threshold  of   extraditable   offences  
under  extradition-­‐‑related  instruments.  However,  this  approach  is  the  result  of  a  
compromise   between   member   states   which   believe   in   the   general   scope   of  
application,  penalty  thresholds  and  lists  of  offences138.  In  cases  where  the  offence  
under   investigation   is   not   an   offence   in   the   requested   state,   the   lack   of   dual  
criminality  may  be  used  as  a  ground  for  refusal139.  
Paragraph   5   of   the   same   article   forms   another   part   of   the   compromise.  
According  to  its  provisions:  
  
1.5.  Member  States  may  make  the  execution  of  a  request  according  to  this  Article  
dependent  on  the  same  conditions  as  they  apply  in  respect  of  requests  for  search  and  
seizure.    
  
In   other   words,   this   paragraph   allows   the   member   state   to   require   the  
consistency   of   the   request   with   its   law,   irrespective   of   the   double   criminality  
compliance.  However,  as  pointed  out  in  the  2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol  
Explanatory   Report,   that   provision   shall   be   interpreted   in   the   light   of   the  
instrument  and  must  not  hinder  its  practical  effect  by  applying  this  condition:  
  
The   possibilities   for   a   member   state   to   refuse   assistance   on   the   ground   that   the  
request   is  not  consistent  with   its   law  are   therefore   limited.  This  means   for  example  
that  a  Member  State  cannot  refuse  a  request  made  under  Article  1  solely  because  
its   national   law   does   not   provide   for   the   production   of   information   relating   to   the  
existence   of   bank   accounts   in   criminal   investigations,   or   because   its   national  
                                                                                                                            
137  Art.   1.3  of   the   2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol:  The   obligation   set   out   in   this  Article   shall  
apply   only   if   the   investigation   concerns:   an   offence   punishable   by   a   penalty   involving   deprivation   of  
liberty  or  a  detention  order  of  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  four  years  in  the  requesting  State  and  at  
least  two  years  in  the  requested  State,  or;  an  offence  referred  to  in  Article  2  of  the  1995  Convention  on  
the  Establishment  of  a  European  Police  Office  (Europol  Convention),  or  in  the  Annex  to  that  Convention,  
as  amended,  or;  to  the  extent  that  it  may  not  be  covered  by  the  Europol  Convention,  an  offence  referred  to  
in   the  1995  Convention  on  the  Protection  of   the  European  Communities'ʹ  Financial   Interests,   the  1996  
Protocol   thereto,   or   the  1997  Second  Protocol   thereto.   It   is  noteworthy   that   the   formulation  of   this  
article   has   been   criticised   as   uncertain   and   vague   with   regard   to   the   scope   of   the   Europol  
mandated   offences,   see:   G.   VERMEULEN,   W.   DE   BONDT,   EULOCS.   The   EU   level   offence  
classification  system:  A  bench-­‐‑mark  for  enhanced  internal  coherence  of  the  EU’s  criminal  policy,  Maklu  
2009,  p.  20.    
138  The  provisions  in  this  paragraph  are  the  result  of  a  compromise  between  those  Member  States  which  
were  in  favour  of  a  general  scope  of  application,  those  which  preferred  (different)  penalty  thresholds  and  
yet  others  which  preferred  a  list  of  offences.  The  final  text  was  agreed  in  the  light  of  the  amount  of  work  
that  the  execution  of  requests  for  information  on  bank  accounts  may  involve  and  the  fact  that  the  measure  
is  a  new  measure,  not  provided  for  in  any  earlier  instruments  relating  to  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  
matters,   and   so   far   not   available   in   certain   Member   States,   2001   EU   MLA   Convention   Protocol  
Explanatory  Report,  p.  3.    
139  2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol  Explanatory  Report,  p.  4.  
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provisions  on  search  and  seizure  normally  demand  a  higher   threshold   than  
that  set  in  paragraph  3  (…)140.  
    
The   same   provision   is   set   out   in   art.   2   of   the   2001   EU   MLA   Convention  




The  provisions  of  the  Schengen  Implementation  Convention  (hereafter:  SIC)  
related   to   double   admissibility   of   cross-­‐‑border   searches   are   also   worth  
mentioning  here:    
  
Art.   51.   The   Contracting   Parties   may   not   make   the   admissibility   of   letters  
rogatory  for  search  or  seizure  dependent  on  conditions  other  than  the  following:  
(a)  the  act  giving  rise  to  the  letters  rogatory  is  punishable  under  the  law  of  both  
Contracting  Parties  by  a  penalty  involving  deprivation  of  liberty  or  a  detention  order  
of  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  six  months,  or  is  punishable  under  the  law  of  one  
of   the   two  Contracting  Parties   by   an   equivalent   penalty   and   under   the   law   of   the  
other  Contracting  Party  by  virtue  of  being  an  infringement  of  the  rules  of  law  which  
is   being   prosecuted   by   the   administrative   authorities,   and  where   the   decision  may  
give  rise   to  proceedings  before  a  court  having   jurisdiction   in  particular   in  criminal  
matters;  
(b)   execution   of   the   letters   rogatory   is   consistent   with   the   law   of   the  
requested  Contracting  Party.  
  
Accordingly,   the  SIC  links  the  double  admissibility  of  evidence  from  search  
and  seizure  with  either  a  six-­‐‑month  threshold  or  consistency  with  the  domestic  
law  of  the  requested  party.    
 
 
1.2.2.2. Double  criminality  in  the  MR  instruments    
  
Instruments   based   on   the  mutual   recognition   principle   provide   a   different  
approach  to  mutual  availability  of  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  measures,  linking  it  with  
the  concept  of  double  criminality.      
  
                                                                                                                            
140  On  the  other  hand   the  provision  allows  a   judicial   control   in   the   requested  State.  Since   there  are  no  
common  rules  in  this  respect,  the  nature  of  that  control  may  be  different  in  the  different  Member  States.  
In   general   terms   it   means   that   the   requested   State   will   be   able   to   put   the   request   before   a   judicial  
authority   for   an  assessment   of   the   request  with   regard   to  national   conditions,   including   constitutional  
requirements,   that  are  not  covered   in  Article  1.  Such  conditions  might   include,   for  example,  privileged  
information,  2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol  Explanatory  Report,  p.  4.  
141  Art.  2.4  of  the  2001  EU  MLA  Convention  Protocol:  Member  States  may  make  the  execution  of  a  
request  according  to  this  Article  dependent  on  the  same  conditions  as  they  apply  in  respect  of  requests  for  





- FD  EAW  and  surrenderable  offences  
  
The  concept  of  extraditable  offences,  developed  within  the  MLA  instruments,  
lost  its  meaning  following  the  introduction  of  the  FD  EAW  and  the  implications  
for   the   double   criminality   requirement   associated   therewith142.   Hence,   the  
following  analysis  starts  from  this  instrument  which  initiates  the  new  approach.      
The   FD   EAW   does   not   copy   the   concept   developed   within   the   realm   of  
extraditable   offences   and,   instead,   introduces   a   new   concept   of   ‘surrenderable  
offences’  based  on  a  two-­‐‑track  approach.  First  of  all,  the  instrument  still  refers  to  
the  sanction  threshold,  however,  it  is  modified  to:  
- 12  months  in  abstracto  in  the  issuing  member  state;  and  
- four  months  in  concreto  in  the  issuing  member  state143.  
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  FD  EAW  resiles  from  imposing  a  threshold  for  the  
executing   state.   However,   the   key   provision   of   the   FD   EAW   is   the   breaking  
down  of  double  criminality  by  introducing  the  so-­‐‑called  ‘32  MR  offences  list’144:  
  
Art.  2.2.  The  following  offences,  if  they  are  punishable  in  the  issuing  Member  
State  by  a  custodial  sentence  or  a  detention  order  for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  
three  years  and  as   they  are  defined  by  the   law  of   the   issuing  Member  State,   shall,  
                                                                                                                            
142  W.  DE  BONDT,  Overcoming  …,  p.143.  
143  Art.  2.1  FD  EAW:  A  European  arrest  warrant  may  be   issued   for  acts  punishable  by   the   law  of   the  
issuing  Member  State  by  a  custodial  sentence  or  a  detention  order  for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  12  
months   or,  where   a   sentence   has   been   passed   or   a   detention   order   has   been  made,   for   sentences   of  at  
least  four  months.  Accordingly,  one  may  notice  that  the  in  abstracto  threshold  in  the  issuing  member  
state   corresponds   to   the   threshold   included   in   the   EU   Extradition,   whereas   the   in   concreto   provision  
corresponds  to  the  1957  CoE  Extradition,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Overcoming…,  p.  143.  
144  These  offences,  hereafter  abbreviated  as  the  ‘MR  offences’,  are  as  follows:  participation  in  a  
criminal   organisation,   terrorism,   trafficking   in   human   beings,   sexual   exploitation   of   children  
and  child  pornography,   illicit   trafficking   in  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic  substances,   illicit  
trafficking  in  weapons,  munitions  and  explosives,  corruption,  fraud,  including  that  affecting  the  
financial   interests  of   the  European  Communities  within   the  meaning  of   the  Convention  of   26  
July  1995  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Communities’  financial  interests,  laundering  of  the  
proceeds   of   crime,   counterfeiting   currency,   including   the   euro,   computer-­‐‑related   crime,  
environmental   crime,   including   illicit   trafficking   in   endangered   animal   species   and   in  
endangered   plant   species   and   varieties,   facilitation   of   unauthorised   entry   and   residence,  
murder,   grievous   bodily   injury,   illicit   trade   in   human   organs   and   tissue,   kidnapping,   illegal  
restraint   and   hostage-­‐‑taking,   racism   and   xenophobia,   organised   or   armed   robbery,   illicit  
trafficking  in  cultural  goods,  including  antiques  and  works  of  art,  swindling,  racketeering  and  
extortion,   counterfeiting   and   piracy   of   products,   forgery   of   administrative   documents   and  
trafficking  therein,  forgery  of  means  of  payment,  illicit  trafficking  in  hormonal  substances  and  
other   growth   promoters,   illicit   trafficking   in   nuclear   or   radioactive   materials,   trafficking   in  
stolen  vehicles,  rape,  arson,  crimes  within  the   jurisdiction  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  
unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft/ships,  sabotage.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  list  was  clearly  inspired  
by   the   Europol   list   as   supplemented   by   the   Eurojust   Decision,   the   list   in   the   SIC   and   the  
substantive  criminal  law  acquis  at  that  time,  see:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  EULOCS….,  
p.   20.   It   also   should  be  noticed   that   the  MR  offences  vary   slightly  across   instruments,   see:  G.  
VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  30-­‐‑31.  
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under   the   terms   of   this   Framework   Decision   and   without   verification   of   the  
double  criminality  of  the  act,  give  rise  to  surrender  pursuant  to  a  European  
arrest  warrant:  (…).  
Art.   2.4.   For   offences   other   than   those   covered   by   paragraph   2,   surrender  may    
be  subject   to   the  condition  that   the  acts   for  which  the  European  arrest  warrant  has  
been   issued   constitute   an   offence   under   the   law   of   the   executing   Member   State,  
whatever  the  constituent  elements  or  however  it  is  described.    
(…)  
Art.   4.   The   executing   judicial   authority  may   refuse   to   execute   the   European  
arrest  warrant:    
1.    if,  in  one  of  the  cases  referred  to  in  Article  2(4),  the  act  on  which  the  European  
arrest   warrant   is   based   does   not   constitute   an   offence   under   the   law   of   the  
executing  Member  State  (…).    
  
Thus,   the   FD   EAW   introduces   an   automatic   application   of   the   mutual  
recognition  principle   and  execution  of   the  warrant   if   the   following   cumulative  
conditions  are  fulfilled:  
- the  offence  is  one  of  the  32  MR  offences,  according  to  the  issuing  member  
state;  and  
- the   offence   is   punishable   in   the   issuing   member   state   by   a   custodial  
sentence   or   a   detention   order   for   a   maximum   period   of   at   least   three  
years  and  as  they  are  defined  by  the  law  of  the  issuing  member  state.  
For  other  acts,  which  are  not  on  the  list,  execution  of  a  warrant  may  still  be  
subject  to  the  condition  of  double  criminality145.    
The   abolition   of   the   double   criminality   requirement   in   the   FD   EAW   was  
hotly   debated   during   drafting   of   the   instrument   and   was   described   as   ‘the  
central  and  the  most  controversial  element  in  the  application  of  the  principle  of  
mutual   recognition   to   criminal   law’146.   Consequently,   the   move   towards  
limitation  of  double  criminality  within  the  FD  EAW  was  by  no  means  welcomed  
with  open  arms   everywhere.  This   approach  has  been  questioned,   especially   in  
light   of   the   limits   of   mutual   recognition   and   abolition   of   the   test   of   dual  
criminality  without  previous  approximation  of  the  substantial  law147.  The  scope  
                                                                                                                            
145  It  has  to  be  stressed  that  lack  of  dual  criminality  constitutes  grounds  for  an  optional  refusal  
only  (art.  4.1  FD  EAW).    
146   S.  PEERS,  Mutual  Recognition   and  Criminal  Law   in   the  European  Union:  Has   the  Council   got   it  
wrong?,   Common  Market   Law   Review,   2004   Vol.   41,   p.   14.   See   also:   S.   ALEGRE.  M.   LEAF,  
Mutual   Recognition   in   European   Judicial   Cooperation:   A   Step   Too   Far   Too   Soon?   Case   Study   –   the  
European  Arrest  Warrant,  European  Law  Journal,  2004  Vol.  10,  No.  2,  p.  208-­‐‑209,  with  regard  to  
abolition  of  the  double  criminality  requirement  in  light  of  the  ECHR.  
147   See   in   more   detail   about   approximation:   W.   DE   BONDT,   G.   VERMEULEN,   Appreciating  
Approximation.  Using   common   offence   concepts   to   facilitate   police   and   judicial   cooperation   in   the  EU  
[in:]  EU  and  International  Crime  Control:  Topical  Issues,  M.  COOLS,  B.  DE  RUYVER,  M.  EASTON,  
L.   PAUWELS,   P.   PONSAERS,   G.   VANDE   WALLE,   T.   VANDER   BEKEN,   F.   VANDER  
LAENEN,   G.   VERMEULEN,   G.   VYNCKIER   (eds.),   Maklu   2010;   G.   VERMEULEN,   L.   VAN  





of   the   MR   offences   list   has   also   been   criticised   for   being   overly   generic   and  
imprecise148.   This   scepticism   follows   from   the   fact   that   differences   in   domestic  
legislation  with  regard  to  the  substantial  law  of  the  issuing  state  may  only  lead  
to   a   situation  where   a   state   is   required   to   execute   a  warrant   even   though   the  
offence  is  not  punishable  in  its  legislation149.  Therefore,  many  questions  and  fears  
have  been  raised  under  the  FD  EAW  due  to  the  fact  that  it  allows  surrender  of  
the   subject   of   the  warrant   even   if   the   offence   at   issue   is   not   punishable   in   the  
executing  state150.  This  issue  was  also  analysed  by  the  ECJ  in  the  case  Advocaten  
voor   de  Wereld151.   The   association  Advocaten   voor   de  Wereld   questioned  whether  
the  abolition  of  double  criminality  with  regard  to  32  offences  is  in  line  with  the  
principle  of  legality  in  criminal  matters.  The  ECJ  disagreed  that  it  infringes  that  
principle   due   to   the   fact   that   the   FD   EAW   does   not   seek   to   harmonise   the  
criminal   offences   in   question   in   respect   of   their   constituent   elements   or   of   the  
penalties  which  they  attract,  but  relies  on  the  criminal  offence  as  defined  in  the  
law  of  the  issuing  state.  Moreover,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the  issuing  state  is  
the  party   that   should  make   sure   that   the  principle  of  nullum   crimen   sine   lege   is  
respected  and  as   long  as   the   legislation  of   the   issuing   state   is   sufficiently   clear  
there   is   no   breach   in   that   field152.   Despite   the   fact   that   the   ECJ   was  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
defendants   in   criminal  proceedings   throughout   the  European  Union   [in:]  EU  and   International  Crime  
Control:  Topical  Issues,  M.  COOLS,  B.  DE  RUYVER,  M.  EASTON,  L.  PAUWELS,  P.  PONSAERS,  
G.   VANDE   WALLE,   T.   VANDER   BEKEN,   F.   VANDER   LAENEN,   G.   VERMEULEN,   G.  
VYNCKIER   (eds.),   Maklu   2010;   A.   WEYEMBERGH,   The   functions   of   approximation   of   penal  
legislation   within   the   European   Union,   Maastricht   Journal   of   European   and   Comparative   Law  
2005,  Vol.  12,  No.  2.  
148   The   ’32   MR   offences   list’   refers   only   to   the   nature   of   the   listed   offences   and   does   not  
guarantee   compatibility   between  member   states  with   regard   to   their   scope   at   domestic   level,  
see:   P.   WILIŃSKI,  Opinia   prawna   o   dopuszczalności   ograniczenia   wykonania   ENA   ze   względu   na  
zasadę   wzajemności,   zasadę   podwójnej   karalności,   zasadę   terytorialności   oraz   ochronę   praw  
podstawowych   [in:]   Nowelizacja   Art.   55   Konstytucji   RP   przez   Sejm   V   kadencji,   Biuro   Analiz  
Sejmowych,  Kancelaria  Sejmu  2006,  p.  43;  A.  GÓRSKI,  P.  HOFMAŃSKI  (eds.),  A.  SAKOWICZ,  
D.  SZUMIŁO-­‐‑KULCZYCKA,  Europejski…,  p.  168-­‐‑172.  
149   See   also:   M.   MÖSTL,   Preconditions   and   limits   of   mutual   recognition,   Common   Market   Law  
Review,  2010,  Vol.  47,  p.  432-­‐‑433  and  his  remarks  with  regard  to  the  principle  nullum  crimen  sine  
lege.  
150  M.  MÖSTL,  Preconditions…,  p.  432-­‐‑433.    
151  Advocaten  voor  de  Wereld  v.  Leden  van  de  Ministerraad,  C-­‐‑303/05,  [2007]  ECR  I-­‐‑3633.  
152  Ibid.,  §§  50:  This  principle  implies  that  legislation  must  define  clearly  offences  and  the  penalties  which  
they  attract.  That  condition  is  met  in  the  case  where  the  individual  concerned  is  in  a  position,  on  the  basis  
of   the  wording  of   the   relevant  provision  and  with   the  help  of   the   interpretative  assistance  given  by   the  
courts,   to   know   which   acts   or   omissions   will   make   him   criminally   liable.   §§   51:   In   accordance   with  
Article   2(2)   of   the   Framework   Decision,   the   offences   listed   in   that   provision   give   rise   to   surrender  
pursuant  to  a  European  arrest  warrant,  without  verification  of  the  double  criminality  of  the  act,  ‘if  they  
are  punishable  in  the  issuing  Member  State  by  a  custodial  sentence  or  a  detention  order  for  a  maximum  
period   of   at   least   three   years   and   as   they   are   defined   by   the   law   of   the   issuing  Member   State’.  §§   52.  
Consequently,  even  if  the  Member  States  reproduce  word-­‐‑for-­‐‑word  the  list  of  the  categories  of  offences  set  
out  in  Article  2(2)  of  the  Framework  Decision  for  the  purposes  of  its  implementation,  the  actual  definition  
of  those  offences  and  the  penalties  applicable  are  those  which  follow  from  the  law  of  'ʹthe  issuing  Member  
State'ʹ.  The  Framework  Decision  does  not  seek  to  harmonise  the  criminal  offences  in  question  in  respect  of  
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straightforward   in   its   view,   it   is   safe   to   say   that   this   judgment   did   not   fully  
tackle  the  obstacles  and  problems  of  the  limits  of  double  criminality153.    
  
- FD  FO  
  
The  FD  FO   follows   the   concept  of  double   criminality   established   in   the  FD  
EAW,   and   art.   3.2   of   the   framework  decision   abandons   the  double   criminality  
requirement  with  regard  to  the  MR  offences  list.  Accordingly,  these  offences,  as  
they  are  defined  by  the  law  of  the  issuing  state,  and  if  they  are  punishable  in  the  
issuing  state  by  a  custodial  sentence  of  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  three  years,  
shall  not  be  subject  to  verification  of  the  double  criminality  of  the  act154.  For  cases  
not   covered   by   the   list,   the   executing   state   may   subject   the   recognition   and  
enforcement  of  a  freezing  order  to  the  condition  that  the  acts  for  which  the  order  
was   issued   constitute   an   offence   under   the   laws   of   that   state,   whatever   the  
constituent  elements  or  however  they  are  described  under  the  law  of  the  issuing  
state155.    
The   instrument,   however,   does   not   directly   address   the   problem   of   the  
double   availability   of   the   measure   indicated   in   the   order.   Consequently,  
ambiguity  arises  over  what  should  happen  if  the  double  criminality  requirement  
of  the  offence  is  fulfilled,  but  in  a  similar  domestic  case  the  freezing  would  not  
be  available   in   the  executing  state?  The  FD  FO  Directive  remains  silent  on   this  
matter156.   Hence,   some   member   states   reacted   independently   and   introduced  
additional   grounds   for   refusal   in   their   national   legislation,   where   the  
requirement  of  double  availability  of  the  measure  is  not  satisfied.  Some  authors  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
their  constituent  elements  or  of  the  penalties  which  they  attract.  §§  53.  Accordingly,  while  Article  2(2)  of  
the   Framework  Decision   dispenses  with   verification   of   double   criminality   for   the   categories   of   offences  
mentioned  therein,  the  definition  of  those  offences  and  of  the  penalties  applicable  continue  to  be  matters  
determined  by  the  law  of  the  issuing  Member  State,  which,  as  is,  moreover,  stated  in  Article  1(3)  of  the  
Framework  Decision,  must  respect  fundamental  rights  and  fundamental  legal  principles  as  enshrined  in  
Article  6  EU,  and,  consequently,  the  principle  of  the  legality  of  criminal  offences  and  penalties.  §§  54.  It  
follows  that,  in  so  far  as  it  dispenses  with  verification  of  the  requirement  of  double  criminality  in  respect  
of   the   offences   listed   in   that   provision,   Article   2(2)   of   the   Framework   Decision   is   not   invalid   on   the  
ground  that  it  infringes  the  principle  of  the  legality  of  criminal  offences  and  penalties.    
153   See   also:  M.  MÖSTL,  Preconditions…,  p.   433-­‐‑434;   A.   GÓRSKI,  Europejskie…,  p.   109-­‐‑114;   A.  
GÓRSKI,  P.  HOFMAŃSKI  (ed.),  A.  SAKOWICZ,  D.  SZUMIŁO-­‐‑KULCZYCKA,  Europejski…,  p.  
170;  V.  MITSILEGAS,  The  Constitutional  Implications  of  Mutual  Recognition  in  Criminal  Matters  in  
the  EU,    Common  Market  Law  Review,  2006,  Vol.  43,  p.  1289.    
154  Art.  3.2  FD  FO:  The  following  offences  [32  MR  offences,  M.K.],  as  they  are  defined  by  the  law  of  the  
issuing  State,  and  if  they  are  punishable  in  the  issuing  State  by  a  custodial  sentence  of  a  maximum  period  
of  at  least  three  years,  shall  not  be  subject  to  verification  of  the  double  criminality  of  the  act.    
155  Art.  3.4  FD  FO:  For  cases  not  covered  by  paragraph  2,  the  executing  State  may  subject  the  recognition  
and  enforcement  of  a  freezing  order  made  for  purposes  referred  to  in  paragraph  1(a)  to  the  condition  that  
the  acts   for  which  the  order  was  issued  constitute  an  offence  under  the  laws  of  that  State,  whatever  the  
constituent  elements  or  however  described  under  the  law  of  the  issuing  State.    
156  Besides  a  general  rule  that  the  executing  state  shall  forthwith  take  the  necessary  measures  for  
immediate  execution  of  the  order  in  the  same  way  as  for  a  freezing  order  made  by  an  authority  





call   it  an  ‘extended’  scope  of  the  requirement  laid  down  in  art.  3.4  FD  FO.  This  
line   of   reasoning,   however,   has   not   been   accepted   by   the   Commission   which  
stated  that  this  is  clearly  not  in  compliance  with  the  framework  decision157.    
  
- FD  EEW  
  
The   double   criminality   together  with   the   double   admissibility   concept  was  
widely  debated  when  drafting  the  FD  EEW.  The  EEW  Proposal  promotes  further  
limitations   of   the   double   criminality   requirement   and   stipulates   that   the  
recognition  or  execution  of  the  warrant  shall  not  be  subject  to  verification  of  dual  
criminality  if  either  or  both  of  the  following  conditions  are  met:  
- it   is  not  necessary   to   carry  out   a   search  of  private  premises   for   the  
execution  of  the  warrant;  or  
- the  offence  is  one  of  the  offences  listed  in  art.  16.2  EEW  Proposal158.  
In  other  words,  the  EEW  Proposal  requires  verification  of  double  criminality  
only   in  cases  concerning  searches  of  private  premises,  unless   the  offence  being  
investigated  is  one  of   the  offences   included  in  the   list159.   It   is  worth  noting  that  
this  far-­‐‑reaching  approach  was  used  to  test  its  political  feasibility,  due  to  the  fact  
that   the   Commission   took   the   view160   that   the   concept   of   dual   criminality   is  
inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  of  a   judicial  decision  and,  
consequently,  it  should  not  be  possible  to  refuse  execution  on  such  grounds161.  
                                                                                                                            
157  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  Report   from  the  Commission  based  on  Art.  14  of   the  Council  
Framework  Decision  2003/577/JHA  of  22  July  2003  on  the  execution  in  the  European  Union  of  
orders  freezing  property  of  evidence  /COM/2008/0885  final/,  p.  5.    
158  The  list  of  offences  in  this  Article  is  copied  from  the  list  of  offences  in  Article  2  of  the  draft  Framework  
Decision  on  the  application  of  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  to  financial  penalties.  This  builds  upon  
the  list  of  offences  in  Article  2  of  the  Framework  Decision  on  the  European  arrest  warrant,  which  is  also  
incorporated  in  Article  3  of  the  Framework  Decision  on  freezing  orders,  EEW  Proposal,  para.  108,  p.  
25,  see  also:  S.  GLESS,  Mutual  recognition,  judicial  inquiries,  due  process  and  fundamental  rights  [in:]  
European   evidence   warrant:   transnational   judicial   enquiries   in   the   EU,   J.   VERVAELE   (ed.),  
Intersentia  2005,  p.  127.    
159  In  line  with  the  approach  adopted  in  the  draft  Framework  Decision  on  the  application  of  the  principle  
of  mutual  recognition  to  financial  penalties,  the  list  does  not  contain  a  threshold  level  of  imprisonment  or  
other  penalty  in  the  issuing  State,  EEW  Proposal,  para.  109,  p.  25.  
160   See   discussion   on   dual   criminality:   CH.   WILLIAMS,   The   European   Evidence   Warrant:   the  
Proposal  of   the  European  Commission,  ERA  Forum:  Special   Issue  on  European  Evidence  2005,  p.  
23.    
161  Refusal  to  execute  the  European  Evidence  Warrant  on  the  grounds  that  the  act  on  which  it   is  based  
does   not   constitute   an   offence   under   the   national   law   of   the   executing   State   (dual   criminality)   is  
inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  of  a  judicial  decision.  It  should  consequently  not  be  
possible   to   refuse   execution   on   such   grounds.  However,   in   order   to   facilitate   the   change-­‐‑over   from   the  
existing   rules   to   the   new  mutual   recognition   regime   of   the   European   Evidence  Warrant,   a   two-­‐‑stage  
approach   is   proposed.   First,   this   Article   narrows   the   conditions   in   which   execution   can   be   made  
dependent   on   dual   criminality.   Secondly,  Article   24   provides   that   dual   criminality,   as  more   narrowly  
defined  by  Article  16,  can  be  invoked  only  for  a  transitional  period  (…)  This  Article  builds  on  the  position  
in  existing  instruments  that  dual  criminality   is  abolished  except  where  the  executing  State  considers   it  
necessary  to  carry  out  a  seizure  or  a  search  of  premises.  It  goes  further  by  abolishing  the  ability  to  refuse  
 RATIONE  MATERIAE  
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                   81  
However,  as  the  final  version  of   the  FD  EEW  shows,   the  political   feasibility  
was  limited162  and  consequently  the  provisions  concerning  mutual  availability  of  
measures  were  only  partially  incorporated163.  The  first  condition  which  links  the  
double  criminality  requirement  with  searches  of  private  premises  still  stands  in  
the  FD  EEW164.  However,  the  instrument  restores  the  threshold  of  three  years  of  
imprisonment  for  the  MR  offences165.  Moreover,  if  the  EEW  is  not  related  to  any  
of   the   MR   offences   and   its   execution   would   require   a   search   or   seizure,  
recognition  or  execution  of   the  EEW  may  be  subject   to   the  condition  of  double  
criminality166.    
It   is  noteworthy  that   the   final  version  of   the  FD  EEW  specifically  addresses  
the   problem   of   double   admissibility   for   evidence   from  house   search.  Art.   11.3  
reads:    
11.3.  Each  Member  State  shall  ensure:    
(i)  that  any  measures  which  would  be  available  in  a  similar  domestic  case  in  the  
executing  State  are  also  available  for  the  purpose  of  the  execution  of  the  EEW;    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
co-­‐‑operation  on  the  ground  of  dual  criminality  where  either:  (a)  it  is  not  necessary  to  carry  out  a  search  of  
private  premises  for  the  execution  of  the  warrant.  This  reflects  the  added  sensitivity  of  searching  private  
premises;  or  (b)  the  offence  is  on  the  list  of  offences  specified  in  this  Article,  EEW  Proposal,  paras  106,  
107,  p.  24-­‐‑25.  
162  With   respect   to   ‘political  utopianism’  and  discussions  on   the  EEW  see:  W.  DE  BONDT,  G.  
VERMEULEN,  Appreciating  Approximation…,  p.  25.  
163   In   this   respect   see   the   key   features   of   the   amended   legislative   proposal   for   reconsultation  
agreed   upon   by   the   Council:  Double   criminality:   regarding   the   definition   of   offences,   the   proposal  
provides  that  for  32  categories  of  offences,  double  criminality  may  not  be  invoked  by  the  executing  State  
as  a  ground  for  refusing  an  EEW  if  the  offence  concerned  is  punishable  in  the  issuing  State  with  at  least  
three  years  of  imprisonment.  If  the  EEW  is  not  related  to  any  of  the  offences  set  out  in  the  list  and  its  
execution  would  require  a  search  or  seizure,  recognition  or  execution  of  the  EEW  may  be  subject  to  the  
condition  of  double  criminality.  If  the  EEW  is  not  related  to  any  of  the  offences  set  out  in  the  list  and  its  
execution  would  require  a  search  or  seizure,  recognition  or  execution  of  the  EEW  may  be  subject  to  the  
condition  of  double  criminality.   In  relation  to  offences   in  connection  with   taxes  or  duties,  customs  and  
exchange,  recognition  or  execution  may  not  be  opposed  on  the  ground  that  the  law  of  the  executing  State  
does   not   impose   the   same   kind   of   tax   or   duty   or   does   not   contain   a   tax,   duty,   customs   and   exchange  
regulation  of  the  same  kind  as  the  law  of  the  issuing  State,  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Amended  
legislative   proposal   for   reconsultation,   2003/0270(CNS),   18.7.2008,   and   the   critical   remarks   of  
the   European   Parliament   associated   thereto:   Verification   of   double   criminality   should   gradually  
disappear   from   instruments   founded   on   mutual   recognition.   The   provision   which   this   amendment  
removes  is  a  step  in  the  opposite  direction  and  was  not  envisaged  in  the  European  Commission  proposal,  
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT,  Report  on  the  proposal  for  a  Council  Framework  Decision  on  the  
European  Evidence  Warrant  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  objects,  documents  and  data  for  use  in  
proceedings   in   criminal   matters   (13076/2007   –   C6-­‐‑0293/2008   –   2003/2070(CNS)),   15.10.2008,   
p.  20.    
164  Art.  14.1.  FD  EEW:  The  recognition  or  execution  of  the  EEW  shall  not  be  subject  to  verification  
of  double  criminality  unless  it  is  necessary  to  carry  out  a  search  or  seizure.    
165  Art.   14.2.   FD  EEW:   If   it   is  necessary   to   carry  out  a   search  or   seizure   for   the   execution   of   the  
EEW,   the   following   offences,   if   they   are   punishable   in   the   issuing   State   by   a   custodial   sentence   or   a  
detention  order   for  a  maximum  period  of  at  least  three  years  and  as  they  are  defined  by  the   law  of  
that  State,  shall  not  be  subject  to  verification  of  double  criminality  under  any  circumstances.  






(ii)   that   measures,   including   search   or   seizure,   are   available   for   the  
purpose  of  the  execution  of  the  EEW  where  it  is  related  to  any  of  the  offences  
as  set  out  in  Article  14(2).    
  
Therefore,   the   instrument,   regardless   of   the   availability   of   measures   for  
domestic  cases,  requires  the  search  and  seizure  to  be  available  for  the  purpose  of  
executing  an  EEW  which  relates  to  the  offences  included  in  the  MR  offences.  In  
the  literature  this  approach  is  described  as  an  example  of  ‘alternative  use  of  the  
32  MR  offences  list’167.    
  
- EIO  Directive  
  
Unfortunately,   the   approach   developed   under   the   FD   EEW   for   ‘alternative  
use  of  the  MR  offences  list’  was  not  employed  when  drafting  the  EIO  Directive.  
As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   instrument   which   seeks   to   replace   the   existing,   over-­‐‑
complex   framework   of   mutual   legal   assistance   in   the   EU,   and   which   covers  
almost  all  types  of  evidence,  takes  a  step  backwards  when  it  comes  to  ensuring  
the  double  permissibility  of  investigative  measures168.   
 
In   the   first   place,   the   EIO   Directive   maintains   double   criminality   and   the  
three-­‐‑year   imprisonment   threshold169.   However,   the   instrument   lacks   any  
provision  such  as  those  laid  down  in  art.  11.3  FD  EEW,  which  would  ensure  the  
availability  of   the  measure   indicated   in   the  EIO   in   the  executing  member   state  
with   regard   to   some   cases.   Instead,   the   EIO   Directive   lists   the   investigative  
measures  which  must  always  be  available  under  the  law  of  the  executing  state.  
However,   the   scope   of   the   measures   concerned   is   extremely   tight   and   refers  
neither  to  telephone  tapping  nor  to  house  search170.  Moreover,  the  EIO  Directive  
states  that  the  problem  of  double  admissibility  may  be  resolved  by  recourse  to  a  
different   type   of   investigative  measure   other   than   that   indicated   in   the   EIO   if  
                                                                                                                            
167  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  31.  
168  Compare  with:  J.  BLACKSTOCK,  The  European  Investigation  Order,  New  Journal  of  European  
Criminal  Law,  Vol.  1,  Issue  4,  2014,  p.  492;  F.  ZIMMERMANN,  S.  GLASER,  A.  MOTZ,  Mutual  
Recognition…,  p.  73-­‐‑74.  
169  See  Art.  11.1  (g)  EIO  Directive  and  Annex  D  of  the  EIO  Directive.  
170   Art.   10.2   EIO   Directive:   Without   prejudice   to   Article   11,   paragraph   (1)   does   not   apply   to   the  
following  investigative  measures,  which  always  have  to  be  available  under  the  law  of  the  executing  State:  
(a)  the  obtaining  of  information  or  evidence  which  is  already  in  the  possession  of  the  executing  authority  
and   the   information  or   evidence  could  have  been  obtained,   in  accordance  with   the   law  of   the   executing  
State,   in   the   framework   of   criminal   proceedings   or   for   the   purposes   of   the   EIO;   (b)   the   obtaining   of  
information   contained   in   databases   held   by   police   or   judicial   authorities   and   directly   accessible   by   the  
executing  authority  in  the  framework  of  criminal  proceedings;  (c)  the  hearing  of  a  witness,  expert,  victim,  
suspected  or  accused  person  or   third  party   in   the   territory  of   the  executing  State;   (d)  any  non-­‐‑coercive  
investigative  measure   as   defined  under   the   law   of   the   executing  State;   (e)   the   identification   of   persons  
holding  a  subscription  of  a  specified  phone  number  or  IP  address.      
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that  measure  would  not  be  available  in  a  similar  domestic  case171.  Hence,  even  if  
not   explicitly   expressed   in   the   grounds   for   refusal,   art.   10   EIO   Directive  
introduces  a  new  hidden  ground  for  refusal172,  except  in  the  case  of  interception  
of   telecommunications,   where   this   ground   is   explicitly   laid   down   in   the  
Directive:  
 
Art.   30.5.   In   addition   to   the   grounds   for   non-­‐‑recognition   or   non-­‐‑execution  
referred  to  in  Article  11,  the  execution  of  an  EIO  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  may  
also   be   refused   where   the   investigative   measure   would   not   have   been  
authorised  in  a  similar  domestic  case.  The  executing  State  may  make  its  consent  
subject  to  any  conditions  which  would  be  observed  in  a  similar  domestic  case.    
  
It   is   worth   noting   that   this   approach   follows   from   the   fact   that   the   EIO   is  
based  on  an  investigative  measure  to  be  executed;  therefore,  in  accordance  with  
the  principle  of  mutual  recognition,  it  is  the  issuing  authority  that  decides  on  the  
type   of   investigative   measure   to   be   executed.   Consequently,   provisions  
concerning  recourse  to  a  different  type  of  investigative  measure  bring  necessary  
flexibility  to  this  rule  and  make  it  possible  for  the  executing  authority  to  choose  
in  some  situations173.    
  
- Proposal   for   the   establishment   of   the   European   Public   Prosecutor’s  
Office  
  
When   looking   into   instruments   addressing   evidence-­‐‑gathering   and   the  
double   permissibility   of   investigative   measures,   the   provisions   set   out   in   the  
                                                                                                                            
171  In  this  respect  see  also  Recital  (10)  of  the  EIO  Directive:  However,  the  executing  authority  should,  
wherever  possible,  use  another  type  of  investigative  measure  if  the  indicated  measure  does  not  exist  under  
its  national  law  or  would  not  be  available  in  a  similar  domestic  case.  Availability  should  refer  to  occasions  
where  the  indicated  investigative  measure  exists  under  the  law  of  the  executing  State  but  is  only  lawfully  
available   in   certain   situations,   for   example  where   the   investigative  measure   can  only  be   carried  
out  for  offences  of  a  certain  degree  of  seriousness,  against  persons  for  whom  there  is  already  a  
certain   level  of   suspicion  or  with   the   consent  of   the  person   concerned.   The   executing   authority  
may  also  have  recourse  to  another  type  of  investigative  measure  where  it  would  achieve  the  same  result  as  
the  investigative  measure  indicated  in  the  EIO  by  means  implying  less  interference  with  the  fundamental  
rights  of  the  person  concerned.  
172  Art.  10.5  EIO  Directive:  Where,  in  accordance  with  paragraph  1,  the  investigative  measure  indicated  
in  the  EIO  does  not  exist  under  the  law  of  the  executing  State  or  it  would  not  be  available   in  a  similar  
domestic  case  and  where  there  is  no  other  investigative  measure  which  would  have  the  same  result  as  the  
investigative  measure  requested,  the  executing  authority  shall  notify  the  issuing  authority  that  it  
has  not  been  possible  to  provide  the  assistance  requested.  
173  EIO  Explanatory  Memorandum,  p.  10.  See  also  further  comments:    (…)  when  the  investigative  
measure  provided  for  in  the  EIO  exists  in  the  law  of  the  executing  State  but  its  use  is  restricted  to  a  list  or  
category  of  offences  which  does  not  include  the  offence  covered  by  the  EIO:  this  case  covers  for  example  
the  situation  where  the  EIO  is  issued  in  order  to  intercept  the  telecommunications  of  a  suspect  and  where,  
in  the  executing  State,  the  interception  of  telecommunications  is  available  only  for  a  list  of  offences  which  
does  not  include  the  offence  mentioned  in  the  EIO.  In  such  case,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  impose  the  





EPPO  Proposal  cannot  be  overlooked.  Art.  26  of  the  EPPO  Proposal  lists  the  21  
investigative  measures  which   should   be   available   in   all  member   states   for   the  
purposes  of   investigations  and  prosecutions  conducted  by  the  European  Public  
Prosecutor’s   Office174.   Such   measures   would   be   subject   to   the   conditions  
provided   for   in   this   article   and   those   set   out   in   national   law.   Investigation  
measures  other  than  those  included  in  the  list  may  only  be  ordered  or  requested  
by   the   European   Public   Prosecutor’s   Office   if   available   under   the   law   of   the  
member  state  where  the  measure  is  to  be  carried  out.  Moreover,  according  to  the  
instrument,   member   states   should   ensure   that   some   of   the   investigative  
measures  are  subject  to  authorisation  by  the  competent  judicial  authority  of  the  
Member  State  where  they  are  to  be  carried  out.    
It  is  worth  noting  that  both  investigative  measures  covered  by  this  research,  
namely  telephone  tapping  and  house  search,  are  included  in  the  above  list  and,  
moreover,  are  subject   to   judicial  authorisation   in  cases  where  the  domestic   law  
requires  it.    
 
1.2.2.3. Conclusion    
  
As   the   above   analysis   shows,   the   instruments   governing   cross-­‐‑border  
cooperation   in   criminal   matters   in   the   EU   provide   different   approaches   to  
tackling   the   double   availability   of   investigative   measures.   Extradition-­‐‑related  
instruments   rely   on   the   concept   of   extraditable   offences,   which   links   the  
allowance  for  the  measure  with  imprisonment  thresholds  in  both  the  requesting  
and  requested  state.  Other  MLA  instruments  refer  to  ordre  public,  however,  with  
regard   to   some   measures,   such   as   monitoring   of   bank   information,   home  
searches  or  interception  of  telecommunications,  the  execution  may  be  dependent  
on   double   criminality   or   compliance   with   domestic   provisions   regarding   the  
availability  of  the  measure  in  the  requested  state  in  a  similar  domestic  case.  
The  MR   instruments   originally   aspired   to   ensure   the  mutual   availability   of  
evidentiary   measures   throughout   the   EU,   including   the   availability   of   search  
and   seizure,   if   the   offence   being   investigated   is   one   of   the   MR   offences.  
However,   this   idea   failed   as   it   was   politically   unfeasible   and   the   approach  
agreed  within  the  EIO  Directive  allows  the  executing  member  state  to  refuse  the  
execution  if   in  a  similar  domestic  case  the  measure  indicated  in  the  EIO  would  
not   be   permissible175.   Therefore,   the   EIO   Directive   does   not   maximise   the  
                                                                                                                            
174  Art.  26.2  EPPO  Proposal:  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  measures  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  
may   be   used   in   the   investigations   and   prosecutions   conducted   by   the   European   Public   Prosecutor’s  
Office.  Such  measures  shall  be  subject  to  the  conditions  provided  for  in  this  Article  and  those  set  out  in  
national  law.  Investigation  measures  other  than  those  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  may  only  be  ordered  or  
requested   by   the   European   Public   Prosecutor’s  Office   if   available   under   the   law   of   the  Member   State  
where  the  measure  is  to  be  carried  out.      
175   The   approach   agreed   within   the   cooperation   in   criminal   matters   should   be,   however,  
confronted  with  the  power  to  enter  and  search  private  premises  for  the  purposes  of  European  
cooperation  available  within  other   fields  of  EU  cooperation.   In   this  matter   see,   inter   alia,   arts.  
12–13  of  the  European  Council,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  139/2004  of  20  January  2004  on  the  
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availability   of   investigative   measures   among   member   states,   even   in   cases  
related   to   offences   which   give   rise   to   abandoning   the   principle   of   double  
criminality  in  surrendering  a  person.    
 























































































































to  one  of  









                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
control   of   concentrations   between   undertakings   (the   EC  Merger   Regulation),   29.1.2004,   OJ   L  
24/1,  which  allow  searches  of  private  premises  under  a  foreign  request.  In  this  respect  see  also  
the  comments  of  W.  JASIŃSKI  in:  Gwarancyjność  przepisów  regulujących  przeszukanie  w  sprawach  

















































Art.  11.1  (h)  
Ordre  
public    
















-­‐‑   -­‐‑   -­‐‑   Art.  9.2  
 
 
1.2.3. Ratione  materiae  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR  
  
According  to  the  ECtHR  some  investigative  measures  cannot  be  available  for  
just  any  offence.  However,  the  Court  does  not  seek  to  link  the  particular  grounds  
with  the  availability  of  investigative  measures;  instead,  it  focuses  on  setting  out  
rules  with  respect  to  the  quality  of  the  legal  basis  of  those  coercive  and  intrusive  
measures176.    
 
                                                                                                                            
176  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking…,  p.  148.  
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1.2.3.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
In  cases  concerning  telephone  tapping,  the  ECtHR  first  of  all  points  out  that,  
in  order  to  avoid  abuses  of  power:  
- the  impugned  measure  must  have  some  basis  in  domestic  law;  
- the   domestic   law   must   be   compatible   with   the   rule   of   law   and  
accessible  to  the  person  concerned177.  
The   Court   also   explains   that   tapping   and   other   forms   of   interception   of  
telephone   conversations   represent   a   serious   interference   in   someone’s   private  
life   and   correspondence   and   must   accordingly   be   based   on   a   law   that   is  
particularly   precise178.  Moreover,   it   is   essential   to   have   clear,   detailed   rules   on  
the   subject,   especially   as   the   technology   available   for   use   is   continually  
becoming  more   sophisticated179.   Thus,   any   law   providing   a   legal   basis   for   the  
measure   has   to   set   out   clearly   the   conditions   subject   to   which   telephone  
conversations   may   be   tapped   in   order   to   ensure   the   foreseeability   of   the  
measure180.    
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Court  accepts  various  approaches  to  setting  out  the  
preconditions,   including   general   grounds   for   interception.   In   Kennedy   v.   The  
United   Kingdom,   a   case   concerning   the   English   grounds   referring   to   national  
security,   preventing   or   detecting   serious   crime   or   safeguarding   the   economic  
well-­‐‑being  of  the  UK,  the  Court  ruled  that:    
  
As   to   the   nature   of   the   offences,   the   Court   emphasises   that   the   condition    
of   foreseeability  does  not  require  States  to  set  out  exhaustively  by  name  the  specific  
offences   which   may   give   rise   to   interception.   However,   sufficient   detail   should   be  
provided   of   the   nature   of   the   offences   in   question   (…)   The   applicant   criticises   the  
terms   “national   security”   and   “serious   crime”   as   being   insufficiently   clear.   The  
Court  disagrees.  It  observes  that  the  term  “national  security”  is  frequently  employed  
in   both   national   and   international   legislation   and   constitutes   one   of   the   legitimate  
aims  to  which  Article  8  §  2   itself   refers.  The  Court  has  previously  emphasised   that  
the  requirement  of  “foreseeability”  of  the  law  does  not  go  so  far  as  to  compel  States  to  
enact   legal   provisions   listing   in   detail   all   conduct   that   may   prompt   a   decision   to  
deport  an  individual  on  “national  security”  grounds.  By  the  nature  of  things,  threats  
to  national  security  may  vary  in  character  and  may  be  unanticipated  or  difficult  to  
define   in   advance   (…)   The   Court   therefore   considers   that,   having   regard   to   the  
provisions  of  RIPA,  the  nature  of  the  offences  which  may  give  rise  to  an  interception  
order  is  sufficiently  clear181.  
                                                                                                                            
177  Dragojević  v.  Croatia,  §§  151.  
178  Kruslin  v.  France,  §§  33.  
179  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  93.  
180  See  inter  alia:  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany  §§  96;  Dragojević  v.  Croatia,  §§  83.  
181  Kennedy   v.   United   Kingdom,   §§   159:  As   an   example   of   the   contrary,   see   the   conclusions   in  
Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova:  Moreover,  it  is  unclear  under  the  impugned  legislation  who  –  and  under  






To  sum  up,  the  minimum  safeguards  produced  by  the  Court  with  regard  to  
ratione  materiae  consist  of  a  legal  basis  which  precisely  determines  the  nature  of  
the  offences  which  may  give  rise   to  an   interception  order.  Moreover,  given  the  
fact   that   the   measure   is   of   an   intrusive   nature,   the   Court   also   requires  
compliance  with  principles  of  necessity  and  proportionality182.    
 
1.2.3.2. House  search  
  
As  in  the  case  of  telephone  tapping,  in  cases  concerning  house  searches,  the  
Court  focuses  on  examining  the  quality  of  the  legal  basis  for  the  interference  and  
whether  this  legal  basis  ensures  a  minimum  standard  against  abuses  of  power183.    
Firstly,   according   to   the   Court,   the   measure   must   have   a   clear   basis   in   a  
domestic   legal   system   in   order   to   afford   adequate   and   effective   safeguards  
against   any   abuse184.   It   is   noteworthy   that   the   Court   accepts   the   precondition  
referring  to  the  objective  of  the  measure,  e.g.  to  uncover  physical  evidence  that  
may   be   instrumental   for   the   criminal   investigation,   preventing   a   crime   or  
protecting  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others185.  However,  in  any  case  a  decision  
as  to  the  house  search  must  be  based  on  reasonable  suspicion186.  It  is  noteworthy  
that  the  facts  which  raise  such  suspicion  need  not  be  of  the  same  level  as  those  
necessary  to  justify  a  conviction  or  even  the  bringing  of  a  charge187.  
Secondly,   the   house   search   has   to   be   carried   out   in   accordance   with   the  
principle   of   necessity   and   proportionality188.   According   to   the   Court’s   settled  
case-­‐‑law,   the  notion  of  necessity   implies   that   the   interference   corresponds   to   a  
‘pressing  social  need’  and  in  particular  that  it   is  proportionate  to  the  legitimate  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
protection  of  health  or  morals  or  in  the  interests  of  others.  While  enumerating  in  section  6  and  in  Article  
156   §   1   the   circumstances   in   which   tapping   is   susceptible   of   being   applied,   the   Law   on   Operational  
Investigative   Activities   and   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   fails,   nevertheless,   to   define   “national  
security”,   “public   order”,   “protection   of   health”,   “protection   of  morals”,   “protection   of   the   rights   and  
interests   of   others”,   “interests   of   ...   the   economic   situation   of   the   country”   or   “maintenance   of   legal  
order”  for  the  purposes  of  interception  of  telephone  communications.  Nor  does  the  legislation  specify  the  
circumstances  in  which  an  individual  may  be  at  risk  of  having  his  telephone  communications  intercepted  
on  any  of  those  grounds,  Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova,  §§  46.  
182  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  106-­‐‑107.  
183  W.  JASIŃSKI,  Dowodowe  czynności…,  p.  17-­‐‑25.  
184  Crémieux  v.  France,  §§  39.    
185  Smirnov  v.  Russia,  App.  71362/01,  §§  44.    
186  Wieser  and  Bicos  Beteiligungen  GmbH  v.  Austria,  §§  58.  
187  Ratushna  v.  Ukraine,  §§  77,  see  also:  Vasylchuk  v.  Ukraine,  App  no.  24402/07,  §  78.  
188  The  principal  point  in  issue  has  been  the  justification  for  the  search.  Under  the  Court'ʹs  settled  case-­‐‑
law,  the  notion  of  “necessity”  implies  that  the  interference  corresponds  to  a  pressing  social  need  and,  in  
particular,  that  it  is  proportionate  to  the  legitimate  aim  pursued;  in  determining  whether  an  interference  
is  “necessary  in  a  democratic  society”,  the  Court  will  take  into  account  that  a  margin  of  appreciation  is  
left   to   the  Contracting  States.  The  Contracting  States  may   consider   it   necessary   to   resort   to  measures  
such   as   searches   of   residential   premises   and   seizures   in   order   to   obtain   physical   evidence   of   certain  
offences,  Zubal’  v.  Slovakia,  §§  40;  see  also:  Saint-­‐‑Paul  Luxembourg  S.A.  v.  Luxembourg,  §§  43-­‐‑46.  
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aim   being   pursued189.   In   this   respect,   the   Court   also   explores   the   offence   that  
may  give  rise  to  the  request  for  a  house  search190.  Moreover,  the  Court  stated  that  
the   fact   that   a  penalty   incurred   is   lower   than   five  years   of   imprisonment  does  
not  automatically  mean  that  the  measure  is  disproportional191.      
The   ECtHR   also   refers   to   the   content   of   the  warrant.   Accordingly,   it  must  
contain:    
- information  about  the  ongoing  investigation;  
- the  purpose   of   the   search   or   the   reasons  why   it   is   believed   that   a  
search   of   the   applicant'ʹs   property   would   enable   evidence   of   any  
offence  to  be  obtained192;  
- the   number   of   entries   authorised,   limited   to   a   maximum   if   a  




In  summary,  the  position  of  the  ECtHR  is  that  telephone  tapping  and  house  
search  cannot  be  made  available  for   just  any  offence.  However,   the  Court  does  
not   explicitly   list   which   offences   justify   these   intrusive   measures,   but   instead  
focuses  on  the  quality  of  the  legal  basis  for  them.  Consequently,  the  ECtHR  has  
ruled  that  both  measures  require  a  clear  basis  in  a  domestic  legal  system,  which  
is   accessible   and   feasible   to   the   person   concerned   in   order   to   afford   adequate  
and   effective   safeguards   against   any   abuse.   Moreover,   both   measures   shall  
comply  with  necessity  and  proportionality  requirements.    
1.2.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  ratione  materiae 
 
The  overview  of  domestic  provisions  shows  the  variety  of  grounds  which  are  
apt  to  justify  telephone  tapping  and  house  search,  determined  by  exhaustive  list  
of   offences,   minimum   imprisonment   thresholds,   general   grounds   or   the  
                                                                                                                            
189   According   to   the   Court’s   settled   case-­‐‑law,   the   notion   of   necessity   implies   that   the   interference  
corresponds   to   a  “pressing   social  need”  and   in  particular   that   it   is  proportionate   to   the   legitimate   aim  
pursued,  Keegan  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  30.  
190  To   determine   whether   these   measures   were   “necessary   in   a   democratic   society”,   the   Court   has   to  
explore   the   availability   of   effective   safeguards   against   abuse   or   arbitrariness   under   domestic   law   and  
check   how   those   safeguards   operated   in   the   specific   case   under   examination.   Elements   taken   into  
consideration  in  this  regard  are  the  severity  of  the  offence  in  connection  with  which  the  search  and  seizure  
have  been  effected,  Stefanov  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  38.    
191  See  Steeg  and  Wenger  v.  Germany,  App.  no.  9676/05,  App.  No.  10744/05  and  App.  no.  41349/06  
[in:]  W.  JASIŃSKI,  Dowodowe  czynności…,  p.  17-­‐‑25.  
192  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  37;  Smirnov  v.  Russia,  §§  48.  
193  In  the  case  Rossem  v.  Belgium  the  ECtHT  noted  that:  [the]  search  warrant  had  to  be  accompanied  
by   certain   limitations,   so   that   the   interference   which   it   authorised   was   not   potentially   unlimited,  
particularly  with  regard  to  the  right  to  respect  for  a  person’s  home.  The  warrant  had  therefore  to  contain  
a   minimum   number   of   indications,   so   that   it   was   subsequently   possible   to   verify   whether   the   police  
officers  who  enforced  it  had  complied  with  the  scope  of  the  investigation  thus  authorized,  COUNCIL  OF  





objectives  of  the  measures.  All  these  approaches  are  in  line  with  the  ECtHR  case-­‐‑
law  which  requires  that  the  legal  basis  for  interference  is  explicitly  and  precisely  
set  out  in  the  law.  At  the  same  time,  both  the  CoE  and  the  EU  instruments  deal  
with   ratione   materiae   issues   by   referring   to   ordre   public,   extraditable   offences,  
minimum   imprisonment   thresholds   or   lists   of   offences.   MR   instruments   that  
abandon   double   criminality   for   MR   offences,   however,   do   not   represent  
progress   towards   common   grounds   for   evidence-­‐‑taking,   and   allowance   of  
investigative  measures   in  cases  with  a  cross-­‐‑border  dimension  is  still  governed  
by  the  domestic,  and  very  different  provisions  of  the  member  states  concerned.  
That  may  have  a   frustrating  effect  both   for  gathering  and  use  of   evidence   in  a  
cross-­‐‑border   context.  Therefore,   it   seems  necessary   to  devise   common  grounds  
for  ordering  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  for  purposes  of  EU  cooperation  
in   criminal   matters.   Operating   under   common   preconditions   would   facilitate  
cross-­‐‑border  evidence-­‐‑taking,  but  also  enhance  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence,  
since   it   would   do   away  with   dilemmas   as   to   whether   the  measure   would   be  
available   in   a   similar   domestic   case   and,   consequently,   whether   the   gathered  
evidence  can  be  per  se  admissible.      
The   biggest   problem   that   arises   here,   however,   is   the   question   of   how   to  
devise   minimum   standards,   given   the   variety   of   domestic   provisions   in   this  
matter.  The  solutions  apparent  in  MLA  instruments,  which  refer  to  extraditable  
offences   or   the   ordre   public   clause194,   do   not   seem   to   offer   a   solution   here.   The  
reason   is   that   they   are   context-­‐‑sensitive   and   allow  member   states   to   refuse   if  
domestic  requirements  for  evidence-­‐‑taking  are  not  fulfilled.  What  is  aimed  at  in  
this  chapter,  however,   is  a  situation  where  no  differences  exist  among  member  
states  as  to  the  allowance  of  both  measures  in  cross-­‐‑border  context.  Accordingly,  
it  is  necessary  to  consider  approaches  developed  under  MR  instruments,  which  
aim  at  ensuring  the  mutual  availability  of  certain  measures  for   the  purposes  of  
EU  cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  namely:  
- linking   mutual   availability   with   the   minimum   imprisonment  
threshold  in  the  issuing  state;  or    
- linking  mutual  availability  with  the  MR  offences  list.    
 
1.2.4.1. In  search  of  a  common  denominator  
  
- The  minimum  imprisonment  threshold  as  a  solution?  
  
The  minimum  imprisonment   threshold   is  used   to  deal  with   the   recognition  
and   execution   of   warrants   or   orders.   A   penalty   threshold   of   three   years   of  
imprisonment  in  the  issuing  state  is  stipulated,  inter  alia,  in  the  FD  EAW,  FD  FO,  
FD  EEW  and  EIO  Directive.  In  this  light,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  whether  this  
                                                                                                                            
194  See  alternatively:  P.  ASP,  A.  VON  HIRSCH,  D.  FRÄNDE,  Double  Criminality  and  Transnational  
Investigative   Measures   in   EU   Criminal   Proceedings:   Some   Issues   of   Principle,   Zeitschrift   für  
Internationale  Strafrechtsdogmatik,  11/2006,  p.  512-­‐‑520.  
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threshold  could  also  accommodate  the  mutual  availability  of  telephone  tapping  
and  house  search.    
This   alternative   would   consist   of   ensuring   that   if   the   offence   being  
investigated   is   punishable   in   the   issuing   state   by   a   custodial   sentence   or   a  
detention   order   for   a   maximum   period   of   at   least   three   years,   the   executing  
member   state   ensures   that   both   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   are  
available   for   the   purpose   of   execution   of   the   order.   This   three-­‐‑year   threshold  
corresponds  with   the   threshold   required   for   double   criminality   across   the  MR  
instruments.   This   approach,   however,   constitutes   neither   a   satisfactory   nor   a  
fortunate  alternative,  for  the  following  reasons.        
First   of   all,   this   alternative   does   not   seek   to   provide   common   grounds   for  
both  measures  across  the  EU,  since  it  merely  indicates  which  law  shall  prevail.  It  
would   also   be   contrary   to   art.   30.5   EIO   Directive,   which   highlights   the  
requirement   of   mutual   allowance   for   the   interception   of   telecommunications.  
Moreover,   the   scope   of   its   use   would   also   be   hampered   by   the   fact   that   in  
different  member   states  different   offences  meet   the   threshold  of   three  years   of  
imprisonment.   That   means   that   issuing   the   measures   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border  
context   would   be   still   context-­‐‑sensitive   and   would   not   enjoy   the   mutual  
availability  across  the  EU.  
  
- Double  admissibility  for  MR  offences    
  
The   second   alternative   for   ratione   materiae   refers   to   the   MR   offences   and  
consists  of   situations  where  member   states  ensure   the  availability  of   telephone  
tapping  and  searches  of  premises  if  the  offence  being  investigated  relates  to  any  
of   the  MR   offences.   This   approach   is   inspired   by   art.   11.3   (ii)   FD   EEW  which  
ensures  the  availability  of  search  and  seizure  for  the  purpose  of  the  execution  of  
the  EEW  where   it   is  related  to  any  of   the   ’32  MR  offences   list’.   In  other  words,  
this   alternative   would   mean   the   possibility   to   use   MR   offences   beyond   the  
abandonment  of  the  double  criminality  requirement195.    
The  main  added  value  of  this  approach  is  its  compliance  with  the  concept  of  
MR   offences   which   already   exists   and   is   used   in   the   framework   of   EU  
cooperation   in   criminal   cases,   especially   in   cases   concerning   EAW.   Operating  
under   an   exhaustive   list   of   offences   would   free   member   states   from   context-­‐‑
sensitive  availability  and,  instead,  ensure  coherent  list  of  offences  giving  rise  to  
mutual   allowance   for   both   measures.   Given   the   serious   nature   of   all   MR  
offences,   there   is   a   high   chance   that   the   availability   of   both  measures   already  
falls  within   the   scope  of  domestic  grounds,   irrespective  of  how  member   states  
determine  availability  preconditions.  Moreover,  if  the  member  states  are  willing  
to   introduce   these   grounds   for   investigations   being   carried   out   in   a   domestic  
context,  then  the  transfer  of  already  existing  evidence  would  also  be  facilitated.  
                                                                                                                            
195  This  alternative  has  already  been  given  attention   in   the   following  study:  G.  VERMEULEN,  
W.   DE   BONDT,   Y.   VAN   DAMME,   EU   cross-­‐‑border   gathering….   See   also:   W.   DE   BONDT,  





However,   the   biggest   objection   to   this   alternative   may   be   domestic  
incoherence  with  regard  to  the  substantive  law  of  the  member  states  and  lack  of  
EU   definitions   of   the  MR   offences196.   This   problem  was   raised   in   the   German  
demarche  with   respect   to   the   FD   EEW,   where   Germany   had  made   the   lack   of  
clear  and  common  definitions  and  the  possibility  of  having  to  meet  obligations  
with   regard   to  behaviour  not   criminalised  under  German   legislation  one  of   its  
key   issues   during   negotiations197.   Indeed,   the   different   approaches   to   the  
substantive   law   may   significantly   hamper   the   use   of   MR   offences   as   mutual  
preconditions   for  both  measures.  However,   it   should  be  stressed   that   there  are  
current   initiatives   to   overcome   these  difficulties198,  which   are   briefly  presented  
below.  
  
- Approximation  of  the  MR  offences  and  added  value  of  EULOCS  
  
As   indicated   in   the   preceding   paragraph,   the   32   MR   offences,   also   called  
‘Euro   crimes’,   have   never   been   tackled   at   the   EU   level   as   a   united   exercise,  
however,  a  series  of  offences  on  the  list  have  been  subjected  to  harmonisation199.    
First  and  foremost,  substantive  difficulties  could  also  be  overcome  using  the  
EU   Level   Offence   Classification   System   (EULOCS)   which   brings   together   the  
current   JHA   substantive   criminal   law   acquis200.   The   EULOCS   would   bring  
simplicity   and   accessibility   to   the   double   criminality   requirement.   As   a  
consequence,   double   criminality   as   a   ground   for   refusal   could   be   abandoned  
with  respect  to  offences  that  have  been  subject  to  approximation  and  identified  
as  such  in  the  EULOCS.  Thus,  from  the  perspective  of  the  cooperating  member  
states,  EULOCS  can  simplify  the  procedure  of  recognition  and  significantly  limit  
the   time  dedicated   to   establishing  whether   or   not  double   criminality   is  met   in  
cases   where   cooperation   is   dependent   on   a   double   criminality   requirement.  
Consequently,  the  double  criminality  verification  process  for  those  offences  that  
have  been  subject  to  approximation  would  have  the  potential  of  speeding  up  the  
cooperation   process.   Finally,   and   most   important   for   this   research,   the  
classification  would  also  have  an  impact  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  due  to  
the  fact  that  in  many  cases  the  availability  of  an  investigative  measure  depends  
on  the  crime  that   is   the  subject  of   the  investigation.  Therefore,   the   introduction  
                                                                                                                            
196  A.  GÓRSKI,  Europejskie…,  p.  199.  
197  W.  DE  BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  Appreciating  Approximation…,  p.  25.    
198  See  also:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking…,  p.  421  et  seq.  
199   L.  KLIMEK,  European  Arrest  Warrant,   Springer   2015,   p.   103-­‐‑104.   See   also   provisions   of   the  
Stockholm   Programme:   Minimum   rules   with   regard   to   the   definition   of   criminal   offences   and  
sanctions   may   also   be   established   when   the   approximation   of   criminal   laws   and   regulations   of   the  
Member  States  proves  essential  to  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  a  Union  policy  which  has  been  
subject  to  harmonisation  measures,  p.  15.  See  also:  A.  SUOMINEN,  Effectiveness  and  Functionality  of  
Substantive  EU  Criminal  Law,  New  Journal  of  European  Criminal  Law,  Vol.  5,   Issue  3,  2014,  p.  
388  et  seq.;  T.  MARGUERY,  European  Union  Fundamental  Rights  and  Member  States  Action  in  EU  
Criminal  Law,  Maastricht  Journal  of  European  and  Comparative  Law,  2013,  Vol.  2,  p.  290-­‐‑291.  
200  See:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  EULOCS….,  p.  9.  
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of  minimum  standards  with  respect  to  the  gathering  of  evidence  in  the  EU  could  
be  effectuated  at  least  for  offences  that  have  been  subject  to  approximation  and  
for   which   it   may   be   expected   that   member   states   consider   it   important   to  
strengthen  the  fight  against  those  offences201.  
  
1.2.4.2. Conclusion    
  
The   research   has   revealed   the   need   for   mutual   availability   of   telephone  
tapping   and  house   search   for  purposes  of  EU   cooperation   in   criminal  matters.  
This  goal  could  be  achieved  by  ensuring  the  availability  of  both  measures  if  the  
offence  being  investigated  is  related  to  any  offence  included  in  the  MR  offences  
list202.  That  would  ensure  that  no  differences  exist  among  member  states  as  to  the  
allowance  for  the  measures.  Enhancing  mutual  trust  as  to  the  preconditions  for  
both   measures   would   be   rewarded   with   per   se   admissibility   of   evidence   if  
gathered  accordingly,  since  member  states  would  not  need  to  face  the  dilemma  
of  whether   the  measure  would   be   permissible   in   a   similar   domestic   case   and,  
consequently,  the  status  of  the  evidence  gathered.  
Consequently,   given   the   central   research   question   of   this   chapter,   devising  
common   grounds   for   ordering   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   for   the  
purposes  of  EU  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  may  prove  feasible  if  it  is  based  
on   the  MR   offences   list.   Operating   under   a   common  materiae   standard  would  
ensure   the   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   using   both   measures  
within   the   entirety   of   the   EU   in   cases   where   the   offence   being   investigated  
relates   to   one   of   the   ‘Euro   crimes’.   The   common   scope   of   ratione   materiae   for  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search  would   do   away  with   issues   arising   from  
national   incompatibilities   concerning   the   grounds   for   ordering   the   measure,  
facilitate  cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of  evidence  and,  consequently,  enhance  their  per  
se   admissibility   throughout   the   EU.   Introducing   the   minimum   standard   with  
respect   to   evidence-­‐‑gathering   in   a   domestic   context   would   also   significantly  
enhance   the   transfer   and  mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   that   already   exists.  
For  other  offences,  which  are  not   included   in   the  MR  offences   list,   the  general  
provisions  would   still   apply.   In   other  words,   in   cases   not   concerning   the  MR  
offences,   the   member   states   might   still   subject   the   execution   of   investigative  
measures  to  the  double  admissibility  requirement.  
                                                                                                                            
201  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking…,  p.  436-­‐‑438.  
202  See  also  2010  Stockholm  Programme,  p.  15:  The  relationship  between  approximation  of  criminal  
offences  or  their  definition  and  the  double  criminality  rule  in  the  framework  of  mutual  recognition  should  
be  further  explored.  The  Commission  is  invited  to  make  a  report  to  the  Council  on  this  issue.  One  of  the  
issues  may  be   the  necessity   and   feasibility   of   approximation   or  definition   of   criminal   offence   for  which  





1.3. Ratione  loci  
  
The  next   issue   that  deserves   focus  when  examining  minimum  standards   to  
enhance  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  is  related  to  ratione   loci.   Inconsistencies  
in   this  matter  may  arise  when  execution  of   an   investigative  measure   indicated  
by   another  member   state   surpasses   the   ratione   loci   scope  of   the   executing   state  
because  the  locations/places  where  the  measure  can  be  taken  are  more  limited  in  
a   national   context203.   Given   the   fact   that   the   measures   investigated   in   this  
research  have  different  loci  connotations,  the  following  study  presents  a  separate  
analysis  for  each  measure.    
Thus,   for   telephone   tapping,   the   research   focuses   on   cases   in   which   the  
location   of   the   telephone   is   a   determining   factor   –   in   other   words,   telephone  
tapping  as  linked  to  and  determined  by  its  location,  e.g.  in  someone’s  home,  an  
office   or   a   public   place.   Consequently,   the   central   research   question   is   the  
following:  
  
How   could   member   states   enhance   mutual   trust   in   terms   of   telephone   tapping  
targeted  by  location  in  view  of  enhancing  the  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence?  
  
With   regard   to   house   search,   the   research   aims   at   overcoming  
incompatibilities   concerning   the   scope   of   ‘house’   that   may   be   searched.  
Consequently,  the  central  research  question  is  the  following:  
  
How  could  member  states  define  a  ‘house’  for  the  purposes  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  house  
searches  in  view  of  enhancing  the  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence?  
1.3.1. Ratione  loci  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  
  
This   chapter   deals   with  minimum   standards   relating   to   telephone   tapping  
where   the   location  of   the   telephone   is  a  determining  factor.  Telephone  tapping  
may  be  carried  out,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  targeting  home  telephones,  office  
telephones,   publicly   available   telephones   (telephone-­‐‑boxes,   restaurants,   hotels  
etc.)   or   within   strategic   monitoring204.   In   all   these   cases   the   key   factor   is   the  
location  of  the  telephone  used  by  the  individual.    
 
1.3.1.1. Ratione  loci  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation  
  
The   majority   of   member   states   do   not   explicitly   state   rules   for   telephone  
tapping   targeted   by   location.   The   reference   to   location   as   a   subject   of   the  
measure   may   be   found   under   the   English   RIPA205.   The   lack   of   explicitly  
                                                                                                                            
203  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  75.  
204  W.  JASIŃSKI,  Dowodowe  czynności  …,  p.  17-­‐‑25.  
205   Section   8   RIPA:   An   interception   warrant   must   name   or   describe   either   (a)   one   person   as   the  
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expressed   regulations   leaves   open   the   question   of   whether   the   measure   is  
permitted  in  the  member  states206.    
  
Table  7:  Ratione  loci  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation  
  
   England  
and  Wales  
France   Ireland   The  
Netherlands  







NO   NO   NO   NO   NO  
  
  
1.3.1.2. Ratione   loci   with   regard   to   telephone   tapping   in   MLA   and   MR  
instruments    
  
The  MLA   and  MR   instruments   concerning   telephone   tapping   are   not   very  
forthcoming  when   it   comes   to   the   legitimacy  of   ‘tapping   targeted  by   location’.  
However,  some  references  relevant  to  the  matter  are  listed  below.  
  
- Council  of  Europe,  Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10  
  
According  to  art.  2  a)  of  the  Recommendation,  a  request  for  assistance  should  
contain  a  description  of  the  telecommunication  to  be  intercepted.  Therefore,  this  
provision   covers   a   broad   scope   and   the   term   ‘telecommunication   to   be  
intercepted’  may  be  defined  by  reference  to  particular  person,  telephone  number  
or  targeted  location.      
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
interception   subject;   or   (b)   a   single   set   of   premises   as   the   premises   in   relation   to   which   the  
interception  to  which  the  warrant  relates  is  to  take  place.  
206   According   to   the   representatives   from   the  member   states   consulted   for   this   research,   it   is  
highly   probable   that   the   measure   would   be   permitted   in   Spain.   The   measure   could   be  
considered  (if  necessary,  proportionate  and  well  founded)  in  France  and  the  Netherlands.  It  is  
highly   doubtful   whether   the   measure   could   be   effected   in   Ireland,   due   to   the   fact   that   the  
telephone  number   to  be   intercepted   is  always   related   to  a   specific  person.  This   strict  point  of  
view   also   prevails   in   Polish   doctrine,   however,   it   is   safe   to   say   that   the   question   of   ‘tapping  
targeted  by   location’   in  Poland  has  not  been   fully  grasped  and  still   calls   for   special  attention.  
For  instance,  one  of  the  opinions  developed  under  Polish  legislation  is  that  tapping  targeted  by  
location  may  refer  only   to  office   telephones  and,  moreover,  only   if   the   telephone   is  not  being  
used  by  third  parties;  otherwise,  the  measure  is  not  permitted,  see:  K.  DUDKA,  Ochrona  prawa  
do   prywatności   i   jej   ograniczenia   w   polskim   prawie   karnym.   Cz.   1,   Czasopismo   Prawa  Karnego   i  
Nauk  Penalnych,  2000/2,  p.  83.  With  respect  to  the  French  regulation,  see  also  the  domestic  case  
of  French  Trésor  Public  and  Société  de  Course  v.  L  [1965]  Dalloz  Jur,  423-­‐‑424  where  the  court  stated  
the  admissibility  of   the   tapping  of   telephone  boxes   [in:]  A.  RZEPLIŃSKI,  Wyroki  Europejskiego  
Trybunału  Praw  Człowieka  w  Strasburgu  Sprawa  Huvig   przeciwko  Francji  wyrok   z   dnia   24   kwietnia  






- 2000  EU  MLA  Convention  
  
The  Convention  does  not  explicitly  refer  to  ratione  loci   in  terms  of  telephone  
tapping.   Its   art.   18.3   (f)   stipulates   that   requests  under   this  article   shall   include,  
among  other   things,   the  provision  of   sufficient   technical  data,   in  particular   the  
relevant  network  connection  number,  to  ensure  that  the  request  can  be  met.      
Therefore,  as   in   the  case  of  Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10,   the  Convention  
basically   refers   to   the   telephone   number   to   be   intercepted.   This   leads   to   the  
conclusion   that   the   instrument   does   not   exclude   the   tapping   of   telephones  
targeted   by   the   location,   which   could   be   executed   as   far   as   the   domestic  
provisions  of  concerned  member  states  allows  for  that.  
  
- Council   Resolution   of   17   January   1995   on   the   lawful   interception   of  
telecommunications  
  
The   provisions   of   the  Council   Resolution   of   17   January   1995   on   the   lawful  
interception   of   telecommunications207   are   also   interesting   in   the   light   of   the  
permissibility  of  tapping  targeted  by  location,  as  it  provides:  
  
Art.  1.  Law  enforcement  agencies  require  access  to  the  entire  telecommunications  
transmitted,   or   caused   to   be   transmitted,   to   and   from   the   number   or   the   other  
identifier  of  the  target  service  used  by  the  interception  subject.    
  
This  provision  shows   that   the   interception  of   telecommunications  may   take  
place   either   with   regard   to   the   number,   or   other   target   service   used   by   the  
person  whose   communications   are   to   be   intercepted,   which  may   also   include  
telephones  determined  by  location.    
  
- EIO  Directive  
  
The  Directive  also  refers  to  the  ‘target  identifier’.  Its  art.  30.3  c)  stipulates  that  
the  EIO  shall  contain:    
- information   for   the   purpose   of   identifying   the   subject   of   the  
interception;    
- the  desired  duration  of  the  interception;  and    
- sufficient  technical  data,  in  particular  the  target  identifier,  to  ensure  
that  the  EIO  can  be  executed.    
Specification  of   the   term   ‘target   identifier’   is  provided  by  Section  H7  of   the  
EIO  template208.  Accordingly,  this  term  covers,  in  particular,  mobile  telephones,  
landline  telephones,  email  addresses  and  Internet  connections.  Accordingly,  the  
                                                                                                                            
207   COUNCIL   OF   THE   EUROPEAN   UNION,   Council   Resolution   of   17   January   1995   on   the  
lawful  interception  of  telecommunications,  4.11.1996,  OJ  C  329/1.  
208  Annex  A  of  the  EIO  Directive.    
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The   wording   of   the   instruments   and   documents   concerning   telephone  
tapping  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  cross-­‐‑border  interception  may  also  refer  
to   a   measure   determined   by   the   location   of   the   telephone.   This   conclusion  
follows  from  the  fact  that  the  instruments  use  terms  such  as:   ‘relevant  network  
connection   number’,   ‘identifier   of   the   target   service   used   by   the   interception  
subject’,  or  ‘the  target  identifier’,  which  may  be  understood  in  a  broad  sense  and  
also  cover  telephones  determined  by  their  location.    
 
1.3.1.3. Tapping  targeted  by  location  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR  
  
In   cases   concerning   telephone   tapping,   the   ECtHR   does   not   rule   out  
interceptions  linked  with  particular  places.  A  good  example  thereof  may  be  the  
recent  case  of  Zakharov  v.  Russia,  where  the  Court  stated  as  follows:    
  
Lastly,  as  regards  the  content  of  the  interception  authorisation,  it  must  clearly  
identify   a   specific   person   to   be   placed   under   surveillance   or   a   single   set   of  
premises  as  the  premises  in  respect  of  which  the  authorisation  is  ordered209.  
  
A   similar   line   of   reasoning  may   be   found   in   the   case   of   Kennedy   v.   United  
Kingdom,   where   the   Court   examined   the   provisions   of   the   English   RIPA   and  
ruled,  as  follows:  
  
(…)   in   internal   communications   cases,   the   warrant   itself   must   clearly  
specify,  either  by  name  or  by  description,  one  person  as  the  interception  subject  or  a  
single   set   of   premises   as   the   premises   in   respect   of   which   the   warrant   is  
ordered   (…).  Names,  addresses,   telephone  numbers  and  other  relevant   information  
must  be  specified  in  the  schedule  to  the  warrant.  (…)  The  Court  considers  that,  in  
the   circumstances,no   further   clarification   in   the   legislation   or   the   Code   of  
the  categories  of  persons  liable  to  have  their  communications  intercepted  can  
reasonably  be  required210.  
  
Having  arrived  at  this  conclusion,  it  is  necessary  now  to  examine  whether  the  
ECtHR   imposes   any   particular   minimum   standards   with   regard   to   telephone  
tapping  determined  by  certain  loci.  Thus,  the  following  study  sketches  the  case-­‐‑
law  concerning  places  most  extensively  examined  by  the  Court,  namely  homes,  
offices  and  public  telephones.    
                                                                                                                            
209  Zakharov  v.  Russia,  §§  264.  






- Home  telephones  
  
In   its   case-­‐‑law   the   ECtHR  permits   the   tapping   of   telephones   linked  with   a  
home211.  In  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany  the  Court  ruled:  
  
The   Court   does   not   exclude   that   the   contested   legislation,   and   therefore   the  
measures  permitted  thereunder,  could  also   involve  an   interference  with  the  exercise  
of  a  person’s  right  to  respect  for  his  home212.  
  
Moreover,  the  Court  highlights  that  telephone  conversations  made  from  the  
home  deserve  the  protection  provided  by  Art.  8  ECHR:    
  
It  is  clear  from  the  Court’s  case-­‐‑law  (…)  that  telephone  conversations  made  
from   the  home   are   covered   by   the   notions   of   "ʺprivate   life"ʺ   and   "ʺcorrespondence"ʺ  
under  Article  8  of  the  Convention213.    
  
- Office  telephones  
  
The   legitimacy   of   the   tapping   of   office   telephones   was   examined   by   the  
ECtHR  in  the  case  of  Halford  v.  United  Kingdom.  In  this  case  the  applicant  alleged  
that  calls  made  both  from  her  home  and  office  telephones  were   intercepted  for  
the  purposes  of  obtaining  information  to  be  used  against  her.  When  examining  
the   case,   the   Court   ruled   that   the   applicant   could   have   had   a   reasonable  
expectation  of  privacy  for  such  calls  and,  consequently,   found  that   there  was  a  
violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR   in   relation   to   the   interception  of   calls  made  via  office  
telephones:  
  
In  the  Court’s  view,   it   is  clear   from  its  case-­‐‑law  that   telephone  calls  made   from  
business  premises  as  well  as  from  the  home  may  be  covered  by  the  notions  of  "ʺprivate  
life"ʺ  and  "ʺcorrespondence"ʺ  within  the  meaning  of  Article  8214.  
                                                                                                                            
211   The   Court,   having   considered   all   the   evidence,   does   not   find   it   established   that   there   was   an  
interference  with  Ms  Halford’s  rights  to  respect  for  her  private  life  and  correspondence  in  relation  to  her  
home   telephone.   In   view   of   this   conclusion,   the   Court   does   not   find   a   violation   of   Article   8   of   the  
Convention   (art.   8)   with   regard   to   telephone   calls   made   from  Ms  Halford’s   home,   Halford   v.   United  
Kingdom,   §§   60.   See   also:   CH.   GRABENWARTER,   European   Convention   on   Human   Rights.  
Commentary,  C.H.  Beck  2014,  p.  202.    
212  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany,  §§  41;  see  also:  Malone  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  64.  
213  Halford  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  52,  see  also:  Amann  v.  Switzerland,  §§  43.  
214  (…)  There  is  no  evidence  of  any  warning  having  been  given  to  Ms  Halford,  as  a  user  of  the  internal  
telecommunications   system   operated   at   the   Merseyside   police   headquarters,   that   calls   made   on   that  
system  would  be  liable  to  interception.  She  would,  the  Court  considers,  have  had  a  reasonable  expectation  
of  privacy  for  such  calls,  which  expectation  was  moreover  reinforced  by  a  number  of  factors.  As  Assistant  
Chief   Constable   she   had   sole   use   of   her   office   where   there   were   two   telephones,   one   of   which   was  
specifically  designated  for  her  private  use.  Furthermore,  she  had  been  given  the  assurance,  in  response  to  
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The  same  line  of  argumentation  may  be  found  in  Copland  v.  United  Kingdom,  a  
case  dealing  with  the  interception  of  office  e-­‐‑mails:  
  
According   to   the   Court’s   case-­‐‑law,   telephone   calls   from   business   premises   are  
prima   facie   covered   by   the   notions   of   “private   life”   and   “correspondence”   for   the  
purposes  of  Article  8  §  1215.  
  
- Public  telephones  
  
One   of   the   most   difficult   questions   when   examining   tapping   targeted   by  
location   is  whether   conversations   held   via   publicly   available   telephones   could  
also  be  intercepted  and,  if  so,  whether  these  conversations  fall  within  the  scope  
of  Art.  8  ECHR  in  the  same  way  as  home  or  office  telephones.  From  the  case-­‐‑law  
concerning  this  issue  follows  the  conclusion  that  the  key  factor  in  these  cases  is  
first  and  foremost  a  person'ʹs  reasonable  expectations  as  to  privacy.    
Accordingly,  where   an  applicant  uses   an  open-­‐‑air   channel,   the   interception  
does  not  constitute  interference  since  the  conversation  is  accessible  to  other  users  
and  could  hardly  be  classified  as  private  communication216.  The  same  conclusion  
was  made  with   regard   to  conversations  undertaken  within  a   radio  channel   for  
civil   aircraft217.   On   the   other   hand,   in   A.   v.   France   the   Court   accepted   the  
argument   that  where  a  conversation  concerned  the  public   interest,   this  did  not  
deprive  it  of  its  private  character218.    
Another  significant  example  is  the  case  of  Perry  v.  The  United  Kingdom.  In  this  
case  the  Court  pointed  out  that:    
  
It   cannot   therefore  be  excluded   that  a  person'ʹs  private   life  may  be  concerned   in  
measures   effected   outside   a   person'ʹs   home   or   private   premises.   A   person'ʹs  
reasonable  expectations  as  to  privacy  is  a  significant  though  not  necessarily  
conclusive  factor219.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
a  memorandum,  that  she  could  use  her  office  telephones  for  the  purposes  of  her  sex-­‐‑discrimination  case.  
For  all  of  the  above  reasons,  the  Court  concludes  that  the  conversations  held  by  Ms  Halford  on  her  office  
telephones  fell  within  the  scope  of  the  notions  of  “private  life”  and  “correspondence”  and  that  Article  8  
(art.  8)  is  therefore  applicable  to  this  part  of  the  complaint,  Halford  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  45-­‐‑46.  
215  (…).  It  follows  logically  that  e-­‐‑mails  sent  from  work  should  be  similarly  protected  under  Article  8,  as  
should  information  derived  from  the  monitoring  of  personal  Internet  usage,  Copland  v.  United  Kingdom,  
§§  41.  
216  K.  REID,  A  Practitioner’s  Guide  to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  
2004,  p.  390.  
217  U.  KILKELLY,  The   right   to   respect   for   private   and   family   life.   A   guide   to   the   implementation   of  
Article  8  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  Human  Rights  Handbooks,  No.  1,  2003,  p.  
13.    
218  U.  KILKELLY,  The  right...,  p.  13;  A.  v.  France,  §§  35-­‐‑36.  





In  Uzun   v.   Germany   the   authorities   intercepted   telephones   in   the   house   in  
which   the   applicant   lived   with   his   mother   and   in   a   telephone   box   situated  
nearby.   In   that   case   the   key   issue   was   surveillance   via   GPS,   however,   the  
conclusion   drawn   by   the   ECtHR   is   also   relevant   for   the   purposes   of   this  
research:    
  
There  are  a  number  of  elements  relevant  to  a  consideration  of  whether  a  person'ʹs  
private   life   is   concerned   by   measures   effected   outside   a   person'ʹs   home   or   private  
premises.  Since  there  are  occasions  when  people  knowingly  or   intentionally   involve  
themselves  in  activities  which  are  or  may  be  recorded  or  reported  in  a  public  manner,  
a   person'ʹs   reasonable   expectations   as   to   privacy   may   be   a   significant,  
although  not  necessarily  conclusive,  factor220.    
  
Thus,   in   the  Court’s  view  tapping  of  conversations  held  via  public  channels  
may   also   be   permitted   and,   as   far   as   they   comply   with   the   reasonable  




The   case-­‐‑law   settled   by   the   ECtHR   shows   that   the   Court   allows   for  
interceptions  and  surveillance  linked  with  particular  locations.  According  to  the  
Court,   due   to   the   intrusive   nature   of   these   measures,   some   of   the   ‘tapped  
locations’  are  also  covered  by  the  notions  of   ‘private   life’  and   ‘correspondence’  
within   the  meaning   of  Art.   8   ECHR.   These   locations   are,   in   particular,   homes  
and  business  premises.    
  
1.3.1.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  and  ratione  loci      
  
As   reported   in   this   chapter,   the   inconsistencies   of   domestic   law   may  
negatively  impact  on  the  gathering  and  admissibility  of  evidence  from  telephone  
                                                                                                                            
220  Uzun  v.  Germany,   §§   44;   see   also:  There   are   a   number   of   elements   relevant   to   a   consideration   of  
whether   a   person'ʹs   private   life   is   concerned   by   measures   effected   outside   a   person'ʹs   home   or   private  
premises.   Since   there   are   occasions   when   people   knowingly   or   intentionally   involve   themselves   in  
activities  which  are  or  may  be  recorded  or  reported  in  a  public  manner,  a  person'ʹs  reasonable  expectations  
as   to   privacy  may   be   a   significant,   although   not   necessarily   conclusive,   factor   (…)  A   person  walking  
along  the  street  will  inevitably  be  visible  to  any  member  of  the  public  who  is  also  present.  Monitoring  by  
technological   means   of   the   same   public   scene   (for   example,   a   security   guard   viewing   through   closed-­‐‑
circuit   television)   is   of   a   similar   character   (see   also  Herbecq   and   the  Association   “Ligue   des   droits   de  
l'ʹhomme”  v.  Belgium,  nos.  32200/96  and  32201/96,  Commission  decision  of  14  January  1998,  Decisions  
and  Reports  (DR)  92-­‐‑B,  p.  92,  concerning  the  use  of  photographic  equipment  which  does  not  involve  the  
recording   of   the   visual   data   obtained).   Private-­‐‑life   considerations   may   arise,   however,   once   any  
systematic   or   permanent   record   comes   into   existence   of   such   material   from   the   public   domain   (…)  
Likewise,   the   covert   and   permanent   recording   of   the   applicants'ʹ   voices   at   a   police   station   for   further  
analysis  as  voice  samples  directly  relevant  for  identifying  these  persons  in  the  context  of  other  personal  
data  was  regarded  as  the  processing  of  personal  data  about  them  amounting  to  an  interference  with  their  
private  lives  (…),  Uzun  v.  Germany,  §§  44-­‐‑47.    
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tapping  targeted  by  location.  Consequently,  given  the  domestic  differences,  the  
flexibility  of  the  EU  and  CoE  in  this  matter  (references  to  specific  targets,  which  
may  be  described  by  their   location),  as  well  as   the  ECtHR’s  approach,   it  seems  
necessary   to   establish   common   rules   addressing   the   legitimate   exercise   of   the  
measure  and  the  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  accordingly.    
Thus,   cross-­‐‑border   telephone   tapping   could   be   facilitated   if  member   states  
ensured  the  availability  of   tapping  targeted  by   location  for   the  purposes  of  EU  
cooperation  in  criminal  matters.  The  introduction  of  this  provision  would  clarify  
the   availability   of   the   measure   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context   and   do   away   with  
discussions  as  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  measure  and  enhance  per  se  admissibility  
of  evidence  gathered  thereby.  Operating  under  common  rules  could  also  ensure  
a  common  level  of  protection  for  affected  persons.  Hence,  given  the  fact  that  the  
measure  may   interfere  with   the  privacy   of   a   broad   spectrum  of   third  party   or  
random  users,  it  is  also  necessary  to  consider  certain  limitations.    
First  and  foremost,  following  the  approach  of  the  ECtHR,  the  measure  would  
need   to   correspond  with   the   level  of  protection  ensured   in  Art.   8  ECHR,   since  
the   tapping  of  a   telephone  determined  by   location   (e.g.  home   telephone,  office  
telephone)  is  covered  by  the  notions  of  ‘private  life’  and  ‘correspondence’  within  
the  meaning   of  Art.   8   ECHR.  This   rule   also   applies   to   conversations  made  via  
publicly   available   telephones,   if   a   person  whose   conversations   are   tapped   has  
reasonable  expectations  as   to   the  privacy  of   the  conversations.   It   is  noteworthy  
that   nowadays   the   usage   of   publicly   available   telephones   is   not   very   great.  
However,   the   conclusions   made   in   this   respect   may   give   rise   to   further,  
extended   research   on   minimum   standards   regarding   the   interception   of   e-­‐‑
conversations  targeted  by  location,  e.g.  in  hot-­‐‑spots,  wifi  zones  etc.    
Taking  into  account  the  wide  range  of  persons  whose  conversations  may  be  
intercepted  within   the   tapping   of   telephones   determined   by   location   (e.g.   flat-­‐‑
mates,   office-­‐‑mates,   random   users),   mutual   trust   as   to   the   measure   could   be  
additionally   enhanced   if   member   states   ensured   that   it   is   available   only   in  
exceptional   cases   and,   obviously,   if   the   requirements   for   necessity   and  
proportionality  are  fulfilled,  and  that  the  stored  data  are  screened  and  processed  
in  a  way  that  minimises  the  risk  of  abuses221.    
1.3.2. Ratione  loci  with  regard  to  house  search 
 
This  research  deals  solely  with  house  search  and,  consequently,  no  concerns  
are   raised   relating   to   searches   of   public   premises   since   public   premises   fall  
outside   the   scope   of   Art.   8   ECHR   and,   consequently,   do   not   deserve   special  
focus  with  regard  to  all  the  criteria  undertaken  in  this  research.    
However,   the   term   ‘house’   has   very   different   connotations   across   the  
domestic  legislation  of  member  states  and  that  may  hinder  searches  carried  out  
upon  EU  cooperation,  as  well  as  per  se  admissibility  of  items  gathered  from  the  
                                                                                                                            
221   With   regard   to   the   protection   of   third   parties   monitored   by   chance   or   as   necessary  





measure.   Therefore,   this   part   of   the   research   elaborates   upon   a   common  
minimum  standard  with  regard  to  the  notion  and  scope  of  the  word  ‘house’   in  
the  context  of  cross-­‐‑border  house  searches222.  
  
1.3.2.1. Definition  of  a  ‘house’  in  domestic  contexts  
  
The  member  states  included  in  this  research  tend  not  to  specify  the  scope  of  
premises   that   may   be   searched   in   their   legislation.   Only   one   jurisdiction  
(England   and  Wales)   provides   detailed   regulation   in   this  matter   (any   place,   in  
particular,  any  vehicle,  vessel,  aircraft  or  hovercraft;  any  offshore   installation;  any  tent  
or   movable   structure223).   The   provisions   of   other   member   states   have   been   laid  
down   vaguely.   As   a   result,   these   issues   are   elaborated   on   by   scholars   and  
jurisprudence  and,  therefore,  some  of  examples  are  outlined  below.  
According   to   French   doctrine   and   jurisprudence,   ‘domicile’   is   not   only   a  
person’s  central  place  of  existence  (établissement)  but  also  a  temporary  residence  
(office,  hotel  room,  vehicle  adapted  for  living,  theatre  box).  At  the  same  time,  the  
jurisprudence   excludes   from   this   scope   an   artistic   atelier,   a   car   or   a   burnt-­‐‑out  
flat224.  The  French  approach  may  be  contrasted  to  Spanish  jurisprudence,  which  
is   less  protective   and   excludes   from   the   scope  of   ‘domicile’,   inter   alia,   garages,  
offices,  squats,  elevators,  vehicles  or  hotel  rooms  rented  by  the  hour225.  The  Irish  
provisions,  in  general,  distinguish  between  private  premises  and  dwellings  and  
offer   greater   constitutional   protection   to   the   latter226.   In   Poland,   the   biggest  
controversies  have  been  stirred  up  with  regard  to  searches  of  vehicles  where  the  
Human  Rights  Defender  submitted  an  application  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  
with   a   view   to   examining   the   compatibility   of   the   present   approach  with   the  
Polish   Constitution227.   It   is   noteworthy   that   searches   of   vehicles   in   Poland   are  
allowed   under   numerous   so-­‐‑called   ‘police   acts’   which   permit   interference  
without   judicial   or   prosecutorial   control.   Different   provisions   for   car   searches  
also  apply  in  the  Netherlands228.    
This  variety  of  domestic  approaches,  especially  with  regard  to  cars,  confirms  
the  necessity  of  progress  towards  a  common  understanding  of  what  constitutes  
‘house’  in  the  context  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  searches.  
  
                                                                                                                            
222  Concerns  with  regard  to  ratione  loci  covered  by  special  privileges  are  elaborated  upon  in  the  
chapter  which  deals  with  ratione  personae,  as  well  as  minimum  standards  relating  to  searches  of  
legal  persons.  
223  Section  23  PACE.  
224   M.   ROGACKA-­‐‑RZEWNICKA,   Recenzja   pracy   doktorskiej   mgr   Artura   Kaznowskiego   pt.  
„Instytucja  przeszukania  w  procesie  karnym  a  prawo  do  prywatności”,  p.  9.    
225   J.R.   ÁLVAREZ   RODRÍGUEZ,   F.J.   RÍUS   DIEGO,   La   entrada   y   registro   en   lugar   cerrado.  
Consideraciones  procesales,  jurisprudinciales  y  policiales,  Madrid  2009,  p.  71.  
226  A.  CRAS,  Y.M.  DALY,  Ireland…,  p.  51  et  seq.  
227   RZECZNIK   PRAW   OBYWATELSKICH,   Wniosek   Rzecznika   Praw   Obywatelskich   z   dnia  
29/8/2014,  application  signature:  II.519.344.2014.ST,  29.8.2014.  
228  I.  PEÇI,  The  Netherlands…,  p.  111.    
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1.3.2.2. Ratione  loci  with  regard  to  house  search  in  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments    
  
The   instruments   governing   trans-­‐‑border   house   searches   do   not   attempt   to  
overcome   difficulties   that   follow   from   different   understandings   of   the   word  
‘house’   in   the   EU.   Consequently,   the   legitimacy   of   house   search   is   always  
context-­‐‑sensitive  and  depends  on  the  domestic  regulations  of  the  member  states  
concerned.   However,   two   instruments   which   address   this   issue   are   worth  




The   SIC   provides   an   interesting   approach   to   the   ratione   loci.   Art.   41.5   (c)  
concerns  the  general  conditions  for  hot  pursuit:  
41.5  (c)  Entry  into  private  homes  and  places  not  accessible  to  the  public  shall  
be  prohibited.    
Accordingly,  this  provision  distinguishes  between  private  homes  and  places  
which   are   not   accessible   to   the   public,   and   a   link   between   both   places  which  
prohibits  entry  is  the  expectation  of  privacy  associated  therewith.    
  
- FD  EEW  
  
The  EEW  Proposal  in  many  places  refers  to  ‘private  premises’229.  Reference  to  
‘private  premises’  may  be  also  found  in  the  FD  EEW.  Its  Recital  (7)  reads:  
  
The   EEW   may   be   used   to   obtain   any   objects,   documents   and   data   for   use   in  
proceedings   in   criminal  matters   for  which   it  may   be   issued.   This  may   include,   for  
example,  objects,  documents  or  data  from  a  third  party,  from  a  search  of  premises  
including   the   private   premises   of   the   suspect,   historical   data   on   the   use   of   any  
services  including  financial  transactions,  historical  records  of  statements,  interviews  
and   hearings,   and   other   records,   including   the   results   of   special   investigative  
techniques.    
  
Unfortunately,   at   no   point   does   the   instrument   attempt   to   clarify   the  




The  majority  of  instruments  governing  EU  cross-­‐‑border  house  search  remain  
silent  when  it  comes  to  the  notion  and  scope  of  the  word  ‘house’.  The  FD  EEW  
makes   reference   to   ‘private   premises’   but  without   further   specification   of   that  
term.   On   the   other   hand,   a   clear   rule   is   provided   in   the   SIC,   which   equates  
private  homes  with  places  not  accessible  to  the  public.    
                                                                                                                            





1.3.2.3. Meaning  of  ‘home’  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR  
  
The   ECtHR   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   notion   of   ‘home’   does   not   solely  
encompass  a  private  individual’s  home.  In  the  Court’s  view,  the  word  ‘domicile’  
in  the  French  version  of  Art.  8  ECHR  has  a  broader  connotation  than  ‘home’  and  
should  prevail  over  the  English  version230.    
According   to   the   Court,   the   ‘domicile’   will   usually   be   the   place,   the  
physically   defined   area,  where   private   and   family   life   develops231.  Whether   or  
not   a   particular   habitation   constitutes   a   ‘home’   depends   on   the   factual  
circumstances,   namely,   the   existence   of   sufficient   and   continuous   links  with   a  
specific  place232.  In  its  case-­‐‑law  the  Court  has  also  extended  the  notion  of  ‘home’  
to   cover   business   premises   and   offices   located   on   the   premises   of   a   public  
authority.  There  has  also  been  some  consideration  with  regard  to  vehicles.  All  of  




In  numerous  cases  the  Court  has  specified  how  the  scope  of  ‘home’  should  be  
understood  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  8  ECHR.  Accordingly,  the  notion  ‘home’  
could  include  a  place  where  one  intended  to  live,  not  confining  ‘home’  to  where  one  
actually  was   living  particularly  where   there   is  no   intention   to  use   the   residence   in  
question  as  one’s  home233.    
  
However,   the   Court   highlights   that   not   all   living   places   are   ‘homes’,   for  
example,   holiday   homes   and   work   hostels   might   be   exceptions   (although   the  
Court   ruled   that   a   hotel   room   used   by   a   homeless   person   constitutes   his  
‘home’)234.  A  good  example  of  the  notion  of  ‘home’  is  the  case  of  Rachwalski  and  
Ferenc  v.  Poland.   In  that  case  the  Court  found  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  
private   life  and  home  with   regard   to  an  old  and  decrepit  house   the  applicants  
rented  and  where   they  occasionally   invited   their   friends   to   spend  a  night   or   a  
couple  of  days  (a  squat).    
It   is   also  noteworthy   that   the  Court   is  of   the  opinion   that  ownership   is  not  
necessary  to  establish  a  ‘home’  and,  consequently,  a  rented  flat  also  constitutes  a  
‘home’235.    
  
                                                                                                                            
230  Saint  Paul  Luxembourg  S.A.  v.  Luxembourg,  §§  37.  
231  Rachwalski  and  Ferenc  v.  Poland,  §§  68.  
232  D.  HARRIS,  M.  O’BOYLE,  E.  BATES,  Law  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  Oxford  
2009,  p.  376.    
233  Gillow  v.  United  Kingdom,  cited  in:  D.  HARRIS,  M.  O’BOYLE,  E.  BATES,  Law  of  the…,  p.  376.    
234  D.  HARRIS,  M.  O’BOYLE,  E.  BATES,  Law  of  the…,  p.  376.  
235  Gillow  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  46.  
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- Business   premises   and   the   offices   of   persons   exercising   liberal  
professions    
  
The  important  case  in  the  area  of  business  premises  is  Niemietz  v.  Germany.  In  
this  case  the  Court  pointed  out  that  
  
it  is  not  always  possible  to  distinguish  clearly  which  of  an  individual’s  activities  form  
part  of  his  professional  or  business  life  and  which  do  not.  Thus,  especially  in  the  case  
of   a   person   exercising   a   liberal   profession,   his  work   in   that   context  may   form  part  
and   parcel   of   his   life   to   such   a   degree   that   it   becomes   impossible   to   know   in  what  
capacity  he  is  acting  at  a  given  moment  of  time236.    
  
Consequently,  the  Court  found  that:  
  
[T]he  words  "ʺprivate  life"ʺ  and  "ʺhome"ʺ  as  including  certain  professional  or  business  
activities   or   premises  would   be   consonant  with   the   essential   object   and   purpose   of  
Article  8237.    
  
Consequently,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  term  ‘home’  or  ‘domicile’  also  covers  
business  premises  and  the  offices  of  persons  exercising  liberal  professions238.  It  is  
noteworthy   that   this  approach  also   refers   to   the  business  premises  of  a   juristic  
person239.    
  
- Office  located  on  the  premises  of  a  public  authority  
  
In  the  case  of  Peev  v.  Bulgaria   the  Court  ruled  that  the  offices  located  on  the  
premises  of  a  public  authority   fall  within   the  scope  of   ‘home’   in   light  of  Art.  8  
ECHR.  The  Court  pointed  out  that:  
  
[U]nder  the  “reasonable  expectation  of  privacy”  test  in  light  of  circumstances  of  the  
case,   a   search   which   extended   to   the   applicant’s   desk   and   filing   cabinets   must   be  
regarded  as  an  interference  with  his  private  life240.    
                                                                                                                            
236  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  29.      
237  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  31.  
238  See:  Funke  v.  France,  §§  48  and  Crémieux  v.  France,  §§  31  in  respect  of  searches  of  residential  
premises;  Chappell  v.  United  Kingdom  §§  51,  and  Buck  v.  Germany  §§  31-­‐‑33  in  respect  of  business  
premises;  and  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  29-­‐‑31  and  Roemen  and  Schmit  v.  Luxembourg,  §§  64-­‐‑65   in  
respect  of  offices  of  persons  exercising  a  liberal  profession.    
239  Société  Colas  Est  and  Others  v.  France,  §§  41.  
240  Peev  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  39:  The  Court  considers  that,  in  view  of  its  similarity  to  the  cases  cited  above,  the  
situation   obtaining   in   the   present   case   should   also   be   assessed   under   the   “reasonable   expectation   of  
privacy”  test.  In  the  Court'ʹs  opinion,  the  applicant  did  have  such  an  expectation,  if  not  in  respect  of  the  
entirety   of   his   office,   at   least   in   respect   of   his   desk   and   his   filing   cabinets.  This   is   shown   by   the   great  
number   of   personal   belongings   that   he   kept   there   (…).  Moreover,   such   an   arrangement   is   implicit   in  






This   conclusion   was   repeated   in   a   case   which   dealt   with   the   search   of   a  
professor’s  office  located  at  a  university:  
  
[A]s  to   the  search  of  a  person'ʹs  office   located  on  the  premises  of  a  public  authority,  
the  Court  has  considered  such  a  measure  to  interfere  with  the  individual'ʹs  private  life  
if   the  person  concerned  had  had  a  “reasonable   expectation  of  privacy”   in  respect  of  
his  office,  whereas  it  left  open  whether  such  a  search  also  amounted  to  an  interference  
with  the  individual'ʹs  right  to  respect  for  his  home241.  
 
- Vehicles    
  
With  regard  to  the  permissibility  of  car  search,  the  Court  clearly  pointed  out  
that:    
  
the   search   of   a   person’s   car   interferes  with   the   rights   guaranteed   by  Article   8   §  1  
ECHR242.  
  
This  conclusion  was  repeated  in  Petri  Sallinen  and  Others  v.  Finland,  where  the  
Court  examined  Finnish  regulations  specifying  search  and  seizure  of  privileged  
material  which  had  been  found  and  seized  during  a  search  of  a  law  office  as  well  
as  the  flat  and  vehicles  of  an  applicant.    
Therefore,  in  light  of  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR,  one  may  assume  that  vehicle  
searches  also   interfere  with  the  rights  guaranteed  by  Art.  8  ECHR  and  deserve  




The  overview  of  the  case-­‐‑law  settled  by  the  ECtHR  shows  a  broad  notion  of  
the  word  ‘home’,  since  the  Court  links  the  ‘home’  with  a  reasonable  expectation  
of   privacy.   Accordingly,   the   ‘home’   should  mean   not  merely   the   place  where  
one  intended  to  live,  but  also  business  premises,  offices  located  in  the  premises  
of  a  public  authority  and  vehicles.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
such   as   a   regulation   or   stated   policy   of   the   applicant'ʹs   employer   discouraging   employees   from   storing  
personal  papers  and  effects  in  their  desks  or  filing  cabinets  –  to  suggest  that  the  applicant'ʹs  expectation  
was  unwarranted  or  unreasonable.  The  fact  that  he  was  employed  by  a  public  authority  and  that  his  office  
was  located  on  government  premises  does  not  of  itself  alter  this  conclusion,  especially  considering  that  the  
applicant   was   not   a   prosecutor,   but   a   criminology   expert   employed   by   the   Prosecutor'ʹs   Office   (…).  
Therefore,   a   search  which   extended   to   the   applicant'ʹs   desk   and   filing   cabinets  must   be   regarded   as   an  
interference  with  his  private  life.  
241  Steeg  and  Wenger  v.  Germany,  Apps.  no.  9676/05,  10744/05  and  41349/06,  Commission  decision    
of  3  June  2008.  
242  Steeg   and  Wenger  v.  Germany,  Apps.  no.   9676/05,   10744/05  and  41349/06;   see  also:  Ernst   and  
Others  v.  Belgium,  §§  110.  
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1.3.2.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  ratione  loci  and  house  search    
  
While  looking  into  the  domestic  approaches  it  became  clear  that,  in  pursuit  of  
enhancing  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence  in  the  EU,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  
a   common   understanding   of   the   term   ‘house’   in   the   context   of   cross-­‐‑border  
searches.  This  common  understanding  could  follow  the  approach  of  the  ECtHR  
and   SIC   1985,   and   rely   on   a   reasonable   expectation   of   privacy   together   with  
inaccessibility   of   the   place   to   the   public.   Therefore,   ‘house’   would   be   a   place  
where   one   intends   to   live,   but   also   an   office,   premises   located   within   public  
authorities,  a  vehicle  and  any  other  place  which  is  not  accessible  to  the  public243.  
Operating  under  the  same  understanding  of  the  scope  of  ‘house’  could  facilitate  




This  chapter  examined  the  feasibility  of  coming  to  minimum  standards  with  
regard  to  ratione  loci  separately  for  telephone  tapping  and  house  search.  
As  to  the  former  measure,  the  conclusion  is  that  gathering  of  evidence  from  
telephone  tapping  and  per  se  admissibility  thereof  could  be  enhanced  if  member  
states  clearly  allowed  telephone  tapping  targeted  by  location  for  purposes  of  EU  
cross-­‐‑border   cooperation.   This   location   could   be   a   home,   an   office   or   even   a  
public   place.   Taking   into   account   the   wide   range   of   persons   whose  
conversations  may  be   intercepted  within  the  tapping  of   telephones  determined  
by   location   (e.g.   flat-­‐‑mates,   office-­‐‑mates,   random   users),   the   measure   will   be  
available   only   in   exceptional   cases,   accompanied   by   safeguards   for   persons  
targeted   by   chance   and,   obviously,   if   the   requirements   for   necessity   and  
proportionality  are  fulfilled.    
As   to   the   latter   measure,   introducing   a   common   definition   of   what  
constitutes   ‘house’   in   the   context   of   EU   cross-­‐‑border   searches   could   do   away  
with  dilemmas   that  arise   from  variations  of  domestic   laws  and  ensure   that   the  
measure   is  carried  out  under   the  same  provisions.  This  definition  could  follow  
the  approach  of   the  ECtHR  and  SIC  1985,  and  provide   that  a   ‘house’  will  be  a  
place  with   reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and   inaccessibility  of   the  place   to  
the  public.  
Operating  under  these  minimum  standards  could  remove  the  difficult  issues  
that  arise  from  the  diversity  of  domestic  laws  and  enhance  mutual  trust  between  
member   states,   ensuring   that   both   measures   are   permissible   under   common  
minimum   provisions,   associated   with   the   same   level   of   protection   of   persons  
affected.  That  could  be  rewarded  with  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  
from  both  measures.  
                                                                                                                            
243  Consequently,  ‘house’  is  to  be  construed  as  also  including  the  registered  office  of  a  company  
run   by   a   private   individual   and   a   legal   entity’s   registered   office,   branches   or   other   business  





1.4. Ratione  temporis    
  
Differences  between  member  states  as  to  temporis  concerns  constitute  another  
element   that   may   hamper   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context.   Thus,   the  
goal  of  this  chapter  is  to  investigate  both  measures  in  terms  of  ratione  temporis,  in  
view   of   coming   to   common  minimum   standards.   As   in   the   previous   chapter,  
due  to  the  different  connotations  of  ratione  temporis  relating  to  telephone  tapping  
and  house  search,  the  measures  deserve  separate  analysis.    
Accordingly,   minimum   standards   with   regard   to   ratione   temporis   and  
telephone   tapping   should   deal   with   the   duration   of   the   measure.   The   central  
research  question  is  the  following:  
  
How  could  member  states  enhance  mutual  trust  with  regard  to  the  time  limits  of  
telephone  tapping?  
  
Regarding  house  search,  minimum  standards  should  refer  to  the  time  of  the  
search   and   its   influence   on   the   admissibility   of   evidence.   Consequently,   the  
central  research  question  is  the  following:  
  
How  could  member  states  enhance  mutual  trust  with  regard  to  the  time  of  house  
search?    
  
Ratione  temporis  concerns  may  also  be  linked  to  the  procedural  moment  when  
the  measures   become   available   (e.g.   the   in   rem   phase,   in   personam   phase   etc.).  
However,  it  is  neither  feasible  nor  necessary  to  come  to  a  common  approach  in  
this  respect,  especially  in  light  of  diversities  between  legal  systems  and  different  
structures   of   criminal   proceedings   across   the   EU.   Moreover,   it   is   doubtful  
whether  a  stage  of  proceedings  itself  may  have  such  a  significant  impact  on  the  
mutual   per   se   admissibility   of   evidence,   if   in   both   cases   the   measures   are  
accompanied   by   common  minimum   standards.   Therefore,   these   issues   are   not  
elaborated  upon  in  this  research.    
1.4.1. Ratione  temporis  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping 
 
This   chapter   deals  with   the  duration   limits   of   the  measure.   The   absence   of  
common   EU   minimum   standards   in   this   matter   may   hamper   cross-­‐‑border  
telephone  tapping  when  the  issued  period  of  time  surpasses  the  ratione  temporis  
scope   of   the   executing   state,   because   the   time   limits   in   the   executing   state   are  
shorter,  or  because  the  measure  is  subject  to  intermediate  renewal  where  it  lasts  
for   the   duration   ordered.   Therefore,   this   chapter   offers   an   insight   into   the  
questions   of   the   duration,   time   limit   and   renewal   of   cross-­‐‑border   telephone  
tapping.  
 RATIONE  TEMPORIS  
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                   109  
  
1.4.1.1. Time  limits  of  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation    
  
All  systems  investigated  in  this  research  adhere  to  clear  provisions  regarding  
the   maximum   duration   of   the   measure   and   the   conditions   of   its   renewal.  
However,   as   the   following   table   outlines,   there   are   differences   in   terms   of   the  
duration  of  a  single  issuance  and  of  the  total  time  limits  of  the  measure,  which  
are  apparent  across  the  jurisdictions  investigated:  
  
Table  8:  Ratione  temporis  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation  
  
   England  
and  Wales  
France   Ireland   The  
Netherlands  








nature  of  the  
offence)  
4  months   3  months   4  weeks   3  months   3  months  
Renewal     YES  
  
YES   YES   YES  –  up  to  3  
months  in  
total  









1.4.1.2. Ratione  temporis  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  in  the  MLA  and  MR  
instruments      
  
Neither   the   MLA   nor   the   MR   instruments   provide   straightforward  
provisions  with  regard   to  maximum  duration  of   the  measure.  The   instruments  
and   policy   documents   solely   address   whether   there   is   an   indication   of   the  
duration  of   the  measure   in  the  request/order  and  what  should  happen  in  cases  
where  the  desired  duration  exceeds  the  domestic  scope  temporis  of  the  requested  
state.  The  examples  are  listed  below:  
  
- Council  of  Europe,  Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10  
Art.  2.  Requests   for  assistance  should,   in  addition  to   the   indications  mentioned  
in  Article  14  of  the  convention,  contain  the  following  information:    
d.  an  indication  of  the  period  of  time  during  which  the  interception  is  to  
be  effected.    
Art.   3.   If   the   period   for   which   interception   is   requested   exceeds   the   period   for  
which  an  order  is,  or  may  be,  issued  according  to  the  law  of  the  requested  Party,  that  
Party  should  so  inform  the  requesting  Party  without  delay  and  indicate  possibilities,  






- 2000  EU  MLA  Convention  
  
Art.  18.3.  Requests  under  this  Article  shall  include  the  following:    
(e)  the  desired  duration  of  the  interception.  
  
- EIO  Directive  
  
Art.   30.3.   An   EIO   referred   to   in   paragraph   1   shall   also   contain   the   following  
information:    
(b)  the  desired  duration  of  the  interception.  
  
Consequently,   the   concrete  duration  of   telephone   tapping   carried  out   in   an  
EU   cross-­‐‑border   context   depends   on   the   member   states   concerned.   It   is  
noteworthy   that,   in   light  of   the  Recommendation  No.  R   (85)  10,   the   law  of   the  
requested   state   prevails   and   the   requesting   party  must   adhere   to   its   domestic  
time  limits  and  renewal  procedures.    
  
1.4.1.3. Maximum  duration  of  telephone  tapping  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR  
  
In   cases   concerning   telephone   tapping,   the   ECtHR   has   ruled   that   the  
establishment   of   a   general   rule   with   regard   to   the   maximum   duration   of   the  
measure   is   left   to  member   states.   At   the   same   time,   the   Court   does   not   set   a  
maximum   limit   and,  moreover,  presents   a  wide  margin  of   appreciation   in   this  
matter.    
In  Kruslin  v  France  the  Court  held  that  the  setting  of  a  limit  on  the  duration  of  
telephone   tapping  was   necessary244.  However,   in   the   case   of  Kennedy   v.  United  
Kingdom  the  Court  ruled  as  follows:  
  
(…)   the   overall   duration   of   any   interception   measures   will   depend   on   the  
complexity  and  duration  of  the  investigation  in  question  and,  provided  that  adequate  
safeguards  exist,   it   is  not  unreasonable  to   leave  this  matter   for  the  discretion  of   the  
relevant  domestic  authorities245.    
  
In   the   same   judgment,   the   Court   pointed   out   that   ‘adequate   safeguards’  
relate,   inter   alia,   to   supervision   and   keeping   the   warrants   under   continuous  
review,   which   constitutes   satisfactory   protection   against   abuses   and   arbitrary  
interference246.  A  similar  line  of  reasoning  may  be  found  in  the  case  of  Iordachi  v.  
                                                                                                                            
244  Above  all,  the  system  does  not  for  the  time  being  afford  adequate  safeguards  against  various  possible  
abuses  (…)  Nothing  obliges  a  judge  to  set  a  limit  on  the  duration  of  telephone  tapping,  Kruslin  v.  
France,  §§  35.    
245  Kennedy  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  161.  
246  Ibid.    
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Moldowa  in  which  the  Court  referred  to  the  setting  up  of  clear  requirements  for  
renewal  of  the  measure  and  procedure247.    
It   is   also   noteworthy   that   in   the   case   Van   Pelt   v.   The   Netherlands   the  
Commission  found  that  the  tapping  of  the  applicant’s  telephone  for  almost  two  
years  had  not  violated  the  ECHR248.    
In   summary,   the   ECtHR   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   law   should   provide   for  
clear  limitations  on  the  duration  of  telephone  tapping,  as  well  as  a  procedure  to  
follow  after   the   expiry  of   this   time  and  grounds   for   its   renewal.  However,   the  
Court  accepts  long  durations  and  the  absence  of  a  maximum  limit,  as  far  as  it  is  
reasonable  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  as  long  as  it  is  accompanied  by  
adequate  safeguards.        
  
1.4.1.4. Minimum   standards   with   regard   to   ratione   temporis   and   telephone  
tapping  
  
Given   the   case-­‐‑law   of   the   ECtHR,   it   is   clear   that   mutual   trust   between  
member  states  could  be  enhanced  by  ensuring  that  they  provide  clear  rules  as  to  
the  maximum  duration  of  the  measure  and  its  renewals.  That  could  strengthen  
the   presumption   that   the   foreign   procedure   under   which   the   measure   is  
effectuated  ensures   the  same   level  of  protection  against  abuses.  Having  regard  
to  the  results  of  the  comparative  study,  the  legislation  included  in  this  research  
already   adheres   to   the   requirements   outlined   above.   In   each   member   state  
provisions   for   dealing   with   the   maximum   duration   of   the   measure   and   clear  
conditions  of  renewal  are   in  place.  However,  regardless  of  this  fact,   time  limits  
in   cross-­‐‑border   telephone   tapping   are   still   very   context-­‐‑sensitive   and   may  
significantly  vary,  depending  on   the  member  states   concerned.  That   could  still  
hamper  cross-­‐‑border  execution  of  the  measure.    
Consequently,   it   is   necessary   to   consider   whether   adopting   common   time  
limits   for   the   measure   carried   out   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context   could   be   a  
solution   here.   Even   if   it   would   significantly   facilitate   evidence-­‐‑gathering,   the  
idea  seems  neither  desirable  nor  doable.  Firstly,   it  would  be  difficult   to  set  out  
any   reasonable   and   satisfactory   common   duration.   Secondly,   it   is   doubtful  
whether  member  states  would  be  willing  to  resile  from  their  domestic  provisions  
and   introduce   new   time   limits   for   the   purposes   of   EU   cross-­‐‑border   telephone  
tapping.  Thirdly,  the  ECtHR  does  not  set  any  concrete  minimum  duration  either,  
rulling   that   what   is   of   utmost   importance   is   the   quality   of   the   law   and  
appreciating  different  domestic  approaches  in  this  matter.  
Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  whether  member  states  could  continue  
                                                                                                                            
247  The  Court  further  notes  that  the  legislation  in  question  does  not  provide  for  a  clear  limitation  in  time  
of  a  measure  authorising  interception  of  telephone  communications.  While  the  Criminal  Code  imposes  a  
limitation   of   six   months   (…),   there   are   no   provisions   under   the   impugned   legislation   which   would  
prevent   the   prosecution   authorities   from   seeking   and   obtaining   a   new   interception   warrant   after   the  
expiry  of  the  statutory  six  months'ʹ  period,  Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova,  §§  45.    





regulating  this  issue  and  simply  acknowledge  differences  coming  from  domestic  
legislation,  on   condition   that   they  provide   clear   rules   as   to   the  duration  of   the  
measure  and   its   renewal.  That  would  mean   that  member   states   could  agree   to  
execute   the   foreign,   desirable   duration,   even   if   it   differed   from   the   domestic  
provisions   that   would   apply   in   a   similar   domestic   case.   This   approach   fully  
relies  on  the  domestic  provisions  of  the  issuing  state,  and  leaves  this  state  with  
the  decision  as  to  the  time  limit  for  the  telephone  tapping  warrant  to  be  issued  
and   executed,   according   to   its   law.  Given   the   fact   that  mutual   trust  would   be  
enhanced   by   ensuring   that   member   states   envisage   provisions   relating   to   the  
maximum   duration   of   the   measure   and   the   conditions   of   its   renewal,   the  
executing  state  could  per  se  assume  that  the  measure  is  to  be  issued  and  renewed  
(if   necessary),   according   to   the   law   that   provides   the   same   level   of   protection.  
However,  what  brings  the  necessary  flexibility  to  this  rule  for  the  executing  side  
is  the  overall  maximum  duration  provided  by  the  domestic  law  of  the  executing  
state,  which  constitutes  the  maximum  limit  to  which  the  executing  state  may  act.  
In   other   words,   member   states   would   apply   foreign   requirements   as   to   the  
duration  of  the  measure  but  only  to  the  maximum  extent  provided  by  the  law  of  
the  executing  state.    
To   sum   up,   the  minimum   standards   for   telephone   tapping  with   regard   to  
ratione   temporis   could   consist   of   ensuring   that   all  member   states   provide   clear  
rules  as  to  the  maximum  duration  of  the  measure  and  its  renewal.  This  provision  
would   enhance   mutual   trust   between   member   states   and   strengthen   the  
presumption  that  the  procedure  under  which  the  measure  is  granted  or  renewed  
ensures  the  same  level  of  protection  against  abuses  and,  therefore,  the  executing  
member  state  may  execute  it  according  to  the  desired  duration,  unless  it  extends  
past  the  overall  maximum  time  limit  in  that  state.    
1.4.2. Ratione  temporis  with  regard  to  house  search 
 
This  chapter  deals  with  the  times  of  searches,  especially  searches  conducted  
at  night  and  at  ‘unreasonable  hours’.  Incompatibilities  between  member  states  in  
this   matter   may   raise   dilemmas   as   to   the   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered  
upon  different  time  frameworks.  Consequently,  the  following  study  investigates  
the   feasibility   of   coming   to   minimum   standards   that   would   enhance   mutual  
trust  between  member  states  in  this  matter  and  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence,  
even  that  gathered  at  night  or  daybreak.    
 
1.4.2.1. Search-­‐‑times  in  domestic  legislation  
  
There   is  no  coherence  between  the  investigated  legal  systems  as  to  the  time  
of  searches.  Whereas  two  provide  precise  time  frameworks  for  the  measure,  the  
other  states  refer  to  ‘reasonable  hours’.  None  of  the  investigated  laws  explicitly  
prohibits  night  searches.  However,  all  member  states  require  that  night  searches  
shall  be  conducted  solely  in  exceptional  cases.  
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In  England  and  Wales,  house  search  under  a  warrant  must  be  carried  out  at  a  
reasonable  hour  unless  it  appears  to  the  constable  executing  it  that  the  purpose  
of  the  search  may  be  frustrated  upon  an  entry  at  a  reasonable  hour249.  Searches  in  
France   are   only   authorised   to   be   carried   out   during   the   day-­‐‑time.  Apart   from  
exceptional  cases  provided  for  by  law,  searches  may  not  be  undertaken  before  6  
am.  These  exceptional  cases  involve,  among  other  things,  drugs,  organised  crime  
or   terrorism.  Also,  operations   launched  during   the  day  may  be   continued   into  
the  night250.  Warrants   in   Ireland   can   be   executed   at   any   time,   including  night-­‐‑
time,  likewise  in  the  Netherlands.  In  Poland,  according  to  art.  221  KPK,  searches  
of   places   of   residence   are   conducted   at   night-­‐‑time   only   in   urgent   cases.   The  
‘night-­‐‑time’  is  from  10  pm  to  6  am,  however,  a  search  commenced  by  day  may  
be   continued  during   the  night-­‐‑time.   Pursuant   to   the  LECrim,   a   search  may  be  
conducted  during  the  day  and,  in  urgent  cases,  during  the  night  as  well.  There  is  
no   one   rule   for   ‘day’   or   ‘night’   hours   in   the   Spanish   criminal   proceedings.  
Following   the   jurisprudence,   in   such   cases,   the   season   and   ‘Spanish   customs’  
should  also  be  considered251.    
  
Table  9:  Ratione  temporis  with  regard  to  house  search  in  domestic  legislation  
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1.4.2.2. Search-­‐‑times  in  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments      
  
The   instruments   governing   evidence-­‐‑gathering   do   not   address   much   the  
search-­‐‑time   concerns.   The   only   example   may   be   found   in   the   EEW   Proposal,  
which  includes  special  provision  with  regard  to  these  issues.  Accordingly,  art.  12  
of  the  EEW  Proposal,  which  deals  with  additional  safeguards  for  the  execution  
of  a  warrant,  reads:  
  
                                                                                                                            
249  Section  16  PACE.    
250  J.  TRICOT,  France…,  p.  244.  






Art.  12.2  (a):  a  search  of  private  premises  should  not  start  at  night,  unless  this  is  
exceptionally  necessary  due  to  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case.  
  
This  safeguard,  however,  has  not  been  incorporated  into  the  final  version  of  
the   FD   EEW.   Undoubtedly,   this   article   was   striving   for   the   maximisation   of  
procedural   safeguards   and   the   chances   of   admissibility   for   evidence   gathered  
within   the   measure   by   limiting   night   searches   only   to   exceptional   cases.  
However,  having  taken  into  account  the  comparative  study,  one  may  notice  that  
the   term   ‘night’   is   still   imprecise  due   to   the   fact   the   ‘night’  may  have  different  
connotations  across  different  domestic  laws.    
  
1.4.2.3. Ratione   temporis   with   regard   to   house   search   in   the   case-­‐‑law   of   the  
ECtHR  
  
In   cases   concerning   search   times,   the   Court   is   more   concerned   with   the  
principle   of   necessity   and   proportionality   than   on   indicating   a   strict   time  
framework  for  the  measure.    
In   the   case   of   Misan   v.   Russia   the   Court   accepted   the   domestic   Russian  
approach  that  allows  searches  during  night  hours.  In  that  case  the  Russian  police  
carried   out   a   search   of   the   applicant’s   flat   from   9.30   pm   to   11.00   pm.   The  
applicant  argued  that  the  night  search  had  not  been  relevant  and  sufficient  and,  
consequently,   it   had   been   unlawful   under   domestic   law.   However,   the   Court  
pointed  out  that:  
  
it  does  not  consider   it  necessary  to  determine  whether   the  mere   fact   that   the  search  
was   carried   out   at   night   is   in   itself   sufficient   to   undermine   its   lawfulness.   It   will  
instead   concentrate   on   whether   the   interference   was   “necessary   in   a   democratic  
society”252.    
  
In   the   case   Rachwalski   and   Ferenc   v.   Poland   the   Court   found   there   to   be   a  
violation   in   the   fact   that   the  applicants  were  confronted  by  a  number  of  police  
officers  carrying  truncheons  and  accompanied  by  dogs  at  the  front  door  of  their  
house   in   the  middle  of   the  night.  However,  when  examining  the  quality  of   the  
Polish   law,   the   Court   did   not   question   the   possibility   of   carrying   out   a   night  
search   under   Polish   legislation.   Nevertheless,   the   Court   observed   that   the  
domestic   provisions   that   allow   night-­‐‑searches   had   not   been   fulfilled   in   this  
case253.  
An   interesting   example   is   the   case   of   Kučera   v.   Slovakia,   where   the   Court  
found  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  even  thought   the  measure  started  at  6.00  am  
(in  accordance  with  the  domestic   law  that  specified  the  hours  of  searches).  The  
Court   concluded   that,   in   light  of  all   the  circumstances  of   this   case,   starting   the  
                                                                                                                            
252  Misan  v.  Russia,  §§  54.  
253  Rachwalski  and  Ferenc  v.  Poland,  §§  71-­‐‑73.  
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search  at  daybreak  had  been  neither  necessary  nor  proportional254.    
In  summary,  the  approach  of  the  ECtHR  allows  night-­‐‑searches  insofar  as  the  
measure   is   necessary   and   proportional.   However,   according   to   the   Court,   the  
terms   of   carrying   out   the  measure   during   the   night   should   have   a   clear   legal  
basis   in   domestic   law,   and   the   key   feature   is   always   necessity   and  
proportionality  of  the  search  time  in  a  particular  case.    
  
1.4.2.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  ratione  temporis  and  house  search  
  
There  is  common  ground  between  the  domestic  systems  of  the  member  states  
included   in   this   research   as   to   the   exceptional   conditions  under  which   a  night  
search   may   be   executed.   This   approach   corresponds   with   the   case-­‐‑law   of   the  
ECtHR,   which   links   search   times   with   the   principle   of   proportionality   and  
necessity   instead   of   ruling   on   a   precise   time   framework   for   the   measure.  
Therefore,   the   minimum   standard   with   regard   to   ratione   temporis   and   house  
search   could   comply  with  domestic   rules,   the   provision   set   out   in   art.   12.2   (a)  
EEW  Proposal  together  with  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR,  and  consist  of  ensuring  
that   house   searches   are   carried   out   solely   at   reasonable   hours,   unless   this   is  
exceptionally   necessary   due   to   the   particular   circumstances   of   the   case.  
Accordingly,  member  states  would  still  be  allowed  to  perform  night  searches  (or  
searches  at  unreasonable  hours),  however,  the  use  of  this  way  of  carrying  out  the  
measure   would   be   limited   by   common   requirements   based   on   principles   of  
necessity  and  proportionality  apparent  in  each  particular  case.    
Accordingly,   differences   in   domestic   time-­‐‑frames  would   not   constitute   any  
obstacle   to   per   se   admissibility   of   the   evidence,   since   member   states   would  
believe   that   the  search  executed   in  an  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context  would  meet   the  
same  conditions  and  ensure  the  same  level  of  protection  against  abuses  in  terms  
of  temporis.    
1.4.3. Conclusion 
 
This   chapter   has   provided   an   insight   into   temporis   concerns   in   view   of  
coming   to   common   EU   minimum   standards   in   this   respect,   which   would  
enhance  mutual  trust  between  member  states  and  result  in  per  se  admissibility  of  
evidence.    
The  outcome  is  that,  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping,  mutual  trust  could  be  
enhanced   by   member   states   introducing   straightforward   rules   regarding   the  
time  limits  of  the  measure,  namely,  maximum  duration  and  rules  for  its  renewal.  
That  could  allow  member  states  to  execute  orders  containing  various  durations  
of  the  measures.  With  regard  to  house  search,  mutual  trust  could  be  taken  to  a  
higher  level  by  member  states  ensuring  that  night  searches,  as  well  as  searches  at  
unreasonable  hours,  can  be  conducted  only  in  exceptional  cases,  if  necessary  due  
to  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case.  In  this  scenario  member  states  would  
                                                                                                                            





per  se  trust  that,  irrespective  of  temporis  incompatibilities  between  member  states,  
the  measure  is  carried  out  according  to  a  commonly  agreed,  minimum  standard,  
and  does  not  carry  a  risk  of  abuses  of  power.    
Introducing  these  provisions   for   the  purposes  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border   telephone  
tapping   and   house   search   could   facilitate   evidence-­‐‑gathering,   enhance  mutual  
trust   between   member   states   as   to   the   time   frameworks,   and,   consequently,  
enhance  the  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  accordingly. 
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1.5. Ratione  personae  
  
EU   cross-­‐‑border   gathering   and   use   of   evidence  may   also   be   hampered   by  
incompatibilities   related   to   ratione   personae.   These   incompatibilities   may   arise  
when  evidentiary  measures  can  only  be  taken  for  a  limited  category  of  persons  
and  when  these  categories  vary  depending  on  the  member  state  concerned255,  or  
when   domestic   provisions   provide   special   rules   relating   to   the   gathering   of  
evidence   from  specific  persons  or  professions.  This  may  apply,   for  example,   to  
persons   covered   by   immunities,   persons   obliged   not   to   disclose   information  
classified  as  privileged  or  confidential,  or  secrets  related  to  some  professions  or  
functions,   such   as   lawyers,   journalists   and   doctors.   Extra   dilemmas  may   arise  
with   regard   to   the   targeting   of   third   persons,   as   well   as   the   status   of   third  
persons   affected  by   chance.  Moreover,   consideration   shall   also   be  given   to   the  
liability  of  legal  persons  to  be  subject  to  the  measures256.    
Consequently,   this   chapter   looks   into   ratione  personae   issues  with   a   view   to  
coming  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  with  regard  to  various  categories  of  
persons   that   may   be   targeted   by   the   measures.   Thus,   the   central   research  
question  is  the  following:  
  
Which  categories  of  persons  could  be  targeted  by  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  
in  the  context  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of  evidence?  
  
This   central   research   question   gives   rise   to   the   following   secondary  
questions:  
  
Which   immunities   or   privileges   require   a   special   procedure   when   it   comes   to   EU  
cross-­‐‑border  telephone  tapping  and  house  search?  
  
Could   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   be   permissible   with   regard   to   third  
parties?    
  
Could  legal  persons  be  the  subject  of  telephone  tapping  and  house  search?    
  
With   regard   to   these   research  questions  one  may  wonder  whether   some  of  
                                                                                                                            
255  As  the  study  on  EU  cross-­‐‑border  evidence-­‐‑gathering  shows,  member  states  are  very  reluctant  to  
proceed  with  the  execution  of  an  investigative  measure  if  it  surpasses  the  national  scope  ratione  personae.  
Only   70%   indicated   that   execution  would   not   be   possible   in   such   cases.  Only   30%   is   prepared   to   go  
ahead  with   this   investigative  measure,  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  
cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  75-­‐‑76.  
256  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN,  Liability  of  legal  persons  
for   offences   in   the   EU,   Maklu   2012;   G.   VERMEULEN,  W.   DE   BONDT,   C.   RYCKMAN   (eds.),  





these   concerns   would   fit   better   into   the   chapter   dealing   with   ratione   loci,   in  
particular   when   it   comes   to   interferences   in   places   used   by   persons   granted  
immunity   or   privilege   (e.g.   law   firms,   politicians’   offices,   etc.).   However,  
exploring  these  items  within  ratione  personae  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  the  core  
link   between   the   special   procedure   and   the   place   is   the   privileged   person.  
Consequently,  the  determining  factor  is  not  the  locus  itself  but  the  fact  this  locus  
is  occupied  by  a  person  enjoying  special  privilege.  Therefore,  the  searching  and  
tapping   of   ‘privileged   places’  was   omitted   from   the   ratione   loci   chapter   and   is  
elaborated  upon  below.    
1.5.1. Ratione  personae  in  domestic  legislation   
 
1.5.1.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
The  comparative  study  shows  that  member  states  allow  for  a  wide  scope  of  
persons  who  may  be   targeted  by   telephone   interceptions.  According   to   all   the  
domestic   provisions,   the  measure  may   be   carried   out   not   only  with   regard   to  
suspects,   but   also   with   regard   to   other   individuals,   including   third   parties.  
However,   all   member   states   provide   restrictions   in   this   matter,   indicating  
categories  of  persons  which  cannot  be  affected  by  the  measure  or  persons  whose  
conversations  may  be  tapped  under  certain,  limited  conditions:  
  
Table  10:  Ratione  personae  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping  in  domestic  legislation  
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T.  HOWSE,  England…,  p.  152;  Interception  of  Communications.  Code  of  Practice,  p.  16-­‐‑23;  art.  
237  §  4  KPK.  With  regard  to  the  remaining  states,  the  information  is  based  on  my  consultation  
with  representatives  of  member  states  
  
Having  regard  to  the  third  research  question  of  this  chapter,  it  is  noteworthy  
that   there   is   no   consistency   between  member   states   as   to   the   admissibility   of  
evidence   obtained   from   tapped   conversations   of   the   tapped   conversations   of  
representatives  of  legal  persons257.   
                                                                                                                            
257  According  to  member  states’  representatives,  only  in  three  member  states  could  the  measure  
be  considered  admissible  and  effected  (France,  Ireland  and  Spain).  In  the  remaining  states,  there  
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1.5.1.2. House  search  
  
For   house   search,  member   states   provide   that   the  measure  may   be   carried  
out   with   regard   to   all   individuals,   including   persons   who   are   not   parties   in  
criminal   proceedings.   In   the   legislation   included   in   this   research   materiae  
concerns  and  the  circumstances  of  a  particular  case  prevail  over  the  status  of  the  
individuals   whose   premises   may   be   searched.   However,   as   in   the   case   of  
telephone   tapping,   the   legislation   refers   to   persons   whose   premises   are  
protected   due   to   the   fact   that   they   are   occupied   by   persons   enjoying   special  
privileges,  including  lawyers,  journalists  and  doctors.  
  
Table  11:  Ratione  personae  with  regard  to  house  search  in  domestic  legislation  
  
   England  
and  Wales  
France   Ireland   The   Ne-­‐‑
therlands  
Poland   Spain  
























lawyers   lawyers   lawyers  
journalists  
lawyers  
Section   7.2   Police   and  Criminal   Evidence  Act   1984,   Code   B,   Code   of   Practice   for   Searches   of  
Premises  by  Police  Officers  and  the  Seizure  of  Property  Found  by  Police  Officers  on  Persons  or  
Premises;  arts.  219,  225  and  226  KPK.  With  regard  to  the  remaining  states,  information  is  based  




As   the  overview  of  domestic   legislation   shows,  member   states  do  not   limit  
the   legitimate   exercise   of   these   measures   to   parties   to   the   proceedings.  
Consequently,   the   measures   may   be   executed   against   other   individuals,  
including  third  parties.    
However,   all   the   member   states   provide   limitations   on   the   use   of   the  
measures,  specifying  categories  of  persons  who  deserve  special  protection,  due  
to   fact   that   they   are   covered   by   immunities   or   privileges.   These   categories   of  
persons  vary  from  one  member  state  to  another,  however,  all  those  included  in  
this  research  give  lawyers  special  protection.      
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  member  states  are  not  coherent  when  it  comes  
to  telephone  tapping  or  searching  of  premises  of  legal  persons.  Whereas  in  some  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
are   no   special   rules   relating   to   legal   persons,   which   leaves   open   the   question   as   to   the  





the  legislation  contains  straightforward  provisions  relating  to  this  issue,  in  other  
member  states  the  legislation  remains  silent  on  the  matter.    
1.5.2. Ratione  personae  in  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments  
  
This  subsection  examines  whether  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments  governing  
EU   cooperation   in   criminal   matters   address   personae   concerns   with   regard   to  
both  measures.  In  particular,  this  part  of  the  study  aims  at  exploring  whether  the  
EU  favours  any  groups  of  persons  or  professions  that  deserve  special  protection  
in  the  context  of  EU  cooperation  in  criminal  matters.  Consideration  is  also  given  
to  the  legitimacy  of  subjecting  third  parties  and  legal  persons  to  the  measures.    
  
1.5.2.1. Ratione  personae  in  MLA  instruments  
  
When   examining   the   MLA   instruments   one   may   notice   that   there   are   not  
many   references   to   ratione   personae   in   them.  Only   the   Recommendation  No.   R  
(85)   10   provides   that   the   execution   of   such   letters   rogatory  may   be   refused   if,  
according   to   the   law   of   the   requested   party,   the   status   of   the   person   whose  
telecommunications   are   to   be   intercepted   does   not   permit   the   use   of   this  
measure.   Consequently,   member   states   are   given   the   freedom   to   refuse  
execution   of   the   foreign   request   if   its   execution   would   surpass   the   domestic  
personae  scope.  
As  for  legal  persons,  the  instruments  refer  to  the  availability  of  mutual  legal  
assistance  which  relates  to  proceedings  in  connection  with  offences  for  which  a  
legal   person   may   be   liable258.   However,   no   specific   concerns   are   raised   with  
regard  to  the  legal  person  as  a  subject  of  evidentiary  measures.    
  
1.5.2.2. Ratione  personae  in  MR  instruments  
  
In  contrast  to  the  MLA  instruments,  the  MR  instruments  directly  address  the  
ratione   personae   and   link   these   issues  with   grounds   for   non-­‐‑execution.  The  MR  
instruments   explicitly   state   that   the   executing   member   state   may   refuse  
recognition  or  execution  where  there  is  an  immunity  or  privilege  under  the  law  
of  this  state  which  makes  it   impossible  to  execute  the  warrant/order.  However,  
this  formulation  may  raise  ambiguities  due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  common  
definition  of  what  constitutes  an  immunity  or  privilege  in  the  EU259.    
 
                                                                                                                            
258  Art.   3.2   2000  EU  MLA  Convention:  Mutual   assistance   shall   also   be   afforded   in   connection  with  
criminal   proceedings   and   proceedings   as   referred   to   in   paragraph   1   which   relate   to   offences   or  
infringements  for  which  a  legal  person  may  be  held  liable  in  the  requesting  Member  State;  see  also:  G.  
VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN,  Liability  of  legal  persons…,  p.  129-­‐‑130.  
259  See  in  more  detail:  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking…,  p.  
275-­‐‑278.  
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- FD  EAW  
  
The  first  instrument  to  make  reference  to  immunity  or  privilege  was  the  FD  
EAW260.  Its  art.  20  reads:    
  
Art.   20.1.   Where   the   requested   person   enjoys   a   privilege   or   immunity  
regarding   jurisdiction  or   execution   in   the   executing  Member  State,   the   time   limits  
referred  to   in  Article  17  shall  not  start  running  unless,  and  counting  from  the  day  
when,   the   executing   judicial   authority   is   informed   of   the   fact   that   the   privilege   or  
immunity   has   been   waived.   The   executing   Member   State   shall   ensure   that   the  
material  conditions  necessary  for  effective  surrender  are  fulfilled  when  the  person  no  
longer  enjoys  such  privilege  or  immunity.    
2.  Where  power  to  waive  the  privilege  or  immunity  lies  with  an  authority  of  the  
executing  Member  State,  the  executing  judicial  authority  shall  request  it  to  exercise  
that  power  forthwith.  Where  power  to  waive  the  privilege  or  immunity  lies  with  an  
authority   of   another   State   or   international   organisation,   it   shall   be   for   the   issuing  
judicial  authority  to  request  it  to  exercise  that  power.    
  
The  introduction  of  this  ground  for  refusal  has  been  called  in  the  literature  a  
step  backwards  in  comparison  with  mutual  legal  assistance,  where  this  ground  
for  refusal  was  traditionally  not  included261.  Moreover,  even  though  it  has  been  
acknowledged  that   the   field  of  obtaining  evidence  does  not  necessarily  require  
the   same   rules   as   decisions   to   arrest   people   and   that   it   is   not   an   appropriate  
method   to   take   the   grounds   for   refusal   already   contained   in   other   mutual  
recognition  instruments  as  a  starting  point  for  negotiations262,  this  provision  has  
consequently   been   copied   into   the   EU   instruments   governing   evidence-­‐‑
gathering,  namely  the  FD  FO,  the  FD  EEW  and  the  EIO  Directive263.    
 
- FD  FO  
  
The   FD   FO   in   its   art.   7   lists   grounds   for   optional   non-­‐‑recognition   or   non-­‐‑
execution.   Accordingly,   the   execution   of   the   order   may   be   refused   or   not  
recognised  if:  
Art.  7.1.  (b)  there  is  an  immunity  or  privilege  under  the  law  of  the  executing  
                                                                                                                            
260   It   is   noteworthy   that   this   ground   was   inserted   in   the   framework   decision   during   the  
December  2001  negotiations  for  the  sole  reason  of  convincing  Italy,  which  did  not  want  to  risk  
Italians  under  national  political  immunity  or  privilege  becoming  surrenderable  under  the  EAW.    
261  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  C.  RYCKMAN  (eds.),  Rethinking…,  p.  276.  
262  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Discussion  paper  on   the  European  Investigation  
Order  (11842/10),  8.7.2010,  p.  8.    
263  See  also:  Whilst  it  should  already  be  pitied  that  this  was  the  price  to  be  paid  for  reaching  consensus  at  
the  level  of  the  JHA  Council  on  the  EAW,  there  was  clearly  no  good  reason  to  simply  copy  the  ground  for  
non-­‐‑execution  into  the  sphere  of  MLA  by  introducing  it  in  the  EEW  or  the  Freezing  Order,  for  the  effect  
of  execution  would  not  come  close  to  surrender,  as  in  the  case  of  the  EAW,  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  





state  which  makes  it  impossible  to  execute  the  freezing  order264.    
  
- FD  EEW  
  
The  FD  EEW  consequently  copies  the  ratione  personae  approach  and  stipulates  
that  recognition  or  execution  of  the  EEW  may  be  refused  in  the  executing  state  if:  
  
Art.  13.1  (d)  there  is  an  immunity  or  privilege  under  the  law  of  the  executing  
state  which  makes  it  impossible  to  execute  the  EEW.  
    
However,   it   is   remarkable   that   the   EEW   Preamble   provides   some  
clarifications  as  to  what  may  constitute  an  immunity  of  privilege.  Thus,  Recital  
(17)  of  FD  EEW  reads:  
  
There   is  no  common  definition  of  what  constitutes  an   immunity  or  privilege   in  the  
European  Union  and  the  precise  definition  of  these  terms  is  therefore  left  to  national  
law,  which  may  include  protections  which  apply  to  medical  and  legal  professions  
(…)265.  
  
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  Form  A  of  the  EEW  template  included  in  the  EEW  
Proposal   required   further   details   of   whether   the   objects,   documents   or   data  
sought  by  the  warrant  constitutes  material  likely  to  be  covered  by  any  privileges  
or  immunities266.  However,  the  final  template  of  the  EEW  lacks  this  reference.  
  
- EIO  Directive  
  
The   EIO   Directive   follows   the   approach   presented   in   the   preceding  
paragraphs.  Accordingly,  art.  11.  1  (a)  stipulates  that  recognition  of  execution  of  
an  EIO  may  be  refused  in  the  executing  state  where:  
  
Art.  11.  1  (a)  there  is  an  immunity  or  privilege  under  the  law  of  the  executing  
State   which   makes   it   impossible   to   execute   the   EIO   or   there   are   rules   on  
determination  and  limitation  of  criminal  liability  relating  to  freedom  of  the  press  and  
freedom  of  expression  in  other  media,  which  make  it  impossible  to  execute  the  EIO.    
  
As   in   the   case   of   the   preceding   instruments,   the   EIO   Directive   does   not  
provide   any   definition   of   what   constitutes   an   immunity   or   privilege   and,  
                                                                                                                            
264  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  FO  Proposal  did  not  include  this  provision.    
265  Recital  (17)  of  the  FD  EEW:  (…)  but  should  not  be  interpreted  in  a  way  which  would  run  counter  to  
the  obligation  to  abolish  certain  grounds  for  refusal   in  Article  7  of  the  Council  Act  of  16  October  2001  
establishing,   in   accordance   with   Article   34   of   the   Treaty   on   European   Union,   the   Protocol   to   the  
Convention   on  Mutual   Assistance   in   Criminal  Matters   between   the  Member   States   of   the   European  
Union.    
266  EEW  Proposal,  Annex,  Form  A  (D).  
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consequently,   leaves   it   to   national   law.  However,   Recital   (20)   of   the   Directive  
makes  reference  to  protections  which  apply  to  the  medical  and  legal  professions  
as   well   as   to   the   freedom   of   the   press   and   freedom   of   expression   in   other  
media267.    
It  is  noteworthy  that  when  discussing  the  final  wording  of  the  EIO  Directive  
issues   of   privileges   and   immunities  were   hotly   debated.   Special   attention  was  
drawn   to   legal   privileges   and   house   search.   It   was   highlighted   that   a   general  
ground  for  refusal  would  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  execution  of  an  EIO  to  
search  the  office  of  a  lawyer  may  be  refused  to  protect  the  relationship  between  
the  lawyer  and  the  suspected  and  accused  person.  It  was  also  stressed  that  this  
situation  could  be  dealt  with  under  the  ground  for  refusal  related  to  privileges  
and  immunities,  which  could  be  further  developed268.  Moreover,  it  was  pointed  
out  that:  
    
It   should   be   possible   to   refuse   an   EIO   where   its   recognition   or   execution    
in   the   executing  State  would   involve  breaching  of  an   immunity  or  privilege   in  
that   State.   The   decision   on   the   recognition   or   execution,   as   well   as   the   actual  
execution  of  the  investigative  measure,  should  be  carried  out  with  the  same  celerity  
and  priority  as  for  a  similar  national  case269.  
  
It   is   also   noteworthy   that   the   EIO   Directive,   in   contrast   to   preceding  
instruments,   also   refers   to   freedom   of   the   press   and   freedom   of   expression   in  
other  media.  This  issue  was  under  discussion  with  regard  to  the  measures  which  
conflict  with  constitutional   rules   relating   to   freedom  of  association,   freedom  of  
the  press  and  freedom  of  expression  in  other  media270.    
                                                                                                                            
267  See  also  Recital  (20)  of  the  Directive:  It  should  be  possible  to  refuse  an  EIO  where  its  recognition  or  
execution  in  the  executing  State  would  involve  a  breach  of  an  immunity  or  privilege  in  that  State.  There  
is  no  common  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  immunity  or  privilege  in  Union  law,  the  precise  definition  
of  these  terms  is  therefore  left  to  national  law,  which  may  include  protections  which  apply  to  medical  and  
legal   professions,   but   should   not   be   interpreted   in   a   way   to   counter   the   obligation   to   abolish   certain  
grounds   for   refusal   as   set   out   in   the   Protocol   to   the   Convention   on  Mutual   Assistance   in   Criminal  
Matters  between  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  This  may  also  include,  even  though  they  are  
not  necessarily  considered  as  privilege  or  immunity,  rules  relating  to  freedom  of  the  press  and  freedom  of  
expression   in   other   media;   see   also:   In   its   request,   the   European   Parliament   asked   specifically   about  
standards  relating  to  ‘protection  of  attorney’s  offices  from  search  and  seizure’.  It  is  clear  from  the  case  law  
that  a  stricter  standard  of   scrutiny   is  usually  applied  when   it  comes   to  searches  of   lawyers’  offices  and  
seizures  of  documents  or  computers  containing  the  information  on  the  lawyers’  clients  (and  similarly  for  
other  groups  with  professional  secrecy  requirements).  In  such  cases,  both  the  CJEU  and  ECtHR  require  
more  safeguards  to  be  put  in  place  in  order  to  protect  professional  secrecy  (…),  EUROPEAN  UNION  
AGENCY  FOR  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS,  Opinion…,  p.  7-­‐‑8.  
268  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Orientation  debate,  (15531/10),  29  October  2010,  p.  
5;   see   also:   Proposal   for   a   European   Investigation   Order,   Law   Society   of   England   and   Wales  
Preliminary  Remarks,  p.  8.  
269   EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT,   Committee   report   tabled   for   plenary,   1st   reading/single  
reading,  A7-­‐‑0477/2013.    
270  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION,  Outstanding  issues,   (15329/10),  21.10.2010,  p.  18.  





With  regard  to   legal  persons,   the  EIO  Directive  presents  a  similar  approach  
to  the  EU  2000  MLA  and  stipulates  that:  
  
Art.  4.  An  EIO  may  be  issued:  (d)  in  connection  with  proceedings  referred  to  in  
points   (a),   (b),   and   (c)   which   relate   to   offences   or   infringements   for  which   a   legal  
person  may  be  held  liable  or  punished  in  the  issuing  State.    
  
This  provision,   however,   does   not   clarify  whether   the   legal   person  may  be  




Neither   the  MLA  nor   the  MR   instruments  have  made   telephone   tapping  or  
searches   of   premises   explicitly   dependent   on   specific   ratione   personae  
requirements.  However,  the  MLA  instruments  traditionally  make  the  execution  
of  a   letter   rogatory  dependent  on  compliance  with   the  domestic  personae   scope  
and,  if  the  legal  system  of  the  executing  state  grants  immunity  to  the  requested  
person,   then   the   requested  state  may  refuse   the  assistance.   In  contrast,   the  MR  
instruments  explicitly   refer   to   immunity  or  privilege  and  make   it  a  ground   for  
non-­‐‑recognition  or  non-­‐‑execution,  even  if  there  is  no  common  understanding  in  
the  EU  of  what  constitutes  immunity  or  privilege.  Thus,  the  instruments  attempt  
to   clarify   these   terms   and,   therefore,   link   them   with   the   legal,   medical   and  
journalistic  professions.  In  this  light  it  stands  out  that  even  if  ratione  personae  has  
been   traditionally   connected   with   political   privileges271,   the   MR   instruments  
clearly  loosen  the  link  with  political  aspects272.    
The  instruments  do  not  provide  any  particular  references  to  the  possibility  of  
making  third  parties  or  legal  persons  subject  to  the  measures.  However,  Annex  
A   Section   E,   which   refers   to   the   identity   of   the   person   concerned   by   the  
investigative   measure   attached   to   the   EIO   Directive,   also   applies   to   legal  
persons.      
  
1.5.3. Ratione  personae  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR 
 
Following   the   MR   instruments,   which   take   into   special   consideration   the  
legal,  medical   and   journalism  professions,   it   is  necessary   to   look   into   the   case-­‐‑
law   settled   by   the   ECtHR   relating   to   these   professions.   Accordingly,   the  
following   study   deals   with   the   minimum   standards   which   the   Court   has  
established   with   regard   to   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   of   persons  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
should  fall  under  the  ground  for  refusal  mentioned  as  immunities  or  privileges,  was  raised  by  
Austria.  It  is  noteworthy  that  a  reference  to  the  media  is  also  included  in  Recital  (28)  of  the  FD  
EEW,  which  refers  to  freedom  of  the  press  and  freedom  of  expression  in  other  media.  
271  Vide:  Italian  position  with  regard  to  adoption  of  the  EAW,  p.  121.    
272  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  50.  
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granted  these  privileges.  Moreover,  given  the  research  questions  reported  in  the  
opening  paragraph,   the  overview  of  case-­‐‑law  also  encompasses  ratione  personae  
concerns  with  regard  to  third  parties  and  legal  persons.    
  
1.5.3.1. Protection  of  professional  privileges   
  
- Legal  privilege  
 
In  cases  concerning   lawyers   targeted  by   telephone   tapping,   the  ECtHR  first  
emphasises  that,  by  virtue  of  Art.  8  ECHR,  correspondence  between  lawyers  and  
their   clients,   whatever   its   purpose,   enjoys   privileged   status   as   far   as  
confidentiality  is  concerned.  This  follows  from  the  fact  that  lawyers  are  assigned  
a  fundamental  role  in  a  democratic  society273  and,  therefore,  should  have  in  their  
professional   contacts   with   clients   a   reasonable   expectation   of   protection   and  
respect  for  professional  privacy274.  
However,   communications   falling   within   the   ambit   of   the   lawyer-­‐‑client  
privilege  can  still  be  intercepted,  for  example,  by  chance  or  because  the  suspect  
whose   conversations   are   being   intercepted   calls   his   lawyer.   The   risk   of  
interception  of  privileged  materials  may  also  occur  in  cases  where  a  lawyer  is  a  
suspect.   Therefore,   the   Court   has   derived  minimum   standards  with   regard   to  
telephone   tapping  which   affects   the   legal   profession.   These   standards  may   be  
summarised  in  the  following  way:  
- the   law   must   provide   a   clear   legal   basis   for   defining   the  
interception   of   privileged   conversations.   In   other   words,   the   law  
should   provide   clear   rules   defining   what   should   happen   when   a  
telephone  call  made  by  a  client  to  his  lawyer  is  intercepted275;  
- the   law  must   contain   procedures   for   supervising   the   interception  
when  the  intercepted  material  may  cover  an  area  of  the  confidential  
relations  between  lawyers  and  their  clients.  Due  to  the  possibility  of  
                                                                                                                            
273  Michaud   v.   France,   §§   117-­‐‑118;   see   also:   S.   v.   Switzerland,   §§   48.  The   Court   considers   that   an  
accused’s   right   to   communicate  with   his   advocate   out   of   hearing   of   a   third   person   is   part   of   the   basic  
requirements  of  a  fair  trial  in  a  democratic  society  and  follows  from  Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art.  6-­‐‑3-­‐‑c)  of  the  
Convention.  If  a  lawyer  were  unable  to  confer  with  his  client  and  receive  confidential  instructions  from  
him  without  such  surveillance,  his  assistance  would  lose  much  of  its  usefulness,  whereas  the  Convention  
is  intended  to  guarantee  rights  that  are  practical  and  effective;  see  also:  The  Court  would  emphasise  the  
central  role  of  the  legal  profession  in  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  maintenance  of  the  rule  of  law.  
The  freedom  of  lawyers  to  practise  their  profession  without  undue  hindrance  is  an  essential  component  of  
a   democratic   society   and   a   necessary   prerequisite   for   the   effective   enforcement   of   the   provisions   of   the  
Convention,   in  particular   the  guarantees  of   fair   trial  and  the  right   to  personal  security.  Persecution  or  
harassment  of  members  of   the   legal  profession   thus   strikes  at   the  very  heart   of   the  Convention   system,  
Elci  and  Others  v.  Turkey,  §§  669.  
273  Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova,  §§  50.  
274  Aalmoes  and  112  Others  v.  The  Netherlands  (dec.).  





human   error   or   abuse,   the   Court   considers   that   it   is   desirable   to  
entrust  the  supervisory  control  to  a  judge276;  
- the  measure  must   comply  with   requirements  of   extreme  necessity  
and  proportionality  in  cases  in  which  a  lawyer  is  participating.  The  
Court   highlights   that   the   notion   of   necessity   implies   that   the  
interference   corresponds   to   a   pressing   social   need   and,   in  
particular,   that   it   is   proportionate   to   the   legitimate   aim   being  
pursued277.    
One   of   the   cases   in  which   the  Court   examined   the   quality   of   the   law  with  
regard  to  legal  professional  privilege  is  Kopp  v.  Switzerland.  In  this  case  the  Court  
pointed  out  that,  even  though  Swiss  case-­‐‑law  had  established  the  principle  that  
legal   professional   privilege   only   covers   the   relationship   between   lawyers   and  
their  clients,   the   law  does  not  clearly  state  how,  under  what  conditions  and  by  
whom   the   distinction   is   to   be   drawn   between   matters   specifically   connected  
with  a  lawyer’s  work  under  instructions  from  a  party  to  proceedings  and  those  
relating  to  activity  other   than  that  of  counsel.  The  Court  was  not  convinced  by  
the  Swiss  procedure  of  selection  of  privileged  information  which  cannot  become  
part  of  the  case  file  from  not  privileged  information  which  could  be  added  to  the  
case  file  and  considered  in  court.  The  Court  noticed  that  the  person  tasked  with  
sorting   between   these   types   of   information   (the   lawyer   working   in   the   post  
department)  who  is  a  member  of  the  executive,  worked  without  the  supervision  
of   an   independent   judge,   especially   in   this   sensitive   area   of   the   confidential  
relations   between   a   lawyer   and   his   or   her   clients,   which   directly   concern   the  
rights   of   the   defence.   Accordingly,   the   Court   stated   that   Swiss   law   does   not  
indicate   with   sufficient   clarity   the   scope   and   manner   of   exercise   of   the  
authorities’   discretion   in   the  matter   and,   consequently,   the   tapped   lawyer   did  
not   enjoy   the  minimum   degree   of   protection   required   by   the   rule   of   law   in   a  
democratic  society,  which  constitutes  a  breach  of  Art.  8  ECHR278.  
On   the   contrary,   in   the   case   of  Aalmoes   v.   The   Netherlands,   the   Court   was  
satisfied  with  the  quality  of  domestic  law  with  regard  to  the  tapping  of  a  lawyer.  
In   this  case,   the  Court  noticed   that   the  Dutch  regulation  distinguishes  whether  
the   lawyer   is   a   suspect   or   a   third   party.   As   for   the   former,   if   the   information  
obtained  by  the  interception  falls  within  the  ambit  of  the  legal  privilege  of  non-­‐‑
disclosure,   it  must   be   destroyed   and  may  not   be   used   in   evidence.  Dutch   law  
prescribes  the  involvement  of  a  member  in  authority  of  the  professional  group  (a  
representative   of   the   bar   association)   concerned   with   identifying   what  
information   may   and   may   not   be   added   to   the   case   file   in   the   light   of   the  
                                                                                                                            
276  In  order  to  secure  respect  for  this  reasonable  expectation,  it  is  therefore  required  that  the  interception  of  
telecommunications  be  subject  to  an  adequate  system  of  supervision.  In  this  area,  faced  with  evolving  and  
sophisticated   technology   and   the   possibility   of   human   error   or   abuse,   the  Court   considers   that   it   is   in  
principle   desirable   to   entrust   the   supervisory   control   to   a   judge,   Aalmoes   and   112   Others   v.   The  
Netherlands  (dec.).  
277  Aalmoes  and  112  Others  v.  The  Netherlands  (dec.);  Messina  v.  Italy  (no.  2),  §§  65.  
278  Kopp  v.  Switzerland,  §§  72-­‐‑75.  
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privilege.   It   is   the   investigating   judge   who   eventually   authorises   what  
information  conveyed   to  or  by   the  suspect  may  be   included   in   the  case   file.   In  
cases   where   the   lawyer   is   not   a   suspect,   his   telephone   cannot   be   intercepted.  
However,   in   the   case   of   conversations   intercepted   by   chance   (e.g.   because   the  
client  called  his  lawyer),  the  prosecutor  who  screens  the  information  may  order  
that  the  privileged  information  has  to  be  destroyed.  In  summary,  the  Court  was  
satisfied   that   the   Dutch   regulations   governing   the   interception   of  
telecommunications   in   the   context   of   tapping   lawyers   are   sufficiently   precise,  
comprehensive  and  provide  for  adequate  safeguards  against  abuses279.    
  
According   to   the   case-­‐‑law   of   the   ECtHR,   searches   of   law   offices   are  
permissible   unless   they   involve   the   seizure   of   privileged   items.  Consequently,  
the   Court   has   developed   minimum   standards   in   order   to   ensure   adequate  
protection  and  effective  safeguards  against  any  abuse  and  arbitrariness  in  cases  
where  a  search  of  a   lawyer’s  office   is  concerned.  The  Court’s  core  standards   in  
this  matter  are  as  follows:  
- the  measure  has   to  be  proportionate   to   its  purposes  of  preventing  
crime;  
- the   measure   should   preferably   be   supervised   by   a   judicial   or  
independent  authority280;  
- the  warrant  has  to  be  reasonably  limited;  and  
- the  search  has  to  be  carried  out   in  the  presence  of  an   independent  
observer   in   order   to   ensure   that   materials   subject   to   professional  
secrecy  are  not  removed281.    
One   of   the  major   cases   in   this   area   is  Niemietz   v.  Germany.   In   this   case,   the  
authorities   expected   to   find   a   document   in   a   law   firm   which   might   have  
revealed   the   identity   of   a   third   party   to   be   prosecuted   for   a   criminal   offence.  
                                                                                                                            
279  Aalmoes  and  112  Others  v.  The  Netherlands  (dec.).  
280  In  the  present  case,  hard  disks  were  searched,  copied  and  seized.  They  contained  information  passing  
between  the  first  applicant  and  his  clients,  who  had  no  role  in  the  investigated  offence.  While  the  seized  
hard  disks  were  returned  to  the  first  applicant,  however,  a  copy  of  the  fourth  hard  disk  remained  with  the  
police   for   some   considerable   time.   The   Court   notes   that   the   search   and   seizure   were   rather  
extensive  and  is  struck  by  the  fact  that  there  was  no  independent  or  judicial  supervision  (…)  In  
sum,  the  Court  finds  that  the  search  and  seizure  measures  in  the  present  case  were  implemented  without  
proper  legal  safeguards.  The  Court  concludes  that,  even  if  there  could  be  said  to  be  a  general  legal  basis  for  
the   measures   provided   for   in   Finnish   law,   the   absence   of   applicable   regulations   specifying   with   an  
appropriate  degree  of  precision  the  circumstances  in  which  privileged  material  could  be  subject  to  search  
and   seizure   deprived   the   applicants   of   the   minimum   degree   of   protection   to   which   they   were   entitled  
under  the  rule  of  law  in  a  democratic  society,  Sallinen  and  Others  v.  Finland,  §§  89-­‐‑92.  
281   In  addition,   the  Court  notes   that,  while   the  search  was  carried  out   in   the  presence  of   two  certifying  
witnesses,   they   were   neighbours   who   were   not   legally   qualified   (see   paragraph   16   above).   This   may    
be   considered   problematic,   as   this   lack  of   legal   qualification  made   it   highly  unlikely   that   these  
observers   were   truly   capable   of   identifying,   independently   of   the   investigation   team,   which  
materials  were  covered  by  legal  professional  privilege,  with  the  result  that  they  did  not  provide  an  
effective   safeguard   against   excessive   intrusion   by   the   police   into   the   applicant’s   professional   secrecy,  





When  analysing  the  case,  the  Court  first  noted  that  the  search  of  a  place  such  as  
a   law  firm  was  disproportionate   to   the  purpose  of  preventing  crime.  Secondly,  
the  Court  found  that  there  were  no  special  procedural  safeguards  attending  the  
exercise   of   search   powers   on   the   premises   of   lawyers   in   German   law,   even  
though   the   search   had   been   carried   out   in   the   presence   of   two   assistants.  
Thirdly,  according  to  the  Court,  the  warrant  was  drawn  in  broad  terms,  in  that  it  
ordered   a   search   for   and   the   seizure   of   ‘documents’,   without   any   limitation,  
hence  not  revealing  the  purpose  of  the  search  of  the  law  firm282.  
In  Smirnov  v.  Russia  the  applicant  claimed  that  his  flat  (which  was  part  of  the  
ongoing   criminal   investigation   into   his   clients’   alleged   criminal   activity)   had  
been   searched  with   a   view   to   obtaining   evidence   against   his   clients   and   their  
files  stored  on  his  computer  and,  therefore,  the  search  had  violated  the  lawyer-­‐‑
client  privilege.  When  examining  the  case  the  Court  stated  that  the  search  order  
was  drafted  in  extremely  broad  terms,  referring  indiscriminately  to  ‘any  objects  
and  documents   that  were  of   interest   for   the   investigation’,  without  any  further  
limitation.   The   order   did   not   contain   any   information   about   the   ongoing  
investigation,  the  purpose  of  the  search  or  the  reasons  why  it  was  believed  that  
the  search  at  the  law  firm  would  enable  evidence  of  any  offence  to  be  obtained.  
The   Court   found   that   the   domestic   authorities   failed   in   their   duty   to   give  
‘relevant  and  sufficient’  reasons  for  issuing  the  search  warrant283.  Moreover,  the  
Court   observed   that   the   excessively   broad   terms   of   the   search   order   gave   the  
police  unrestricted  discretion  in  determining  which  documents  were  ‘of  interest’  
for   the   criminal   investigation;   this   resulted   in   an   extensive   search   and   seizure.  
The   seized   materials   were   not   limited   to   those   relating   to   ongoing   criminal  
proceedings.   As   noted   above,   there   was   no   safeguard   in   place   against  
interference   with   professional   secrecy,   such   as,   for   example,   a   prohibition   on  
removing   documents   covered   by   lawyer-­‐‑client   privilege   or   supervision   of   the  
search  by  an  independent  observer  capable  of  identifying,  independently  of  the  
investigation   team,   which   documents   were   covered   by   legal   professional  
privilege.  With  regard  to  the  materials  that  were  inspected  and  seized,  the  Court  
found   that   the   search   impinged   on   professional   secrecy   to   an   extent   that  was  
disproportionate  to  whatever  legitimate  aim  was  being  pursued284.    
                                                                                                                            
282  The  ECtHR  also  stressed  that:  (…)  having  regard  to  the  materials  that  were  in  fact  inspected,  the  
search  impinged  on  professional  secrecy  to  an  extent  that  appears  disproportionate  in  the  circumstances;  
it  has,  in  this  connection,  to  be  recalled  that,  where  a  lawyer  is  involved,  an  encroachment  on  professional  
secrecy   may   have   repercussions   on   the   proper   administration   of   justice   and   hence   on   the   rights  
guaranteed  by  Art.  6  ECHR,  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  37.  
283  Smirnov  v.  Russia,  §§  47-­‐‑48.  See  also:  Niemietz  v.  Germany,  §§  35-­‐‑35  and  §§  37;  Ernst  and  Others  
v.  Belgium,  §§  116.    
284  Smirnov  v.  Russia,  §§  48.    
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Another  example  is  the  case  of  Roemen  and  Schmit  v.  Luxembourg,  in  which  the  
Court  noted   that,  unlike   in   the   case  Niemietz   v.  Germany,   the   search  of   the   law  
firm   was   accompanied   by   special   procedural   safeguards:   the   warrant   was  
executed  in  the  presence  of  an  investigating  judge,  a  representative  of  the  public  
prosecutor  and  the  President  of  the  Bar  Council285.  
On   the   other   hand,   in   the   case   of   Robathin   v.   Austria,   the   Court   found   a  
violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  due  to  the  fact  that  the  supervision  did  not  enable  one  
to   establish   that   the   search   of   all   the   applicant’s   electronic   data   was  
proportionate  to  the  circumstances.  Moreover,  the  Court  stated  that  the  seizure  
and  examination  of  all  data  in  the  law  office  went  beyond  what  was  necessary  to  
achieve  the  legitimate  aim286.  
  
- Press  privilege    
  
In   cases   concerning   the   surveillance   of   journalists,   the  Court   highlights   the  
importance   of   the   protection   of   journalistic   sources   for   press   freedom   in   a  
democratic   society   and   the   potentially   chilling   effect   an   order   of   source  
disclosure   has   on   the   exercise   of   that   freedom.   However,   the   minimum  
standards  for  the  tapping  of  journalists  are  lower  than  in  the  case  of  the  tapping  
of  lawyers.    
The   first  difference   is  apparent   in   the  area  of  permissibility  of   the  measure.  
Whereas  the  information  covered  by  a  lawyer’s  privilege  may  never  be  a  target  
of  the  measure,  the  tapping  of  conversations  held  by  a  journalist  may  be  justified  
by  an  overriding  requirement  in  the  public  interest287.  However,  in  this  respect,  
the  Court  highlights  the  importance  of  supervision  of  the  measure  with  a  view  
to   ensuring   adequate   and   effective   safeguards   against   any   abuse   and  
arbitrariness.  
In  Telegraaf  Media  Nederland  Landelijke  Media  B.V.  and  Others  v.  The  Netherlands  
the  Court  examined  the   interception  of   journalists’  communications   in  order  to  
determine   from  whence   they   had   obtained   their   information.  When   analysing  
the  case,  the  Court  found  that  Dutch  law  did  not  provide  safeguards  appropriate  
to   the   use   of   powers   of   surveillance   against   journalists   with   a   view   to  
discovering   their   journalistic  sources  due   to   the   lack  of  any,  either  prior  or  post  
factum,  review  by  an  independent  body  with  the  power  to  prevent  or  terminate  
the  surveillance288.    
The   post   factum   review   of   an   interference   that   had   been   performed   by   the  
public  prosecutor  was  examined  by   the  ECtHR   in  Sanoma  Uitgevers  B.V.   v.  The  
                                                                                                                            
285  Roemen  and  Schmit  v.  Luxembourg,  §§  69-­‐‑72.  However,  in  this  case  the  Court  found  violation  of  
Art.  8  ECHR  due  to  the  fact  that  the  search  warrant  was  drafted  in  relatively  broad  terms  and,  
above  all,  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  search  was  to  establish  the  journalist’s  source  through  his  
lawyer.  
286  Robathin  v.  Austria,  §§  51-­‐‑52.  
287  See,  inter  alia,  Goodwin  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  39;  Voskuil  v.  The  Netherlands,  §§  65.  





Netherlands.   In   this  case,   the   tapping  was  also  carried  out   in  order   to  effect   the  
disclosure   of   journalistic   sources.   Regardless   of   the   fact   that   the  measure   had  
been  the  subject  of  a  judicial  post  factum  review,  the  Court  stated  that  the  review  
could   not   cure   these   failings,   since   it   could   not   prevent   the   disclosure   of   the  
identity  of  the  journalistic  sources  from  the  moment  when  this  information  came  
into  the  hands  of  the  public  prosecutor  and  the  police289.  
On  the  other  hand,  in  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  the  Court  examined  the  
problem   of   conversations   held   by   journalists   which   were   intercepted  
fortuitously  within   ‘strategic  monitoring’.   Firstly,   the   ECtHR  noted   that   in   the  
present   case   the   aim   of   strategic   monitoring   was   not   to   identify   journalists’  
sources   due   to   the   fact   that   the   surveillance  measures  were,   in   particular,   not  
directed   at   uncovering   journalistic   sources.   Secondly,   the   ECtHR   noted   that  
there   was   no   special   provision   for   the   protection   of   freedom   of   the   press   in  
German  law.  However,  the  Court  stated  that,  regardless  of  the  lack  of  provisions  
referring   to   the   non-­‐‑disclosure   of   sources,   the   general   safeguards   were  
considered   adequate   and   effective   for   keeping   the   disclosure   of   journalistic  
sources  to  an  unavoidable  minimum290.    
  
As  was  highlighted  above,  in  cases  concerning  journalists,  the  Court  sees  the  
press   as   the   ‘public   watchdog’   and   highlights   the   concomitant   importance   of  
ensuring  that  individuals  remain  free  to  disclose  information  to  the  press  which,  
in   a   democratic   society,   should   properly   be   accessible   to   the   public291.  
Accordingly,   in   numerous   cases   the   Court   has   ruled   on   the   inviolability   of   a  
newspaper’s   premises   and   stated   that   the   competing   interests   –   namely   the  
protection  of   journalists’   sources  and   the  prevention  and   repression  of   crime  –  
always  need   to   be  properly   balanced.   In   the   cases  Ernst   and  Others   v.   Belgium,  
Tillack  v.  Belgium,  Martin  and  Others  v.  France,  and  Ression  and  Others  v.  France  the  
Court   consequently   pointed   out   that   the   reasons   given   by   the   authorities   to  
justify   the  searches  could  be  considered  relevant,  but  not   sufficient,  and  stated  
that   the   measure   had   been   disproportionate   and   had   violated   the   applicants’  
right  to  freedom  of  expression  under  the  ECHR.    
By   way   of   contrast,   in   Stichting   Ostade   Blade   v.   The   Netherlands   the   ECtHR  
dealt  with   the   search   of   a  magazine’s   premises  which  was   undertaken   after   a  
press   release   that   the   magazine   had   received   a   letter   from   an   organisation  
claiming   responsibility   for   a   series  of  bomb  attacks.  When  examining   the   case,  
the   Court   stated   that   the   search,   which   had   been   carried   out   in   order   to  
investigate   a   serious   crime   and   prevent   further   attacks,   complied   with   the  
requirement  of  being  necessary  in  a  democratic  society292.  
                                                                                                                            
289  Sanoma  Uitgevers  B.V.  v.  The  Netherlands,  §§  96-­‐‑99.  
290  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  151.  
291  Goodwin  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  39;  Roemen  and  Schmit  v.  Luxembourg,  §§  46;  Ernst  and  Others  v.  
Belgium,   §§   91;  Sanoma  Uitgevers   B.V.   v.   The  Netherlands,   §§   50;   and  Telegraaf  Media  Nederland  
Landelijke  Media  B.V.  and  Others  v.  The  Netherlands,  §§  127,  Voskuil  v.  The  Netherlands,  §§  64-­‐‑65.  
292  Stichting  Ostade  Blade  v.  The  Netherlands,  §§  64-­‐‑68.  
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- Medical  privilege    
  
In   cases   concerning   access   to   medical   data   for   purposes   of   criminal  
proceedings,   the   ECtHR   has   referred   to   preservation   of   an   adequate   balance  
between   the   interests   of   an   individual   and   the   public   interest   in   investigating  
crime.    
In  Z.  v.  Finland  the  Court  examined  the  search  of  a  hospital  and  seizure  of  the  
medical   records  of   the  wife   of   a   suspect  who   refused   to  give   evidence   against  
her  husband.  This  information  at  the  material  time  could  have  been  decisive  to  
the   question   of   whether   the   suspect   should   be   prosecuted   for   attempted  
manslaughter  in  respect  of  five  offences  or  just  three  of  them.    
When  examining  the  case,  the  Court  noted  that  respecting  the  confidentiality  
of  health  data  is  a  vital  principle  in  the  legal  systems  of  all  member  states.  It   is  
crucial  not  only   to   respect   the  sense  of  privacy  of  patients  but  also   to  preserve  
their  confidence  in  the  medical  profession  and  in  the  health  services  in  general293.  
However,  at  the  same  time,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  interests  of  a  patient  and  
the  community  as  a  whole  in  protecting  the  confidentiality  of  medical  data  may  
be  outweighed  by  the  interest  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  crime  and  
in   the  publicity   of   court   proceedings,  where   such   interests   are   shown   to   be   of  
even  greater   importance294.   In   this   case,   the  Court   noted   that   the  measure  was  
subject   to   limitations   and   safeguards   against   abuse.   It   is   noteworthy   that   the  
Court  accepted   the   fact   that   the  measure  had  been  ordered  by   the  prosecution  
and   not   by   a   court295.   The  Court   found   to   be  most   important   the   fact   that   the  
obtaining  of  medical  records  is  possible  under  Finnish  law  only  in  very  limited  
circumstances,  namely  in  connection  with  the  investigation  and  the  bringing  of  
charges  for  serious  criminal  offences  for  which  a  sentence  of  at  least  six  years  of  
imprisonment  is  prescribed296.  Moreover,  the  seized  material  had  been  submitted  
in  the  context  of  proceedings  held  in  camera  and  case  documents  were  treated  as  
confidential.   In   addition,   it   was   possible   to   challenge   the   seizure   before   the  
court.  Consequently,  the  Court  stated  that  the  seizure  of  the  applicant’s  medical  
records  and  their   inclusion  in  the  investigation  file  were  supported  by  relevant  
and  sufficient   reasons  and,  moreover,   that   the  measures  were  proportionate   to  






                                                                                                                            
293  Z.  v.  Finland,  §§  95.  
294  Z.  v.  Finland,  §§  97.  
295  Z.  v.  Finland,  §§  108.  
296  Z.  v.  Finland,  §§  107  and  §§  103.    





1.5.3.2. Third  parties  and  persons  affected  fortuitously   
  
- Telephone  tapping  
  
The   Court   allows   the   tapping   of   the   conversations   of   all   individuals,  
including   third   parties   who   are   not   parties   to   an   investigation.   However,   the  
Court  highlights   the   importance  of   the  quality  of   law   in   this  matter  and   states  
that   the   legislation   must   precisely   describe   the   categories   of   person   who,   in  
practice,  may  have  their  communications  intercepted298.    
This   issue  was  examined  by   the  ECtHR   in   the  case  of   Iordachi   and  Others  v.  
Moldova  in  which  the  Court  found  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  due  to  the  fact  that  
the  legislation  did  not  indicate  with  sufficient  clarity  which  categories  of  persons  
are  liable  to  have  their  telephones  tapped  (the  legislation  in  question  referred  to  
‘suspects,   defendants   or   other   persons   involved   in   a   criminal   offence’).   The  
Court  stated  that  the  language  was  very  general  when  referring  to  such  persons,  
as  it  states  that  the  measure  of  interception  may  be  used  in  respect  of  a  suspect,  
defendant   or   other   person   involved   in   a   criminal   offence,   without   further  
explanation  as  to  who  exactly  falls  within  the  category  of  ‘other  person  involved  
in  a  criminal  offence’299.  
In  the  recent  case  of  Zakharov  v.  Russia   the  Court  was  again  straightforward  
in   allowing   the   measure   with   regard   to   third   parties.   When   examining   the  
Russian  provisions  the  Court  noted  that:  
  
interceptions  may  be  ordered  not  only  in  respect  of  a  suspect  or  an  accused,  but  
also  in  respect  of  a  person  who  may  have  information  about  an  offence  or  may  have  
other  information  relevant  to  the  criminal  case  (…)  The  Court  has  earlier  found  that  
interception  measures   in   respect  of  a  person  who  was  not  suspected  of  any  
offence   but   could   possess   information   about   such   an   offence   might   be  
justified   under  Article   8   of   the   Convention   (…).   At   the   same   time,   the   Court  
notes  the  absence  of  any  clarifications  in  Russian  legislation  or  established  case-­‐‑law  
as  to  how  the  terms  “a  person  who  may  have  information  about  a  criminal  offence”  
and   “a   person  who  may   have   information   relevant   to   the   criminal   case”   are   to   be  
applied  in  practice300.  
                                                                                                                            
298  Kennedy  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  160;  see  also:  Above  all,  the  system  does  not  for  the  time  being  afford  
adequate  safeguards  against  various  possible  abuses.  For  example,  the  categories  of  people  liable  to  have  
their  telephones  tapped  by  judicial  order  (…)  are  nowhere  defined,  Huvig  v.  France,  §§  34.    
299  Moreover,  the  Court  is  concerned  by  the  fact  that  the  impugned  legislation  does  not  appear  to  define  
sufficiently   clearly   the   categories   of  persons   liable   to  have   their   telephones   tapped.   It  notes   that  Article  
156  §  1  of  the  Criminal  Code  uses  very  general  language  when  referring  to  such  persons  and  states  that  
the  measure  of  interception  may  be  used  in  respect  of  a  suspect,  defendant  or  other  person  involved  in  a  
criminal   offence.  No   explanation   has   been   given   as   to  who   exactly   falls   within   the   category   of   “other  
person  involved  in  a  criminal  offence”,  Iordachi  and  Others  v.  Moldova,  §§  44.    
300  Zakharov   v.   Russia,   §§   245;   see   also:  Greuter   v.   The  Netherlands   (dec);   see   also:  Above   all,   the  
system   does   not   for   the   time   being   afford   adequate   safeguards   against   various   possible   abuses.   For  
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Moreover,   according   to   the   Court,   special   consideration   must   always   be  
given  to  any  actual  or  potential  infringement  of  the  privacy  of  individuals  who  
are  not  the  subjects  of  the  investigation  and  whose  conversations  are  tapped  by  
chance301  (e.g.  persons  who  were  targeted  by  individual  calls,  or  random  users  of  
the   tapped   telephone).  With   a   view   to   ensuring   protection   of   these   ‘necessary  
participants’,  the  Court  requires  that  the  law  envisages  a  procedure  of  screening  
and  sorting  of  the  gathered  data302.  
Accordingly,   the   Court   has   indicated   that   in   a   field   where   abuse   is  
potentially   so   easy   in   individual   cases   and   could   have   such   harmful  
consequences  for  democratic  society  as  a  whole,  it  is  in  principle:  
- desirable  to  entrust  supervisory  control  to  a   judge303   (however,   the  
Court  also  accepted  the  supervision  of  an  independent  authority)304;  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
example,  the  categories  of  people  liable  to  have  their  telephones  tapped  by  judicial  order  (…)  are  nowhere  
defined,  Kruslin  v.  France,  §§  35.  
301   (…)   the  Act   does   not   regulate   in   detail   the   case   of   persons  monitored   “fortuitously”   as   “necessary  
participants”   in   a   telephone   conversation   recorded   by   the   authorities   pursuant   to   those   provisions.   In  
particular,  the  Act  does  not  specify  the  precautions  which  should  be  taken  with  regard  to  those  persons,  
Amann  v.  Switzerland,  §§  61.    
302   In   its   case-­‐‑law  on   secret  measures   of   surveillance,   the  Court   has  developed   the   following  minimum  
safeguards   that   should   be   set   out   in   statute   law   in   order   to   avoid   abuses   of   power:   the   nature   of   the  
offences  which  may  give  rise  to  an  interception  order;  a  definition  of  the  categories  of  people  liable  to  have  
their   telephones   tapped;   a   limit   on   the   duration   of   telephone   tapping;   the   procedure   to   be   followed   for  
examining,  using  and  storing  the  data  obtained;  the  precautions  to  be  taken  when  communicating  
the  data  to  other  parties;  and  the  circumstances  in  which  recordings  may  or  must  be  erased  or  
the  tapes  destroyed;  see  also:  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  95;  Huvig  v.  France,  §§  34;  Amann  
v.  Switzerland,  §§  76.    
303  Klass   and   Others   v.   Germany,   §§   21   and   51;  Weber   and   Saravia   v.   Germany,   §§   25   and   117;  
Kennedy  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  167.  
304  Within   the   system   of   surveillance   established   by   the   G   10,   judicial   control   was   excluded,   being  
replaced  by  an  initial  control  effected  by  an  official  qualified  for  judicial  office  and  by  the  control  provided  
by   the  Parliamentary  Board  and   the  G  10  Commission.  The  Court  considers   that,   in  a   field  where  
abuse  is  potentially  so  easy  in  individual  cases  and  could  have  such  harmful  consequences  for  
democratic  society  as  a  whole,   it   is   in  principle  desirable   to  entrust  supervisory  control   to  a  
judge.  Nevertheless,  having  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  supervisory  and  other  safeguards  provided  for  by  
the  G  10,   the  Court  concludes   that   the  exclusion  of   judicial  control  does  not  exceed  the  limits  of  
what  may  be  deemed  necessary   in  a  democratic   society.   The  Parliamentary  Board   and   the  G   10  
Commission  are  independent  of  the  authorities  carrying  out  the  surveillance,  and  are  vested  with  
sufficient  powers  and  competence  to  exercise  an  effective  and  continuous  control.  Furthermore,  
the   democratic   character   is   reflected   in   the   balanced   membership   of   the   Parliamentary   Board.   The  
opposition  is  represented  on  this  body  and  is  therefore  able  to  participate   in  the  control  of  the  measures  
ordered  by  the  competent  Minister  who  is  responsible  to  the  Bundestag.  The  two  supervisory  bodies  may,  
in   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   be   regarded   as   enjoying   sufficient   independence   to   give   an   objective  
ruling.  The  Court  notes  in  addition  that  an  individual  believing  himself  to  be  under  surveillance  has  the  
opportunity  of  complaining  to  the  G  10  Commission  and  of  having  recourse  to  the  Constitutional  Court  
(…).   However,   as   the   Government   conceded,   these   are   remedies   which   can   come   into   play   only   in  





- necessary   for   the   law   to  have  straightforward   rules  as   regards   the  
procedure  for  examining,  using  and  storing  the  data305.  
- House  search  
  
In   cases   concerning   house   search,   the  Court   is   straightforward   in   allowing  
the  measure  with  regard  to  a  wide  scope  of  individuals,  including  third  parties,  
as  long  as  the  measure  is  necessary  and  proportionate:  
  
The   Court   accepts   that   the   task   of   uncovering   evidence   of   a   crime   might  
necessitate   a   search   of   a   third  party’s   premises   (…)  However,   such   action  must   be  
proportionate306.  
  
According   to   the   Court,   the   search   of   a   third   party’s   house   needs   to  
correspond   to   a   pressing   social   need   and,   in   particular,   needs   to   be  
proportionate   to   the   legitimate  aim  being  pursued.  Consideration  must  also  be  
given   to   the   extent   of   possible   repercussions   on   the   reputation   of   the   person  
affected  by  the  search307.    
Undertaking   this   task   in   the  case  of  Buck  v.  Germany   the  Court  noticed   that  
the  search  and  seizure  in  the  case  at  issue  was  carried  out  against  a  third  party  (a  
son   of   the   suspect).   Taking   into   account   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   in  
                                                                                                                            
305  As  regards  the  procedure  for  examining,  using  and  storing  the  data,  the  Government  indicated  in  their  
submissions   that,   under  RIPA,  an   intercepting  agency   could,   in  principle,   listen   to  all   intercept  
material  collected  (…).  The  Court  recalls  (…)  that  the  authorities'ʹ  discretion  to  capture  and  listen  to  
captured   material   was   very   wide.   However,   that   case,   unlike   the   present   case,   involved   external  
communications,   in   respect   of   which   data   were   captured   indiscriminately.   Contrary   to   the   practice  
under  the  Interception  of  Communications  Act  1985  concerning  external  communications,   interception  
warrants  for  internal  communications  under  RIPA  relate  to  one  person  or  one  set  of  premises  only  (…),  
thereby  limiting  the  scope  of  the  authorities'ʹ  discretion  to  intercept  and  listen  to  private  communications.  
Moreover,  any  captured  data  which  are  not  necessary  for  any  of  the  authorised  purposes  must  
be   destroyed,  Kennedy   v.  United   Kingdom,   §§   162.   It   is   noteworthy   that   in   this   case   the  Court  
found  no  breach  of  Art.   8  ECHR,   even   though   the  measure  may  affect   a  wide   range  of   third  
parties,   due   to   the   fact   that   the   law   provides   adequate   safeguards   for   the   protection   of   data  
obtained,   in  particular,   (…)  strictly   limits   the  number  of  persons   to  whom   intercept  material   can  be  
disclosed,  imposing  a  requirement  for  the  appropriate  level  of  security  clearance  as  well  as  a  requirement  
to  communicate  data  only  where  there  is  a  “need  to  know”,  §§  163.  As  an  example  of  the  contrary  see:  
Liberty  and  Others  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  64-­‐‑65,  see  also:  Zakharov  v.  Russia,  §§  302.  
306  Vasylchuk  v.  Ukraine,  §§  79.  
307  [T]he  Court  must  first  ensure  that  the  relevant  legislation  and  practice  afford  individuals  adequate  and  
effective  safeguards  against  abuse.  Secondly,  the  Court  must  consider  the  specific  circumstances  of  each  
case  in  order  to  determine  whether,  in  the  particular  case,  the  interference  in  question  was  proportionate  
to   the   aim  pursued   (…).  The   criteria   the  Court  has   taken   into   consideration   in  determining   this   latter  
issue  have  been,  inter  alia,  (…)  the  extent  of  possible  repercussions  on  the  reputation  of  the  person  
affected  by  the  search  (…)  Having  regard  to  the  special  circumstances  of  this  case,  in  particular  the  fact  
that  the  search  and  seizure  in  question  had  been  ordered  in  connection  with  a  minor  contravention  of  a  
regulation  purportedly  committed  by  a  third  person  and  comprised  the  private  residential  premises  of  the  
applicant,  the  Court  concludes  that  the  interference  cannot  be  regarded  as  proportionate  to  the  legitimate  
aims  pursued,  Buck  v.  Germany  §§  45,  §§  52.  
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particular   the   fact   that   the   measure   was   ordered   in   connection   with   a   minor  
offence   and,   moreover,   the   search   was   carried   out   in   a   town   of   some   10,000  
inhabitants   which   meant   that   it   was   likely   to   have   an   adverse   effect   on   the  
personal   reputation   of   the   person   affected,   the   Court   concluded   that   the  
interference  could  not  be  regarded  as  proportionate  to  the  legitimate  aims  being  
pursued  and,  consequently,  found  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR308.    
This  line  of  reasoning  is  also  apparent  in  the  case  of  Zubaľ  v.  Slovakia.  In  this  
case,  the  Court  found  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  due  to  the  fact  that  the  search  of  
the   applicant’s   house   was   carried   out   without   sufficient   grounds,   where   the  
applicant  was  not  suspected  of  any  criminal  offence  but  was  an  injured  party  in  
the  criminal  case309.  
  
1.5.3.3. Legal  persons  
  
When  exploring  ratione  personae  concerns,  consideration  must  be  also  given  to  
the   liability  of  a   legal  person   to  be   the   subject  of   telephone   tapping  and  house  
search.  
Legal  persons  are  directly  protected  by  Art.  8  ECHR.  One  of  the  major  cases  
in  this  area  is  the  case  of  Société  Colas  Est  and  Others  v.  France,  in  which  the  Court  
examined  a  house  search  carried  out  with  regard  to  a  legal  person  and  ruled,  as  
follows:    
  
The  Court   reiterates   that   the  Convention   is  a   living   instrument  which  must  be  
interpreted  in  the  light  of  present-­‐‑day  conditions  (…).  As  regards  the  rights  secured  
to  companies  by  the  Convention,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  Court  has  already  
recognised   a   company'ʹs   right  under  Article   41   to   compensation   for  non-­‐‑pecuniary  
damage  sustained  as  a  result  of  a  violation  of  Article  6  §  1  of   the  Convention  (…).  
Building  on   its  dynamic   interpretation  of   the  Convention,   the  Court  considers  that  
the   time   has   come   to   hold   that   in   certain   circumstances   the   rights   guaranteed   by  
Article  8  of  the  Convention  may  be  construed  as  including  the  right  to  respect  for  a  
company’s  registered  office,  branches  or  other  business  premises310.  
  
Following   this   conclusion,   in   the   area   of   the   tapping   of   conversations   held  
within  a  legal  person’s  activities,  the  Court  ruled  that:  
                                                                                                                            
308  Buck  v.  Germany,  §§  48-­‐‑53,  see  also:  Misan  v.  Russia,  §§  56-­‐‑64.    
309  It  is  true  that  the  scope  of  the  search  was,  reasonably,  limited  to  a  visual  examination  of  the  premises,  
and  that  it  was  carried  out  in  the  presence  of  a  third  person  who  was  not  involved  in  the  case.  The  Court  
nevertheless  considers  relevant  the  applicant'ʹs  argument  that  the  presence  of  the  police  at  his  house  at  6  
a.m.  had  repercussions  for  his  reputation.  At  the  relevant  time  the  applicant  was  abroad.  His  holiday  was  
disturbed  by  the  news  of  the  search  and  the  immediate  arrangements  which  he  considered  it  necessary  to  
make  with  a  view  to  protecting  his  rights.  The  Court  considers  that  the  search  of  the  applicant'ʹs  house,  
carried  out  without  sufficient  grounds,  when  the  applicant  was  not  suspected  of  any  criminal  offence  but  
was  an  injured  party  in  the  criminal  case  in  issue,  was  not  “necessary  in  a  democratic  society”.  There  has  
accordingly  been  a  violation  of  Article  8  of  the  Convention,  Zubaľ  v.  Slovakia,  §§  44-­‐‑45.  






As  regards  the  applicant  association,  the  Court  notes  that  it  has  already  held  that  
a  legal  person  is  entitled  to  respect  for  its  “home”  within  the  meaning  of  Article  8  §  1  
of  the  Convention  (…)  While  it  may  be  open  to  doubt  whether,  being  such  a  person,  
it  can  have  a  “private  life”  within  the  meaning  of  that  provision,  it  can  be  said  that  
its   mail   and   other   communications,   which   are   in   issue   in   the   present   case,   are  
covered  by  the  notion  of  “correspondence”  which  applies  equally  to  communications  
originating   from   private   and   business   premises   (…)   The   former   Commission   has  
already  held,   in  circumstances   identical  to  those  of  the  present  case,   that  applicants  
who  are   legal  persons  may  fear  that  they  are  subjected  to  secret  surveillance.   It  has  
accordingly  accepted  that  they  may  claim  to  be  victims  (…)  The  applicant  association  
is  therefore  entitled  to  the  protection  afforded  by  Article  8311.  
  
It   is  noteworthy   that   in  cases  concerning   legal  persons   the  Court  highlights  
the  risk  of   the   interferences  having  much  more  far-­‐‑reaching  consequences  than  
in   cases   of   natural   persons   and,   therefore,   it   requires   that   such   interferences  




The  Court   has   produced   a   rich   body   of   case-­‐‑law  with   regard   to   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  respectively  and  ratione  personae.  
With   regard   to   the   taking   of   evidence   from   persons   granted   special  
protection   due   to   their   profession,   the   Court   has   defined  minimum   standards  
concerning   the   permissibility   of   the   measures   and   the   safeguards   associated  
with   them.   In   cases   related   to   legal   privilege,   the   Court   points   out   the  
inviolability   of   information   concerning   the   right   of   defence.   In   order   not   to  
interfere  in  an  area  covered  by  the  lawyer-­‐‑client  privilege,  the  Court  has  derived  
minimum   standards   as   to   the   supervision   of   the   measure   and   the   procedure  
relating  to  the  screening  and  destruction  of  the  privileged  information.  In  cases  
affecting   journalistic  and  medical  privilege,   the  Court  allows   interference   if   the  
measure   is   proportionate   and   necessary   in   the   circumstances   of   the   case   and,  
moreover,   if   the   disclosure   of   privileged   sources   is   limited   to   an   unavoidable  
minimum.  
                                                                                                                            
311  Association  for  European  Integration  and  Human  Rights  and  Ekimdzhiev  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  60.    
312  In  the  instant  case,  the  Court  observes  that  during  a  large-­‐‑scale  administrative  investigation,  officials  
from  the  DGCCRF  went  to  the  applicant  companies'ʹ  head  offices  and  branches  in  order  to  seize  several  
thousand  documents.  It  notes  that  the  Government  did  not  dispute  that  there  had  been  interference  with  
the  applicant  companies'ʹ  right  to  respect  for  their  home  (see  paragraph  32  above),  although  they  argued  
that   the   companies   could  not   claim  a   right   to   the   protection   of   their   business   premises   “with   as  much  
force   as   an   individual   could   in   relation   to   his   professional   or   business   address”   (…)   and   that,  
consequently,   the  entitlement  to   interfere  “might  well  be  more   far-­‐‑reaching”.  The  Court  must  therefore  
determine  whether  the  interference  with  the  applicant  companies'ʹ  right  to  respect  for  their  home  satisfied  
the  requirements  of  paragraph  2  of  Article  8,  Société  Colas  Est  and  Others  v.  France,  §§  42;  see  also:  
Crémieux  v.  France,  §§  40-­‐‑41.  
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Regarding   the   scope   of   persons   that   may   be   targeted   by   the  measure,   the  
Court   accepts   the   fact   that   both   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   may   be  
issued  and  executed  with   regard   to   third  parties.  However,   in  order   to  protect  
these  persons  from  abuses,  the  Court  has  established  minimum  standards  which  
relate  to,  inter  alia,  gathering,  screening  and  storing  the  material.      
With  regard  to   legal  persons,   the  Court  makes   it  clear  that   they  are  directly  
protected   by   Art.   8   ECHR   and   may   become   the   subject   of   a   house   search   or  
telephone   tapping.  However,  having   regard   to   the  wide   scope  of  persons  who  
may   be   affected   if   a   legal   person   is   targeted   by  measures,   the   Court   requires  
extra  consideration  as  to  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  measure  to  the  
legal  aim  being  pursued.    
1.5.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  ratione  personae 
 
Ratione  personae  difficulties  can  still  hinder  smooth  cooperation  in  the  area  of  
free  gathering  and  use  of  evidence.  The  above  analysis  shows  that  domestic  laws  
provide   different   approaches   to   the   issue   and   that   this   variety   in   scope   of  
domestic   privileges   or   immunities   may   have   a   negative   impact   on   EU  
cooperation,   since   inconsistencies   as   to   immunity   or   privilege   constitute   a  
ground  for  refusal  under  the  MR  instruments.  
This  research  cannot  tackle  personae  issues  in  great  detail  due  to  the  fact  that  
there   is   no   common   EU-­‐‑level   approach   to   what   constitutes   immunity   or  
privilege,  and  it  is  not  the  aim  of  this  study  to  explore  this  approach.  However,  
certain  minimum   standards   in   this   matter   can   be   derived   already,   within   the  
current  state  of  play.  Firstly,  following  the  concept  of  privileges  and  immunities  
included   in   the  MR  instruments,   it   is  necessary   to  consider  common  minimum  
standards   with   regard   to   special   rules   relating   to   persons   covered   by   certain  
professional   privileges   listed   in   the   instruments.   Secondly,   it   is   worth  
investigating  whether   third  parties   and   legal  persons   could  be  a   subject  of   the  
measures   carried   out   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context,   since   the   differences   between  
member  states  reported  in  the  research,  as  well  as  a  high  level  of  risk  of  abuses  
associated  therewith,  can  significantly  hamper  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of  
evidence.   
  
1.5.4.1. Special  rules  relating  to  persons  granted  professional  privileges    
  
When  looking  into  the  MR  instruments,   in  particular  the  EIO  Directive,  one  
may  notice  that  the  link  between  privileges,  immunities  and  political  concerns  is  
loosening.   The   EIO   Directive   highlights   the   legal,   journalistic   and   medical  
professions   as   the   professions   that,   in   particular,   deserve   special   focus   in   the  
context   of   EU   cooperation   in   criminal   matters.   Consequently,   the   following  
analysis   deals   with   these   groups   of   professions   with   a   view   to   coming   to  
minimum   standards   which   would   enhance   mutual   trust   and   result   in   per   se  






- Legal  privilege  
  
It   is   indisputable   that   any   information   obtained   by   an   interception   which  
falls  within  the  ambit  of  the  legal  privilege  of  non-­‐‑disclosure  must  be  destroyed  
and  may  not  be  used  as  evidence313.  Accordingly,  what   could   in   the   first  place  
enhance  mutual  trust  between  member  states  is  the  assurance  as  to  inevitability  
of   the   privileged   information   and   a   clear   procedure   relating   to   interferences  
which  may  affect  information  covered  by  privilege.  
Therefore,   it  would   contribute   to  mutual   trust   if  member   states  distinguish  
between   situations  where   a   lawyer   is   the   subject   of   the   interception   (e.g.   as   a  
suspect)   or   where   his   or   her   conversations   are   monitored   by   chance.  
Consequently,   following   the   minimum   rules   provided   by   the   ECtHR,   the  
minimum   standards   in   this   respect   could   consist   of   ensuring   that   domestic  
provisions   envisage   adequate  procedures   for   supervising   the  measure   in   cases  
where   client-­‐‑lawyer   privileged   information   may   be   interfered   with.   In   other  
words,  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  among  member  states  that  material  protected  by  
lawyer-­‐‑client   privilege   is   screened   and   sorted   by   a   competent   body,   which  
guarantees  that  information  which  concerns  the  right  of  defence  will  not  become  
part   of   the   case   file.   It   is   noteworthy   that   the   Court   is   in   favour   of   involving  
bodies   which   are   entrusted   with   distinguishing   between   privileged   and   not  
privileged   information,   e.g.   a   representative   of   the   bar   association   or   a   judge,  
and  member  states  could  follow  this  requirement.    
With   regard   to   searches   of   law   firms314,   member   states   could   focus   on  
ensuring   effective   safeguards   that   the   privileged   materials   are   not   interfered  
with.  Therefore,  following  the  approach  of  the  ECtHR,  searches  of  law  firms  in  a  
cross-­‐‑border   context   could   be   carried   out,   for   example,   in   the   presence   of   an  
observer   (preferably   a   representative   of   a   bar   association)   who   ensures   that  
materials   subject   to   professional   secrecy   are   not   removed.  However,   this   goal  
could  also  be  achieved  by  ensuring  a  procedure  of  screening  and  sorting  of  the  
gathered  items  by  a  competent  body,  e.g.  a  judge  or  bar  representative,  together  
with  a  limiting  of  the  possibility  of  disclosure  of  this  material  before  its  review.      
Therefore,  it  would  be  left  to  member  states  to  ensure  this  commonly  agreed  
level  of  protection  in  their  domestic  legislation.    
In   both   cases,   the   measure   will   be   undertaken   only   if   necessary   and  
proportionate  to  the  purposes  of  a  particular  investigation.  Moreover,  following  
                                                                                                                            
313   See   also:   COUNCIL  OF   EUROPE,   Recommendation  No.   R   (2000)   21   of   the   Committee   of  
Ministers  to  member  States  on  the  freedom  of  excercise  of  the  profession  of  lawyer,  22.10.2000:  
All  necessary  measures   should  be   taken   to   ensure   the   respect   of   the   confidentiality   of   the   lawyer-­‐‑client  
relationship.   Exceptions   to   this   principle   should   be   allowed   only   if   compatible   with   the   rule   of   law,  
Principle  I  para.  6.    
314  According  to  the  loci  minimum  standard,  the  term  ‘law  firm’  may  also  refer  to  the  lawyer’s  
home,  car  or  any  place  where  the  privileged  information  is  stored.  
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the   ECtHR,   it   would   require   a   priori315   review   of   the   decision   as   to   issuance,  
effected   by   a   judicial   or   independent   body   of   judicial   character,   in   order   to  
ensure   that   the   decision   is   not   undertaken   without   due   and   proper  
consideration.  Moreover,   in   the  case  of  searches,  member  states  could  establish  
certain   conditions   as   to   the   content   of   the  warrant,  which   in   cases   concerning  
law  firms  should  be  extremely  precise  in  terms  of  the  items  that  are  found.  That  
could  allow  member  states  to  trust  that  authorities  are  not  allowed  to  engage  in  
‘sleepwalking’  with  regard  to  law  firms.    
In  summary,  mutual   trust  between  member  states  with  regard   to  gathering  
of  evidence  from  lawyers  could  be  enhanced  by  domestic  legislation  ensuring:    
- absolute  inviolability  of  information  covered  by  legal  privilege;  
- a   priori   review/authorisation   (by   a   judicial   or   independent   body   of  
judicial  character)  of  the  decision  to  target  a  lawyer;    
- adequate   procedure   for   carrying   out   the   measure,   in   particular,  
screening,  sorting  and  removal  of  the  gathered  items.  
  
- Journalistic  and  medical  privileges  
  
Taking   into   account   the  Court’s   approach,   press   and  medical   privileges  do  
not  require  an  identical  level  of  protection  as  in  the  case  of  legal  privileges  and  
authorities,   in   certain   circumstances,   may   attempt   to   discover   information  
covered  by  journalistic  and  medical  privilege.    
Before  embarking  on  a  detailed  analysis,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  limits  to  
the  rights  for  non-­‐‑disclosure  of  press  information  are  also  listed  and  elaborated  
on  in  Recommendation  No.  R  (2000)  7  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to  Member  
States   on   the   right   of   journalists  not   to  disclose   their   sources  of   information316.  
According   to   these  provisions,  disclosure  of   the   information  may  only  occur   if  
there   is   a   legitimate   aim,   where   the   disclosure   is   necessary   in   the   absence   of  
reasonable   alternative   measures,   where   legitimate   interest   is   outweighed  
(protection   of   human   life,   prevention   of   a   major   crime,   defence   of   a   person  
accused  or  convicted  of  having  committed  a  major  crime),  and  this  applies  to  all  
stages  of  any  proceedings317.    
According  to  this  provision  and  the  Court’s  case-­‐‑law  it  stands  out  that  what  
is   of   the   utmost   importance   here   is   to   ensure   that   a   decision   is   made   with  
adequate   a   priori   consideration,   and   ensuring   compliance   with   this   particular  
requirement  could  contribute  to  enhancing  mutual  trust  between  member  states.  
                                                                                                                            
315   It   should   be   recalled   that   with   regard   to   persons   who   are   not   covered   by   professional  
privileges,   the   review   of   the   measure   may   have   a   posteriori   character   and,   moreover,   can  
intervene  at  three  stages:  when  the  measure  is  first  ordered,  while  it  is  being  carried  out,  or  after  
it  has  been  terminated.    
316  Principle  3  of  the  COUNCIL  OF  EUROPE,  Recommendation  No.  R  (2000)  7  of  the  Committee  
of   Ministers   to   Member   States   on   the   right   of   journalists   not   to   disclose   their   sources   of  
information,  8.3.2003.  





This   goal   could   be   achieved   by   ensuring   that   any   decision   to   interfere   in  
journalistic  or  medical  privilege  will  be  subjected  to  adequate  a  priori  review,  in  
order  to  ensure  that  the  decision  is  not  taken  haphazardly  and  is  proportionate  
to  the  aim  being  pursued.  This  a  priori  review  could  be  effectuated  by  appointing  
a  judicial  (or  independent)  body  as  either  issuing  or  authorising  body.  
Besides  that,  mutual  trust  could  also  be  enhanced  by  ensuring  that  privileged  
information   is   gathered,   screened,   sorted   and   destroyed   under   special  
mechanisms  of  control  in  order  to  ensure  that  only  such  information  which  does  
not   enjoy   special   protection   will   be   registered   or   made   available   by   the  
investigative  action.  This  requirement  could  also  apply  if  the  privileged  material  
was   intercepted  fortuitously.   It   is  noteworthy  that,  as   in  the  case  of  searches  of  
law  firms,  the  search  warrant  may  limit  the  scope  of  the  measure  with  a  view  to  
safeguarding  privileged  items318.    
In   summary,   with   regard   to   journalistic   and   medical   privileges,   member  
states  could  make  progress   towards  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  
from  these  professions  by  ensuring:    
- a  priori  review/authorisation  (by  a  judicial  or  independent  body)  of  
the  decision  to  target  a  journalist  or  medical  professional;    
- adequate   procedure   for   carrying   out   the   measure,   in   particular,  
screening,  sorting  and  removing  the  gathered  items.  
     
1.5.4.2. Third  parties  and  persons  affected  fortuitously  
  
According  to  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR,  as  well  as  the  domestic  provisions  
of  the  member  states  concerned,  both  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  may  
also  affect  persons  who  do  not  necessarily  have   to  be   involved   in   the   criminal  
proceedings.  Firstly,  both  measures  may  be  issued  and  executed  with  regard  to  
third  parties.  Secondly,  the  measures  carry  a  high  risk  of  affecting  third  persons  
by   chance.   Therefore,   if   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   both  
measures  is  the  aim,  then  progress  towards  mutual  trust  as  to  persons  involved  
as  necessary  participants  is  also  required.    
Accordingly,   the  next   step   involves  specification  of   the   requirements  which  
could  facilitate  evidence-­‐‑taking  from  third  parties  and  maximise   the  protection  
against   abuses   with   regard   to   persons   monitored   by   chance.   Following   the  
Court’s   case-­‐‑law  with   regard   to  both  measures   this   goal   could  be   achieved  by  
                                                                                                                            
318   See   also   ibid.,  which   deals  with   interception   of   communications,   surveillance   and   judicial  
searches  and  seizure:  Judicial  authorities  ordering  such  search  or  seizure  should  limit  their  search  and  
seizure   order   with   respect   to   the   disclosure   of   a   journalist'ʹs   source,   and   judicial   or   police   authorities  
following  such  an  order  should  respect  the  confidentiality  of  the  source  in  their  search  and  seizure  actions  
in  accordance  with  both,  Article  8  and  Article  10  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  This  
should   require,   for   example,   that   the   search  or   seizure  be   limited   to  material  which  does  not  
contain  information  identifying  a  source.  Practical  examples  could  be  the  seizure  of  movable  objects  
but  not  of  information  in  case  of  seizure  on  grounds  of  pecuniary  claims  against  journalists  or  the  search  
for   illegal   objects   being   limited   to   these   objects   without   taking   note   of   any   information   identifying   a  
source,  para.  58.    
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ensuring  that:  
- the   law  provides  clear  and  precise   rules  concerning   the  procedure  
for   examining,   using   and   storing   the   data,   including   rules   of  
removal  or  non-­‐‑disclosure  of   the  gathered   items  and  persons  who  
may   have   access   to   the   gathered   data.   It   is   noteworthy   that   these  
issues   are   strongly   linked   to   data   protection   in   criminal  
proceedings319;  
- the  measure   is  properly  supervised,  and  that  material  gathered  by  
chance   is   removed   or   not   disclosed.   This   requirement   is   of   the  
utmost   importance   especially   in   a   field  where  abuse   is  potentially  
so  easy  (e.g.  tapping  of  legal  persons,  searches  of  business  premises,  
strategic   monitoring)   and   could   have   such   harmful   consequences  
for   democratic   society   as   a   whole   (in   such   cases,   following   the  
Court’s  approach,  it  is  advisable  to  entrust  supervision  to  a  judge  or  
independent  authority).    
  
1.5.4.3. Legal  persons  
  
Due  to  the  incompatibility  of  domestic  laws,  minimum  standards  addressing  
the   subjection   of   legal   persons   to   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   also  
appear   necessary.   According   to   the   research,   it   could   facilitate   cooperation   if  
member   states  were   to  provide  directly   for   the   allowance  of   such  measures   in  
cross-­‐‑border   contexts.   That  would   be   in   line  with   the   ECtHR,   since   the   Court  
allows  such  measures  and  highlights   that   legal  persons  are  protected  by  Art.  8  
ECHR.   However,   given   the   wide   scope   of   persons   whose   rights   might   be  
                                                                                                                            
319   In   this   respect   see,   inter   alia:   art.   20   of   the   EIO   Directive;   THE   EUROPEAN   DATA  
PROTECTION   SUPERVISOR,   Opinion   of   the   European   Data   Protection   Supervisor   on   the  
initiative   of   the   Kingdom   of   Belgium,   the   Republic   of   Bulgaria,   the   Republic   of   Estonia,   the  
Kingdom   of   Spain,   the   French   Republic,   the   Italian   Republic,   the   Republic   of   Hungary,   the  
Republic   of   Poland,   the   Portuguese   Republic,   Romania,   the   Republic   of   Finland   and   the  
Kingdom   of   Sweden   for   a   Directive   of   the   European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council   on   the  
European  Protection  Order,  and  on   the   initiative  of   the  Kingdom  of  Belgium,   the  Republic  of  
Bulgaria,  the  Republic  of  Estonia,  the  Kingdom  of  Spain,  the  Republic  of  Austria,  the  Republic  
of  Slovenia  and  the  Kingdom  of  Sweden  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  
Council   regarding   the   European   Investigation   Order   in   criminal  matters,   OJ   C   355/1,   p.   1-­‐‑9;  
EUROPEAN  UNION  AGENCY  FOR  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS,  Opinion…,  p.  8-­‐‑9;  COUNCIL  
OF   THE   EUROPEAN   UNION,   Council   Framework   Decision   2008/977/JHA   of   27   November  
2008   on   the   protection   of   personal   data   processed   in   the   framework   of   police   and   judicial  
cooperation   in   criminal   matters,   30.12.2008,   OJ   L   350/60;   EUROPEAN   COMMISSION,  
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  Economic  
and   Social   Committee   and   the   Committee   of   the   Regions.   A   comprehensive   approach   on  
personal   data   protection   in   the   European   Union,   Brussels   4.11.2010,   COM(2010)   609   final;  
EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,   Proposal   for   a  Directive   of   the   European  Parliament   and   of   the  
Council   on   the   protection   of   individuals   with   regard   to   the   processing   of   personal   data   by  
competent  authorities  for  the  purposes  of  prevention,  investigation,  detection  or  prosecution  of  
criminal  offences  or   the  execution  of   criminal  penalties,   and   the   free  movement  of   such  data,  





infringed  (e.g.  the  tapping  of  legal  persons  would  probably  affect  a  wide  scope  
of   random   conversations),   special   consideration   has   to   be   given   to   the  
requirement   of   necessity   and   proportionality   of   the   measure.   Accordingly,  
member  states  could  provide  clear  rules  as  to  the  way  of  executing  the  measures  
(e.g.   rules   for   the   supervision,   sorting   or   deletion   of   the   gathered  data).   These  
rules  may  correspond  with  the  standards  presented  with  regard  to  third  parties  




The  aim  of  this  chapter  was  to  verify  the  feasibility  of  coming  to  common  EU  
minimum  standards  for  personae  categories  which  deserve  special  protection,  the  
targeting   of   third   parties,   and   the   targeting   of   legal   persons.   These   particular  
concerns   were   selected   for   the   following   reasons.   Firstly,   MR   instruments  
provide  protection  of  certain  categories  of  persons  which  should  be  given  special  
attention   when   executing   evidentiary   measures   abroad.   Secondly,   both  
measures  carry  a  high  risk  of  affecting  third  persons  and,  therefore,  mutual  trust  
in  this  matter  needs  to  be  enhanced.  Finally,  the  most  differences  across  member  
states   are   expected   in   this  matter,   since   each   legal   system  may  be   in   favour  of  
different  categories  of  privileges.    
The   issues  surrounding  ratione  personae   cannot  be   fully  overcome  without  a  
common   understanding   of   privileges   and   immunities,   which   constitutes   a  
ground  for  refusal  under  the  MR  instrument  and  is  one  of  the  biggest  obstacles  
when  it  comes  to  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation.  However,  given  the  fact  that  
the  EIO  Directive  explicitly  refers  to  legal,  journalistic  and  medical  privileges,  it  
is  necessary  to  consider  whether  coming  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  at  
least  with  regard  to  these  privileges  is  feasible,  especially  in  light  of  the  domestic  
provisions  which  also  give  special  consideration  to  the  professions  concerned.    
Accordingly,   with   regard   to   lawyers,   mutual   trust   between  member   states  
could   be   upgraded   by   introducing   clear   rules   regarding   the   inviolability   of  
client-­‐‑lawyer   confidentiality   and,   consequently,   the   inadmissibility   of   evidence  
gained   via   the   tapping   of   lawyers   and   searches   of   law   firms   in   pursuit   of  
information   which   falls   within   the   scope   of   the   right   of   defence.   However,   it  
does  not  automatically  mean  that  a   lawyer  cannot  be  a  subject  of  the  measures  
(if  privileged  material  is  not  targeted),  or  that  a  lawyer’s  conversations  cannot  be  
tapped   fortuitously.   Nevertheless,   in   any   case   where   there   is   a   risk   that  
privileged,  legal  material  may  be  affected,  a  member  state  should  ensure  that  the  
protected  material  is  not  targeted  and,  if  gathered  by  chance,  is  separated  from  
the  case  file  and  not  used  in  the  proceedings.    
Gathering   of   evidence   from   journalists   and  medical   professionals   could   be  
enhanced   if   member   states   ensured   that   the   measures   are   carried   out   only   if  
necessary   in   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   proportionate   to   the   aim   being  
pursued  and,  moreover,  that  the  disclosure  of  protected  sources  is  limited  to  an  
unavoidable   minimum.   It   would   be   left   to   the   member   states   how   they  
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effectuate   these   requirements.  However,   following   the   case-­‐‑law  of   the   ECtHR,  
the  involvement  of  a  judicial  or  independent  body  in  issuing  or  supervising  the  
measure  must  be  regarded  as  good  practice.    
Mutual  trust  between  member  states  could  also  be  enhanced  with  regard  to  
the  third  parties  who  may  be  affected  by  the  measures,  by  providing  clear  rules  
as   to  gathering,  examining,  storing  and  using  the  data  concerning  third  parties  
and  ‘necessary  participants’.  These  issues  have  a  strong  link  with  data  protection  
for   individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  for  the  purposes  
of  criminal  proceedings.    
Finally,   per   se   admissibility   of   evidence   could   also   be   facilitated   if  member  
states  regulate  the  targeting  of  legal  persons  with  the  measures.  As  in  the  case  of  
third  parties,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  measures  to  be  accompanied  by  clear  
rules  for  examining,  screening  and  sorting  data  gathered  by  chance.  
All  these  dimensions  of  ratione  personae  minimum  standards  would  enhance  
mutual   trust   between   member   states   and   ensure   that,   even   if   national  
procedures  may  differ,   the  member  states  provide   the  same   level  of  protection  
with  regard  to  persons  who  may  be  targeted  by  the  measures.  Taking  evidence  
from  journalists,  third  parties  or  legal  persons  would  meet  the  same  conditions  
and  guarantees,   irrespective  of   the  member   states   concerned.  As  a   result,   both  
the  issuing  and  executing  states  involved  in  cooperation  could  per  se  assume  that  
the  measure  is  covered  by  the  same  level  of  protection  as  in  a  similar  domestic  
case.   That   could   significantly   contribute   to   enhancing   per   se   admissibility   of  






2. Minimum   standards   with   regard   to   the  
procedural   rights   associated   with   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search 
 
  
The   following   two   chapters   deal   with   procedural   rights   associated   with  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search.   At   first   sight,   these   issues   may   seem  
disconnected   from  the  concerns  explored   in   the  preceding  chapters,  due   to   the  
fact  that  they  are  not  strictly  related  to  the  field  of  evidence-­‐‑gathering.  However,  
the  procedural  rights  concerns  cannot  be  omitted  from  this  research  due  to  their  
significant   impact   on  mutual   trust   between  member   states   and,   consequently,  
mutual  admissibility  of  evidence320.  
It   is   safe   to   say   that  mutual   recognition   of   evidence   could   be   significantly  
upgraded   if   member   states   could   trust   per   se   that   the   gathering   of   evidence  
abroad   has   not   violated   the   fundamental   rights   of   the   persons   concerned   and  
that  the  cross-­‐‑border  context  of  evidence-­‐‑gathering  neither  deprives  individuals  
of   their   fundamental   rights   nor   reduces   the   accessibility   and   effectiveness   of  
these  rights321.  In  this  context  and  due  to  the  variety  of  evidentiary  measures  and  
their   impact   on   various   fundamental   rights,   it   is   necessary   to   consider   which  
evidentiary  measures  protect   certain   rights  and,   subsequently,  how   to   come   to  
common  minimum  standards  in  view  of  upholding  these  rights.      
EU  fundamental  rights  are  envisaged  in  particular  in  the  ECHR  and  the  EU  
Charter322.  These   instruments  address,   inter   alia,   the   right   to   respect   for  private  
                                                                                                                            
320  With  regard  to  minimum  standards,  mutual  recognition  and  procedural  rights  see,  inter  alia:  
J.  BRANTS,  Procedural  safeguards  in  the  European  Union:  too  little,  too  late?  [in:]  European  evidence  
warrant:   transnational   judicial   enquiries   in   the   EU,   J.   VERVAELE   (ed.),   Intersentia   2005;  W.  DE  
BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  The  Procedural  Rights  Debate.  A  Bridge  Too  Far  or  Still  not  Far  Enough?  
EUCRIM   4/2010,   p.   163-­‐‑167;   S.   GLESS,   Mutual   recognition,   judicial   inquiries,   due   process   and  
fundamental   rights   [in:]   European   evidence   warrant…;   R.   LO ̈O ̈F,   Shooting   from   the   Hip.   Proposed  
Minimum  Rights  in  Criminal  Proceedings  throughout  the  EU,  European  Law  Journal,  Vol.  12,  No.  3,  
May   2006,   p.   426;   M.   MEYSMAN,  Quo   vadis   with   vulnerable   defedants   in   the   EU?,   European  
Criminal   Law   Review   2014,   Vol.   4,   Issue   2,   p.   179-­‐‑183;   L.   VAN   PUYENBROECK,   G.  
VERMEULEN,  Towards  Minimum  Procedural  Guarantees  for  the  Defence  in  Criminal  Proceedings  in  
the   EU,   International   and   Comparative   Law   Quarterly,   2011   Vol.   60,   Issue   4;    
G  VERMEULEN,  Mutual  recognition,  harmonisation  and  fundamental  (procedural)  rights  protection,  
[in:]  Crime,  rights  and  the  EU:  the  future  of  police  and  judicial  cooperation,  M.  MARTIN  (ed),  Justice,  
2008;  G.  VERMEULEN,  How  far  can  we  go  in  applying  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition?  [in:]  The  
Future   of   Police   and   Judicial   Cooperation   in   the   European   Union,   C.   FIJNAUT,   J.   OUWERKERK  
(ed.),  Leiden  2010,  p.  8-­‐‑10.      
321   It   is   worth   noting   that   the   incompatibilities   in   procedural   rights   are   far   more   significant  
when  pre-­‐‑trial  evidence-­‐‑gathering  is  spread  over  multiple  member  states,  see  in  more  detail:  W.  
DE  BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  The  Procedural  Rights  …,  p.  165.  See  also:  H.  KUCZYŃSKA,  The  
problem  of  a  European  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  p.  6-­‐‑7.  
322  With  regard  to  the  sources  of  EU  fundamental  rights  see:  T.  MARGUERY,  European  Union…,  
p.  284-­‐‑288.  
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life,  the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  the  right  to  a  defence,  the  presumption  of  innocence,  
and  the  right  against  self-­‐‑incrimination.  Due  to   the  fact   that  Art.  82.2   (b)  TFEU  
allows  the  setting  of  minimum  standards  concerning  the  rights  of  individuals  in  
criminal   procedure,   the   EU   has   also   adopted   various   instruments   providing  
minimum  standards  with  regard  to  procedural  rights,  in  particular  the  rights  of  
the  accused323  and  victims  of  crime324.    
Among   fundamental   rights   enshrined   at   the   EU   level,   both   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  are  linked  to  the  right  to  respect  for  private  life325  and,  
therefore,   this   fundamental   right   deserves   special   focus   if   enhancing   mutual  
                                                                                                                            
323  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  debate  on  the  procedural  rights  of  the  accused  has  been  stirred  up  
by   the   EUROPEAN  COMMISSION,  Green  Paper   on   Procedural   Safeguards   for   Suspects   and  
Defendants  in  Criminal  Proceedings  throughout  the  European  Union,  19.2.2003,  COM  (2003)75  
final.   The   next   step   towards   uniform   procedural   guarantees   was   the   Proposal   for   a   Council  
Framework   Decision   on   certain   Procedural   Rights   in   Criminal   Proceedings   throughout   the  
European  Union,  28.4.2004,  COM  (2004)328  final.  However,   the  main  aim  of   the  Proposed  FD  
was  not  to  create  new  rights  or  to  monitor  compliance  with  those  rights  that  already  exist  under  
the   ECHR   or   other   international   or   European   instruments,   but   rather   to   ensure   a   reasonable  
level  of  protection  for  suspects  and  defendants  in  criminal  proceedings  in  order  to  comply  with  
the  principle  of  mutual  recognition.  Nevertheless,  the  proposal  was  not  adopted  due  to  the  fact  
that  not  all  member  states  were  convinced  of  its  merits,  see:  W.  DE  BONDT,  G.  VERMEULEN,  
The   Procedural   Rights…,  p.   164,   T.   SPRONKEN,  M.   ATTINGER,  Procedural   Rights   in   Criminal  
Proceedings.  Existing  Level  of  Safeguards  in  the  European  Union,  Maastricht  2005,  p.  5;  see  also:  T.  
SPRONKEN  G.  VERMEULEN,  D.  DE  VOCHT,  L.  VAN  PUYENBROECK,  EU  Procedural  Rights  
in   Criminal   Proceedings,   Maklu   2009;   L.   VAN   PUYENBROECK,   G.   VERMEULEN,   Towards  
Minimum  Procedural  Guarantees…;  G.  VERMEULEN,  How  far  can  we  go…,  p.  8-­‐‑10.  The  next  step  
towards   common   procedural   rights   for   suspects   was   a   resolution   on   the   Roadmap   for  
Strengthening   Procedural   Rights   of   Suspected   or   Accused   Persons   in   Criminal   Proceedings,  
4.12.2009,   OJ   C295/1.   In   the   Roadmap   it   is   stated   that   in   the   context   of   implementing   the  
principle  of  mutual  recognition,  work  should  also  be  undertaken  on  those  aspects  of  procedural  
law   in  which  common  minimum  standards  are  considered  necessary   in  order   to   facilitate   the  
application  of  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition,  respecting  the  fundamental  legal  principles  
of  member  states.  The  Roadmap  deals  with  six  measures  which  are  believed  to  strengthen  the  
procedural  rights  of  suspected  or  accused  persons  in  criminal  proceedings,  as  follows:  Measure  
A:  Translation  and  Interpretation;  Measure  B:  Information  on  Rights  and  Information  about  the  
Charges;  Measure  C:  Legal  Advice  and  Legal  Aid;  Measure  D:  Communication  with  Relatives,  
Employers  and  Consular  Authorities;  Measure  E:  Special  Safeguards  for  Suspected  or  Accused  
Persons  who  are  Vulnerable;  Measure  F:  A  Green  Paper  on  Pre-­‐‑Trial  Detention.  Accordingly,  
one  may  notice   that   no  measures   are   proposed  with   regard   to   legal   remedies.   Following   the  
Roadmap,   several   instruments   on   various   aspects   of   procedural   rights   have   already   been  
enhanced  by  means  of  directives,  inter  alia,  the  right  to  translation,  the  right  to  information,  the  
right  of  access  to  a  lawyer  and  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  the  right  to  be  present  at  the  
trial  in  criminal  proceedings.    
324   See   in   particular   EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT,   COUNCIL   OF   THE   EUROPEAN   UNION,  
Directive   2012/29/EU   of   the   European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council   establishing   minimum  
standards  on  the  rights,  support  and  protection  of  victims  of  crime,  and  replacing  the  Council  
Framework  Decision  2001/220/JHA,  25.10.2012,  OJ  L315/57.  With  respect   to  victims’   rights  see  
also:   P.  WILIŃSKI,   P.   KARLIK   (eds.)   Improving   protection   of   victims’   rights:   access   to   legal   aid,  
Poznań  2014.  
325   Art.   8   ECHR   and   Art.   7   EU   Charter.   See   also:   Explanations   Relating   to   the   Charter   of  





admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   through   these   measures   is   the   goal.  
Consequently,  the  next  step  involves  the  investigation  of  how  to  enhance  mutual  
trust   with   regard   to   this   right.   Undoubtedly,   the   focus   here   should   be   on  
limitations,  since  the  exercise  of  both  measures  may  seriously  interfere  with  the  
right  to  privacy.  Thus,  both  measures  can  be  undertaken  under  strict  conditions,  
inter  alia,  if  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national  security,  
public   safety   or   the   economic  well-­‐‑being   of   the   country,   for   the   prevention   of  
disorder  or  crime,  for  the  protection  of  health  or  morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  
the   rights   and   freedoms   of   others.   However,   everyday   practice   shows   that  
authorities   do   not   always   proceed   in   accordance   with   these   requirements.  
Hence,   both   the   ECHR   and   EU   Charter   grant   to   persons   whose   rights  
guaranteed   therein   are   violated   the   right   to   an   effective   remedy   in   order   to  
protect   and  pursue   these   rights.   In   case   of   the   right   to   respect   for   private   life,  
these   remedies   aim   at   verifying   the   use   of   the  measures  which   carry   a   risk   of  
violations  of  this  fundamental  right.  In  this  light  it  stands  out  that  the  procedural  
right   worth   investigating   in   this   research   is   the   right   to   an   effective   remedy  
against  both  measures.  Ensuring  that  the  cross-­‐‑border  context  does  not  deprive  
the   person   whose   privacy   was   infringed   of   the   possibility   of   challenging   the  
measures   could   significantly   contribute   to   enhancing  mutual   trust   and  mutual  
admissibility  of  evidence  across  the  EU.  
Therefore,  the  two  following  chapters  verify  whether  is  it  possible  to  come  to  
common   EU   minimum   standards   for   an   effective   legal   remedy   against   the  
measures.   
2.1. Rights  to  legal  remedies  
  
As  explained  in  the  opening  subsection,  if  member  states  were  to  ensure  that  
persons  whose  right  to  privacy  was  infringed  by  the  measures  carried  out  in  an  
EU   cross-­‐‑border   context   enjoy   the   same   opportunity   to   legal   remedies   against  
them  it  would  contribute   to  enhancing  mutual   trust  and  mutual  recognition  of  
evidence   in   the   EU.  However,   due   to   the   variety   of   legal   systems   the   right   to  
legal   remedies   may   be   provided   differently   across   the   member   states,   which  
may   hinder   the   enforcement   of   these   rights   in   cases   having   a   cross-­‐‑border  
dimension.   Therefore,   the   central   research   question   in   this   chapter   is   the  
following:    
  
How  could  member  states  provide  common  minimum  criteria   for   the  application  of  
legal  remedies  against  telephone  tapping  and  house  search?    
2.1.1. Rights  to  legal  remedies  in  domestic  legislation  
  
In   daily   European   life   an   individual   may   be   confronted   with   different   legal  
remedies   and   also   potential   conflicts   of   legal   norms   under   and   across   particular  
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national  jurisdictions326.    
  
This   statement   perfectly   reflects   the   state   of   play   when   it   comes   to   legal  
remedies   against   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   across   the   EU  member  
states.  The   rich   landscape  of   systems  and  procedures  hampers   the   formulation  
of   a   coherent   and   transparent   comparative   overview   with   regard   to   legal  
remedies.   Accordingly,   the   following   comparative   study   is   limited   to  
fundamental   aspects   of   the   issues   discussed   in   this   chapter   and   sketches   the  
concerns  that  may  have  an  impact  on  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence327.  
When  reviewing  the  various  domestic  laws,  sharp  contrasts  between  member  
states  appear,  especially  with  regard  to:    
- the   types   of   proceedings   upon   which   the   measures   may   be  
challenged;  and  
- the  scope  of  persons  entitled  to  challenge  the  measures.  
Consequently,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  member  states  investigated  
in   this   research,   the   right   to   legal   remedies   against   the   measures   may   be  
effectuated  on  either  one  or  more  of  the  following  procedures:  
- challenging  the  measures  within  criminal  proceedings:  
a) with   a   view   to   questioning   its   legality,   necessity   or  
proportionality,  or  the  procedure  undertaken  (available  usually  
at   pre-­‐‑trial   stage   as   an   interlocutory   appeal,   granted   to   the  
parties   or   persons   concerned;   usually   leading   to   exclusion   of  
evidence  or  reduction  of  its  probative  value);  
b) with  a  view  to  excluding  the  evidence  (available  usually  at  trial-­‐‑
stage  within  exclusionary  rules,  granted  to  the  parties);  
- challenging  the  measures  within  civil  or  administrative  procedure:  
- with  a  view  to  an  action  for  compensation  of  damages.  
  
The  procedures   listed  above  entail   further  differences  between   the  member  
states  investigated  in  this  research,  which  relate  to:  
- the   variety   of   bodies   entitled   to   review   the   measures   (e.g.  
prosecutors,  criminal  judges,  civil  judges,  investigative  judges);  
- the   variety   of   persons   entitled   to   challenge   the   measures   (e.g.  
parties   to   the   proceedings,   persons   concerned   –   including   third  
persons  if  affected  by  the  measure  –  or  the  investigative  authorities  
themselves);  
- the   variety   of   objectives   of   the   legal   remedy   (e.g.   exclusion   of  
evidence,   nullity   of   evidence   or   compensation   of   damages   for  
persons  whose  rights  were  infringed).    
                                                                                                                            
326  J.B.  BANACH-­‐‑GUTIERREZ,  CH.  HARDING,  Fundamental  Rights  in  European  Criminal  Justice.  
An  Axiological   Perspective,   European   Journal   of  Crime,  Criminal   Law   and  Criminal   Justice   20,  
2012,  p.  241.  
327   For   these   reviews,   I   acknowledge   the   assistance   of   representatives   from   various   member  





The  sketch  of  domestic  regulations  shows  variations  and  differences  between  
the  systems  in  their  approaches  to  the  legal  remedies.  Whereas  in  some  member  
states   the   availability   of   challenge   of   the   measures   already   arises   at   pre-­‐‑trial  
stage  within  an  interlocutory  appeal,  other  states  do  not  provide  a  specific  legal  
remedy   and   rely   on   the   exclusionary   rules   applicable   at   trial   stage   or   provide  
this   right   beyond   the   criminal   proceedings   within   a   civil   or   administrative  
procedure.  Another  sharp  point  of  difference  is  the  aim  pursued  by  the  remedy,  
which   may   be   the   exclusion   of   evidence,   its   nullity   or   compensation   for  
damages.  All   these  diversities  may  hinder   the  challenge   to  procedure   in   cross-­‐‑
border  cases.    
2.1.2. Legal  remedies  in  the  MLA  and  the  MR  instruments  
  
As  an  important  preliminary  note,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  legal  
remedies   against   the   assistance   and   legal   remedies   against   the   measure  
undertaken   upon   the   assistance.   The   former   remedies   are   traditionally  
envisaged   in   the   cooperation   instruments,  whereas   the   latter  are  bound  by   the  
domestic   provisions   of   member   states.   Taking   into   account   the   aim   of   this  
research,   the   following  study  will   in  particular   focus  on   legal   remedies  against  
investigative  measures  carried  out  in  a  cross-­‐‑border  context.  
  
2.1.2.1. Legal  remedies  in  the  MLA  instruments 
  
The   MLA   instruments   concerning   evidence-­‐‑gathering   do   not   explicitly  
address   legal   remedies.   No   reference   to   the   rules   that   should   apply   within  
appeal   proceedings   is  made  whatsoever   in   the   1959   ECMA  or   in   the   2000   EU  
MLA  Convention.  As   a   result,   the   availability   and   scope  of   the   legal   remedies  
raised  within   the  MLA  cooperation  will  depend  on   the  domestic  provisions  of  
the  member  states  concerned.  
  
2.1.2.2. Legal  remedies  in  the  MR  instruments  
  
In  contrast  to  the  MLA  instruments,  explicit  references  to  legal  remedies  are  
apparent   in   the   instruments   based   on   mutual   recognition.   Therefore,   the  
following   overview   focuses   on   instruments   governing   evidence-­‐‑gathering   and  
approaches  to  legal  remedies  which  envisaged  therein.  
  
- FD  FO    
  
The  FD  FO  deals  solely  with  the  rules  concerning  legal  remedies  against  the  
order.  Its  art.  11  reads:  
  
Art.  11.1.  Member  States  shall  put  in  place  the  necessary  arrangements  to  ensure  
that   any   interested   party,   including   bona   fide   third   parties,   have   legal  
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remedies  without  suspensive  effect  against  a  freezing  order  executed  pursuant  to  
Article   5,   in   order   to   preserve   their   legitimate   interests;   the   action   shall   be  
brought   before   a   court   in   the   issuing   State   or   in   the   executing   State   in  
accordance  with  the  national  law  of  each.    
2.  The  substantive  reasons  for  issuing  the  freezing  order  can  be  challenged  
only  in  an  action  brought  before  a  court  in  the  issuing  State  (…).  
  
Accordingly,   the   instrument   clarifies   the   procedure   applied   against   a  
freezing  order  undertaken  upon  the  FD  FO.  Art.  11.2  FD  FO  makes  it  clear  that  
the   initial,   substantive   decision   as   to   issuance   may   only   be   challenged   in   the  
issuing  state328.  However,  this  provision  does  not  ensure  the  availability  of  such  
a  remedy  in  the  issuing  state.  
  
- FD  EEW    
  
The   FD   EEW   follows   the   approach   adopted   in   the   FD   FO  with   respect   to  
legal  remedies.  Consequently,  its  art.  18  reads:  
  
Art.  18.1.  Member  States  shall  put  in  place  the  necessary  arrangements  to  ensure  
that   any   interested   party,   including   bona   fide   third   parties,   have   legal   remedies  
against   the   recognition   and   execution   of   an   EEW   pursuant   to   Article   11,   in  
order   to   preserve   their   legitimate   interests.   Member   States   may   limit   the   legal  
remedies  provided  for  in  this  paragraph  to  cases  in  which  the  EEW  is  executed  using  
coercive  measures.  The  action  shall  be  brought  before  a  court  in  the  executing  
State  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  that  State.    
2.   The   substantive   reasons   for   issuing   the   EEW,   including   whether   the  
conditions  established   in  Article  7  have  been  met,  may  be  challenged  only   in  an  
action   brought   before   a   court   in   the   issuing   State.   The   issuing   State   shall  
ensure   the   applicability   of   legal   remedies   which   are   available   in   a  
comparable  domestic  case.    
                                                                                                                            
328  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  FO  Proposal  reads:  art.  2.  The  freezing  order  may  not  be  appealed  as  to  
its   substance   in   the   executing   State.     However,   this   wording   was   questioned   by   the   EP   which  
stated  that  an  appeal   in  the  executing  State  can  never  relate  to  the  substance  since  this  would  
lead  to  a  duplication  of  procedures  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  give  a  clearer  indication  than  does  
the   proposal   of   the   special   cases   in   which   an   appeal   may   be   lodged   in   the   executing   State.  
Accordingly,   the   EP   proposed   the   following   amendment:   In   the   executing   State   an   appeal   may  
relate  solely  to  the  grounds  for  non-­‐‑execution  laid  down  in  Article  6  and  to  the  conditions  of  execution  
referred   to   in   Article   5(3)   and   may   not   under   any   circumstances   relate   to   the   substance,   see:  
EUROPEAN   PARLIAMENT,   Report   on   the   initiative   by   the   Governments   of   the   French  
Republic,  the  Kingdom  of  Sweden  and  the  Kingdom  of  Belgium  for  the  adoption  by  the  Council  
of  a  Framework  Decision  on  the  execution  in  the  European  Union  of  orders  freezing  assets  or  
evidence,   12.7.2001,   Amendment   10.   However,   this   line   of   reasoning   does   not   address   the  
problem   that   the   executing   state,   in   general,   is   not   competent   to   examine   the   substantive  
grounds  for  issuing  the  warrant.  Therefore,  the  final  wording  of  art.  11.2  FD  FO  is  more  precise  






5.   The   issuing   and   executing   authorities   shall   take   the   necessary   measures   to  
facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  bring  actions  mentioned  in  paragraphs  1  and  2,  
in  particular  by  providing  interested  parties  with  relevant  and  adequate  information.    
  
These  provisions,  as  in  the  case  of  the  FD  FO,  solely  address  decisions  as  to  
the  issuance  and  execution  of  the  warrant,  without  further  reference  to  decisions  
concerning   evidence-­‐‑gathering   in   domestic   contexts.   However,   an   important  
provision  is  included  in  Recital  (21)  FD  EEW:  
  
Each   Member   State   has   in   its   law   legal   remedies   available   against   the  
substantive   reasons   underlying   decisions   for   obtaining   evidence,   including  
whether   the   decision   is   necessary   and   proportionate,   although   those   remedies  may  
differ  between  Member  States  and  may  apply  at  different  stages  of  proceedings329.    
  
Moreover,   direct   reference   to   legal   remedies   against   house   search   is  
envisaged  in  the  EEW  Proposal.  Its  Art.  12  stipulates  that:  
  
Art.  12.2.  The  following  additional  safeguards  are  provided  with  respect  to  search  
and  seizure:      
(b)   a   person   whose   premises   have   been   searched   should   be   entitled   to   receive  
written  notification  of  the  search.  This  should  state,  as  a  minimum,  the  reason  for  the  
search,  the  objects,  documents  or  data  seized  and  the  legal  remedies  available  (…)  
  
As  explained  in  the  EEW  Proposal:  
  
In  the  executing  State,   there   is  a  need  to  ensure  that  the   fundamental  right  not    
to   incriminate  oneself   is  protected,  as  well  as  a  need   for  additional   safeguards  with  
respect   to   search   and   seizure.  When   coercive  measures   are   used   to   obtain   the  
evidence,  it  is  essential  that  effective  legal  remedies  exist  in  both  the  issuing  
and  executing  States.  Further  safeguards  are  provided  in  the  grounds  of  refusal  to  
execute  the  European  Evidence  Warrant330.      
  
Unfortunately,  this  trend  related  to  remedies  against  search  and  seizure  was  
not  incorporated  into  the  final  version  of  the  FD  EEW. 
 
- EIO  Directive  
  
The   approach   envisaged   in   the   EIO   Directive   varies   slightly   from   the  
approaches  laid  down  in  the  preceding  instruments.  Art.  14  of  the  EIO  Directive  
stipulates:  
 
                                                                                                                            
329  Recital  (21)  of  the  FD  EEW.      
330  EEW  Proposal,  para  48,  p.  12.  
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Art.   14.1.  Member   States   shall   ensure   that   legal   remedies   equivalent   to  
those   available   in   a   similar   domestic   case,   are   applicable   to   the  
investigative  measures  indicated  in  the  EIO.    
2.   The   substantive   reasons   for   issuing   the   EIO  may   be   challenged   only   in   an  
action   brought   in   the   issuing   State,   without   prejudice   to   the   guarantees   of  
fundamental  rights  in  the  executing  State.    
3.   Where   it   would   not   undermine   the   need   to   ensure   confidentiality   of   an  
investigation  under  Article  19(1),  the  issuing  authority  and  the  executing  authority  
shall  take  the  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  information  is  provided  about  the  
possibilities   under   national   law   for   seeking   the   legal   remedies   when   these   become  
applicable  and  in  due  time  to  ensure  that  they  can  be  exercised  effectively.    
4.  Member   States   shall   ensure   that   the   time-­‐‑limits   for   seeking   a   legal   remedy  
shall   be   the   same   as   those   that   are   provided   for   in   similar   domestic   cases   and   are  
applied  in  a  way  that  guarantees  the  possibility  of  the  effective  exercise  of  these  legal  
remedies  for  the  parties  concerned.    
5.   The   issuing   authority   and   the   executing   authority   shall   inform   each   other  
about  the  legal  remedies  sought  against  the  issuing,  the  recognition  or  the  execution  
of  an  EIO.    
6.  A  legal  challenge  shall  not  suspend  the  execution  of  the  investigative  measure,  
unless  it  is  provided  in  similar  domestic  cases.    
7.   The   issuing   State   shall   take   into   account   a   successful   challenge   against   the  
recognition  or  execution  of  an  EIO  in  accordance  with  its  own  national  law.  Without  
prejudice   to  national  procedural   rules  Member  States   shall   ensure   that   in   criminal  
proceedings   in   the   issuing   State   the   rights   of   the   defence   and   the   fairness   of   the  
proceedings  are  respected  when  assessing  evidence  obtained  through  the  EIO331.  
                                                                                                                            
331  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  initial  version  for  this  article  was  more  general:  Legal  remedies  shall  be  
available   for  the  interested  parties  in  accordance  with  national   law.  The  substantive  reasons  for  issuing  
the  EIO  can  be  challenged  only  in  an  action  brought  before  a  court  of  the  issuing  State.  As  explained  in  
the  EIO  Explanatory  Memorandum:  Article  13  provides  that  legal  remedies  shall  be  available  for  the  
interested  parties  in  accordance  with  national  law.  As  this  proposal  contains  a  general  regime  and  
does   not   distinguish   between   the   types   of   investigative   measures,   it   is   not   appropriate   to  
provide   in   this   proposal   a   single   regime   for   legal   remedies.   It   is   however   necessary,   under   the  
principle  of  mutual  recognition,  to  prevent  that  substantive  reasons  for  issuing  the  EIO  are  challenged  in  
an  action  brought  before  a  court  of  the  executing  State,  p.  14.  It  is  noteworthy  that  when  discussing  
the  final  version  of  the  EIO  various  approaches  to  legal  remedies  were  debated  and  suggested,  
e.g.:  The  legal  remedies  available  against  an  EIO  should  at  least  be  the  same  as  those  available  in  domestic  
cases   against   the   investigative   measure   in   question.   In   accordance   with   their   national   law,   Member  
States  should  ensure  that  these  legal  remedies  can  be  used  and  should  promptly  inform  interested  parties  
about  the  possibilities  and  methods  of  legal  remedy.  In  cases  where  objections  against  an  EIO  are  made  by  
an  interested  party  in  the  executing  State,  the  executing  State  will  examine  whether  there  are  reasons  for  
not   recognising   the  EIO,   for   example   because   of   the   lack   of   proportionality,   or   infringement   of   human  
rights,  it  is  advisable  that  such  information  is  transmitted  to  the  issuing  authority  and  that  the  interested  
party   is  duly   informed.  There   is   a  need   to   ensure   the   right   to   information  and  access   to   the   courts   for  
those  affected  by  an  EIO.  The  right  of  defence  forms  part  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  (Articles  47  and  48  of  
the  Charter)  during  all  stages  of  the  proceedings,  see  Amendment  65  in:  Amendments  55–199  on  the  
adoption  of  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  regarding  the  European  






The   wording   of   the   article   makes   it   clear   that   legal   remedies   shall   be  
available   not   only   against   the   EIO   (namely   as   to   decision   of   its   issuing   and  
executing),   but   principally   against   the   measures   indicated   therein332.   In   other  
words,  from  art.  14.1  EIO  Directive  the  conclusion  follows  that:    
- the   substantive   reasons   for   issuing   the  measure  may   be   challenged   in  
the  issuing  state,  according  to  the  law  of  this  state;  
- the  manner  of  executing  the  investigative  measure  indicated  in  the  EIO  
may  be   challenged   in   the   executing   state,   according   to   the   law  of   this  
state333.    
However,   even   if   the   EIO   Directive   goes   further   that   the   previous  
instruments   and   ensures   legal   remedies   against   investigative   measures,   this  
provision   becomes   superfluous   and   useless   in   cases  where   domestic   law  does  




The   overview   across   the   instruments   governing   evidence-­‐‑gathering   reveals  
that   there   is   no   provision   whatsoever   expressly   regulating   the   right   to   legal  
remedies  against  evidentiary  measures,  including  telephone  tapping  and  house  
search.    
Therefore,   the   availability   and   manner   of   challenging   the   investigative  
measures  depend  on  the  law  of  the  member  states  concerned.  The  EIO  Directive  
ensures   legal  remedies  equivalent   to   those  available   in  a  similar  domestic  case,  
however,  this  provision  becomes  superfluous  in  cases  where  domestic  law  does  
not  provide  such  a  remedy  or  its  execution  is  not  feasible  in  certain  stages  of  the  
procedure.  Moreover,  none  of   the   instruments  attempt  to  overcome  the  variety  
of   domestic   approaches   to   legal   remedies   against   investigative   measures.  
Consequently,   it   should   be   stressed   that   the   single   reference   to   proceeding   in  
accordance   with   domestic   legal   remedies   is   in   no   way   satisfactory.   Another  
conclusion  is  that  the  EU  does  not  as  yet  provide  more  extensive  protection  for  
legal   remedy   against   telephone   tapping   or   house   search   other   than   that  
provided  in  the  ECHR  and  the  EU  Charter.   
 
 
                                                                                                                            
332  Recital  (22)  of  the  EIO  Directive:  Legal  remedies  available  against  an  EIO  should  be  at  least  equal  to  
those  available  in  a  domestic  case  against  the  investigative  measure  concerned.    
333  Compare  art.  14.1  of  the  EIO  Directive  (Member  States  shall  ensure  that  legal  remedies  equivalent  
to  those  available  in  a  similar  domestic  case,  are  applicable  to  the  investigative  measures  indicated  
in   the   EIO)  with   art.   18.1.   EEW   (Member   States   shall   put   in   place   the   necessary   arrangements   to  
ensure   that   any   interested   party,   including   bona   fide   third   parties,   have   legal   remedies   against   the  
recognition  and  execution  of  an  EEW)  and  art.  11.1  FD  FO   (Member  States  shall  put   in  place   the  
necessary  arrangements   to   ensure   that  any   interested  party   (…)  have   legal   remedies   (…)  against  a  
freezing  order  executed  pursuant  to  Article  5).  
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2.1.3. Legal  remedies  against  the  measures  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR 
 
In  numerous  cases,  the  ECtHR  has  emphasised  the  importance  of  the  right  to  
legal  remedies  against  measures  such  as  telephone  tapping  and  house  search.  In  
reaching   this   conclusion,   the   Court   gives   particular   weight   to   the   scope   of  
persons  concerned  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  remedies  available.    
  
2.1.3.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
In   cases   concerning   legal   remedies   against   telephone   tapping,   the   Court  
examines   very   diverse   fields   related   to   these   concerns,   pointing   out   the  
requirement  of  a  sufficiently  effective  apparatus  for  controlling  the  measure.    
In   the   case   of   the  Association   for   European   Integration   and  Human  Rights   and  
Ekimdzhiev   v.   Bulgaria   the  Court  was  dissatisfied  with   the   absence   of   remedies  
against  the  measure.  Firstly,  the  Court  noted  that  there  was  no  proper  review  of  
the   measure,   which   would   have   verified   its   issuance   and   execution,   and   the  
screening   and   destruction   of   the   data   had   the   surveillance   proved   fruitless334.  
Secondly,  the  Court  was  not  convinced  by  the  absence  of  judicial  or  independent  
control   of   the   measure335.   Finally,   the   Court   was   struck   by   the   lack   of   any  
remedies  against  the  measure:  
  
The   result  of   this   lack  of   information   is   that   those   concerned  are  unable   to   seek  
any   redress   in   respect   of   the   use   of   secret   surveillance   measures   against   them.  
Moreover,  the  Government  have  not  provided  any  information  on  remedies  –  such  as  
an   application   for   a   declaratory   judgment   or   an   action   for   damages   –  which   could  
become   available   to   the   persons   concerned   if   they   find   out   about   any   measures  
against  them336.  
  
In   the   same   case,   the   Court   delineated   stages   in   which   the   legal   remedies  
                                                                                                                            
334  [T]he  texts  make  no  provision  for  acquainting  the  judge  with  the  results  of  the  surveillance  and  do  not  
command   him   or   her   to   review   whether   the   requirements   of   the   law   have   been   complied   with   (…)  
Similarly,  there  exists  no  independent  review  of  whether  the  original  data  is  in  fact  destroyed  within  the  
legal  ten-­‐‑day  time-­‐‑limit   if  the  surveillance  has  proved  fruitless  (…)  Another  point  which  deserves  to  be  
mentioned  in  this  connection  is  the  apparent  lack  of  regulations  specifying  with  an  appropriate  degree  of  
precision  the  manner  of  screening  of  the  intelligence  obtained  through  surveillance,  or  the  procedures  for  
preserving   its   integrity   and   confidentiality   and   the   procedures   for   its   destruction,   Association   for  
European  Integration  and  Human  Rights  and  Ekimdzhiev  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  85-­‐‑86.  
335  [T]he  SSMA  does  not  provide  for  any  review  of  the  implementation  of  secret  surveillance  measures  by  
a   body   or   official   that   is   either   external   to   the   services   deploying   the  means   of   surveillance   or   at   least  
required  to  have  certain  qualifications  ensuring  his   independence  and  adherence   to   the  rule  of   law  (…)  
The  Court  further  notes  that  the  overall  control  over  the  system  of  secret  surveillance  is  entrusted  solely  
to   the  Minister   of   Internal   Affairs   (…)   –   who   not   only   is   a   political   appointee   and   a   member   of   the  
executive,   but   is   directly   involved   in   the   commissioning   of   special   means   of   surveillance   –,   not   to  
independent   bodies   (…),  Association   for   European   Integration   and  Human  Rights   and  Ekimdzhiev   v.  
Bulgaria,  §§  85-­‐‑87.  





may  apply,  which  may  occur  after   the   termination  of   the  surveillance,  but  also  
when  the  surveillance  is  ordered  and  while  it  is  in  progress337.  
The  importance  of   legal  remedies  against  the  measure  was  also  pointed  out  
in  the  case  of  Rotaru  v.  Romania.  The  Court  stated  that  there  must  exist  adequate  
and   effective   safeguards   against   abuse,   since   a   system   of   secret   surveillance  
designed   to   protect   national   security   entails   the   risk   of   undermining   or   even  
destroying  democracy  on  the  grounds  of  defending  it.  Consequently,  the  ECtHR  
ruled  as  follows:  
  
[I]n  order  for  systems  of  secret  surveillance  to  be  compatible  with  Article  8  of  the  
Convention,   they   must   contain   safeguards   established   by   law   which   apply   to   the  
supervision   of   the   relevant   services'ʹ   activities.   Supervision  procedures  must   follow  
the  values   of   a  democratic   society  as   faithfully  as  possible,   in  particular   the   rule   of  
law,  which  is  expressly  referred  to  in  the  Preamble  to  the  Convention.  The  rule  of  law  
implies,  inter  alia,  that  interference  by  the  executive  authorities  with  an  individual'ʹs  
rights   should   be   subject   to   effective   supervision,  which   should   normally   be   carried  
out  by  the  judiciary,  at  least  in  the  last  resort,  since  judicial  control  affords  the  best  
guarantees  of  independence,  impartiality  and  a  proper  procedure338.    
  
Following   this   approach,   in   the   recent   case   of  Zakharov   v.   Russia   the  Court  
was  not  convinced  by   the  Russian  remedies  against   the  measure,   in  particular,  
the  effectiveness  of  such  remedies  and  stated  that:  
  
Lastly,   with   respect   to   the   remedies   to   challenge   the   alleged   insufficiency   of  
safeguards  against  abuse  in  Russian  law  before  the  Russian  courts,  the  Court  is  not  
convinced   by   the  Government’s   argument   that   such   remedies   are   effective   (…)   In  
view   of   the   above   considerations,   the   Court   finds   that   Russian   law   does   not  
provide   for   effective   remedies   to   a   person  who   suspects   that   he   or   she   has  
been  subjected  to  secret  surveillance.  By  depriving  the  subject  of   interception  of  
the  effective  possibility  of  challenging  interceptions  retrospectively,  Russian  law  thus  
eschews   an   important   safeguard   against   the   improper   use   of   secret   surveillance  
measures339.  
  
On   the   contrary,   in   the   case   of  Klass   and   Others   v.   Germany   the   Court  was  
convinced  by  the  system  of  legal  remedies  provided  by  German  law.  The  Court  
noted   that   from   the   moment   of   notification   of   the   measure,   various   legal  
                                                                                                                            
337  It  is  obvious  that  when  surveillance  is  ordered  and  while  it  is  under  way,  no  notification  of  the  persons  
concerned   is   possible,   as   such   notification   would   jeopardise   the   surveillance'ʹs   effectiveness.   They   are  
therefore   of   necessity   deprived   of   the   possibility   to   challenge   specific  measures   ordered   or   implemented  
against  them.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  it  is  altogether  impossible  to  provide  a  limited  remedy  –-­‐‑  
for   instance,   one   where   the   proceedings   are   secret   and   where   no   reasons   are   given,   and   the   persons  
concerned  are  not  apprised  whether  they  have  in  fact  been  monitored  –  even  at  this  stage,  ibid.,  §§  100.  
338  Rotaru  v.  Romania,  §§  59.  
339  Zakharov  v.  Russia,  §§  299-­‐‑300.  
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remedies  become  available  to  the  individual.  These  remedies  were  as  follows:    
- an  action  reviewed  by  an  administrative  court  in  terms  of  the  lawfulness  
of   the  application  and   the   conformity  with   the   law  of   the   surveillance  
measures  ordered;    
- an   action   for   damages   in   a   civil   court   if   the   individual   has   been  
prejudiced;    
- an  action  for  the  destruction  or,  if  appropriate,  restitution  of  documents;    
- finally,  if  none  of  these  remedies  is  successful,  application  to  the  Federal  
Constitutional  Court  for  a  ruling  as  to  whether  there  has  been  a  breach  
of  the  Basic  Law340.    
  
A  similar  conclusion  was  made  by  the  Court  in  the  case  of  Weber  and  Saravia  
v.  Germany341.    
It  is  remarkable  that  the  Court  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  an  individual  may,  
under  certain  conditions,  claim  to  be  the  victim  of  a  violation  without  having  to  
allege  that  such  measures  were  in  fact  applied  to  him  or  her342.    
 
2.1.3.2. House  search  
  
In  cases  concerning  house  search  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  person  
affected   by   the   measure   should   be   granted   effective   access   to   that   review,   in  
order  to  afford  adequate  safeguards  against  abuse343.  
In  Harju  v.  Finland  the  Court  stated  that  the  applicant’s  right  to  respect  for  her  
home  was  violated  by   the   fact   that   there  was  no  prior   judicial  warrant   and  no  
possibility  to  obtain  an  effective  judicial  review  a  posteriori  of  either  the  decision  
to  order  the  search,  or  the  manner  in  which  it  was  conducted344.  
On  the  contrary,  in  the  case  of  Smirnov  v.  Russia   the  Court  observed  that,   in  
the   absence   of   a   requirement   for   prior   judicial   authorisation,   the   investigating  
authorities  had  unfettered  discretion   to  assess   the  expediency  and  scope  of   the  
search  and  seizure.   In   the  present  case,  however,   the  absence  of  a  prior   judicial  
warrant  was,  to  a  certain  extent,  counterbalanced  by  the  availability  of  an  ex  post  
factum  judicial  review.  The  applicant  could,  and  did,  make  a  complaint  to  a  court  
which  was  called  upon  to  review  both  the  lawfulness  of,  and  justification  for,  the  
search  warrant345.  
                                                                                                                            
340  Klass  and  Others  v.  Germany,  §§  71.    
341  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  135-­‐‑136.  
342  [O]therwise,  where  a  State   institutes  secret  surveillance  the  existence  of  which  remains  unknown  to  
the  persons  being  controlled,  with  the  effect  that  the  surveillance  remains  unchallengeable,  Article  8  could  
to  a  large  extent  be  reduced  to  a  nullity.  It  is  possible  in  such  a  situation  for  an  individual  to  be  treated  in  
a  manner  contrary  to  Article  8,  or  even  to  be  deprived  of  the  right  granted  by  that  Article,  without  his  
being  aware  of  it  and  therefore  without  being  able  to  obtain  a  remedy  either  at  the  national  level  or  before  
the  Convention  institutions,  Association  “21  December  1989”  and  Others  v.  Romania,  §§  167.  
343  Miailhe  v.  France  (No.  1),  §§  37.  
344  Harju  v.  Finland,  §§  44.    








In   conclusion,   the  Court   rules   that   there   should   be   a   requirement   for   legal  
remedies  against  both  measures,  which  would  ensure  an  effective  apparatus  for  
controlling   the   measures.   It   is   noteworthy   that   the   ECtHR   is   satisfied   with  
various   forms   of   remedies,   as   long   as   these   remedies   afford   adequate   and  
effective   safeguards   against   abuse.   In   the   case   of   both   telephone   tapping   and  
house   search,   legal   remedies   should   attempt   to   verify   substantive   reasons  
underlying   decisions   to   issue   the   measure   and   the   manner   in   which   it   was  
conducted.   Moreover,   with   regard   to   telephone   tapping,   the   Court   is   of   the  
opinion   that,  under   certain   conditions,   a  person  may   claim   to  be   a  victim  of   a  
violation  without   having   to   allege   that   such  measures  were   in   fact   applied   to  
him  or  her,  and  even  if  the  measure  proved  fruitless.    
2.1.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  legal  remedies  against  telephone  
tapping  and  house  search 
 
Due  to  the  variety  of  legal  systems  and  approaches  to  legal  remedies,  coming  
to  common  minimum  standards  and  answers  to  research  question  presented  in  
opening   subsection   may   seem   difficult   at   first   sight.   MR   instruments,   and   in  
particular  the  EIO  Directive,  do  not  make  much  progress  towards  legal  remedies  
against   investigative  measures   and   simply   refer   to  domestic  provisions,  which  
are  strikingly  different.  However,  what  may  help  to  overcome  these  differences  
is  the  ECtHR’s  case-­‐‑law  which  turns  attention  from  the  procedure  applied  to  the  
effectiveness   of   the   remedies.   Following   the   Court’s   approach,   member   states  
could  enhance  mutual   trust  by  ensuring  effective  apparatus   for   controlling   the  
measures,   in   accordance   with   domestic   measures.   This   effective   apparatus  
would  give  any  person  whose  right  to  respect  for  privacy  was  infringed  a  legal  
remedy  to  challenge:    
- the   substantive   reasons   underlying   the   decisions   to   obtain   evidence,  
including   whether   the   decision   is   necessary   and   proportionate.   This  
scope  of  remedies  could  cover,  in  particular,  the  initial  decision  as  to  the  
issuance  of  the  measure  and  would  relate  to  ratione  materiae,  as  well  as  
its   necessity   and  proportionality   to   the   aim  being  pursued   (e.g.   in   the  
case  of  searches  of  legal  persons  or  the  tapping  of  a  telephone  targeted  
by  its  location);  
- the   manner   in   which   the   measure   was   issued   and   exercised.   These  
remedies   could   deal,   in   particular,  with   ratione   auctoritatis,   ratione   loci,  
and  ratione  temporis,  as  well  as  the  concerns  related  to  the  use,  storage,  
screening  or  destruction  of  irrelevant  data.    
Accordingly,   depending   on   the   circumstances   of   the   case   and   person  
concerned,   these   remedies  may   vary   significantly   between  member   states   and  
apply,   inter   alia,   in   criminal,   civil   or   administrative   proceedings.   However,   it  
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should  be  noted  that  if  the  legal  remedy  is  granted  to  the  entitled  person  and  it  is  
effective  in  the  ECtHR’s  understanding,  the  available  procedure  is  of  secondary  
importance.   This   conclusion   significantly   helps   to   overcome   the   problem   of  
variations  in  domestic  procedures  applicable  to  legal  remedies.    
Special   consideration   should   be   given   to   persons   targeted   by   telephone  
tapping   if   the  measure  proves   fruitless.   In   this   case,   breaches  may   relate,   inter  
alia,   to   the   storage   or   disclosure   of   the   gathered   data.  However,   it   is   doubtful  
whether   these   persons   shall   be   covered   by   a   minimum   standard   due   to   the  
absence   of   any   criminal   evidence   in   such   cases.   Nevertheless,   these   persons  
could   be   granted   remedies   to   pursue   their   rights   in   the   fields   of   civil   or  
administrative   law,  as  well  as  within  data  protection   instruments,  according  to  
domestic  provisions.      
In   summary,   ensuring   that   each   member   state   provide   effective   legal  
remedies   against   telephone   tapping   and   house   search   for   the   persons   whose  
right   to   privacy   was   affected   by   the   measures   would   significantly   enhance  
mutual   trust   between  member   states,   even   though   those   remedies  may   differ  
between   member   states,   apply   in   different   proceedings   and   entail   different  
consequences.  What  is  of  utmost  importance  is  that  the  person  who  believes  his  
or   her   fundamental   rights   were   infringed   is   granted   an   effective   means   to  
pursue   those   rights,   and   that   the   cross-­‐‑border   context  of  proceedings  does  not  
hamper  it.  The  key  here  is  the  ‘effectiveness’  of  the  right  to  a  remedy,  which  can  
be   ensured   differently   within   the   legal   systems   across   the   EU.   As   a   result,  
mutual   trust   in   cross-­‐‑border  gathering  of   evidence  would  be   taken   to  a  higher  
level  and  member  states  could  accept  evidence  per  se,  believing  that  gathering  of  






2.2. Right  to  be  notified      
  
Effective  apparatus  for  controlling  the  measures  can  only  work  if  the  persons  
entitled  to  challenge  the  measure  are  fully  aware  of  the  fact  they  were  the  subject  
of  the  measures,  and  that  the  legal  remedy  is  available346.  Consequently,  to  tackle  
the  concerns  about  procedural  rights  fully,  this  chapter  deals  with  the  right  to  be  
notified  of  the  measures.  The  central  research  question  here  is  the  following:  
  
How   can   member   states   come   to   a   common   EU   minimum   standard   for   effective  
notification  of  the  measures?  
  
2.2.1. The  right  to  be  notified  in  domestic  legislation   
 
As   in   the   case   of   legal   remedies,   the   following   study   will   merely   report  
different  approaches,  relevant  for  purposes  of  the  research347.  
  
2.2.1.1. Notification  of  telephone  tapping 
  
The  overview  across  six  jurisdictions  reveals  that  member  states  regulate  the  
notification  of  the  measure  differently.  Accordingly,  member  states  provide:  
- individual  notification  of   the  measure  given   to   the  persons  whose  
telephones  have  been  tapped;  
- no   individual   notification   of   the  measure,   but   the  parities  may  be  
notified  by  accessing  the  case  files;  
- no  notification  whatsoever.    
 
2.2.1.2. Notification  of  house  search  
  
Notification  of  house  searches  in  member  states  investigated  in  this  research  
is  usually  exercised  either  as  a  right  to  be  present  at  the  search  or  being  notified  
of  it  in  writing,  with  both  measures  sometimes  being  exercised  simultaneously.  
However,   in   member   states   that   allow   searches   without   invitation/consent,  
notification  may  also  be  effectuated  by  official  information  that  the  measure  has  
                                                                                                                            
346   This   issue  was   pointed   out   by   the   ECtHR   in   light   of   the   telephone   tapping   in  Weber   and  
Saravia   v.  Germany:   [T]he   question   of   subsequent  notification   of   surveillance  measures   is   inextricably  
linked  to  the  effectiveness  of  remedies  before  the  courts  and  hence  to  the  existence  of  effective  safeguards  
against  the  abuse  of  monitoring  powers,  since  there  is  in  principle  little  scope  for  recourse  to  the  courts  by  
the  individual  concerned  unless  the  latter  is  advised  of  the  measures  taken  without  his  or  her  knowledge  
and  thus  able  to  challenge  their  legality  retrospectively,  §§  135.  
347  For  the  following  study,  I  acknowledge  the  reviews  carried  out  by  representatives  of  member  
states.  
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been   conducted   or   the   presence   of   a   judicial   authority   when   the   measure   is  
being  carrying  out.    
Accordingly,  the  following  approaches  are  apparent:  
- obligatory/alternative  presence  of  the  occupier  or/and  witnesses;  
- obligatory/alternative   presence   of   supervising   authorities   (e.g.  
investigative  judge);  
- granting  to  the  person  concerned  notification  of  the  search.  
 
2.2.1.3. Conclusion    
  
Surprisingly,  the  right  to  be  notified  of  the  measures  constitutes  a  sharp  point  
of   difference   between   member   states.   Besides   the   variety   of   approaches,   it   is  
very   doubtful   whether   all   of   the   notifications   available   under   domestic  
legislation  may  be  recognised  as  effective.      
2.2.2. The  right  to  notification  in  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments     
  
2.2.2.1. Telephone  tapping  
  
A   reference   to   notification   of   the   measure   might   be   found   in  
Recommendation  No.  R  (85)  10,  which  includes  the  provision  that  the  requested  
party  might  make  the  execution  of   letters  rogatory  dependent  on  the  condition  
that:    
  
Art.  4  (c)  after  the  requested  interception  has  taken  place,  the  authorities  of  the  
requested  party  will,  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  practice  of  that  party,  
so   inform   the   subscriber   to   the   telecommunication   facility  which   has   been  
intercepted  or  any  other  person  concerned.    
  
Besides  that  provision,  no  reference  to  notification  whatsoever  is  made  either  
in  the  MLA  or  the  MR  instruments.  
  
2.2.2.2. House  search    
  
The   only   explicit   reference   to   notification   of   the   persons   whose   house   has  
been   searched   is   laid   down   in   the   EEW  Proposal.   Its  Art.   12.2   (b),   concerning  
additional  safeguards  applicable  to  search  and  seizure,  reads:  
  
(…)  a  person  whose  premises  have  been  searched  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  
written  notification  of  the  search.  This  shall  state,  as  a  minimum,  the  reason  for  
the  search,  the  objects,  documents  or  data  seized,  and  the  legal  remedies  available  (…)  
  
Unfortunately,   this   notification   provision   was   not   included   in   the   final  








An  overview  of  the  MLA  and  MR  instruments  reveals  that  notification  of  the  
measures  has  not  been  given  a  lot  of  attention  at  EU  level.  Neither  the  2000  EU  
MLA   Convention   nor   the   EIO   Directive   attempts   to   address   the   question   of  
notification  of  telephone  tapping,  even  if  these  instruments  refer  to  the  measure.  
With   regard   to   notification   of   house   search,   only   the  EEW  Proposal   addresses  
the  issue,  however,  the  proposed  solution  has  not  been  incorporated  into  further  
instruments   concentrated   on   evidence-­‐‑gathering.   Accordingly,   the   right   to   be  
notified  of   the  measures  conducted   in   the  cross-­‐‑border  context  depends  on   the  
domestic  provisions  of  the  member  states  concerned.    
2.2.3. The  right  to  notification  in  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR 
  
2.2.3.1. The  right  to  be  notified  of  telephone  tapping  
  
The  approach  of   the  ECtHR   is  not  very   clear   in   terms  of  notification  of   the  
measure.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  points  out  that  as  soon  as  notification  can  
be   made   without   jeopardising   the   purpose   of   the   surveillance   after   its  
termination,   information   should   be   provided   to   the   persons   concerned.   In   the  
case  of  the  Association  for  European  Integration  and  Human  Rights  and  Ekimdzhiev  v.  
Bulgaria  the  Court  found  that:  
  
the   absence   of   a   requirement   to  notify   the   subject   of   interception   at   any  point  was  
incompatible   with   the   ECHR,   in   that   it   deprived   the   interception   subject   of   an  
opportunity  to  seek  redress  for  unlawful  interferences  with  his  or  her  Article  8  rights  
and  rendered   the  remedies  available  under   the  national   law  theoretical  and   illusory  
rather   than   practical   and   effective.   The   national   law   thus   eschewed   an   important  
safeguard  against  the  improper  use  of  special  means  of  surveillance.    
  
Moreover,   when   examining   this   case,   the   Court   highlighted   that   adequate  
and  effective  guarantees  against  abuse  should  exist  both:  
- during  the  initial  stage  when  issuing  the  measure,  and  
- during   the   later   stages  when   the   surveillance   is   actually   being   carried  
out  or  has  already  ended.  According  to  the  Court,  that  control  is  crucial  
for   verifying  whether   the   executors   in   fact   comply  with   the  warrants  
authorising  the  use  of  such  means,  or  whether  they  faithfully  reproduce  





                                                                                                                            
348  Association  for  European  Integration  and  Human  Rights  and  Ekimdzhiev  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  85.  
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In  the  case  of  Zakharov  v.  Russia  the  Court  similarly  ruled  that: 
 
The   supervision   of   interceptions,   as   it   is   currently   organised,   does   not   comply  
with  the  requirements  of  independence,  powers  and  competence  which  are  sufficient  
to  exercise  an  effective  and  continuous  control,  public  scrutiny  and  effectiveness   in  
practice.   The   effectiveness   of   the   remedies   is   undermined   by   the   absence   of  
notification  at  any  point  of   interceptions,  or  adequate  access  to  documents  
relating  to  interceptions349.  
  
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  cases  of  Klass  and  Others350  and  Weber  and  Saravia351:  
  
the   Court   examined   German   legislation   which   provided   for   notification   of  
surveillance  as  soon  as  that  could  be  done  after  its  termination  without  jeopardising  
its  purpose.  The  Court  took  into  account  that  it  was  an  independent  authority  which  
had  the  power  to  decide  whether  an  individual  being  monitored  was  to  be  notified  of  a  
surveillance   measure.   The   Court   found   that   the   provision   in   question   ensured   an  
effective  notification  mechanism  which  contributed   to  keeping   the   interference  with  
the  secrecy  of  telecommunications  within  the  limits  of  what  was  necessary  to  achieve  
the  legitimate  aims  pursued352.  
  
                                                                                                                            
349  Zakharov  v.  Russia,  §§  302.  
350  In  the  opinion  of   the  Court,   it  has  to  be  ascertained  whether   it   is  even  feasible   in  practice  to  require  
subsequent   notification   in   all   cases.   The   activity   or   danger   against   which   a   particular   series   of  
surveillance   measures   is   directed   may   continue   for   years,   even   decades,   after   the   suspension   of   those  
measures.   Subsequent   notification   to   each   individual   affected   by   a   suspended   measure   might   well  
jeopardise  the  long-­‐‑term  purpose  that  originally  prompted  the  surveillance.  Furthermore,  as  the  Federal  
Constitutional  Court  rightly  observed,  such  notification  might  serve  to  reveal  the  working  methods  and  
fields  of   operation  of   the   intelligence   services   and   even  possibly   to   identify   their   agents.   In   the  Court’s  
view,  in  so  far  as  the  "ʺinterference"ʺ  resulting  from  the  contested  legislation  is  in  principle  justified  under  
Article   8   para.   2   (art.   8-­‐‑2)   (…),   the   fact   of   not   informing   the   individual   once   surveillance   has   ceased  
cannot  itself  be  incompatible  with  this  provision  since  it  is  this  very  fact  which  ensures  the  efficacy  of  the  
"ʺinterference"ʺ.  Moreover,   it   is   to   be   recalled   that,   in   pursuance   of   the   Federal   Constitutional   Court’s  
judgment   of   15   December   1970,   the   person   concerned   must   be   informed   after   the   termination   of   the  
surveillance   measures   as   soon   as   notification   can   be   made   without   jeopardising   the   purpose   of   the  
restriction,  Klass  and  Others,  §§  58,  see  also:  H.  KUCZYŃSKA,  Interception  of  communications  in  the  
light  of  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights,  (Intercepação  de  Comunicações  sob  a  Luz  da  Convenção  
Européia   de   Direitos   Humanos),   Argumenta   Revista   do   Programa   de   Mestrado   em   Cięncia  
Jurídica  da  Universidade  Estadual  Do  Norte  Paraná  2011,  Brazil,  p.  122-­‐‑123.  
351  The   fact   that   persons   concerned   by   secret   surveillance  measures   are   not   subsequently   notified   once  
surveillance  has  ceased  cannot  by  itself  warrant  the  conclusion  that  the  interference  was  not  “necessary  
in  a  democratic  society”,  as  it  is  the  very  absence  of  knowledge  of  surveillance  which  ensures  the  efficacy  
of  the  interference.  Indeed,  such  notification  might  reveal  the  working  methods  and  fields  of  operation  of  
the  Intelligence  Service  (see  Klass  and  Others,  cited  above,  p.  27,  §  58,  and,  mutatis  mutandis,  Leander,  
cited  above,  p.  27,  §  66).  As  soon  as  notification  can  be  carried  out  without  jeopardising  the  purpose  of  the  
restriction  after  the  termination  of  the  surveillance  measure,  information  should,  however,  be  provided  to  
the  persons  concerned,  Weber  and  Saravia  v.  Germany,  §§  135.  





However,  in  some  cases,  the  Court  accepts  the  lack  of  notification,  as  long  as  
there  are  other  safeguards:  
  
By   contrast,   in   the   case   of   Kennedy   the   absence   of   a   requirement   to   notify   the  
subject   of   interception   at   any   point   in   time   was   compatible   with   the   Convention,  
because  in  the  United  Kingdom  any  person  who  suspected  that  his  communications  
were  being  or  had  been  intercepted  could  apply  to  the  Investigatory  Powers  Tribunal,  
whose   jurisdiction   did   not   depend   on   notification   to   the   interception   subject   that  
there  had  been  an  interception  of  his  or  her  communications353.  
  
A  similar   line  of  argumentation  may  be  also   found   in   the  case  of  Greuter  v.  
The  Netherlands,   in  which   the  Court   examined   the   lack   of   obligation   for  Dutch  
criminal   investigating   authorities   to   inform   persons   who   are   not   themselves  
suspects   in  a   criminal   investigation  of   the   tapping  of   their   telephone   lines  and  
stated  that:  
  
The   Court   considers   that   in   order   for   systems   of   secret   surveillance   to   be  
compatible   with   Article   8   of   the   Convention,   they   must   contain   supervisory  
safeguards   established   by   law   in   order   to   prevent   arbitrariness.   Supervisory  
procedures  must  follow  the  values  of  a  democratic  society  as  faithfully  as  possible,  in  
particular   the   rule   of   law.   This   implies   inter   alia   that   the   interference   by   the  
executive   authorities   with   an   individual’s   rights   should   be   subject   to   effective  
supervision,  which   should  normally   be   carried   out   by   the   judiciary,   at   least   in   the  
last   resort,   since   judicial   control   affords   the   best   guarantees   of   independence,  
impartiality   and   a   proper   procedure   (…).  The   fact   that   information   about   an  
individual   is   being   gathered   by   way   of   secret   surveillance,   and   that   its  
storage   and   possible   release   is   not   disclosed   to   the   person   concerned,   does  
not   of   itself   warrant   the   conclusion   that   such   an   interference   is   not  
“necessary   in   a   democratic   society”   (…)   The   Court   further   notes   that   the  
tapping   took   place   with   the   authorisation   and   under   the   supervision   of   an  
investigating  judge,  as  required  by  the  relevant  statutory  and  regulatory  provisions.  
The   Court   finally   notes   that,   when   the   applicant   asked   the   public   prosecutor  
whether  her  telephone  had  been  tapped,  she  received  an  affirmative  reply  and  





                                                                                                                            
353  Ibid.;  see  also:  Kennedy  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  169.  
354  Greuter  v.  The  Netherlands  (dec.),  see  also  Leander  v.  Sweden,  §§  66:  The  fact  that  the  information  
released  to   the  military  authorities  was  not  communicated  to  Mr.  Leander  cannot  by   itself  warrant   the  
conclusion   that   the   interference  was  not  "ʺnecessary   in  a  democratic   society   in   the   interests   of  national  
security"ʺ,  as  it  is  the  very  absence  of  such  communication  which,  at  least  partly,  ensures  the  efficacy  of  
the  personnel  control  procedure.    
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2.2.3.2. The  right  to  be  notified  of  house  search  
  
In  cases  concerning  house  search   the  Court   in   its  case-­‐‑law  recommends   the  
presence  of   independent  observers,  particularly  with   regard   to  searches  of   law  
firms355.    
In  the  case  of  Alexov  v.  Bulgaria  the  Court  concluded  that  the  search  of  a  home  
was  not  conducted  ‘in  accordance  with  the  law’  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  8  §  2  
ECHR,  inter  alia,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  right  to  be  present  had  not  been  fulfilled.  
The  Court  noted  that    
  
the  search  was  conducted  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses,  it  appears  that  none  of  the  
other   individuals   required   by   law   to   be   present   –   the   occupier   or   a  member   of   his  
family,  the  manager  of  the  property  or  a  representative  of  the  municipality  attended.  
Accordingly,  it  appears  that  the  prerequisites  for  performing  such  a  search  were  not  
present   and   its   execution   was   not   in   compliance   with   the   relevant   provisions   of  
domestic  law356.    
  
On  the  other  hand,   in  Camenzind  v.  Switzerland   the  Court  found  the  manner  
of   searching  proportionate   to   the   aim  being  pursued  due   to   the   fact   that,   inter  
alia,   the   interference   took   place   in   the   applicant’s   presence   after   he   had   been  
allowed  to  consult  the  file  on  his  case  and  telephone  a  lawyer357.  
However,   in   none   of   the   cases  mentioned   above   does   the  Court   develop   a  
general   requirement,   with   regard   to   either   the   presence   of   the   occupier   or  
independent   observers   or   the  manner   of   proceeding   if   the   householder   of   the  
premises  is  absent  at  the  time  of  the  search.  At  the  same  time,  the  Court  stressed  
the   importance   of   independent   witnesses   when   a   lawyer’s   office   is   being  
searched.  In  Aleksanyan  v.  Russia  the  Court  stated  that  where  a  lawyer’s  office  is  
concerned  it  is  necessary  to  examine  whether  it  was  carried  out  in  the  presence  
of  an  independent  observer  to  ensure  that  material  subject  to  legal  professional  
privilege   is  not   removed358.   It   is  noteworthy,  however,   that   the  Court  does  not  
accept  random  observers  when  it  comes  to  law  firms.  In  Iliya  Stefanov  v.  Bulgaria  
the  Court  noted  that:  
  
while   the   search   was   carried   out   in   the   presence   of   two   certifying  witnesses,   they  
were  neighbours  who  were  not  legally  qualified.  This  may  be  considered  problematic,  
as   this   lack   of   legal   qualification  made   it   highly  unlikely   that   these   observers  were  
truly  capable  of  identifying,  independently  of  the  investigation  team,  which  materials  
were  covered  by  legal  professional  privilege,  with  the  result  that  they  did  not  provide  
                                                                                                                            
355  See  in  more  detail  on  pages  129-­‐‑131.  
356  Alexov  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  128.    
357  Camenzind  v.  Switzerland,  §§  46.  










In  conclusion,  with  regard  to  telephone  tapping,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  
that   the   notification   of   the   interception   should   be   provided   to   the   person  
concerned   as   soon   as   it   can   be  made  without   jeopardising   the   purpose   of   the  
interference.   Such   notification   may   also   be   fulfilled   by   granting   access   to  
documents   relating   to   interceptions.  However,   under   some   circumstances,   the  
Court  accepts  a  lack  of   individual  notification  which  at  the  same  time  does  not  
deprive   the   person   concerned   of   access   to   the   transcripts   and   legal   remedies  
against  the  measure.  In  the  field  of  house  searches,  the  Court  provides  minimum  
standards   for   safeguards   which   include,   inter   alia,   notification   of   the   person  
whose  premises  have  been  searched  and  the  need  for  independent  third  parties  
to  be  present  at  the  search360.    
2.2.4. Minimum  standards  with  regard  to  notification  of  the  measures 
 
The   right   to   notification   of   the   measures   plays   an   important   role   in  
enhancing   mutual   trust   between   member   states,   complementing   the   right   to  
legal   remedies  by  enabling   its   feasibility.  Consequently,   to  enhance  procedural  
rights   in   cross-­‐‑border   gathering   of   evidence   fully   and   completely,   it   is   also  
necessary  to  come  to  common  minimum  standards  with  regard  to  the  right  to  be  
notified   of   telephone   tapping   and   house   search.   This   goal   can   be   achieved   by  
member   states   ensuring   that   persons   entitled   to   legal   remedies   against   the  
measures  carried  out  in  cross-­‐‑border  context  are  also  effectively  informed  about  
the  fact  the  measure  was  carried  out  and  that  a  legal  remedy  against  its  taking  is  
available.  
In  the  case  of  both  measures  it  would  be  up  to  member  states  to  ensure  the  
effective   performance   of   such   notification.   In   cases   concerning   telephone  
tapping,   it  could  be  effectuated  as  a  separate  decision,  or  through  access  to  the  
case   files,   depending  on   the   legal   system  and  way  of   conducting  proceedings.  
With   regard   to   house   search,   the   right   to   be   notified   of   the   measure   could  
correspond   with   the   EEW   Proposal,   which   stipulates   that   a   person   whose  
premises  have  been  searched  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  notification  (preferably  
written)   of   the   search,   which   explains   the   reason   for   the   search,   the   objects,  
documents  or  data  seized,  and  the   legal  remedies  available.  However,  member  
states   could   provide   other   ways   of   exercising   the   notification,   provided   it  
ensures  detailed   information  explaining   the  principles  and  scope  of   the  search,  
sufficient  for  effective  questioning  of  the  measure. 
                                                                                                                            
359  Stefanov  v.  Bulgaria,  §§  43.    
360  G.  VERMEULEN,  L.  VAN  PUYENBROECK,  Approximation…,  p.  58.    
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3. Minimum   standards   to   enhance   per   se  
admissibility  of  evidence:  conclusions  
  
A  big  obstacle   in   the  field  of  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence   is   the   lack  of  
mutual   trust,  which   follows   from   the  differences  between   legal   systems  across  
the  EU.  As  a  consequence,   it  may  be  difficult  for  authorities  to  accept  evidence  
gathered  from  such  intrusive  measures  as  telephone  tapping  or  house  search,  if  
there   is   mutual   distrust   as   to   the   way   of   evidence-­‐‑gathering,   preservation   of  
fundamental  rights  or  protection  against  abuses  of  power.  Consequently,  if  per  se  
admissibility  of  evidence  is  aimed  at,  it  is  necessary  to  enhance  mutual  trust  by  
introducing   common   minimum   standards   in   the   sharpest   points   of   contrast  
between   domestic   provisions.  When   it   comes   to   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search,  these  contrasts  were  reported  in  the  following  fields:  
- rules   governing   telephone   tapping   and   house   search,   in   particular,   the  
scope  of  both   investigative  measures   ratione   auctoritatis,   ratione  materiae,  
ratione  loci,  ratione  temporis  and  ratione  personae;  and  
- procedural  rights  associated  with  both  measures,  namely,  the  right  to  be  
notified  of  them  and  the  right  to  legal  remedies  against  their  exercise.    
The   research   has   proved   the   feasibility   of   coming   to   common   minimum  
standards   in   these   fields.   Consequently,   irrespective   of   the   name-­‐‑tag   of   the  
issuing  authority,  if  member  states  assume  per  se  that  bodies  designated  by  other  
member   states   guarantee   the   minimum   protection   against   arbitrariness,   the  
evidence   gathered   upon   their   decisions   would   constitute   per   se   admissible  
evidence,   even   if   in   a   similar   domestic   case   the   measure   would   require   the  
involvement   of   a   different   body   (e.g.   judicial).   If   member   states   ensure   the  
availability   of   both  measures  with   regard   to   cases   concerning  MR   offences,   it  
would  do   away  with  discussions   about   the  mutual   allowance  of   the  measures  
and   result   in   per   se   admissible   evidence   gathered   upon   common   minimum  
materiae   standards.   Mutual   trust   could   also   be   significantly   enhanced   by  
introducing   the   same   minimum   standards   with   regard   to   places   and   time-­‐‑
frameworks  in  which  the  measures  may  be  conducted.  If  member  states  accept  a  
mutual   approach   to   personae,   including   the   scope   of   persons   concerned   and  
groups   granted   special   treatment,   evidence   gathered   through   these   persons  
would   constitute   per   se   admissible   evidence   and   ensure   a   common   level   of  
protection  for  these  persons  in  the  EU.  On  top  of  that,  persons  whose  rights  were  
infringed   could   be   granted   common   minimum   standards   related   to   effective  
legal  remedies,  although  these  remedies  may  differ  between  member  states  and  
may   apply   at   different   stages   of   proceedings.   Moreover,   the   feasibility   of  
effectuating  these  remedies  could  be  enhanced  by  adopting  common  standards  
for  the  notification  of  the  measures.      
It   is   noteworthy,   however,   that   the   exhaustive   derivation   of   minimum  
standards   is   not   always   feasible.   Accordingly,   gathering   and   use   of   evidence  




may   be   still   hampered   by   ratione   materiae   or   ratione   personae   incompatibilities,  
due  to   the   lack  of  common  EU  understanding  of  substantive   law,  privileges  or  
immunities.   The  minimum   standards   derived   in   this   research   deal   with   these  
concerns  only  to  the  extent  currently  possible.    
It   is   also   important   to   stress   that   the   introduction   of   minimum   standards  
would   obviously   not   deprive   member   states   of   the   possibility   to   adopt   more  
generous   standards   of   protection.   However,   to   constitute   per   se   admissibility  
within   the  entirety  of   the  EU,  proceeding   in   line  with   the  minimum  standards  
would  be  sufficient.      
In  summary,  evidence  obtained  through  EU  cross-­‐‑border  telephone  tapping  
or  house  search,  if  it  complies  with  the  minimum  standards  investigated  in  this  
research,   would   constitute   per   se   admissible   evidence   even   if   the   domestic  
provisions  are  not  always   the   same   in  every  member   state.  That  would   finally  
provide   transparent   rules   as   to   the   status   of   evidence   gathered   in   EU   cross-­‐‑
border  contexts,  since  thus  far  neither  the  domestic  legislation  of  member  states  
(save   for   the  Polish  KPK)  nor   that  of   the  EU  contains  rules  directly  addressing  
admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  aboad.  Therefore,  operating  under  minimum  
standards  could  finally  clarify  the  status  of  evidence  gathered  abroad  and  make  
progress  towards  a  comprehensive  system  for  the  obtaining  and  use  of  evidence  
in  criminal  matters  in  the  EU. 
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III. Minimum   standards   for   admissibility   of  
irregularly  obtained  evidence    
  
The  minimum   standards   elaborated   in   the   former  part   provide   transparent  
rules  in  terms  of  the  way  that  evidence  is  gathered,  in  view  of  enhancing  its  per  
se   admissibility   in   the   EU.   However,   the   question   arises   what   to   do   with  
evidence   that   has   been   gathered   irregularly,   in   breach   of   law   or   not   in  
accordance  with  common  minimum  rules;  to  accept  it  or  not?  If  so,  on  the  basis  
of  which  jurisdiction?    
It   is   safe   to   say   that   from   the   very   beginning   the   problem   of   irregular  
evidence   raises   ambiguities   in   the   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context.   The   Tampere  
conclusions   refer   solely   to   ‘evidence   lawfully   gathered’   by   a   member   state’s  
authorities361.   Neither   MLA   nor   MR   evidence-­‐‑related   instruments   raise   any  
concerns  whatsoever  about  irregular  evidence.  At  the  same  time  current  practice  
in   the   EU   illustrates   the   member   states’   confusion   when   it   comes   to   the  
admission  of  evidence  irregularly  obtained  in  another  EU  member  state,  due  to  
the  lack  of  domestic  or  EU  rules  in  this  matter.  The  lack  of  transparent  common  
rules   as   to   irregular   evidence   may   significantly   hamper   mutual   trust   and  
discourage   member   states   from   cooperation   in   the   evidentiary   field.   On   the  
other   hand,   it   may   open   the   doors   for   overstepping   or   bypassing   domestic  
regulations  within  cross-­‐‑border  proceedings,  which   the  academic   literature  has  
termed   evidential   ‘process-­‐‑laundering’362.   Evidence-­‐‑laundering   may   have   a   very  
harmful  effect  on  the  fundamental  rights  and  carry  a  risk  of  breaches  commited  
as  a  result  of  EU  cooperation.  On  top  of  that,  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation  may  bring  
irregularities  both   in   the   issuing  and  executing  member  state,  which  may  raise  
ambiguities  about  admissibility  on  both  sides,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  not  clear  
whether  a  member   state   should  use   its  own  approaches   to   the  admissibility  of  
the   evidence   or   rely   on   foreign   admissibility   rules.   In   this   context   it   is  
noteworthy   that   member   states   are   unwilling   to   apply   their   national   rules  
concerning  the  admissibility  of  evidence  and  usually  take  a  more  lenient  attitude  
to   evidence   obtained   abroad   than   would   be   the   case   in   a   similar   domestic  
context363.    
  
                                                                                                                            
361  EUROPEAN  COUNCIL,  Presidency  Conclusions,  Tampere  15  and  16  October  1999,  p.  36.  
362  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…p.114;  H.  KUCZYŃSKA,  Wspólny…,  p.   129-­‐‑
132.  
363  See  art.  587  of  the  KPK:  Transcripts  from  inspections,  examinations  of  persons  in  the  capacity  of  the  
accused,  witnesses  or  experts  made  on  the  request  of  a  Polish  court  or  public  prosecutor,  or   transcripts  
from   other   evidentiary   procedures   carried   out   by   the   courts   or   public   prosecutors   of   foreign   States   or  
authorities  acting  under  their  supervision,  may  be  read  at  the  trial  on  the  principles  set  forth  in  Article  
389,  391  and  393,  if  the  manner  of  conducting  the  procedure  is  not  contrary  to  the  legal  order  of  
the  Republic  of  Poland;  see  also:  A.  GÓRSKI,  Komentarz  do  art.  587  KPK  [in:]  Kodeks  postępowania  
Karnego.  Komentarz,  A.  SAKOWICZ  (ed.),  Warszawa  2015,  p.  1216-­‐‑1217.  




Hence,   given   all   the   issues   reported   above,   a   common   rule   relating   to  
irregularly  obtained  evidence  appears  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  a  minimum  
level  of  protection  and  to  comply  with  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition.  Thus,  
the  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  make  progress  towards  a  common  EU  theory  about  
evidence   obtained   irregularly   gathered   from   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search.  The  central  research  questions  here  are  as  follows:    
  
Is  it  feasible  to  come  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  on  the  basis  of  which  it  can  
be  decided  when  irregular  evidence,  which  obviously  cannot  constitute  per  se  admissible  
evidence,  will  be  admissible  after  all  (non  per  se  admissibility)?  
  
Is  it  feasible  to  come  to  common  EU  minimum  standards  on  the  basis  of  which  it  can  
be   decided   when   irregular   evidence   will   be   inadmissible   in   any   event   (per   se  
inadmissibility)?  
  
The  opening  subsections  of   this  part  of   the   research  show  the  multi-­‐‑faceted  
understanding  of   irregular  evidence  and  the  manners  of  dealing  with   irregular  
evidence   in   various   contexts.   The   second   part   goes   straight   to   the   research  
questions,  bringing  up  the  topic  of  the  factors  that  should  determine  the  non  per  
se   admissibility   or   per   se   inadmissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context.    
  
1. Irregularly   obtained   evidence:   What   exactly  
does  it  mean? 
 
Before   embarking   on   a   detailed   study   of   the   admissibility   of   irregularly  
obtained  evidence   it   is  necessary   to   specify   in  what   sense   the   term   ‘irregularly  
obtained  evidence’  is  being  used  for  the  purposes  of  this  research.  
‘Irregular’,   ‘illegal’,   ‘improper’,   ‘unlawful’,   ‘gathered   in   violation   of   law’,  
‘flawed’,  ‘illegally  obtained’;  all  of  these  terms  can  be  found  when  studying  the  
literature   regarding   evidence  of  which   the   admissibility   should  be   questioned.  
This   variety   of   nomenclature   also   reflects   the   variety   of   national   and   supra-­‐‑
national   approaches   to   the   issue   discussed   in   this   chapter.   This   research,  
however,  follows  the  terminology  according  to  which:    
- evidence  obtained  illegally  –  means  evidence  that  has  been  obtained  by  
way  of  an  offence;  
- evidence  obtained  irregularly  –  means  evidence  that  has  been  obtained  
in  violation  of  procedural  law;  
- evidence  obtained  improperly  –  means  evidence  that  has  been  obtained  
as  a  consequence  of  deception  or  fraud364.  
  
                                                                                                                            
364  A.  LACH,  Europejska  pomoc…,  p.  318-­‐‑319.  
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Due   to   the  scope  of   the   research,  which  deals   in  particular  with  procedural  
concerns,   this   study   refers   to   the   above   mentioned   ‘evidence   obtained  
irregularly’  and,  therefore,  uses  this  term.    
  
2. Approaches  to  irregularly  obtained  evidence  in  
domestic  legislation   
2.1. Evidence  gathered  domestically 
 
The   aim   of   this   part   of   the   study   is   to   provide   a   general   overview   of  
approaches   to   evidence   obtained   irregularly   across   the   domestic   legislation   of  
the  member   states   investigated   in   this   research365.   The  domestic   approaches   to  
irregular  evidence  gathered  domestically  will  be   subsequently  confronted  with  
approaches  to  irregular  evidence,  but  gathered  in  an  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context.  
English   legislation   introduces   three   basic   flaws   that   determine   the  
irregularity   of   evidence   which   are,   as   follows:   (a)   any   evidence   obtained   by  
torture,  which  leads  to  automatic  exclusion  of  the  evidence;  (b)  evidence  of  any  
intercepted   communications   to   which   the   Regulation   of   Investigatory   Powers  
Act   2000   applies,   including   communications   intercepted   illegally;   and   (c)   a  
confession  made  by  an  accused  person   that  was  obtained  by  oppression,  or  by  
words   or   actions   conducive   to   unreliability.   Any   other   illegally   obtained  
evidence  may   be   excluded   in   the   exercise   of   judicial   discretion  within   a   ‘fair-­‐‑
trial’,  laid  down  in  §§  78  of  the  PACE366:    
  
§§  78:   In  any  proceedings   the   court  may  refuse   to  allow  evidence  on  which   the  
prosecution  proposes  to  rely  to  be  given  if  it  appears  to  the  court  that,  having  regard  
to   all   the   circumstances,   including   the   circumstances   in   which   the   evidence   was  
obtained,   the   admission   of   the   evidence   would   have   such   an   adverse   effect   on   the  
fairness  of  the  proceedings  that  the  court  ought  not  to  admit  it.    
  
The  court   is  obliged   to   take   the  view  that   the  admission  of  evidence  would  
have   such   an   adverse   effect   on   the   fairness   of   the   proceedings   that   the   court  
ought   not   to   admit   it367.   It   is   noteworthy,   however,   that   common   law   systems  
pay  more  attention  to   the  effect   that   the  evidence  will  have  at  a   trial   than  with  
how   the   evidence   was   obtained368.   Consequently,   it   is   not   the   mere   fact   that  
evidence  has   been   illegally   obtained   that   entitles   the   court   to   exclude   it   under  
                                                                                                                            
365  In  this  respect  see  also:  J.  R.  SPENCER,  The  Concept  of  …,  p.  31.  
366  A.  L.-­‐‑T.  CHOO,  England  and  Wales:  Fair  Trial  Analysis  and  the  Presumed  Admissibility  of  Physical  
Evidence  [in:]  Exclusionary  Rules  in  Comparative  Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  p.  331.  
367  S.  SEABROOKE,  J.  SPRACK,  Criminal  Evidence  and  Procedure:  The  Essential  Framework.  Second  
Edition,  London  1999,  p.  154.  
368  T.  HOWSE,  England  …,  p.  173.    




Section   78   PACE,   it  must   also   be   ensured   that   a   person   has   a   fair   trial,   so   the  
court  may  exclude  evidence  even  though  the  evidence  itself  is  admissible369.    
French   legislation   relies   on   the   theory   of   evidentiary   nullities,   which   is  
dominant  in  European  countries  with  civil  law  systems370.  Broadly  speaking,  the  
French  law  provides  a  distinction  between:  
- formal  nullities  which  are  explicitly  laid  down  in  the  law  (rules  that  
end   with   the   words   ‘under   penalty   of   nullity’),   concerning,   in  
particular,   the   pre-­‐‑trial   stage,   e.g.   irregularities   concerning   search  
and  seizures  (§§  56-­‐‑57  CCP)  or   interception  of  telecommunications  
(§§  100  CCP);  and    
- substantive   irregularities  which   entitle   a   judge   to   state   the   nullity  
under  Art.  171  CCP:  
Art.  171:  There  is  a  nullity  when  the  breach  of  an  essential  formality  
provided   for   by   a   provision   of   the   present  Code   or   by   any   other   rule   of  
criminal  procedure  has  harmed  the  interests  of  the  party  it  concerns.  
Regarding   the   latter,   French   case   law  has   developed   two   leading   ‘essential  
formalities’,  which  refer  to  public  order  and  rights  of  the  defence371.    
In  Ireland  there  is  a  dichotomy  between  evidence  which  has  been:  
- obtained  in  breach  of  the  legal  rights  of  an  individual;  or    
- obtained  in  breach  of  constitutional  rights372.  
In   reference   to   the   former,   the   trial   judge   has   the   discretion   to   admit   or  
exclude  the  evidence  taking  into  account  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  within  
the   balancing   test   of   the   public   interest   and   a   fair   trial   of   the   accused.   It   is  
noteworthy  that  the  Irish  courts  have  adopted  a  rather  inclusionary  approach  to  
this   evidence373.   When   it   comes   to   evidence   gathered   through   a   breach   of   an  
individual’s   constitutional   rights,   then   the   evidence   must   be   automatically  
excluded   by   the   trial   judge,   unless   there   are   extraordinary   extenuating  
circumstances  which  justify  its  admission374.  
The  Dutch  Strafvordering  provides  so-­‐‑called  ‘minimum  evidence  rules’,  which  
limit   the   free   evaluation   of   the   evidence   by   the   judge   for   the   purpose   of  
facilitating  the  establishment  of  the  substantive  truth  (e.g.  the  rule  that  proof  of  
an  accused  person’s  guilt  may  not  be  presumed  only  on  the  basis  of  a  statement  
by  one  witness).  Apart  from  these  minimum  rules,  the  Sv  does  not  contain  any  
                                                                                                                            
369  D.  JOHNSON,  G.  HUTTON,  Evidence  and  Procedure,  Oxford  2014,  p.  71.    
370  A.  LACH,  Europejska  pomoc  …,  p.  325.    
371   J.   PRADEL,  France:   Procedural  Nullities   and   Exclusion   [in:]  Exclusionary   Rules   in   Comparative  
Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  p.  148-­‐‑149.    
372  A.  RYAN,  Ireland  …,  p.  346-­‐‑348.  
373  V.  CONWAY,  Y.  DALY,   J.   SCHWEPPE,   Irish  Criminal   Justice:  Theory,  Process   and  Procedure,  
Dublin  2010,  p.  79.    
374  A.  CRAS,  Y.M.  DALY,   Ireland…,  p.  34.   It   is  also  noteworthy   that  a   recent  Supreme  Court’s  
decision  in  DPP  v  JC   [2015]  IESC  31  changed  the  general  exclusionary  rule  which  had  been  in  
place   for   the   past   25   years;   see   in   more   detail   in   this   respect:   Y.M.   DALY:  
<http://humanrights.ie/civil-­‐‑liberties/dpp-­‐‑v-­‐‑jc-­‐‑initial-­‐‑observations-­‐‑on-­‐‑the-­‐‑exclusionary-­‐‑rule-­‐‑
case/>.  
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rules   on   how   the   evidence   was   gathered.   Consequently,   illegally   obtained  
evidence   is  admissible  as   legal  evidence.  However,   this  does  not  automatically  
mean   that   the   evidence   could   be   used   at   a   trial.   Firstly,   its   exclusion  may   be  
required  due  to  unreliability  caused  by  the  violation.375.  Secondly,  exclusion  may  
be  based  on  one  of  the  interesting  sanctions,  laid  down  in  Art.  359a  Sv:  
  
Art.   359a.   1.   If   procedural   rules   prove   to   have   been   breached   during   the  
preliminary   investigation,   which   breach   can   no   longer   be   remedied,   and   the   legal  
consequences  of  the  breach  are  not  apparent  from  statutory  law,  the  court  may  rule  
that:    
- the  severity  of   the  punishment  will  be  decreased   in  proportion  to  the  
gravity   of   the   breach   if   the   harm   caused   by   the   breach   can   be  
compensated  in  this  way;    
- the   results  of   the   investigation  obtained   through   the  breach  may  not  
contribute  to  the  evidence  of  the  offence  charged;      
- the  Public  Prosecution  Service  will  be  barred  from  prosecuting  if  the  
breach   makes   it   impossible   to   hear   the   case   in   compliance   with   the  
principles  of  due  process.      
2.   In   applying   the   first   subsection,   the   court  must   take   account   of   the   interest  
that  the  breached  rule  serves,  the  gravity  of  the  breach  and  the  harm  it  causes.      
3.  The   judgment  must   contain   the  decisions   referred   to   in   the   first   subsection.  
These  must  be  reasoned.      
  
The  Polish  KPK  has  recently  sharply  modified  the  approach  to  admissibility  
of   irregular   evidence,   significantly   opening   a   possibility   of   use   of   irregular  
evidence   in   criminal   proceedings.   Two   articles   introduced   in   2016   currently  
regulate   this   area,   namely   art.   168a   and   168b   of   the   KPK.   According   to   the  
former,  evidence  may  not  be  deemed  inadmissible  only  on  the  basis  of   the  fact  
that  it  has  been  obtained  in  breach  of  procedural  rules  or  by  way  of  a  forbidden  
act   referred   to   in  art.   1§1  of   the  Polish  Criminal  Code,  unless   the  evidence  has  
been   obtained   by   public   officers   upon   murder,   intentional   bodily   injury   or  
deprivation   of   liberty.   Art.   168b   opens   a   broad   possibility   to   use   evidence  
gathered  by  intelligence  services  in  criminal  proceedings.  Besides  these  articles,  
the  KPK  has  established  several  procedural  bans,  which  have  direct   impact  on  
the  admissibility  of  evidence.  Accordingly,  evidence  covered  by  prohibitive  bans  
laid  down  in  the  law  (e.g.  interrogation  of  the  counsel  for  the  defence  concerning  
facts  he  has  learned  in  the  course  of  preparing  the  defence,  or  a  priest  concerning  
the   content   of   a   confession,   or   a   ban   on   using   unacceptable   interrogation  
methods  such  as  hypnosis)  will  be  inadmissible376.  
The  general  approach  in  Spain  is  that  the  sentence  can  be  based  only  on  the  
evidence  given  at  trial  with  full  respect  to  the  principle  of  contradiction377.  That  
                                                                                                                            
375  M.  J.  BORGERS,  L.  STEVENS,  The  Netherlands…,  p.  184-­‐‑186.  
376  P.  WILIŃSKI,  Criminal  Procedure…,  p.  212.    
377  L.  BACHMAIER,  Spain  …,  p.  710.    




is  why   Spanish   law   provides   a   detailed   approach   to   illegal   evidence.   The   key  
statutory  provision  in  Spain  concerning  the  exclusion  of  evidence  is  Art.  11.1  of  
the  LOPJ  which  stipulates  that:    
  
Art.  11.1.  Evidence  obtained,  directly  or   indirectly,   in  violation  of   fundamental  
rights  or  liberties,  shall  have  no  effect.  
  
The   expression   ‘no   effect’   means   either   a   prohibition   on   admitting   the  
evidence,   or   a   prohibition   on   evaluating   it378.   Moreover,   Art.   238   of   the   LOPJ  
refers  to  nullity  when  the  evidence  was  obtained  through  violation  of  statutory  
procedural  rules:  
  
Art.  238.  Procedural  acts  will  be  fully  void  in  the  following  cases:    
- When  the  court  lacks  subject-­‐‑matter  jurisdiction.      
- When  the  act  has  been  performed  under  violence  or  compulsion.      
- When   the   essential   rules   of   procedure   are   not   respected   and   this   may   have  
caused  an  actual  restriction  of  the  right  of  defence.      
- When  the  act   is  done  without   the  assistance  of   lawyer,   in   the  cases  where   the  
law  prescribes  it  as  mandatory.      
- When  an  oral  hearing  is  held  without  the  mandatory  presence  of  the  court  clerk.    
- In  all  other  cases  where  the  procedural  rules  so  state379.  
 
 
2.2.  Evidence  gathered  in  the  trans-­‐‑border  context   
 
This  subsection  examines  whether  member  states  also  apply  their  protective  
rules  concerning  irregularly  obtained  evidence  to  evidence  gathered  abroad.  It  is  
necessary   to   highlight   that,   save   for   the   Polish   art.   587   KPK   (which   accepts  
foreign  items  provided  the  manner  of  conducting  the  procedure  is  not  contrary  
to  the  legal  order  of  the  Republic  of  Poland),  member  states  do  not  provide  rules  
for   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   abroad,   including   evidence   gathered  
irregularly.  Therefore,   instead  of   legislation  this  part  of   the  study  examines  the  






                                                                                                                            
378  L.  BACHMAIER  WINTER,  Spain:  The  Constitutional  Court’s  Move  from  Categorical  Exclusion  to  
Limited  Balancing  [in:]  Exclusionary  Rules  in  Comparative  Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  
p.  213.    
379   J.   TOMÉ   PAULE,   P.   GARCÍA-­‐‑LUBÉN   BARTHE,   J.A.   TOMÉ   GARCÍA,   Temario   de   derecho  
procesal   penal,   Third   edition,   COLEX   2009,   p.   289-­‐‑292;   E.   DE   URBANO   CASTRILLO,   M.   Á.  
TORRES  MORATO,  La   prueva   ilíca   penal.   Estudio   Jurisprudencial.   Third   edition,   Thomson,   2003;    
T.  ARMENTA  DEU,  La  prueba  ilícita  (Un  estudio  comparado).  Second  edition,  Marcial  Pons  2011.    
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One   of   the   oft-­‐‑cited   and   leading   cases   in   this   field   (also   an   illustration   of  
evidence-­‐‑laundering)   is   R.   v.   Governor   of   Pentonville   Prison   ex   parte   Chinoy380.  
Chinoy  worked   as   a  manager   in   Paris   and  was  wanted   in   the  US   for  money-­‐‑
laundering  offences.  US  agents  had  unlawfully  intercepted  Chinoy’s  telephone,  
which   was   based   in   France.   Knowing   that   the   information   obtained   through  
interception   would   be   excluded   in   extradition   proceedings   in   France,   the   US  
agents  arranged  Chinoy’s  arrest  by  English  police  when  he  was  visiting  the  UK.  
During  the  extradition  proceedings,  the  English  court  had  to  make  reference  to  
the  admissibility  of   evidence  obtained   from   illegal   interceptions   carried  out  by  
the   US   in   France.   In   doing   so,   the   Court   used   art.   78   PACE   and,   as   a  
consequence,   upheld   the   admissibility   of   the   evidence   irrespective   of   the   fact  
that   in   the   lex   loci   the   evidence  would   not   be   admissible381.   Thus,   the   English  
court  ignored  the  fact  that  in  France  the  evidence  was  irregular  and  treated  it  in  
the   same   manner   as   would   have   been   the   case   if   it   had   been   gathered  
domestically.    
Good   examples   of   the   ‘reverse   phenomenon   of   process   laundering’382  
(admissibility  in  the  locus  state,  but  inadmissibility  in  the  forum  state)  are  found  
in   certain   Belgian   cases   concerning   telephone   tapping  when   this  measure   still  
had  no  legal  basis  under  Belgian  law.  
In  the  first  case,  the  interception  of  telecommunications  had  been  carried  out  
in   the   Netherlands,   between   a   suspect   under   investigation   in   Belgium   and   a  
drug-­‐‑trafficker  operating  in  the  Netherlands.  The  requesting  state  was  Belgium,  
even   though   the   interception   of   telecommunications   still   had   no   legal   basis  
there.  Regardless  of  this  fact,  the  interception  was  submitted  as  evidence  and  the  
Belgian   courts   relied   upon   this   evidence   in   convicting   the   suspect.   Their  
rationale  was  that  the  interception  had  been  carried  out  in  accordance  with  both  
the   lex   loci   and  Art.   8   ECHR383.   Accordingly,   the   domestic   court   accepted   this  
‘legal   bypass’,   which   allowed   intentional,   cross-­‐‑border   gathering   and   use   of  
evidence  which  would  be  questionable  if  gathered  domestically.      
The   essential   fact   in   the   second   case  was   that   the   Belgian   authorities   used  
records   tapped   in   France   in   the   course   of   criminal   proceedings,   upon   the  
initiative   of   French   bodies   and  within   French   proceedings.   Again,   the   Belgian  
Cour  de  Cassation  upheld  the  admissibility  of  the  evidence  due  to  the  fact  that  the  
records  had  been  obtained  in  conformity  with  French  law  and  the  ECHR.  What  
is   noteworthy   here   is   that   the   Belgian   court   noted   its   incompetence   to   verify  
                                                                                                                            
380  R.   v.   Governor   of   Pentonville   Prison   ex   parte   Chinoy   [1992]   1  All   E.R.   317   [in:]   C.  GANE,  M.  
MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…,  p.  113  et  seq.    
381  L.  HARRIS,  CH.  MURRAY,  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters.  International  Co-­‐‑operation  in  
the  Investigation  and  Prosecution  of  Crime,  London  2000,  p.  188-­‐‑189.    
382  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…,  p.  114.    
383  Cour  de  Cassation  (2éme  ch.,  sect.  néerl.)  26  January  1993  (en  cause  de  Co.  D.).  Revue  de  droit  
pénal,  1993,  p.  768  [in:]  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…,  p.  114.    




foreign  procedures,  highlighting  at  the  same  time  that  any  evidence  collected  in  
violation  of  the  ECHR  should  not  be  admissible384.    
The   last   case   deals   with   an   application   for   extradition   from   Belgium   to  
Sweden.  The  application  was  partially  based  on  records  obtained  in  Sweden,  in  
accordance   with   Swedish   law.   However,   such   evidence   would   not   have   been  
admitted   in   Belgium,   where   it   would   have   been   recognised   as   unlawfully  
obtained.   Taking   into   account   conformity  with   Swedish   law,   as  well   as  Art.   8  
ECHR,  the  Belgian  court  again  relied  upon  the  evidence  presented  to  it,  this  time  
on  behalf  of  the  Swedish  authorities385.    
  
2.3.  Conclusion 
 
The  above  paragraphs  reveal  that  even  if  all  member  states  were  to  develop  
complex   and  protective   domestic   approaches   to   irregularly   obtained   evidence,  
these  domestic  rules  may  not  be  scrupulously  applied  when  it  comes  to  evidence  
gathered   from   abroad.   Firstly,   this   follows   from   the   fact   that   member   states  
usually   lack   domestic   rules   regarding   the   admissibility   of   evidence   collected  
abroad.  Secondly,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  some  member  states  are  more  tolerant  and  
flexible   in   their   approaches   to   foreign   items386.   In   order   to   outline   the  possible  
approaches   to   the   admissibility   of   evidence   irregularly   gathered   abroad,   one  
may  distinguish  between  member  states  that:  
- rely  on  lex  locus  legislation  and  use  foreign  requirements  with  regard  
to  irregular  evidence;  
- rely   on   lex   forum   legislation   and  use   the   same  model   of   control   that  
applies  to  evidence  gathered  nationally;  
- limit  the  domestic  model  of  control  to  general  principles,  such  as  the  
legal  order  or  fundamental  rights;  
- ignore   both   the   foreign   and   domestic   models   of   control   and  
automatically  recognise  the  evidence  as  regular387.              
  
 
                                                                                                                            
384  Cour  de  Cassation   (2éme   ch.,   sect.   néerl.)   12  October   1993   (en   cause   de  D.).  Revue  de  droit  
pénal,  1994,  p.  792  [in:]  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…,  p.  114-­‐‑115.    
385  Cour  de  Cassation  (2éme  ch.,  sect.  néer.)  19  February  1985  [in:]  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  
The  Admissibility…,  p.  115.    
386  G.  VERMEULEN,  W.  DE  BONDT,  Y.  VAN  DAMME,  EU  cross-­‐‑border  gathering…,  p.  92-­‐‑96.  
387   P.   J.   P.   TAK,   Bottlenecks…,   p.   346-­‐‑347;   A.   LACH,   Europejska   pomoc  …,   p.   330.  Taking   this  
conclusion  into  account,  it  is  hard  to  explain  why,  in  strict  countries,  evidence  which  would  be  
irregular  if  obtained  domestically  should  not  be  recognised  as  irregular  if  obtained  elsewhere.  
As  an  example  to  the  contrary,  one  could  also  wonder  why  evidence  which  is   irregular  in  the  
locus  member  state  should  be  recognised  as  regular  in  other  states,  see  in  more  detail:   J.I.M.G.  
JAHAE,  P.A.M.  MEVIS,   J.M.  REIJNTJES,   J.Y.   TAEKEMA,  Criminal   Evidence  Obtained  Abroad   –  
How  to  Assess   the  Legality  of  Obtaining   it   [in:]  New  Trends   in  Criminal   Investigation  and  Evidence,  
Vol.2,  C.M.  BREUR,  M.M.  KOMMER,  J.F.  NIJBOER,  J.M.  REIJNTJES  (eds.),  Intersentia  2000,  p.  
355.  
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3. Approaches   to   irregularly   obtained   evidence   in  
the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR 
 
The   ECHR   does   not   contain   any   rules   regarding   the   admissibility   or  
exclusion   of   evidence   obtained   irregularly388.   Hence,   the   Court   indicates   its  
secondary   role   in   that   issue,   consequently   underlining   that   questions   of  
admissibility   or   exclusion   of   evidence   are   primarily   given   to   national   judges,  
operating   under   national   laws389.   Therefore,   the   Court   points   out   that   its   role  
should  be  centred  solely  on  the  consequences  of  the  use  of  irregular  evidence,  in  
particular,  on  the  question  of  whether  the  use  of  irregular  evidence  has  violated  
Art.  6  ECHR  which  guarantees  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  In  other  words,  the  role  of  
the   Court   is   to   ascertain   whether   the   proceedings   considered   as   a   whole,  
including  the  way  in  which  the  evidence  was  taken,  were  fair  as  required  by  Art.  
6  ECHR:  
  
It   is   not   the   role   of   the   Court   to   determine,   as   a   matter   of   principle,   whether  
particular   types   of   evidence   –   for   example,   unlawfully   obtained   evidence   –  may   be  
admissible  or,   indeed,  whether   the  applicant  was  guilty  or  not.  The  question  which  
must  be  answered  is  whether  the  proceedings  as  a  whole,  including  the  way  in  which  
the   evidence   was   obtained,   were   fair.   This   involves   an   examination   of   the   alleged  
“unlawfulness”   in   question   and,   where   violation   of   another   Convention   right   is  
concerned,  the  nature  of  the  violation  found390.  
  
Therefore,   the   Court’s   approach   to   illegally   obtained   evidence   has   been  
described  in  the  literature  as  a  ‘right  to  fair-­‐‑use  of  evidence’,  which  constitutes  a  
protective  system  based  on  a  two-­‐‑tiered  analytical  model391.   In  the  first  tier,  the  
Court’s   analysis   determines   whether   Convention   rights   were   violated.   In   the  
second   tier,   the   ECtHR   examines   whether   the   admission   or   use   of   evidence  
obtained   in   violation   of   a   first-­‐‑tier   norm   violated   Art.   6   ECHR392.   As   an  
important  preliminary  note,  however,  it  should  be  stressedthat  the  Court  is  very  
                                                                                                                            
388   See   also:   F.   PINAR  ÖLÇER,   Illegally   Obtained   Evidence   in   European   Treaty   of   Human   Rights  
(ETHR)  Law,  Annales  XL,  N.  57,  2008,  p.  65-­‐‑153.  
389  See  inter  alia,  Schenk  v.  Switzerland,  §§  46  and  Mantovanelli  v.  France,  §§  34.  The  Court  has  also  
reiterated  that  it  is  not  its  task  to  act  as  a  court  of  appeal  or,  as  is  sometimes  said,  as  a  court  of  
fourth  instance,  for  the  decisions  of  domestic  courts,  see:  Evcimen  v.  Turkey,  §§  25.    
390  See:  P.G.  and  J.H.  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  76;  Allan  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  42;  Asch  v.  Austria,  §§  
26;  Edwards  v.  United  Kingdom  §  34;  Mantovanelli  v.  France,  §§  34;  Bernard  v.  France,  §§  37;  Miailhe  
v.  France  (No.2),  §§  43;  Schenk  v.  Switzerland,  §§  46.  
391  See  in  this  respect:  A.M.  TORRES  CHEDRAUI,  An  analysis  of  the  exclusion  of  evidence  obtained  
in  violation  of  human  rights   in   light  of   the   jurisprudence  of   the  ECtHR,  Tilburg  Law  Review  2010–
2011  (15);  F.  PINAR  ÖLÇER,  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights:  The  Fair  Trial  Analysis  Under  
Article  6  of   the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights   [in:]  Exclusionary  Rules   in  Comparative  Law,  
S.C.   THAMAN   (ed.),   Springer   2013,   p.   373;   see   also:   F.   PINAR  ÖLÇER,   Illegally  Obtained  …,   
p.  86.  
392  F.  PINAR  ÖLÇER,  Illegally  Obtained…,  p.  88-­‐‑89.  




careful   in   examining   the   alleged   violations   of   Art.   6   ECHR   in   respect   of   the  
admissibility   of   evidence   and,   moreover,   is   oriented   towards   remedying  
unfairness  so  that  irregularly  obtained  evidence  can  be  used.  Consequently,  the  
Court  has  developed  two  approaches  to  illegal  evidence  and  fair  trials:    
- per  se   inadmissibility:   illegally  obtained  evidence  which  presents  such  a  
high   risk   to   fairness   that   it   may   absolutely   not   be   used   (evidence  
obtained  through  violation  of  Art.  3  ECHR,  amounting  to  torture);  
- non   per   se   admissibility:   illegally   obtained   evidence   which   presents   a  
high   risk   to   fairness   (obtained   in   violation   of   Art.   3   ECHR,   not  
amounting  to  torture)  or  a  low  risk  to  fairness  of  trial  (violations  of  Art.  8  
ECHR).    
All  of  these  approaches  are  outlined  below.    
 
3.1. Per  se  inadmissibility 
3.1.1. Evidence  obtained  through  violation  of  Art.  3  ECHR,  amounting  to  
torture 
 
The   Court   has   established   only   one   absolute   exclusionary   rule   regarding  
evidence   obtained   in   violation   of   Art.   3   ECHR393,   that   is,   in   circumstances  
amounting  to  torture394.  This  rule  concerns  both  statements  and  real  evidence,  as  
follows:  
  
[I]ncriminating   evidence   –   whether   in   the   form   of   a   confession   or   real   evidence   –  
obtained  as  a  result  of  acts  of  violence  or  brutality  or  other  forms  of  treatment  which  
can   be   characterised   as   torture   –   should  never   be   relied   on   as   proof   of   the   victim’s  
guilt,   irrespective   of   its  probative  value.  Any  other   conclusion  would  only   serve   to  
legitimate   indirectly   the   sort  of  morally   reprehensible   conduct  which   the  authors  of  
Article  3  of  the  Convention  sought  to  proscribe  or,  as  it  was  so  well  put  in  the  United  
States  Supreme  Court’s   judgment   in   the  Rochin   case   (…),   to   “afford   brutality   the  
cloak   of   law”.   It   notes   in   this   connection   that   Article   15   of   the   United   Nations  
                                                                                                                            
393  It  has  to  be  stressed  that,  in  opposition  to  art.  15  UN  Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  
Cruel  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment,  neither  the  ECHR  nor  the  Charter  for  
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  or  the  European  Convention  for  the  Prevention  of  
Torture  and  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment  expressly  addresses  the  problem  
of  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  as  a  result  of  torture,  see  in  more  detail:  W.  JASIŃSKI,  Ł.  
CHOJNIAK,  Admissibility  of  Evidence  Obtained  by  Torture  and  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  in  
Criminal   Proceedings.  Overview   of   European   and   Polish   Standards   [in:]   C.   FENYVESI,   C.  HERKE  
(eds.),  Pleadings.  Celebration  Volume  of  Professor  Tremmel  Florian'ʹs  70th  Birthday,  Pecs  2011,  p.  125  
et  seq.  
394  The  Court  defines  torture  as:  deliberate  inhuman  treatment  causing  very  serious  and  cruel  suffering  
(…)  In  addition  to  the  severity  of  the  treatment,  there  is  a  purposive  element  to  torture,  as  recognised  in  
the   United   Nations   Convention   against   Torture,   which   in   Article   1   defines   torture   in   terms   of   the  
intentional   infliction   of   severe   pain   or   suffering   with   the   aim,   inter   alia,   of   obtaining   information,  
inflicting  punishment  or  intimidating;  Gäfgen  v.  Germany,  §§  90.    
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Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  
Punishment  provides   that   statements  which  are   established   to  have  been  made  as  a  
result   of   torture   shall   not   be  used   in   evidence   in   proceedings   against   the   victim   of  
torture395.  
  
Consequently,  according  to  the  Court’s  stance,  evidence  obtained  by  torture  
(both  confession  and  real  evidence)  will  always  render  the  trial  unfair:  
- irrespective  of  its  probative  value,  and    
- irrespective   of   whether   its   use   was   decisive   in   securing   the  
defendant’s  conviction396.  
The  Court’s  approach   is   supported  by   the   following  arguments.  Firstly,   the  
admission   of   statements   obtained   as   a   direct   result   of   treatment   violating   the  
prohibition   of   torture   would   put   in   question   the   absolute   character   of   that  
prohibition397.   Secondly,   statements   obtained   as   a   direct   result   of   treatment   in  
breach  of  Art.  3  ECHR  are  simply  unreliable398.    
Consequently,   the   use   of   evidence   obtained   through   torture   will   always  
breach  Art.   6  ECHR,   regardless  of  whether  or  not   the   evidence  was   a  decisive  
factor  in  the  conviction.  
  
3.2. Non  per  se  admissibility 
 
As  explained  above,  the  Court  has  established  only  one  per  se  inadmissibility  
rule   concerning   evidence   obtained   through   torture.   Consequently,   from   the  
                                                                                                                            
395   Jalloh   v.   Germany,   §§   105.   See   also   §§   99   of   the   same   judgment:  The   Court   reiterates   in   this  
connection  that  Article  3  enshrines  one  of  the  most  fundamental  values  of  democratic  societies.  Even  in  
the  most  difficult  circumstances,  such  as  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  organised  crime,  the  Convention  
prohibits   in  absolute  terms  torture  and  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment,   irrespective  of  
the  victim’s  conduct.  Compare:  Örs  and  Others  v.  Turkey,  §§  60;  Harutyunyan  v.  Armenia  §§  63,  §§  
64  and  §§  66;  and  Levint ̧a  v.  Moldova,  §§  101,  §§  104,  §§  105.  
396  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  rule  applies  not  only  when  the  defendant  is  tortured,  but  also  when  
witnesses   and   co-­‐‑defendants   are   forced   to   testify   against   the   accused.  Moreover,   the   fact   that  
the   person   submitted   to   torture   confessed   or   testified   to   an   authority   other   than   the   one  
responsible  for  this  ill-­‐‑treatment  does  not  automatically  determine  the  admissibility  of  evidence  
thus   obtained,   see:  Harutyunyan   v.  Armenia,   §§   63-­‐‑64;  C.  NOWAK,  Prawo   do   rzetelnego   procesu  
sądowego   w   świetle   EKPC   i   orzecznictwa   ETPC   [in:]  Rzetelny   proces   karny   w   orzecznictwie   sądów  
polskich   i   międzynarodowych,   P.  WILIŃSKI   (ed.),   Oficyna   2009,   p.   142;   Jalloh   v.   Germany,  with  
three  concurring  or  dissenting  opinions,  as  well  as  partially  critical  remarks  of  A.  LACH,  Glosa  
do  wyroku  ETPC  z  dnia  1  czerwca  2010  r.,  22978/05,  LEX/el.  2010,  see  also:  Harutyunyan  v.  Armenia,  
§§   113;   W.   JASIŃSKI,   Karnoprocesowa   dopuszczalność   dowodów   uzyskanych   w   wyniku   tortur  
(standardy   strasburskie),   Państwo   i   Prawo   2011,   No.5,   p.   44-­‐‑56.   In   contrast,   Art.   15   of   the   UN  
Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment  
applies  solely  to  statements  and  does  not  cover  real  evidence,  see:  T.  THIENEL,  The  Admissibility  
of   Evidence  Obtained   by   Torture   under   International   Law,  The   European   Journal   of   International  
Law,  No.  2/2006,  p.  351  et  seq.    
397  The  use  of  evidence  absolutely  prohibited  by  art.  3  might  be  an  incentive  for  law-­‐‑enforcement  officers  
to  use  such  methods  notwithstanding  such  absolute  prohibition,  Gäfgen  v.  Germany,  §§  178.    
398  W.  JASIŃSKI,  Ł.  CHOJNIAK,  Admissibility  of…,  p.  128.    




Court’s   point   of   view,   evidence   gathered   in   violation   of   Art.   3   ECHR,   not  
amounting   to   torture,   as  well   as   in  violation  of  Art.   8  ECHR,  presents   a   lower  
risk   to   fairness   of   trial   than   evidence   obtained   by   torture   and,   therefore,   the  
unfairness  may  be  processed  away  through  compensation  mechanisms.  In  other  
words,  in  cases  concerning  violations  which  are  not  torture,  the  ECtHR  appears  
to  restore  fairness  using  the  balancing  test399.    
3.2.1. Evidence   obtained   in   violation   of   Art.   3   ECHR,   not   amounting   to  
torture 
 
The  absolute   exclusionary   rule   relating   to   torture  has  not   been   extended   to  
other   forms   of   violation   of   Art.   3   ECHR,   namely   inhuman   or   degrading  
treatment   or   punishment.   From   the   Court’s   point   of   view,   this   category   of  
violations  still  presents  a  high  risk  to  fairness,  however,  contrary  to  torture,  this  
can  still  be  recuperated  within  the  balancing  test.    
In  the  case  of  Jalloh  v.  Germany  evidence  was  gathered  through  inhumane  or  
degrading  treatment,  not  amounting  to  torture400.  When  examining  the  case,  the  
Court  stated  that:    
  
§§  105.  As  noted  above,  the  use  of  evidence  obtained  in  violation  of  Article  3  in  
criminal  proceedings  raises  serious  issues  as  to  the  fairness  of  such  proceedings.  The  
Court  has  not   found   in   the   instant  case   that   the  applicant  was  subjected   to   torture  
(…).    
§§   106.   Although   the   treatment   to   which   the   applicant   was   subjected   did   not  
attract   the   special   stigma   reserved   to   acts   of   torture,   it   did   attain   in   the  
circumstances   the  minimum   level   of   severity   covered   by   the   ambit   of   the  Article   3  
prohibition.   It   cannot   be   excluded   that   on   the   facts   of   a   particular   case   the   use   of  
evidence  obtained  by   intentional  acts  of   ill-­‐‑treatment  not  amounting  to  torture  will  
render  the  trial  against  the  victim  unfair,  irrespective  of  the  seriousness  of  the  offence  
allegedly  committed,  the  weight  attached  to  the  evidence  and  the  opportunities  which  
the  victim  had  to  challenge  its  admission  and  use  at  his  trial.  
§§   107.   In   the   present   case,   the   general   question   whether   the   use   of  
evidence  obtained  by  an  act  qualified  as   inhuman  and  degrading   treatment  
automatically  renders  a  trial  unfair  can  be  left  open  (…).  
                                                                                                                            
399   That   approach   has   been   described   in   the   literature   as   a   broad   and   flexible   umbrella   test   of  
balancing,  allowing  for  restrictions  of  sub-­‐‑rights,  as  long  as  proceedings  as  a  whole  were  fair.  However,  
the   Court’s   Art.   6   ECHR   balancing   is   not   always   well-­‐‑structured   and   is   complicated   by   its   at   times  
unclear  applications  of  what  appears  to  be  a  well-­‐‑conceived  approach.  This  sometimes  makes  it  difficult  to  
ascertain   how  and  why   a   particular   outcome  was   reached   in   a   concrete   case,   F.  PINAR  ÖLÇER,  The  
European  Court…,  p.  376-­‐‑377.  
400  An  applicant  was  subjected  to  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment  contrary  to  the  substantive  
provisions   of  Art.   3   ECHR  when   emetics  were   administered   to   him   in   order   to   force   him   to  
regurgitate  the  drugs  he  had  swallowed.  The  evidence  used  in  the  criminal  proceedings  against  
the   applicant   was   thus   obtained   as   a   direct   result   of   a   violation   of   one   of   the   core   rights  
guaranteed  by  the  Convention,  see:  Jalloh  v.  Germany,  §§  104  et  seq.    
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It  is  noteworthy  that  in  this  case  the  Court  found  violation  of  Art.  6  §  1  ECHR  
taking  into  account  that  the  evidence  was  decisive  in  conviction  of  the  applicant.  
Moreover,  the  Court  highlighted  that  any  possible  discretion  the  national  courts  
may  have  had  to  exclude  the  evidence  could  not  come  into  play,  as  it  considered  
the  impugned  treatment  to  be  authorised  by  national  law401.  
In  conclusion,  evidence  obtained  through  inhumane  or  degrading  treatment  
or   punishment   does   not   cause   per   se   inadmissibility   of   evidence.   However,  
taking   into   account   all   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   including   the   weight   of  
evidence,  the  offence  at  issue  or  the  public  interest  in  securing  a  conviction,  this  
breach  may  also  render  the  trial  unfair402.    
  
3.2.2. Evidence  obtained  in  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  
  
Although   the   ECtHR   sets   high   standards   for   the   protection   of   privacy   and  
interprets  Art.  8  ECHR  widely,  it  does  not  rigorously  enforce  those  standards  by  
excluding   evidence   obtained   in   violation   of   this   article403.   On   the   contrary,   in  
most  cases  regarding  the  violation  of  the  right  to  privacy,  the  Court  accepts  the  
admission  of  evidence.  To  justify  this,  the  Court  uses  a  balancing  test  of  defence  
rights  and  the  impact  of  the  evidence  on  the  conviction  of  the  accused.  
One   of   the   leading   cases   concerning   the   admissibility   of   evidence   obtained  
through   violation   of  Art.   8   ECHR   is   the   case   of  Schenk   v.   Switzerland404.  When  
examining  the  case,  the  Court  used  its  standard  balancing  test  concerning  right  
                                                                                                                            
401   Jalloh   v.   Germany,   §§   121-­‐‑123.   However,   see   the   concurring   opinion   of   Judge   Bratza;   the  
concurring   opinion   of   Judge   Zupančič;   the   dissenting   opinion   of   Judges   Wildhaber   and  
Caflisch;   the   joint   dissenting   opinion   of   Judges   Ress,   Pellonpää,   Baka   and   Šikuta   and   the  
dissenting  opinion  of  Judge  Hajiyev.  
402  In  this  respect  see  the  concurring  opinion  of  Judge  Cabral  Barreto  attached  to  the  judgment  in  
Bykov   v.  Russia:   [We]   should   also   go   a   step   further   by   stating  unequivocally   that   the   use   of   evidence  
obtained  by  means  of  an  act  classified  as  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  automatically  undermines  the  
fairness   of   a   trial,   since   the   difference   between   torture   and   inhuman   treatment   is   often   difficult   to  
establish   and   the   nuances   are   sometimes   tiny;   furthermore,   as   a   rule,   both   situations   –   torture   and  
inhuman   and   degrading   treatment   –   involve   blunders   by   the   authorities   against   an   individual   in   a  
position  of  inferiority.  The  Grand  Chamber  should  in  my  opinion  state  firmly  that  any  evidence  obtained  
in   breach   of  Article   3   in   the   course   of   a   trial   –   through   torture   or   ill-­‐‑treatment  –  will   always   infringe  
Article  6  of  the  Convention,  even  if  such  evidence  did  not  play  a  decisive  part  in  the  conviction,  and  even  
if   the   accused  was   able   to   challenge   the   evidence   thus   obtained,  without   leaving  open   the  possibility   of  
relying  on  the  weight  of  public  interest  and  the  seriousness  of  the  offence.  
403   F.   PINAR   ÖLÇER,   The   European   Court…,   p.   395,   H.   KUCZYŃSKA,   Interception   of  
communications….,  p.  123-­‐‑125.  
404  In  this  case  the  applicant  claimed  to  be  the  victim  of  an  infringement  of  his  right  to  respect  
for  his  private   life  and  his   right   to   the  confidentiality  of   telephone   telecommunications  which  
had  been  tapped  contrary  to  the  domestic  law,  as  well  as  his  right  to  a  fair  trial  by  reason  of  the  
use  of  the  disputed  recording  in  evidence.  The  Commission,  however,  dismissed  the  complaint  
based  on  Art.  8  ECHR  on  the  ground  that  the  domestic  remedies  had  not  been  exhausted.  On  
the  other  hand,  the  Commission  declared  the  application  admissible  with  regard  to  the  use  of  
the  recording  and  violation  of  Art.  6  ECHR,  see:  Schenk  v.  Switzerland,  §§  36-­‐‑37.  




of  defence  and  with  the  impact  of  the  evidence  on  the  conviction  of  the  accused  
405.  Regarding   the   former   requirement,   the  Court  arrived  at   the  conclusion   that  
the   applicant   had   and   indeed   took   the   opportunity   of   challenging   the  
authenticity  of  the  recordings  and  opposing  their  use.  Moreover,  he  was  able  to  
examine   witnesses,   including   a   witness   in   respect   of   the   recording’s   content.  
According   to   the  Court,   the   fact   that   his   attempts  were   unsuccessful  made   no  
difference  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case406.    
Regarding  the  latter  requirement,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the  recording  of  
the   telephone  conversation  was  not   the  only  evidence  on  which   the  conviction  
was   based.   Consequently,   it   was   stressed   that   the   criminal   court   had   taken  
account   of   a   combination   of   evidential   elements   before   reaching   the   final  
opinion407.    
Taking   into   account   all   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   Court   therefore  
concluded  that,  irrespective  of  the  illegal  interception,  there  was  no  violation  of  
Art.  6  ECHR.  In  other  words,  the  applicant’s  trial  was  fair,  because:  
- the  accused  had  the  opportunity   to  dispute   the  use  of   illegal  evidence,  
and  
- the  recorded  material  was  not  the  only  piece  of  evidence  in  the  case408.  
Another  case  concerning   the  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered   in  violation  
of  the  right  to  privacy  was  Bykov  v.  Russia.  In  this  case,  although  the  Court  found  
there  was  a  violation  of  Art.  8  §  2  ECHR409,  it  did  not  automatically  exclude  the  
                                                                                                                            
405  Pointing  out  its  secondary  role  in  assessing  the  admissibility  of  evidence:  In  particular,  it  is  not  
its  function  to  deal  with  errors  of  fact  or  of  law  allegedly  committed  by  a  national  court  unless  and  in  so  
far  as  they  may  have  infringed  rights  and  freedoms  protected  by  the  Convention.  §§  46.  While  Article  6  
(art.   6)   of   the   Convention   guarantees   the   right   to   a   fair   trial,   it   does   not   lay   down   any   rules   on   the  
admissibility  of  evidence  as  such,  which  is  therefore  primarily  a  matter  for  regulation  under  national  law.  
The  Court  therefore  cannot  exclude  as  a  matter  of  principle  and  in  the  abstract  that  unlawfully  obtained  
evidence  of  the  present  kind  may  be  admissible.  It  has  only  to  ascertain  whether  Mr.  Schenk’s  trial  as  a  
whole  was  fair,  Schenk  v.  Switzerland,  §§  45.  
406  Ibid.,  §§  47.  
407  Ibid.,  §§  48.    
408  However,   three  separate  opinions  were  annexed   to   this   judgment.   In   their   Joint  Dissenting  
Opinion,   Judges   Pettiti,   Spielmann,   De  Meyer   and   Carrillo   Salcedo   stated   that:   No   court   can,  
without  detriment  to  the  proper  administration  of  justice,  rely  on  evidence  which  has  been  obtained  not  
only  by  unfair  means  but,  above  all,  unlawfully.  If  it  does  so,  the  trial  cannot  be  fair  within  the  meaning  
of   the   Convention.   In   the   instant   case,   it   is   not   disputed   that   "ʺthe   recording   in   issue   was   obtained  
unlawfully"ʺ.  Even  if  the  courts  which  determined  the  charge  against  the  applicant  relied,  as  is  noted  in  
the   judgment,   on   "ʺevidence   other   than   the   recording   but  which   corroborated   the   reasons   based   on   the  
recording  for  concluding  that  [the  person  concerned]  was  guilty"ʺ,  it  remains  true  that  they  "ʺadmitted  the  
recording  in  evidence"ʺ  and  that  their  decisions  were  "ʺpartly"ʺ  founded  on  the  disputed  cassette.  For  these  
reasons,  we  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  in  this  case  there  was  a  violation  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  as  
secured   in   Article   6   (art.   6)   of   the   Convention.   See   also   the   Joint   Dissenting   Opinion   of   Judges  
Pettiti   and   De   Meyer,   and   the   Dissenting   Opinion   of   Judge   De   Meyer,   all   attached   to   the  
judgment.    
409   In   this   case   the   applicant   complained   that   the   covert   operation   had   involved   an   unlawful  
intrusion   into   his   home   and   that   the   interception   and   recording   of   this   conversation   had  
interfered   with   his   private   life   (Bykov   v.   Russia,   §§   69   et   seq.).   The   Court   stated   that   the  
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irregular   recordings.   Instead,   the   Court   used   the   standard   balancing   test   to  
examine  the  fairness  of  the  whole  proceedings,  as  in  the  previous  case410.  
Consequently,   the   Court   examined  whether   the   rights   of   the   defence  were  
disregarded   and   whether   the   evidence   in   question   was   supported   by   other  
material.   Regarding   the   former,   the   Court   noted   that   the   applicant’s   trial  was  
adversarial  and,  in  particular,  that  he  had  an  opportunity  to  challenge  the  use  of  
the   evidence411.   With   regard   to   the   latter,   the   Court   stated   that   the   evidence  
obtained  through  the  interception  of  telecommunications  was  not  the  sole  basis  
for   the  applicant’s   conviction   since   the  key  evidence   for   the  prosecution  was  a  
statement412.   Consequently,   with   regard   to   the   above   mentioned   conclusions,  
after  examining:  
- the   safeguards   which   surrounded   the   evaluation   of   the  
admissibility  and  reliability  of  the  evidence  concerned,    
- the  nature  and  degree  of  the  alleged  compulsion,  and  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
interference   was   not   ‘in   accordance   with   law’,   as   required   by   Art.   8   §   2   ECHR,   due   to   the  
absence  of  specific  and  detailed  regulations.  Consequently,  the  Court  noted  that  the  use  of  this  
surveillance  technique  as  part  of  an  ‘operative  experiment’  was  not  accompanied  by  adequate  
safeguards  against  various  possible  abuses.  Accordingly,  its  use  was  open  to  arbitrariness  and  
was   inconsistent  with   the   requirement  of   lawfulness,  which   constitutes   a  breach  of  Art.   8   §   2  
ECHR  (see  in  particular:  Bykov  v.  Russia,  §§  82-­‐‑82).    
410   §§   90.   In   determining   whether   the   proceedings   as   a   whole   were   fair,   regard   must   also   be   had   to  
whether   the   rights   of   the   defence   were   respected.   It   must   be   examined   in   particular   whether   the  
applicant   was   given   the   opportunity   of   challenging   the   authenticity   of   the   evidence   and   of  
opposing   its   use.   In   addition,   the   quality   of   the   evidence   must   be   taken   into   consideration,  
including  whether   the  circumstances   in  which   it  was  obtained  cast  doubt  on   its  reliability  or  accuracy.  
While   no   problem   of   fairness   necessarily   arises   where   the   evidence   obtained   was   unsupported   by  
other  material,  it  may  be  noted  that  where  the  evidence  is  very  strong  and  there  is  no  risk  of  its  being  
unreliable,  the  need  for  supporting  evidence  is  correspondingly  weaker.  
411  In  the  present  case,  the  applicant  was  able  to  challenge  the  covert  operation,  and  every  piece  of  evidence  
obtained  thereby,  in  the  adversarial  procedure  before  the  first-­‐‑instance  court  and  in  his  grounds  of  appeal.  
The  grounds  for  the  challenge  were  the  alleged  unlawfulness  and  trickery  in  obtaining  evidence  and  the  
alleged  misinterpretation  of  the  conversation  recorded  on  the  tape.  Each  of  these  points  was  addressed  by  
the  courts  and  dismissed  in  reasoned  decisions.  The  Court  notes  that  the  applicant  made  no  complaints  in  
relation   to   the  procedure  by  which   the   courts   reached   their  decision  concerning   the  admissibility  of   the  
evidence,  Bykov  v.  Russia,  §§  96.  
412  The  Court  further  observes  that  the  impugned  recording,  together  with  the  physical  evidence  obtained  
through  the  covert  operation,  was  not  the  only  evidence  relied  on  by  the  domestic  court  as  the  basis  for  the  
applicant'ʹs  conviction.  In  fact,  the  key  evidence  for  the  prosecution  was  the  initial  statement  by  V.,  who  
had  reported  to   the  FSB  that   the  applicant  had  ordered  him  to  kill  S.,  and  had  handed   in  the  gun  (…).  
This  statement,  which  gave  rise  to  the  investigation,  was  made  by  V.  before,  and  independently  from,  the  
covert  operation,   in  his  capacity  as  a  private   individual  and  not  as  a  police   informant.  Furthermore,  he  
reiterated   his   incriminating   statements   during   his   subsequent   questioning   on   several   occasions   and  
during  the  confrontation  between  him  and  the  applicant  at  the  pre-­‐‑trial  stage.  §§  98.  In  view  of  the  above,  
the   Court   accepts   that   the   evidence   obtained   from   the   covert   operation   was   not   the   sole   basis   for   the  
applicant'ʹs  conviction,  corroborated  as   it  was  by  other  conclusive  evidence.  Nothing  has  been  shown  to  
support  the  conclusion  that  the  applicant'ʹs  defence  rights  were  not  properly  complied  with  in  respect  of  
the  evidence  adduced  or  that  its  evaluation  by  the  domestic  courts  was  arbitrary,  Bykov  v.  Russia,  §§  96.  




- the  use  to  which  the  material  obtained  through  the  covert  operation  
was  put,    
the   Court   found   that   the   proceedings   in   the   applicant’s   case,   considered   as   a  
whole,  were  not  contrary  to   the  requirements  of  a   fair   trial  and  there  had  been  
no   violation   of   Art.   6   §   1   ECHR413,   irrespective   of   the   fact   that   there   was   a  
violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  and  the  applicant’s  right  to  privacy414.    
Another  case  which  is  worth  presenting  here  is  the  case  of  Khan  v.  The  United  
Kingdom415.  Two  themes  clearly  emerge  from  this  judgment.  Firstly,  in  contrast  to  
the   position   examined   in   the  Schenk   case,   the   recordings   in   question  were   not  
unlawful  in  the  sense  of  being  contrary  to  domestic  criminal  law416.  Secondly,  the  
recordings  were   the  only   evidence   against   the   applicant   and  his  plea  of   guilty  
was  tendered  only  on  the  basis  of  the  judge’s  ruling  that  the  evidence  should  be  
admitted.    
Consequently,   following   the   Court’s   stand   presented   in   the   case   of   Schenk,  
the   recordings   in  Khan   should  be  excluded  due   to   their  decisive   impact  on   the  
conviction  of  the  accused.  The  Court,  however,  stated  otherwise  and  explained:  
  
§§  37.  (…)  It  is  true  that,  in  the  case  of  Schenk,  weight  was  attached  by  the  Court  
to   the   fact   that   the   tape   recording   at   issue   in   that   case  was   not   the   only   evidence  
against  the  applicant.  However,  the  Court  notes  in  this  regard  that  the  recording  in  
the   Schenk   case,   although   not   the   only   evidence,   was   described   by   the   Criminal  
Cassation   Division   of   the   Vaud   Cantonal   Court   as   having   “a   perhaps   decisive  
influence,   or   at   the   least   a   not   inconsiderable   one,   on   the   outcome   of   the   criminal  
                                                                                                                            
413  Bykov  v.  Russia,  §§  104-­‐‑105.  
414  However,  annexed  to  the  judgment  was  the  concurring  opinion  of  Judge  Cabral  Barreto,  the  
concurring   opinion   of   Judge  Kovler,   the   partially   dissenting   opinion   of   Judge   Costa   and   the  
partially  dissenting  opinion  of  Judge  Spielmann,  joined  by  Judges  Rozakis,  Tulkens,  Casadevall  
and  Mijović.  The  controversy  of  that  conclusion  may  be  seen  not  only  in  the  judgment,  but  also  
in  the  literature,  see:  F.  PINAR  ÖLÇER,  The  European  Court…,  p.  396.  
415  In  this  case,  the  applicant  alleged  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  due  to  the  fact  that  the  listening  
device   was   placed   in   the   suspect’s   home   by   the   police   without   judicial   authorisation   and  
without  there  ever  having  been  a  law  regulating  such  invasions  of  privacy  (see:  Khan  v.  United  
Kingdom,   §§   22   et   seq.).   A   breach   of  Article   6   §   1   of   the  Convention  was   found   based   on   the  
ground  that  the  use  as  the  sole  evidence  in  his  case  of  the  material  which  had  been  obtained  in  
breach  of  Article  8  of  the  Convention  was  not  compatible  with  the  ‘fair  hearing’  requirements  of  
Article  6  (see:  Khan  v.  United  Kingdom,  §§  29  et  seq.).    
416  The  Court  notes  at  the  outset  that,  in  contrast  to  the  position  examined  in  the  Schenk  case,  the  fixing  
of  the  listening  device  and  the  recording  of  the  applicant'ʹs  conversation  were  not  unlawful  in  the  sense  of  
being   contrary   to   domestic   criminal   law.   (…)   The   “unlawfulness”   of  which   complaint   is  made   in   the  
present  case  relates  exclusively  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  statutory  authority  for  the  interference  with  
the   applicant'ʹs   right   to   respect   for   private   life   and   that,   accordingly,   such   interference   was   not   “in  
accordance  with  the  law”,  as  that  phrase  has  been  interpreted  in  Article  8  §  2  of  the  Convention,  Khan  v.  
United  Kingdom,  §§  36.  
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proceedings”   (…).   Moreover,   this   element   was   not   the   determining   factor   in   the  
Court'ʹs  conclusion417.  
  
Subsequently,  the  Court  turned  its  attention  to  the  rights  of  defence:    
  
§§  38.  The   central   question   in   the  present   case   is  whether   the  proceedings   as   a  
whole   were   fair.   With   specific   reference   to   the   admission   of   the   contested   tape  
recording,   the  Court   notes   that,   as   in   the   Schenk   case,   the  applicant  had  ample  
opportunity  to  challenge  both  the  authenticity  and  the  use  of  the  recording.  
He  did  not  challenge  its  authenticity,  but  challenged  its  use  at  the  voir  dire  and  again  
before  the  Court  of  Appeal  and  the  House  of  Lords.  The  Court  notes  that  at  each  level  
of  jurisdiction  the  domestic  courts  assessed  the  effect  of  admission  of  the  evidence  on  
the  fairness  of  the  trial  by  reference  to  section  78  of  PACE,  and  the  courts  discussed,  
amongst  other  matters,  the  non-­‐‑statutory  basis  for  the  surveillance.  The  fact  that  the  
applicant  was  at  each  step  unsuccessful  makes  no  difference  (…).  
  
Consequently,  the  ECtHR  found  no  violation  of  Art.  6  ECHR:  
- irrespective   of   the   fact   that   the   evidence   challenged  was   the   only  
evidence  against  the  applicant;  
- basing   its   judgment   on   the   fact   that   the   accused  had   been   able   to  
challenge  the  authenticity  and  use  of  the  recording.  As  in  the  case  of  
Schenk,   the  Court  concluded  that   the   fact   that   the  applicant  was  at  
each  stage  unsuccessful  made  no  difference418.    
                                                                                                                            
417   It   is  noteworthy   that,  when   examining   the   fact   the   recordings  were   the  only   evidence,   the  
Court  also  referred  to  the  nature  of   the  evidence,  as  follows:  In  the  present  circumstances,  where  
the  tape  recording  was  acknowledged  to  be  very  strong  evidence,  and  where  there  was  no  risk  of  it  being  
unreliable,  the  need  for  supporting  evidence  is  correspondingly  weaker,  Khan  v.  United  Kingdom,  
§§  37.  
418  However,   see   the  partly  concurring,  partly  dissenting  opinion  of   Judge  Loucaides:   I   cannot  
accept  that  a  trial  can  be  “fair”,  as  required  by  Article  6,  if  a  person'ʹs  guilt  for  any  offence  is  established  
through  evidence  obtained  in  breach  of  the  human  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Convention.  It  is  my  opinion  
that  the  term  “fairness”,  when  examined  in  the  context  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  
implies  observance  of  the  rule  of  law  and  for  that  matter  it  presupposes  respect  of  the  human  rights  set  out  
in  the  Convention.  I  do  not  think  one  can  speak  of  a  “fair”  trial  if  it  is  conducted  in  breach  of  the  law.  It  is  
true   that   the  Convention   is   not   part   of   the   domestic   legal   system   of   the  United  Kingdom,   but   for   the  
purposes  of  the  question  in  issue,  it  should  be  treated  as  such,  in  view  of  its  ratification  by  that  country  
and  the  ensuing  obligation  to  enforce  its  provisions  through  its  State  organs.  In  other  words,  in  assessing  
whether   a   trial   was   “fair”   I   can   see   no   reason   to   make   allowances   for   a   State   which   ratified   the  
Convention   but   has   failed   to   incorporate   it   into   its   system.   (…)   The   basic   argument   against   such   an  
exclusionary   rule   is   the   pursuit   of   the   truth   and   the   public   interest   values   in   effective   criminal   law  
enforcement  which  entail   the  admission  of  reliable  and  trustworthy  evidence,   for  otherwise  these  values  
may   suffer   and   guilty   defendants   may   escape   the   sanctions   of   the   law.   Breaking   the   law,   in   order   to  
enforce  it,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  and  an  absurd  proposition.  In  any  event  the  argument  has  no  place  
in  the  context  of  the  issues  in  this  case  because  evidence  amounting  to  an  interference  with  the  right  to  
privacy  can  be  admitted  in  court  proceedings  and  can  lead  to  a  conviction  for  a  crime,  if  the  securing  of  
such  evidence  satisfies  the  requirements  of  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  8,  including  the  one  at  issue  in  
the  present  case,  that  is,  that  it  was  obtained  “in  accordance  with  the  law”.    




Focusing   now   on   search   and   seizure,   one   may   assume   that   the   Court  
employs   the   same   approach   as   in   cases   concerning   the   interception   of  
telecommunications.  In  Miailhe  v.  France  (No.1)  the  Court  found  a  breach  of  Art.  8  
ECHR  due  to  the  absence  of  any  requirement  for  a  judicial  warrant  or  any  other  
restrictions   and   conditions   provided   for   in   law419.   As   a   result,   the   applicant  
argued  that  he  was  the  victim  of  the  consequences  of  the  original  breach  of  Art.  8  
ECHR  found  by  the  Court,  and  that  the  prosecuting  authorities  had  rendered  his  
criminal  conviction  unfair,  based  as  it  was  almost  exclusively  on  the  documents  
seized   by   customs   in   circumstances   held   to   have   been   contrary   to   the  
Convention420.   When   examining   a   violation   of   Art.   6   ECHR   the   Court   again  
pointed   out   that   the   applicant   had   the   opportunity   to   raise   the   objections   of  
nullity  of  the  evidence,  which  were  dismissed  by  the  national  courts.  The  Court  
also   noted   that   both   parties   had   presented   arguments   at   hearings   on   the  
documentation  on  case  file  and,  in  general,  the  equality  of  arms  and  respect  for  
the  right  of  defence  were  preserved.  Consequently,   the  proceedings  as  a  whole  
were   fair,   regardless   of   the   fact   that   the   Court   based   its   statement   solely   on  
evidence  gathered  through  a  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR421.  
  
3.3. Admissibility   of   irregular   evidence   gathered  
abroad 
 
The   cases   reported  above   involved   irregular   evidence  gathered   in   a  merely  
domestic   context.   What   is   of   utmost   interest   in   this   chapter,   however,   is   the  
question  of  the  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  irregularly  in  the  cross-­‐‑border  
context.  Thus  far,  the  Court  has  neither  dealt  in  sufficient  detail  with  the  status  
of   irregular  evidence  gathered  abroad  nor  with  evidentiary  process-­‐‑laundering  
within   the   EU.   However,   it   clearly   follows   from   the   current   case-­‐‑law   of   the  
ECtHR  that  evidence  irregularly  gathered  abroad  is  not  per  se  inadmissible.  
The   previously   mentioned   case   of   Chinoy422,   in   which   the   English   court  
admitted   that   the   transcripts   and   tapes   had   been   illegally   obtained   by   the  US  
authorities  in  France,  may  be  cited  as  the  first  example.  Taking  into  account  the  
English   court’s   conclusion,   Chinoy   turned   to   the   European   Commission   of  
Human  Rights,  claiming  that  his  private  life,  home,  family  and  correspondence  
had  been  interfered  with  contrary  to  Art.  8  ECHR423.  According  to  Chinoy,  that  
interference  consisted  in  the  use  made  by  the  authorities  and  the  English  courts  
of  material   from  unlawful   and   clandestine   tapping   of   telephone   conversations  
involving  himself   and  members  of  his   family.  He  also  placed  emphasis  on   the  
reliance   on   and   internal   use   of   the   recordings   in   processing   and   accessing   the  
                                                                                                                            
419  Miailhe  v.  France  (No.1),  §§  38-­‐‑40.  
420  Ibid.,  §§  38.  
421  Ibid.,  §§  44-­‐‑46.  
422  See  on  note  380  above.  
423  Chinoy  v.  United  Kingdom  (dec.)  App.  no.  15199/89.  
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case,  in  particular  in  the  extradition  proceedings424.    
The   Commission   did   not   deny   the   unlawfulness   of   the   evidence   under  
French  law.  However,  it  underlined  that:  
  
It  is  not  for  the  Commission  to  determine  which  of  the  views  as  to  French  law  put  
forward  is  correct.  Nor  is  it  for  the  Commission  to  determine  in  this  case  whether  the  
recording  of   the   conversations   involved  a  violation  of   the  Convention  by  France.   It  
has  not  been  established  whether  the  French  authorities  were  or  were  not  aware,  and  
if  so  to  what  extent,  of  the  activities  of  the  United  States  agents,  nor  have  the  French  
courts   had   the   opportunity   to   consider   the   matter.   Furthermore,   the   present  
application   has   been   brought   against   the   United   Kingdom.   Accordingly,   the  
Commission  will  deal  with   this  application  not   in   the  context  of   clearly   established  
(or  admitted)  unlawfulness  of  the  recording  under  the  Convention  or  under  French  
law,  but  on  the  assumption  that  doubt  persists  as  to  such  lawfulness.  
  
Accordingly,   when   examining   what   use   was   made   of   the   recordings,   and  
how  that  use  affected  the  applicant’s  rights  under  Art.  8  ECHR  and  Art.  6  ECHR,  
the  Commission   first  and   foremost  noted   that   the   recordings  at   issue  were  not  
made  by  or  with  the  consent  of  the  UK  authorities.  Consequently,  the  use  made  
by   those   authorities   was   limited   to   receipt   of   the   materials   from   the   US,   and  
examination   of   its   relevance   in   the   extradition   proceedings.   In   this   respect   the  
Commission   recalled   the   case   of  Schenk   and   concluded   that   irregular   evidence  
cannot   be   excluded   as   a   matter   of   principle   and   in   abstracto425.   Moreover,   the  
Commission   noted   that   the   transcripts  which  were   used   in   open   court   related  
solely  to  business  matters,  did  not  disclose  any  lack  of  respect  for  his  private  and  
family  life  and,  therefore,  did  not  violate  Art.  8  ECHR.    
A  critical  observer  may  point  to  the  fact  that  the  Commission  did  not  attach  
any  relevance  to  the  admissibility  and  internal  use  of  the  material,  even  though  
there  existed  some  doubt  as  to  the  lawfulness  of  the  recordings  in  question.  This  
element,   however,   was   ignored   as   the   complaint   was   not   directed   against  
France.   In   respect   of   violation  of  Art.   6  ECHR,   the  Commission   reiterated   that  
the   ECHR   contains   no   express   or   implied   requirement   as   to   the   exclusion   or  
admissibility   of   unlawfully   obtained   evidence.   However,   the   Commission  
concluded   that   the   fact   that   the   information  was   obtained   in   breach   of   French  
law   did   not   prevent   it   from   being   lawfully   included   in   the   evidence   under  
English  law,  as  long  as  there  was  a  legal  basis  under  English  law  to  do  so426.      
                                                                                                                            
424  Besides  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR,  Chinoy  also  complained  that  he  had  no  remedy  before  a  
national   authority   in   respect   of   this   complaint,   contrary   to   Art.   13   ECHR.  He   also   alleged   a  
violation  of  Art.  5.4  ECHR,  contending  that  the  scope  of  the  proceedings  was  too  limited.    
425   The   Court   therefore   cannot   exclude   as   a   matter   of   principle   and   in   the   abstract   that   unlawfully  
obtained  evidence  of   the  present  kind  may  be  admissible.   It  has  only  to  ascertain  whether  Mr.  Schenk’s  
trial  as  a  whole  was  fair,  Schenk  v.  Switzerland,  §§  46.  
426  A.A.H.  VAN  HOEK,  M.J.J.P.  LUCHTMAN,  Transnational   cooperation   in   criminal  matters   and  
the  safeguards  of  human  rights,  Utrecht  Law  Review,Volume  1,  Issue  2  (December)  2005,  p.  17.    




It   is   noteworthy   that   the  Chinoy   example   is   described   in   the   literature   as   a  
‘judicial   acceptance   of   a   concept   that   might   be   termed   evidential   process  
laundering’,   since   the   US   agents   illegally   obtained   evidence   which   was  
inadmissible   in   France   and   sought   to   ‘launder’   that   evidence   through   English  
admissibility  rules427.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  this  approach  has  been  criticised,  
as   it   meant   that   the   protection   provided   in   the   Convention   was   merely  
theoretical   and   illusory428.   However,   on   the   other   hand,   the   English   court  
examined  the  evidence  using  the  same  rules  as  would  have  been  the  case  with  
evidence  gathered  domestically429.  
A  similar   line  of  reasoning  may  be  found  in  Rodriguez  v.  The  Netherlands.   In  
this  case,  the  Court  dealt  with  the  problem  of  the  subsequent  use  of  information  
gathered  abroad,  which  may  raise  issues  under  Art.  6  ECHR430.  The  Court  first  of  
all   reiterated   that   questions   concerning   the   admissibility   of   evidence   are  
primarily   a   matter   for   regulation   by   national   law.   Moreover,   the   Court  
considered  that:  
  
[T]he   Convention   does   not   preclude   reliance,   at   the   investigating   stage,    
on  information  obtained  by  the  investigating  authorities  from  sources  such  as  foreign  
criminal   investigations.   Nevertheless,   the   subsequent   use   of   such   information  
can  raise  issues  under  the  Convention  where  there  are  reasons  to  assume  that  
in   this   foreign   investigation   defence   rights   guaranteed   in   the   Convention  
have  been  disrespected.    
  
However,   the   Court   did   not   pursue   this   issue   due   to   the   fact   that   the  
applicant   had   not   substantiated   in   any   way   the   argument   that   such   reasons  
existed  in  the  case  in  question.  
In   conclusion,   one  may   assume   that   neither   the  Court   nor   the  Commission  
excluded  evidence  gathered  abroad  per  se,  even  though  its  use  raised  questions  
with   regard   to   fair   trial.   However,   it   has   to   be   stressed   that   both   cases   lack  
analysis  of  the  requirements  for  admissibility  of  that  evidence,  which  leaves  the  




Taking   into  account   the  Strasbourg  Court’s  approach  to   the  admissibility  of  
evidence,   one   may   conclude   that   the   Court   distinguishes   between   three  
                                                                                                                            
427  C.  GANE,  M.  MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility  …,  p.  114.  
428  A.A.H.  VAN  HOEK,  M.J.J.P.  LUCHTMAN,  Transnational  cooperation…,  p.  18.    
429   G.   STESSENS,  Money   Laundering.   A   New   International   Law   Enforcement   Model,   Cambridge  
2000;  p.  303;  A.  LACH,  Europejska…,  p.  329.  
430  The  applicant  complained,  inter  alia,  that  the  Dutch  court  refused  to  take  oral  evidence  from  
the   US   Assistant   Attorney   as   she   could   have   clarified   issues   in   relation   to   the   investigation  
carried  out  in  the  USA.  
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categories  of  violations  which  bring  with  them  different  consequences  in  relation  
to  the  exclusion  of  evidence,  as  follows:  
- per  se  inadmissibility:  evidence  gathered  through  torture  (Art.  3  ECHR)  
should  have  no  effect,  irrespective  of  its  probative  value,  the  seriousness  
of   the   crime   being   investigated,   the   public   interest   in   securing   the  
conviction  and  the  other  circumstances  of  the  case;  
- non  per  se  admissibility:    
a) evidence   gathered   through   inhumane   or   degrading   treatment  
or   punishment   (Art.   3   ECHR)   should   be   balanced   within   an  
exacting  balancing  test  which  examines  the  right  to  defence,  the  
role   that   the   evidence   plays   in   the   conviction,   as   well   as   the  
seriousness  of   the  crime  being   investigated,   the  public   interest  
in   securing   the   conviction   and   the   probative   value   of   the  
evidence;  
b) evidence   gathered   through   violation   of   the   right   to   privacy  
(Art.   8   ECHR)   should   be   balanced   within   the   balancing   test  
which   is   less   exacting   than   in   the   previous   categories   of  
violation.   First   of   all,   when   examining   the   cases   concerning  
privacy   violations,   one   may   easily   notice   the   Court’s   general  
willingness   to   allow   the   evidence   irrespective  of   the  breaches.  
Secondly,   the   Court   places   emphasis   on   the   high   probative  
value  of  the  evidence  which  often  consists  of  physical  evidence  
(items   seized   through   a   search   or   records   obtained   through  
interception)431.  Thirdly,  the  Court  treats  the  privacy  violations  
as  less  offensive  to  fairness  and  reduces  the  balancing  test  to  an  
examination   of   whether   the   defence   has   been   granted   the  
adequate   opportunity   to   challenge   the   manner   in   which   the  
evidence   was   obtained,   as   well   as   its   use   in   the   trial.  
                                                                                                                            
431  In  this  light  it  should  be  stressed  that,  in  the  case  of  evidence  gathered  through  inhumane  or  
degrading   treatment   or   punishment,   the   Court   does   not   attach   so   much   attention   to   the  
probative  value  of  the  evidence,  compare:  Jalloh  v.  Germany  with  Khan  v.  United  Kingdom.  In  the  
former  case,  concerning  violation  of  Art.  3  ECHR  (but  not  torture),  the  Court  excluded  material  
evidence   irrespective   of   its   high   probative   value.   By   contrast,   in   the   latter   case   the   Court  
referred  to  the  strong  nature  of  evidence  such  as  telephone  tapping,  pointing  out  that  there  is  no  
risk   of   it   being   unreliable   and,   consequently,   the   need   for   supporting   evidence   is  
correspondingly  weaker,  which  resulted   in   its  admission   in  evidence  which  played  a  decisive  
part   in   the   conviction.   In   this   respect   see   also  Allan   v.   United   Kingdom:   §§   43:   In   that   context,  
regard  must  also  be  had  to  whether  the  rights  of  the  defence  have  been  respected,  in  particular  whether  the  
applicant  was  given  the  opportunity  of  challenging  the  authenticity  of   the  evidence  and  of  opposing   its  
use,  as  well  as  the  opportunity  of  examining  any  relevant  witnesses;  whether  the  admissions  made  by  the  
applicant  during  the  conversations  were  made  voluntarily,  there  being  no  entrapment  and  the  applicant  
being  under  no  inducement  to  make  such  admissions  (see  Khan,  cited  above,  §  36);  and  the  quality  of  the  
evidence,  including  whether  the  circumstances  in  which  it  was  obtained  cast  doubts  on  its  reliability  or  
accuracy   (ibid.,  §  37).  While  no  problem  of   fairness  necessarily  arises  where   the   evidence  obtained  was  
unsupported  by  other  material,  it  may  be  noted  that  where  the  evidence  is  very  strong  and  there  is  no  risk  
of  its  being  unreliable,  the  need  for  supporting  evidence  is  correspondingly  weaker.  




Consequently,  even  factors  examined  within  the  balancing  test  
in   cases   concerning   inhumane   or   degrading   treatment   or  
punishment,   such   as   the   weight   of   public   interest,   the  
seriousness   of   the   offence   etc.,   are   of   secondary   importance  
here432.    
Consequently,   taking   into   account   the   scope   of   this   research,   which   deals  
with  telephone  tapping  and  house  search,  one  may  notice  that  the  Court  has  not  
developed   any   exclusionary   rule   with   respect   to   privacy   violations,   to   which  
both  measures  relate.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  which  
would  automatically  lead  to  the  inadmissibility  of  flawed  evidence.  Instead,  the  
Court  promotes  an  umbrella  balancing   test  which   is  broader  and  more   flexible  
than  the  test  used  in  cases  of  evidence  gathered  through  inhumane  or  degrading  
treatment  or  punishment   (Art.   3  ECHR).  This   conclusion   follows   from   the   fact  
that,  in  the  Court’s  view,  violations  of  the  right  to  privacy  pose  a  low  risk  to  trial  
fairness   and   can   be   counterbalanced   through   compensation   mechanisms.   In  
other  words,   the  Court’s  priority   is   the  question  of   fairness  of   the  proceedings  
rather   than   the   substantial   right   to  privacy  which  definitely  plays   a   secondary  
role  here433.    
The  Art.   6   ECHR   balancing   test   of   privacy   violations   consists   of   two  main  
requirements:  
- the  procedural   right   to   oppose   irregular   evidence.   In   other  words,   the  
defence  has   to  be  given  an  opportunity   to  challenge   the   legality  of   the  
evidence  and   its   authenticity,   and   to  oppose   its  use   in  a   trial.  The   fact  
that  these  attempts  are  unsuccessful  makes  no  difference;  
- the   impact   of   evidence   on   the   conviction   of   the   accused434.   This  
requirement   examines   whether   the   illegal   evidence   plays   a   dominant  
role   in   a   conviction,   namely,   whether   the   evidence   is   decisive   for   the  
outcome  of  the  proceedings.  Consequently,   if  defence  rights  have  been  
respected  within  evidentiary  proceedings  and  the  evidence  in  question  
is  not  decisive  for  the  establishment  of  the  defendant’s  guilt,  the  use  of  
                                                                                                                            
432   However,   see  Heglas   v.   Czech   Republic   §§   87,   §§   91,   where   the   Court   considered   that   the  
seriousness  of  the  crime  and  the  public  interest   in  prosecuting  it  should  be  taken  into  account  
when  determining   the   admissibility  of   evidence  gathered   through  violation  of  privacy   rights.  
See  also  the  critical  comments  of  A.M.  Torres  Chedraui:  When  the  seriousness  of  the  crime  is  taken  
into  account  in  the  context  of  fair  trial  rights,  the  protection  of  the  right  is  limited  for  certain  criminals,  
and  there  are  no  additional  safeguards  to  compensate  for  this  limitation.  Finally,  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  
protects  certain  procedural  values  which  would  be  seriously  undermined  if  they  would  be  subsumed  to  the  
gravity  of  the  crime.  In  this  respect,  this  right  is  different  from  art.  8,  because  art.  8  protects  privacy,  and  
a   consideration   of   the   gravity   of   the   crime   would   not   undermine   the   essence   of   this   article,   A.M.  
TORRES  CHEDRAUI,  An  analysis  ..,  p.  227-­‐‑229.    
433  V.  RAMANENKA,  Restrictions  on  admissibility  of   improperly  obtained  evidence   in  criminal   trial,  
Central  European  University,  November  27,  2011,  p.  60.    
434  See,   in  particular:  Allan  v.  United  Kingdom;  Bykov  v.  Russia,  P.G.   and   J.H.  v.  United  Kingdom;  
Heglas  v.  Czech  Republic;  Schenk  v.  Switzerland.    
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illegal  evidence  will  not  render  the  trial  unfair435.  However,  the  case-­‐‑law  
of   the   Court   clearly   demonstrates   the   secondary   role   of   this  
requirement,   since   the  Court  has  allowed   flawed   items,   irrespective  of  
the  fact  that  they  were  the  decisive  materials  in  the  convictions,  basing  
its  conclusion  solely  on  defence  rights.  In  this  respect,  one  may  assume  
that   the   requirement   that   renders   the   trial   unfair   is,   in   principle,   the  
right   to  defence  against   illegal   evidence.   It   is   also  noteworthy   that   the  
Court’s   balancing   test   is   narrower   in   comparison   with   tests   provided  
under  national  legislation  included  in  this  research  and,  in  general,  does  
not  require  balancing  of  the  seriousness  of  the  breach  with  the  weight  of  
public  interest  or  offence  at  issue.    
Consequently,   the   Court   has   adopted   the   stance   that   evidence   obtained  
through  violation  of  Art.  8  ECHR  may  be  admitted  in  proceedings  and  this  does  
not  render  the  trial  unfair,  as  long  as  the  rights  of  defence  have  been  respected.  
The   relevance   of   other   factors   is   circumvented   by   the   particular   cases.   This  
conclusion,  however,  may  be  discussed  from  various  perspectives.      
First   of   all,   the   Court’s   approach   may   be   characterised   as   controversial,  
unstable  and  quite  dynamic.  This  view   is   supported  by   the   fact   that   the  Court  
quite   frequently   adds   to   and   adapts   its   own   model,   creating   new   areas   of  
protection436.  The  controversial  nature  of  the  Court’s  approach  is  also  notable  in  
numerous   concurring   and   dissenting   opinions   attached   to   the   judgments  
concerning   the   admissibility   of   illegal   evidence.   In   this   respect,   it   has   to   be  
stressed   that   the  ECtHR   is   not   consistent   in   terms   of   general   conclusions  with  
regard  to  non  per  se  admissibility.  The  four  dissenting  judges  in  the  Schenk  case,  
whose  opinion  was  partially  followed  by  Judges  Loucaides  (attached  to  the  Khan  
v.   UK   judgment)   and   Tulkens   (attached   to   the  P.G.   and   J.H.   v.   UK   judgment),  
consider  that  a  trial  could  not  be  described  as  ‘fair’  where  evidence  obtained  in  
breach  of  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed  by  the  Convention  had  been  admitted.    
In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  recalling  the  interesting  point  of  view  expressed  in  
the  concurring  opinion  of   Judge  Cabral  Barreto,  attached  to   the  Bykov  v.  Russia  
judgment,  which  distinguishes  between:  
- prohibited   evidence,  which   relates   to   substantive   law   (e.g.   a   breach  of  
the  right  to  confer  freely  with  one’s  lawyer),  and  
- improper   evidence   which   relates   to   procedural   law   (e.g.   the   lack   of  
judicial  authorisation  for  telephone  tapping).    
Consequently,   according   to   this   approach,   violation   of   the   substantive   law  
should  determine   the  unlawfulness  of   the  evidence,  whereas  a  violation  of   the  
procedural   law  should  not  automatically  entail  a  violation  of  Art.  6  ECHR,  but  
simply  the  presumption  of  a  violation437.  When  discussing  this  point  of  view,  the  
                                                                                                                            
435  Z.  ÐURDEVIĆ,  Judicial  Control...,  p.  997.    
436  F.  PINAR  ÖLÇER,  The  European  Court…,  p.  375.    
437  Concurring  opinion  of   Judge  Cabral  Barreto   in   the  case  of  Bykov  v.  Russia.   It   is  noteworthy  
that  in  that  case  Judge  Cabral  Barreto  considered  that  there  was  no  violation  because  there  was  




problem   of   the   admissibility   of   a   statement   taken   in   the   absence   of   a   lawyer  
cannot  be  overlooked,  as  this  is  a  great  example  of  evidence  affecting  substantive  
law.      
In   the   case   of   Salduz   v.   Turkey   the   Court   examined   the   admissibility   of  
evidence  obtained  from  an   interrogation  conducted   in   the  absence  of  a   lawyer.  
When   examining   the   case,   the   Court   first   underlined   the   importance   of   the  
investigation   stage   for   the   preparation   of   the   criminal   proceedings,   as   the  
evidence   obtained   during   this   stage   determines   the   framework   in   which   the  
offence  charged  will  be  considered  at  the  trial438.  In  the  analysis  which  followed,  
the  Court  stated  that:  
- the  applicant’s  rights  to  a  fair  trial  were  undoubtedly  prejudiced  by  the  
restrictions  on  his  access   to  a   lawyer  during   the  police   interrogation439;  
and  
- neither   the   assistance   subsequently   provided   by   a   lawyer,   nor   the  
adversarial  nature  of  the  ensuing  proceedings,  in  which  the  defence  was  
able  to  challenge  the  prosecutor’s  statements,  could  cure  these  defects440.  
In   this   light,   the   Court   questioned   the   admissibility   of   that   statement,  
especially  with  regard  to  the  fact  that  it  constituted  the  main  evidence  on  which  
the  conviction  was  based441.  A  similar  problem  was  scrutinised  by  the  Court   in  
the  case  of  Płonka  v.  Poland,  in  which  the  Court  found  a  breach  of  Article  6  §  1  of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
only  a  formal  breach  (“in  accordance  with  the  law”)  in  obtaining  evidence  that,  in  principle,  was  
admissible  in  a  democratic  society  and  the  rights  of  defence  were,  moreover,  respected.  
438  Salduz  v.  Turkey,  §§  54.  
439   Article   6   §   1   requires   that,   as   a   rule,   access   to   a   lawyer   should   be   provided   as   from   the   first  
interrogation   of   a   suspect   by   the   police,   unless   it   is   demonstrated   in   the   light   of   the   particular  
circumstances  of  each  case  that  there  are  compelling  reasons  to  restrict  this  right.  Even  where  compelling  
reasons  may  exceptionally  justify  denial  of  access  to  a  lawyer,  such  restriction  –  whatever  its  justification  
–  must  not  unduly  prejudice   the   rights   of   the   accused  under  Article  6   (see,  mutatis  mutandis,  Magee,  
cited   above,   §   44).   The   rights   of   the   defence   will   in   principle   be   irretrievably   prejudiced   when  
incriminating   statements   made   during   police   interrogation   without   access   to   a   lawyer   are   used   for   a  
conviction,  Salduz  v.  Turkey,  §§  55.  
440  Thus,  in  the  present  case,  the  applicant  was  undoubtedly  affected  by  the  restrictions  on  his  access  to  a  
lawyer   in   that   his   statement   to   the   police  was  used   for   his   conviction.  Neither   the   assistance   provided  
subsequently   by   a   lawyer  nor   the   adversarial   nature   of   the   ensuing   proceedings   could   cure   the   defects  
which  had  occurred  during  police   custody.  However,   it   is  not   for   the  Court   to   speculate  on   the   impact  
which   the   applicant’s   access   to   a   lawyer   during   police   custody   would   have   had   on   the   ensuing  
proceedings,  Salduz  v.  Turkey,  §§  58.  
441  Moreover,  not   only  did   the   İzmir  State  Security  Court  not   take  a   stance  on   the  admissibility  of   the  
applicant’s  statements  made   in  police  custody  before  going  on  to  examine  the  merits  of   the  case,   it  also  
used   the  statement   to   the  police  as   the  main  evidence  on  which   to  convict  him,  despite  his  denial  of   its  
accuracy   (…).   In   this   connection,   the  Court   observes   that   in   convicting   the   applicant,   the   İzmir  State  
Security   Court   in   fact   used   the   evidence   before   it   to   confirm   the   applicant’s   statement   to   the   police,  
Salduz  v.  Turkey,  §§  57.  In  the  same  line  is  the  case  of  Płonka  v.  Poland  in  which  the  Court  stated  
that:  The  Court  considers  that  in  the  present  case  the  applicant  was  undoubtedly  directly  affected  by  the  
lack   of   access   to   a   lawyer   during   her   questioning   by   the   police.   Neither   the   assistance   provided  
subsequently   by   a   lawyer   or   the   adversarial   nature   of   the   ensuing   proceedings   could   cure   the   defects  
which  had  occurred  during  the  police  custody,  Płonka  v.  Poland,  §§  41.  
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the  Convention  in  conjunction  with  Article  6  §  3  (c)  due  to  the  fact  the  confession  
made  in  the  absence  of  a  lawyer  had  a  bearing  on  the  conviction442.        
Returning   to   the   Court’s   conclusions   with   regard   to   the   admissibility   of  
evidence,  it  should  be  stressed  that  the  Strasbourg  approach  is  widely  discussed  
in  the   literature,   for   the  following  reasons.  The  first  argument   is   that   the  Court  
mistakenly  confuses  the  admissibility  and  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  Secondly,  
it  is  still  controversial  and  doubtful  whether  the  trial  can  be  considered  as  ‘fair’  
where   evidence   obtained   in   breach   of   a   fundamental   right   guaranteed   by   the  
Convention  had  been  admitted.  Finally,  it  is  argued  that  the  case-­‐‑law  concerning  
Art.   3   ECHR   has   provided   a   clear   model   for   Art.   6   ECHR.   Therefore,   the  
consequences  of  violation  of  Art.  3  ECHR  are  not  merely  a  matter  for  regulation  
under  national   law.  Accordingly,   the  modern  understanding  of   the  case-­‐‑law  of  
the   ECtHR   should   also   cover   violations   of   Art.   8   ECHR;   in   other   words,   the  
exclusionary  rule  should  concern  the  prohibition  of  violations  of  privacy  such  as  
illegal  searches  and  interceptions  of  communications443.  
The   Court’s   approach   can   also   be   criticised   as   being   too   narrow   and  
incoherent.   Firstly,   the   ECtHR   places   emphasis   on   the   opportunity   of  
challenging  the  illegal  evidence,  referring  solely  to  rights  of  defence.  At  the  same  
time,  the  Court  remains  silent  over  the  procedural  opportunity  to  oppose  the  use  
of   evidence   obtained   in   violation   of   privacy   rights   by   other   parties,   e.g.   the  
victim   or,   in   particular,   persons   whose   right   to   privacy   have   been   violated444.  
Moreover,   it   should   be   remembered   that   this   research   deals   with   measures  
carried   out   at   the   pre-­‐‑trial   stage.   Consequently,   one   may   notice   that   an  
assessment  of   the   fairness  of   the  whole  proceedings  at   this   ‘stage  of  play’  may  
cause  practical  problems.    
Finally,  in  its  case-­‐‑law,  the  Court  has  dealt  solely  with  evidence  gathered  in  
the   domestic   context.   The   very   general   and   brief   conclusions   as   to   the  
admissibility   of   irregular   evidence   gathered   abroad445   do   not   fully   explain   the  
links  between   the   trial  process   and   trans-­‐‑border  gathering  of   evidence.  Taking  
into  account  both  of  the  cases  presented  above,  one  may  assume  that  the  Court  
                                                                                                                            
442  The  applicant  subsequently  denied   the  content  of  her  statement   to   the  police.  However,  her   initial  
confession  made  in  the  absence  of  a  lawyer  had  a  bearing  on  her  conviction.  While  the  statements  
made  by  the  applicant  during  police  custody  and  her  confession  were  not  the  sole  basis  for  her  conviction,  
the   Katowice   Regional   Court   nevertheless   based   its   final   decision   on   them,   observing   that   her  
testimony   during   the   hearings   was   not   credible.   In   view   of   the   circumstances,   the   guarantee   of  
fairness   enshrined   in  Article  6   required   that   the   applicant  had   the  benefit   of   the   assistance   of   a   lawyer  
from  the  very  first  stage  of  police  questioning.  In  this  regard,  it  is  not  for  the  Court  to  speculate  on  what  
the   applicant’s   reaction   or   her   lawyer’s   advice  would   have   been   had   she   had   access   to   a   lawyer   at   the  
initial  stage  of  the  proceedings,  Płonka  v.  Poland,  §§  39-­‐‑40.  
443   K.   HSIEH,  The   Exclusionary   Rule   of   Evidence.   Comparative   Analysis   and   Proposals   for   Reform,  
Ashgate  Publishing  2014,  p.  308-­‐‑309.  
444   In   the   previous   chapter   it   was   argued   that   the   rights   to   legal   remedies   against   the  
authenticity  and  use  of  evidence  should  be  granted  to  the  persons  whose  rights  were  violated,  if  
those  breaches  may  have  an  impact  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence  and  results  in  the  exclusion  
of  this  material.    
445  See:  Chinoy  v.  United  Kingdom;  Rodriquez  v.  The  Netherlands.    




does  not  per  se  exclude  evidence  irregularly  gathered  abroad.  In  this  respect,  one  
may   wonder   whether   the   Court   is   of   favour   of   the   per   se   admissibility   of  
irregular  evidence  gathered  abroad,  or  its  non  per  se  admissibility.    
Consequently,   these   and   other   questions   regarding   the   admissibility   of  
irregular  evidence  still  remain  largely  unanswered  by  the  Court’s  case  law.    
 
4. Irregularly  obtained  evidence  in  EU  instruments  
  
The  EU  has  not  fully  tackled  the  problem  of  irregularly  obtained  evidence  in  
any  document  related  to  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation  in  criminal  matters.  However,  
some  references  to  the  admissibility  of  irregularly  obtained  evidence  were  made  
within  the  Corpus  Juris  and  EPPO  Proposal.  Therefore,  the  relevant  provisions  of  
these  documents  are  presented  below446.    
  
4.1. Corpus  Juris 
 
The  Corpus   Juris  was   an   academic   proposal   on   European   criminal   law   and  
criminal   procedural   law   for   the   purpose   of   combating   fraud   against   the   EC  
budget   and   the   establishment   of   a   ‘European   Public   Prosecutor’   as   an   EC  
authority447.  It  sought  to  unify  and  define  criminal  offences  and  some  procedural  
rules,  in  order  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  proposal,  as  well  as  the  rights  of  
defence,   particularly   in   cases   of   internal   frauds,   where   the   absence   of   judicial  
control  could  jeopardise  the  protection  of  individual  rights448.    
The  Corpus   Juris  deals  with   the  admissibility  of   evidence   in  arts.   32  and  33.  
Whereas  art.   32  contains  a  non-­‐‑exhaustive   list  of  admissible  evidence449,   art.   33  
provides  a  straightforward  rule  with  regard  to  evidence  irregularly  obtained:  
                                                                                                                            
446   In   this   context   it   is   also   necessary   to   mention   the   Directive   (EU)   2016/343   on   the  
strengthening  of  certain  aspects  of  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  of  the  right  to  be  present  
at  the  trial  in  criminal  proceedings,  which  refers  to  use  of  statements  gathered  through  torture,  
in  breach  of   the   right   to   remain  silent  or   in  breach  of   the   right  not   to   incriminate  oneself,   see  
Recital  (45)  and  art.  10  of  the  Directive.    
447   The  Corpus   Juris   Project   was   carried   out   in   1995-­‐‑1996   upon   an   initiative   of   the   European  
Commission,  and  was   initially  published   in  1997,   see:  Corpus   Juris.   Introducing  penal  provisions  
for   the   purpose   of   the   financial   interests   of   the   European   Union   (dir.   M.   DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY),  
Economica   1997.   A   revised   version   of   the   project   was   published   in   2000   as   a   three-­‐‑volume  
study,  see:  M.  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,  J.A.E.  VERVAELE  (eds.),  The  implementation  of  the  Corpus  Juris  
in  the  Member  States,  Intersentia  2000-­‐‑2001.  
448  See  in  more  detail:  M.  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,  Combating  Fraud—Necessity,  legitimacy  and  feasibility  
of  Corpus  Iuris,  Common  Market  Law  Review,  37  (2000),  p.  249-­‐‑250;  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,  (Publ.)  
Corpus   Juris   of   criminal   legal   provisions   for   the   protection   of   the   financial   interests   of   the   European  
Union,   IUS  CRIMINALE,  series  of   texts  on  European  Criminal  Law,  vol.  7,  1998,   see  also:   J.R.  
SPENCER,  The   Corpus   Juris   project—has   it   a   future?,   Cambridge   Yearbook   of   European   Legal  
Studies,  1999,  Volume  2,  p.  355-­‐‑367.  
449  Art.  32.1  of  the  Corpus  Juris:  In  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union,  the  following  evidence  is  
admitted:  a)  testimony,  either  direct,  or  presented  at  the  trial  via  an  audiovisual  link  if  the  witness  is  in  
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Art.   33.1.   In   proceedings   for   one   of   the   offences   set   out   above   (Articles   1   to   8)  
evidence   must   be   excluded   if   it   was   obtained   by   Community   or   national   agents  
either   in   violation   of   the   fundamental   rights   enshrined   in   the   ECHR,   or   in  
violation   of   the   European   rules   set   out   above   (Articles   31   and   32),   or   in  
violation  of  applicable  national  law  without  being  justified  by  the  European  
rules   previously   set   out;   but   such   evidence   is   only   excluded   where   its  
admission  would  undermine  the  fairness  of  the  proceedings  to  admit  it.    
2.  The  national   law  applicable   to  determinate  whether   the   evidence  has  
been  obtained   legally  or   illegally  must  be  the   law  of  the  country  where  the  
evidence  was  obtained.  When  evidence  has  been  obtained   legally   in   this   sense,   it  
should  not  be  possible  to  oppose  the  use  of  this  evidence  because  it  was  obtained  in  a  
way   that   would   have   been   illegal   in   the   country   of   use.   But   it   should   always   be  
possible   to   object   to   the   use   of   such   evidence,   even   where   it   was   obtained   in  
accordance  with  the  law  of  the  country  where  it  was  obtained,   if   it  has  nevertheless  
violated  rights  enshrined  in  the  ECHR  or  the  European  rules  (Articles  31  and  32)450.  
This   rule,   according   to   the   authors   of   the   Corpus   Juris,   reflects   both   the  
importance  and  complexity  of  the  problem  of  evidence  obtained  in  breach  of  the  
law  in  a  cross-­‐‑border  context,  in  particular:  
- the   diversity   of   evidentiary   rules   in   the   area   of   exercising   coercive  
powers;  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
another  Member  State,  or  recorded  by  the  EPP  in  the  form  of  a  ‘European  deposition’.  For  the  latter,  the  
witness   must   be   examined   before   a   judge,   the   defence   lawyer   must   be   present   and   allowed   to   put  
questions,  and  the  operation  must  be  recorded  on  the  video;  b)  questioning  of  the  accused,  either  direct  or  
recorded  by  the  EPP  in  the  form  of  a  ‘European  interrogation  report’.  For  the  latter  the  questioning  must  
take  place  before  a  judge,  the  accused  must  be  assisted  by  a  defence  lawyer  of  his  choice  (who  has  received  
the   dossier   in   good   time,   and   the   latest   48   hours   before   the   questioning)   and,   if   necessary,   by   an  
interpreter;   in   addition,   the   operation  must   be   recorded   on   video;   c)   statements  made   by   the   accused,  
outside   the   interrogation   previously  mentioned,   as   long   as   they   have   been  made   before   the   competent  
authority  (EEP  or  judge),  and  the  accused  has  first  been  informed  of  his  right  to  silence  and  his  right  to  be  
assisted   by   a   defence   lawyer   of   his   choice   and   that   the   statements   have   been   recorded   in   some  way;   d)  
documents   presented   by   an   official   accountant,   appointed   by   the   competent   court   from   individuals   or  
corporations  appearing  on  a  European  list  approved  by  the  Member  States  on  the  proposal  of  the  E.E.P.,  
either  during   the  preparatory  stage,  or  at   the  beginning  of   the   trial;   e)  documents   that   the  accused  has  
been   required   to   produce   in   a   preliminary   administrative   investigation,   unless   such   an   obligation   is  
accompanied  by  criminal  sanctions.  2.  These  provisions  do  not  exclude  the  validity  of  other  forms  
of  evidence  considered  as  admissible  under  the  national  law  in  force  in  the  State  of  the  court  of  
judgment.   Those   rules,   however,   are   centred   on   the   ‘European   deposition’   and   ‘European  
interrogation   report’   introduced   in  particular   in  order   to  ensure  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  practices  which  
are  extremely  restrictive  in  this  area.    
450   It   has   to   be   stressed   that   some   member   states   proposed   amendments   to   this   provision  
arguing   that   it   is  not   in   line  with   the   jurisprudence  of   the  ECtHR  which  rejects   the  automatic  
exclusion   of   evidence   obtained   in   violation   of   law.  Moreover,   it  was   said   that   art.   33   has   an  
internal  contradiction  due  to  the  fact  that  either  the  evidence  is  collected  in  violation  of  higher  
rules   and   is   thus   excluded   or   it   is   collected   in   compliance   with   the   rules   and   is   admitted.  
Finally,   the   Luxembourg   report   found   that   art.   33§2   might   be   difficult   to   cooperate   on   in  
practice  since,  regarding  the  evidence  obtained  abroad,  this  article  would  force  the  authorities  
to  pay  attention  to  the  admissibility  rules  of  the  country  where  the  evidence  was  obtained,  see:  
M.  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,  J.A.E.  VERVAELE  (eds.),  The  implementation…,  p.  361-­‐‑362.    




- the  diversity  of  attitudes  towards  the  admissibility  of  illegally  obtained  
evidence;  
- the   decision   as   to  which   jurisdiction   should   apply   in   cases  where   the  
evidence   was   obtained   in   accordance   with   the   locus   state,   while   the  
method  by  which  the  evidence  was  obtained  would  have  been  unlawful  
in  the  country  where  the  evidence  was  requested;  
- the  problem  of  admissibility  of  evidence  obtained  against  the  law  of  the  
locus   country   for   use   in   another   member   state,   where   it   would   have  
been  obtained  legally451.  
Hence,   the   Corpus   Juris   proposal   set   the   rule   that   the   evidence   must   be  
rejected  if  it  was  obtained  in  breach  of  the  ECHR,  the  European  rules  laid  down  
in  arts.  31  and  32  of  the  Corpus  Juris,  or  national  law.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  
that  such  evidence  can  only  be  excluded  when  its  admission  would  contravene  
due  process.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  not  be  possible  to  object  to  the  use  of  
evidence   obtained   lawfully   in   another   member   state   solely   because   it   would  
have  been  obtained  illegally  in  the  country  where  the  evidence  is  to  be  used452.  In  
other   words,   the   judge   must   make   sure   that   no   irregularity   has   taken   place  
which   could   damage   the   legally   protected   interest   of   the   accused   person.  
Consequently,   if   the   evidence   only   concerns   third-­‐‑party   interests   there   is   no  
obligation  to  exclude  it453.  
This   proposal   can   be   considered   as   an   attempt   to   combine   the   accusatorial  
and   inquisitorial   traditions   with   complementary   application   of   national   law,  
which  clearly  defines  the  legislation  that  should  determine  the  violation  of  law.  
Moreover,   the   study  group   rejected   any   ‘automatic’   exclusion   of   evidence   and  
limited  exclusion  to  cases  in  which  admission  would  apply  only  in  a  case  where  
illegal  evidence  would  undermine  the  fairness  of  the  proceedings454.  
However,   the   proposed   approach   to   irregularly   obtained   evidence   was  
criticised   in   the   academic   literature   from   various   perspectives.   Firstly,   it   was  
stressed   that   the   Corpus   Juris   copies   the   assessment   criteria   of   the   ECtHR,  
regardless  of  the  fact  that  national  rules  are  very  protective  when  it  comes  to  the  
admissibility  of  irregularly  obtained  evidence.  Consequently,  it  would  mean  the  
abolition   of   national   rules   on   admissibility   and   disregard   the   protection   of  
human  rights  in  national  legal  systems,  since  the  aim  of  the  exclusionary  rule  at  
the   national   level   is   not   only   to   preserve   a   fair   trial   but   also   to   protect   other  
fundamental  rights.  Secondly,  it  was  argued  that  in  some  stages  of  proceedings,  
such  as  the  pre-­‐‑trial  stage,  it  is  not  possible  to  estimate  whether  certain  evidence  
will  render  the  proceedings  unfair  as  a  whole455.    
                                                                                                                            
451  Corpus  Juris…,  p.140.  
452  Ibid.  
453  M.  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,  J.A.E.  VERVAELE  (eds.),  The  implementation  …,  p.  210.      
454   W.   HETZER,   National   Criminal   Prosecution   and   European   Tendering   of   Evidence,   European  
Journal  of  Crime,  Criminal  Law  and  Criminal  Justice,  Vol.  12/2,  2004,  p.  171-­‐‑172.    
455  Z.  ÐURDEVIĆ,  Judicial  Control...,  p.  998.    
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In   conclusion   it   should   be   noted   that   although   the  Corpus   Juris   project   has  
been   criticised   over   the   past   decade,   it   contained   a   harmonising   structure   that  
attempted  to  bring  together  the  existing  European  legal  frameworks,  and  was  a  
catalyst  for  future  proposals,  including  in  the  field  of  admissibility  of  irregularly  
obtained  evidence456.    
 
4.2. Green  Paper  on   criminal-­‐‑law  protection  of   the  
financial   interests   of   the   Community   and   the  
establishment   of   a   European   Prosecutor   and  
EPPO  Proposal 
 
The   next   EU   initiatives   which   address   the   admissibility   of   irregularly  
obtained   evidence   are   the   Green   Paper   on   criminal-­‐‑law   protection   of   the  
financial   interests   of   the   Community   and   the   establishment   of   a   European  
Prosecutor  and  EPPO  Proposal457.  Accordingly,  the  Green  Paper  reads:  
  
The  prior  condition  for  any  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence  is  that  the  
evidence  must  have  been  obtained  lawfully  in  the  Member  State  where  it  is  
found.   The   question   of   the   exclusion   of   evidence   obtained   contrary   to   the   law  
therefore  has  to  be  considered.    
The   law  that  must  be   respected   if   evidence   is  not   to  be   excluded   is   first  
and   foremost   the   national   law  of   the   place  where   the   evidence   is   situated,  
which  integrates  in  all  Member  States  the  principles  of  Article  6  of  the  Union  Treaty,  
the   Charter   of   Fundamental   Rights   of   the   European   Union   and   the   European  
Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Human   Rights   and   Fundamental   Freedoms.   It  
would  include  certain  Community  rules  such  as  those  governing  the  European  arrest  
warrant  or  record  of  questioning  where  they  are  used  as  evidence458.    
  
Therefore,   according   to   the   Green   Paper,   the   rules   governing   exclusion  
would   be   those   of   the  member   state   in  which   the   evidence  was   obtained.   The  
Green   Paper   is   a   clear   derivation   from   the   principle   of   locus   regit   actum   and,  
consequently,   member   states   are   expected   to   accept   evidence   that   would   be  
accepted   in   the   locus   state,   even   if   under   different   rules   with   regard   to   their  
collection   and   admissibility.   As   pointed   out   in   the   academic   literature,   it  
presupposes  that  the  trial  courts  have  to  be  familiar  with  the  rules  of  evidence  in  
the   other   member   states,   which   may   cause   significant   practical   problems.  
                                                                                                                            
456   C.   GÓMEZ-­‐‑JARA   DÍEZ,   Models   for   a   System   of   European   Criminal   Law:   Unification   vs.  
Harmonisation?  New  Journal  of  European  Criminal  Law,  Vol.  1,  Issue  3,  2010,  p.  393-­‐‑394.  
457   EUROPEAN   COMMISSION,   Green   Paper   on   criminal-­‐‑law   protection   of   the   financial  
interests   of   the   Community   and   the   establishment   of   a   European   Prosecutor,   Brussels,  
11.12.2001,  COM  (2001)  715  final.  
458  Ibid.,  point  6.3.4.2,  p.  59.  




However,   the   Commission   argued   that   this   is   a   common   situation   in   private  
international  law  and,  moreover,  the  practical  difficulties  here  should  be  cleared  
up   by   progress   in   facilitating   networking   among   the   member   states’   judicial  
systems,  promoted  by  schemes  such  as  the  European  Judicial  Network459.    
Irrespective   of   the   Green   Paper’s   provisions,   the   Proposal   for   a   Council  
Regulation   on   the   establishment   of   the   European   Public   Prosecutor’s   Office  
(hereafter:  EPPO)  does  not  explicitly  address  evidence  gathered  unlawfully  and  
provides  a  general  admissibility  rule,  as  follows:  
  
Art.   30.   Evidence   presented   by   the  European  Public  Prosecutor'ʹs  Office   to   the  
trial  court,  where  the  court  considers  that  its  admission  would  not  adversely  
affect   the   fairness   of   the   procedure   or   the   rights   of   defence   as   enshrined   in  
Articles   47   and   48   of   the   Charter   of   Fundamental   Rights   of   the   European  
Union,  shall  be  admitted  in  the  trial  without  any  validation  or  similar  legal  
process   even   if   the   national   law   of   the   Member   State   where   the   court   is  
located  provides  for  different  rules  on  the  collection  or  presentation  of  such  
evidence.  
  
What   is   noteworthy   is   that   the   admissibility   rule   proposed   in   the   EPPO   is  
supported  by  the  partial  harmonisation  of  investigation  measures460  and  defence  
rights461.  With   regard   to   the   latter,  one  may  notice   that   those   safeguards  are   in  
line  with  the  ‘roadmap’  for  strengthening  the  procedural  rights  of  suspected  or  
accused  persons  in  criminal  proceedings462.  At  the  same  time  the  EPPO  Proposal  
introduces   a   broad   rule   on   the   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence,   based   on  





                                                                                                                            
459  Ibid.,  p.  59.    
460   Art.   26.1   of   the   EPPO   lists   21   measures   that   shall   be   available   for   the   purposes   of  
investigations   and   prosecutions   conducted   by   the   EPPO,   which   shall   be   subject   to   the  
conditions  provided  in  this  article  and  those  set  out  in  national  law.    
461  See  Chapter  IV  of  the  EPPO  which  deals  with  procedural  safeguards  (arts.  32–35).    
462   It   is   also   important   to   mention   here   that   the   link   between   admissibility   of   evidence   and  
effectiveness   of   the   rights   ensured   in   the   Roadmap   has   already   been   commented   on   in   the  
literature:   If   these   rights   are   to   be  made   effective,   they  must   be   accompanied   by   a   rule   that   evidence  
obtained  in  breach  of  them  is  inadmissible,  and  for  such  a  rule  to  be  applicable  throughout  the  Union  it  
would  have  to  be  included  in  the  EU  instrument  by  which  the  defence  rights  were  guaranteed,  see:  J.R.  
SPENCER,  The  Green  Paper  …,    p.  604-­‐‑605.  
463  In  the  literature  it  was  pointed  out  that  this  wide  scope  of  the  proposal,  as  well  as  the  absence  
of  harmonizing  rules  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  makes  it  susceptible  to  the  risk  of  forum  
shopping,  see:  M.  LUCHTMAN,  J.  VERVAELE,  European  Agencies  for  Criminal  Justice  and  Shared  
Enforcement   (Eurojust   and   the  European  Public  Prosecutor'ʹs  Office),  10  Utrecht  Law  Review,  2014  
(132),  p.  141.  
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4.3. Conclusion 
 
Analysis  of  the  few  existing  EU  approaches  to  irregularly  obtained  evidence  
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  none  of  the  outlined  proposals  provide  rules  of  per  se  
inadmissibility   of   irregularly   obtained   evidence.   However,   certain   conditions  
need   to  be  met.   First   and   foremost,   such   evidence   cannot   affect   the   fairness  of  
the  proceedings.  Moreover,  whereas   the  Corpus   Juris  and  Green  Paper  strongly  
relate  to  locus  law  and  require  that  evidence  must  have  been  obtained  lawfully  in  
the  state  where   it   is   found,   the  EPPO  Proposal  does  not  make  such  a  reference  
and  provides  a  general   rule   for   the  admissibility  of   evidence  which  would  not  
adversely   affect   the   fairness   of   the   procedure,   right   to   an   effective   remedy,  
presumption  of  innocence  or  right  to  defence.  
 
5. Minimum  standards  for  admissibility  of  irregular  
evidence     
 
The   problem   of   how   to   tackle   evidence   obtained   irregularly   in   the  
transnational  context  is  far  from  new464,  and  the  academic  literature  has  already  
presented  certain  alternative   scenarios   in   this   respect465.  However,   the  EU  with  
its   aspirations   to  mutual   recognition  of   evidence   still   lacks  an  approach  which  
would   be   in   line   with   the   mutual   recognition   philosophy   and   ensure  
preservation   of   fundamental   rights   ensured   in   the   ECHR   and   EU   Charter.  
Therefore,   the   following   study   examines   whether   is   it   feasible   to   come   to  
common  rules  with  regard  to  evidence  gathered  irregularly   in  EU  cross-­‐‑border  
contexts.   
                                                                                                                            
464   See,   inter   alia:   E.U.   NETWORK   OF   INDEPENDENT   EXPERTS   ON   FUNDAMENTAL  
RIGHTS,  Opinion   on   the   status   of   illegally   obtained   evidence   in   criminal   procedures   in   the  Member  
States  of  the  European  Union,  30  November  2003.  
465   In   this   respect,   see   three   alternatives   proposed   by   Gane   and  Mackarel:   the   theory   of   the  
diminished   protection   of   the   accused,   the   theory   of   neutrality   and   the   theory   of   double  
admissibility.  According  to  the  first  one,  the  appropriate  law  should  be  the  one  that  provides  a  
lower  standard  of  admissibility.  The  main  weakness  of  this  theory  is,  however,  that  it  cannot  be  
acceptable  as   it  dilutes   the  protection  of   the  suspect,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  may  
encourage   states   to   seek   to   obtain   evidence   abroad   by  means  which  would   not   be   lawful   if  
exercised   domestically.   The   second   approach   refers   to   ‘neutrality’   and   states   that   the  
admissibility  of  evidence  obtained  abroad  would  be  admissible  under  the  lex  fori  if  gathered  in  
the   same  manner.   However,   it   was   argued   that   this   approach   displays   a   lack   of   respect   for  
foreign  jurisdiction.  Moreover,  taking  the  example  of  the  Chinoy  case  into  account,  the  principle  
of   neutrality  may   encourage  member   states   to   indulge   in   ‘forum   shopping’   in   order   to   take  
advantage   of   the   most   relaxed   national   regimes.   Finally,   the   authors   proposed   double  
admissibility,  which  requires  a  double  examination  of  evidence,  which  should  be  admitted  only  
if  admissible  in  both  member  states.  This  approach  has  been  accepted  as  respecting  both  foreign  
rules   and   the   fundamental   rules   of   the   trial   state’s   criminal   justice   system.   see:  C.  GANE,  M.  
MACKAREL,  The  Admissibility…,  p.  116-­‐‑119;  G.  VERMEULEN,  A  European  Judicial  Network  
linked  to  Europol?,  Maastricht  Journal  of  European  and  Comparative  Law,  4  (1997),  p.  353.  





5.1. Examining  possible  scenarios  
  
When   considering   domestic   approaches,   ECtHR   jurisprudence   and   current  
EU   initiatives   in   this   field,   the   following   possible   scenarios   occur   for   dealing  
with  evidence  gathered  irregularly  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context:  
- indication  of   the   law  that  should  determine  whether  evidence  was  
gathered   irregularly   and   whether   it   may   be   used,   even   if   it   is  
irregular;    
- introducing  minimum  standards  for  non  per  se  admissibility  and  per  
se   inadmissibility   which   would   be   based   on   fundamental   rights  
ensured  at  EU  level;  or  
- recognition  of  evidence  as  per  se  admissible  or  per  se  inadmissible.    
Consequently,   the   following   analysis   examines   these   scenarios.   Due   to   the  
fact  that  the  last  alternative  leads  neither  to  the  overcoming  of  existing  problems  
nor   to   the  development  of  a   satisfactory  common  approach,   it   is  not  examined  
below.    
5.1.1. Determining  the  decisive  law 
 
The   first   scenario   relates   to   the   law   that   should   determine   whether   the  
evidence  has  been  obtained  regularly  or  irregularly.  This  approach  is  inspired  by  
Corpus   Juris   and   the   Green   Paper   on   criminal-­‐‑law   protection   of   the   financial  
interests   of   the   Community   and   the   establishment   of   a   European   Prosecutor  
which   rely   on   provisions   of   the   locus   state.   Accordingly,   this   scenario   entails  
three  further  options:    
- application   of   the   locus   law.   This   approach   would   be   based   on   the  
condition   that   the   law   of   the   place   where   the   evidence   is   situated  
should   be   decisive.   This   approach,   however,   is   not   free   of   obstacles.  
First   of   all,   it   would   probably   create   too   many   practical   difficulties  
when   determining   the   regularity   of   evidence   using   foreign   rules.  
Secondly,  it  does  not  attempt  to  overcome  the  problem  of  evidentiary  
process-­‐‑laundering,  since  the  exclusion  of  evidence  would  be  still  very  
context-­‐‑sensitive.   Finally,   it   ignores   forum   law,   which   may   provide  
different  rules  with  regard  to  the  admissibility  of  evidence;  
- application   of   the   forum   legislation   and   use   of   the   same   model   of  
control  that  applies  to  evidence  gathered  nationally.  According  to  this  
approach,   the   admissibility   of   evidence   would   be   determined   by  
asking   a   simple   question:   would   the   evidence,   if   gathered   in   this  
manner  domestically,  be  admissible?  This  approach,  however,  should  
be  rejected  as  lacking  respect  with  regard  to  the  locus  state.  Moreover,  
application  of  this  approach  would  definitely  have  a  frustrating  effect  
on   trans-­‐‑border   cooperation   since   it   does   not   solve   the   problems  
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reported   in   the   preceding   scenario   and,   in   addition,   ignores   the  
provisions  of  the  locus  state;  
- double  admissibility.  This   scenario   requires  a  double  examination  of  
evidence:  namely,  admission  of  evidence  only   if   it   complies  with   the  
requirements  in  both  member  states.  However,  this  solution  seems  to  
be  too  restrictive.  Moreover,  neither  the  Corpus  Juris,  the  Green  Paper  
nor   the   EPPO  Proposal   requires   double   admissibility  with   regard   to  
irregular   evidence.   Double   admissibility  would   also   be   inefficient   in  
more   complex   trans-­‐‑border   investigations   which   concern   more   than  
two   member   states   and,   consequently,   would   require   triple  
admissibility,   quadruple   admissibility   etc.   Moreover,   it   should   be  
remembered  that  some  member  states  are  more  lenient  when  it  comes  
to   evidence   irregularly   obtained   abroad   and   do   not   apply   domestic  
rules   of   admissibility   in   such   cases.   Applying   this   rule   would,  
paradoxically,  hamper  cross-­‐‑border  use  of  evidence   instead  of   taking  
it  to  a  higher  level.    
5.1.2. Minimum  standards  based  on  EU  fundamental  rights   
 
This  scenario  consists  of  breaking  with  both  the  locus  and  forum  standards  for  
admissibility   of   irregular   evidence,   if   gathered   in   the  EU   cross-­‐‑border   context,  
and  basing  the  use  of  irregular  evidence  on  commonly  agreed  standards  relating  
to  fundamental  rights  enshrined  in  the  ECHR  and  EU  Charter.   In  other  words,  
the   decision   whether   or   not   to   recognise   irregular   evidence   would   be  
determined  by  the  consequences  of  violation  of  a  particular   fundamental  right.  
Compliance  with  this  scenario  would  require  two  steps:    
- firstly,   linking   evidence/investigative   measures   to   particular  
fundamental  rights;  
- secondly,  verifying  categories  of  violations  of   these   rights  which  bring  
with   them   different   consequences   in   relation   to   the   exclusion   of  
evidence.  
Undoubtedly,  this  alternative  may  appear  too  far-­‐‑reaching  and  controversial,  
since   it  would  require  member  states   to  use  different,  usually   lower,  standards  
for   irregular   evidence   if   gathered   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context   than   those  
applied   in   domestic   cases.   It   could   paradoxically   increase   the   laundering   of  
evidence   through   EU   standards   and   the   bypassing   of   domestic   admissibility  
rules.  However,  even  if  at  first  sight  it  may  seem  provocative,  this  approach  has  
the   potential   to   provide   solutions   for  many   dilemmas   caused   by   cross-­‐‑border  
admissibility  of  irregular  evidence.  
Firstly,  as  was  reported  in  the  opening  subsections,  member  states  tend  to  be  
more   flexible  when   it   comes   to   foreign   irregular   evidence   and   not   apply   their  
domestic   admissibility   rules   so   restrictively   if   evidence   was   gathered   abroad.  
From   this   perspective,   common   minimum   standards   for   the   admissibility   of  
irregular   evidence   would   upgrade   standards   instead   of   limiting   them,   and  




ensure  at   least   the  compliance  with  EU  fundamental  rights.  Secondly,  common  
minimum   rules   concerning   the   admissibility   of   irregular   evidence   cannot   be  
disconnected   from   specific   categories   of   evidence.   This   means   that   the  
fundamental   rights   to   be   preserved   and,   consequently,   minimum   standards  
determining   admissibility   or   inadmissibility,   would   be   measure-­‐‑specific   and  
rights-­‐‑oriented.  
Therefore,  the  following  study  examines  the  possibility  of  coming  to  common  
rules  for  per  se  inadmissibility  and  non  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  
irregularly  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context  through  telephone  tapping  and  house  
search.  Due   to   the   fact   that   the   fundamental   right   to  which  both  measures   are  
linked   is   the   right   to   respect   for  private   life,   the   research  necessarily   takes   into  
account   the   analysis   of   breaches   of   Art.   8   ECHR   presented   in   the   preceeding  
subsection.    
  
5.1.2.1. The  lack  of  minimum  standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility    
  
Thus  far,  neither  the  EU  nor  the  ECtHR  has  developed  an  exclusionary  rule  
of   absolute   character   other   than   that   relating   to   evidence   gathered   through  
torture   (Art.   3   ECHR).   The   case-­‐‑law   of   the   Court,   presented   in   the   preceding  
paragraphs,  makes   it   clear   that   violations   of  Art.   8   ECHR,   to  which   telephone  
tapping  and  house  search  belong,  do  not  entail  per  se  inadmissibility  of  gathered  
evidence.  None  of   the  existing  EU  instruments   lead  one  to  conclude  otherwise.  
Moreover,   abuses   or   breaches   committed   within   telephone   tapping   or   house  
search  would  not  have  such  a  significant   impact  on   their  probative  value  as   in  
the  case  of,  for  instance,  torture  or  interrogation  in  the  absence  of  a  lawyer.    
Hence,  the  conclusion  is  that  there  are  no  EU  standards  on  the  basis  of  which  
it   can   be   decided   whether   irregular   evidence   gathered   through   telephone  
tapping   or   house   search  will   be   inadmissible   in   any   event.   Consequently,   any  
evidence  irregularly  obtained  will  be  considered  as  not  per  se  admissible  and  will  
be  examined  through  minimum  standards  for  non  per  se  admissibility.    
 
5.1.2.2. Minimum  standards  for  non  per  se  admissibility  
  
Due  to  the  lack  of  minimum  standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility  the  next  step  
involves   the   determination   of   the   standards   on   the   basis   of   which   it   can   be  
decided   when   irregular   evidence   will   be   admissible   after   all.   Following   the  
ECtHR,  this  can  be  determined  by  using  a  balancing  test  to  verify:    
- whether  the  right  to  defence  was  preserved,   in  particular,  whether  
the   defence   has   been   presented   with   adequate   opportunity   to  
invoke   defence   rights   in   challenging   the   manner   in   which   the  
evidence  was  obtained,  as  well  as  its  use  in  the  proceedings;  and  
- whether  the  conviction  was  based  solely  on  the  irregularly  obtained  
evidence.    
This  examination  will  aim  at  veryfing  the  fairness  of  the  procedure,  and  the  
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potentially   negative   impact   of   use   of   irregular   evidence   on   other   fundamental  
rights,   in   particular   the   right   to   defence.   Depending   on   the   result   of   this   test,  
evidence  will  be  deemed  admissible  after  all,  or   inadmissible.  Operating  under  
these  standards  would  ensure  the  preservation  of  EU  fundamental  rights  in  any  
event,   and   the   mutual   effect   of   the   balancing   test   due   to   the   fact   that  
fundamental  rights  are  the  same  elsewhere.  That  also  means  that  admissibility  of  
irregular  evidence  would  lose  its  context-­‐‑sensivity,  since  it  will  not  be  dependent  
on  very  different  domestic  provisions.    
 
6. Minimum   standards   for   admissibility   of  
irregularly  obtained  evidence:  conclusions 
 
This   chapter   has   explored   a   common   approach   to   mutual   admissibility   of  
irregular   evidence   gathered   in   an   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context   from   telephone  
tapping  and  house   search.  After   investigation  of  domestic   legislation,   case-­‐‑law  
of   the   ECtHR   and   the   EU’s   approach,   the   research   has   revealed   that   mutual  
admissibility  of  irregular  evidence  may  be  achieved  if  member  states  break  with  
locus   and   forum   provisions   in   this   matter   and   apply   common   EU   standards  
regarding   non   per   se   admissibility   and   per   se   inadmissibility,   based   on  
fundamental   rights   ensured   at   EU   level.   It   is   noteworthy   that   various  
investigative   measures   may   differently   affect   various   fundamental   rights,  
therefore  minimum  standards  would  also  vary  depending  on  the  evidence  and  
fundamental   right   that   it   may   affect.   Consequently,   not   all   breaches   of  
fundamental  rights  will  give  rise  to  the  same  standards  for  per  se  inadmissibility  
and  non  per  se  admissibility.    
Telephone  tapping  and  house  search  carry  a  risk  of  violations  of  the  right  to  
respect   for   private   life   and,   therefore,   it   is   necessary   to   follow   up   with   the  
standards   related   to   consequences   of   violation   of   this   right   in   relation   to   the  
admissibility   of   evidence.   The   research   has   revealed   that   any   breaches   of   the  
right   to   privacy   entail   per   se   inadmissibility   of   evidence   and,   consequently,  
minimum   standards   presented   in   this   research   only   concern   minimum  
standards  for  non  per  se  admissibility.  Accordingly,  a  decision  whether  or  not  to  
recognise  evidence  gathered  in  violation  of  the  right  to  privacy  would  be  made  
on  the  basis  of  two  requirements:  first,  on  the  preservation  of  rights  to  defence,  
and  second,  on   the   impact  of   the  evidence  on  conviction.  Operating  under   this  
standard  will  verify  the  fairness  of   the  procedure  and,  depending  on  the  result  
of  the  test,  will  lead  to  admissibility  or  inadmissibility  of  evidence.    
The  biggest  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  is  not  domestic  law-­‐‑oriented  
and  neither  requires   the  authorities   to  be  familiar  with  the  rules  of  evidence   in  
the   other   member   states,   nor   to   test   certain   elements   of   the   case   with   their  
conformity   with   foreign   rules,   since   the   fundamental   rights   on   which   the  
minimum   standards   are   based   are   the   same   elsewhere.   However,   a   critical  
observer  could  argue  that  this  approach  does  not  fully  overcome  the  problem  of  




the   ‘black   margin’   of   evidence   that   might   still   be   laundered.   In   other   words,  
member   states   could   take   advantage  of  more   relaxed   legislation   in   the   field  of  
evidence-­‐‑gathering  and   subsequently   launder  evidence  gathered  abroad  under  
non  per  se  admissibility  standards,  which  are  usually  more  lenient  than  domestic  
provisions   in   this  matter.  However,   this   approach   at   least   ensures   compliance  
with   fundamental  EU   rights,  which   currently  may  be  violated   in   the   course  of  
cross-­‐‑border  cooperation.  Secondly,  even  if  this  cluster  of  rights  is  more  limited  
than   domestic   provisions,   this   ‘limited   scenario’   still   prevails   over   the   current  
‘no-­‐‑rules   scenario’,   which   leaves   it   completely   unclear   how   to   proceed   with  
irregular  evidence  gathered  abroad.   
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IV. Final   conclusions:   Mutual   admissibility   of  
evidence  in  the  EU:  legal  fiction  or  a  feasible  
scenario?  
  
The  main  objective  of  this  study  was  to  find  out  whether  is  it  feasible  to  come  
to  various  types  of  common  EU  minimum  standards  with  a  view  to  enhancing  
mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered   from   telephone   tapping   and   house  
search  in  the  EU.  The  study  of  minimum  standards  proves  necessary  due  to  the  
lack  of  common  transparent  rules  addressing  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  
in  a  cross-­‐‑border  context,  together  with  inefficiency  of  the  FRA  principle  which  
may  make  the  whole  effort  towards  free  gathering  of  evidence  fruitless.    
The  research  was  divided  into  two  parts.  In  the  first  part  minimum  standards  
to   enhance   per   se   admissibility   were   the   main   focus.   The   second   part   was  
dedicated   to   minimum   standards   for   admissibility   of   evidence   gathered  
irregularly.    
With   regard   to   the   first   part   of   the   study,   the   research   has   revealed   the  
feasibility   of   coming   to   two  groups  of   common  EU  minimum  rules:  minimum  
standards   in   terms   of   rules   governing   evidence-­‐‑gathering   (ratione   auctoritatis  
ratione   materiae,   ratione   loci,   ratione   temporis,   ratione   personae),   and   minimum  
standards  in  terms  of  procedural  rights  associated  with  both  measures  (right  to  
legal   remedies   against   the  measures   and   right   to   be   notified   of   the  measures).  
The   reason   for   the   selection   of   these   particular   standards   is   that   they  
significantly  impact  on  mutual  trust  and,  moreover,  the  most  differences  across  
member   states   were   reported.   According   to   the   research,   this   goal   can   be  
achieved   by   ensuring   the   same  minimum   level   of   protection   against   arbitrary  
interferences,  of  availability  of  the  measures,  and  of  rules  concerning  evidence-­‐‑
taking.   The   outcome   of   the   study   is   that   these   standards   can   be   met   even   if  
domestic  regulations  vary  from  one  member  state  to  another.  The  research  also  
shows   that   complying   with   these   standards   would   contribute   to   enhancing  
mutual  trust  between  member  states  and,  consequently,  result  in  enhancing  per  
se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  context.  
Thus,   regarding   ratione   auctoritatis,   the   research   has   examined   which  
authorities  should  be  designated  to  issue  the  permission  to  carry  out  telephone  
tapping   and   house   search   in   order   to   enhance   the   mutual   admissibility   of  
evidence   gathered   upon   these   measures.   The   study   has   revealed   that   mutual  
trust   between   member   states   could   be   enhanced   not   by   introducing   common  
name-­‐‑tags   but   by   ensuring   that   authorities   appointed   by   member   states  
guarantee   protection   against   arbitrary   and   haphazard   interferences.   This   goal  
can  be  achieved  by  ensuring  that  both  measures  are  reviewed  either  a  priori  or  a  
posteriori   by   a   judicial   authority,   or   an   authority   independent   of   the   issuing  





towards   interested   parties   and   able   to   conduct   procedure   with   a   judicial  
character.  Ensuring  the  same  standard  in  this  matter  could  enhance  mutual  trust  
between   member   states,   facilitate   cooperation,   improve   the   protection   against  
abuses  and  do  away  with  dilemmas  on  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  where  
there   are   ratione   auctoritatis   incompatibilities.   If   operating   under   this   common  
standard,   member   states   would   assume   per   se   that,   irrespective   of   how   the  
foreign   issuing   authority   is   named,   the   commonly   agreed,   minimum   level   of  
protection  is  ensured.    
With   regard   to   ratione   materiae,   the   research   investigated   the   feasibility   of  
setting  of  common  grounds  for  ordering  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  for  
the   purposes   of   EU   cooperation   in   criminal   matters,   in   view   of   enhancing  
mutual   availability   of   the   measures.   The   study   has   revealed   that   a   common  
materiae   standard   could   be   effectuated   by   member   states   ensuring   the  
availability  of  telephone  tapping  and  house  searches  in  cases  concerning  the  MR  
offences.  That  would  mean  the  allowance  of  both  measures  within  the  entirety  of  
the  EU   in   cases  where   the   offence   being   investigated   relates   to   one   of   the  MR  
offences.  Operating  under  this  standard  could  do  away  with  dilemmas  as  to  the  
allowance   of   the   measure   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context   and   result   in   per   se  
admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  accordingly.    
With   regard   to   ratione   loci   the   research  examined  how  member   states   could  
enhance  mutual   trust   in   terms   of   telephone   tapping   targeted   by   location,   and  
what  should  constitute  a  ‘house’  in  the  light  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  house  searches.  
Consequently,   for   telephone   tapping   the   research  has  proved   that   it  would   be  
helpful   if   member   states   were   clearly   to   provide   the   allowance   of   telephone  
tapping  targeted  by  location  for  purposes  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation.  That  
would  ensure  the  mutual  availability  of  telephone  tapping  targeted  by  location,  
enhance   mutual   trust   with   regard   to   the   measure   and   mutual   recognition   of  
items   gathered   upon   the   measure.   Turning   to   house   search,   the   research   has  
revealed   the   need   to   come   to   a   common   understanding   of   what   constitute   a  
‘house’   in   the   EU   cross-­‐‑border   context.   According   to   the   research,   a   broad  
understanding   of   ‘house’   is   recommendable,   which   encompasses   also   offices,  
business   premises,   vehicles   and   other   places   which   are   not   accessible   to   the  
public.  That   could   resolve   the   issues  coming   from  variations  of  domestic   laws,  
ensure  that  both  measures  are  carried  out  under  the  same  provisions,  and,  as  a  
result,  enhance  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered  through  the  measure.    
The  ratione  temporis  chapter  has  faced  the  problem  of  how  member  states  may  
enhance  mutual  trust  with  regard  to  time  limits  of  telephone  tapping  and  time  of  
house  search.  The  study  has  revealed  that  mutual  trust  between  member  states  
could  be  upgraded  by  ensuring  that  all  member  states  provide  clear  rules  as  to  
the  maximum  duration  of  the  measure  and  its  renewals,  and  that  house  searches  
are   carried   out   at   reasonable   hours   and   in   accordance   with   the   principles   of  
necessity   and   proportionality.   These   provisions   could   enhance   mutual   trust  
between   member   states   as   to   the   procedure   under   which   the   measure   is  
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effectuated  abroad  and  result  in  per  se  admissibility  of  evidence,  even  if  gathered  
upon  different  time-­‐‑frameworks.  
With  respect  to  ratione  personae,  the  research  verified  the  feasibility  of  coming  
to   minimum   standards   with   regard   to   the   categories   that   deserve   special  
protection,  targeting  third  parties,  and  targeting  legal  persons.  Thus,  with  regard  
to   lawyers,   the  research  has  revealed   that  mutual   trust  between  member  states  
may  be  enhanced  by  introducing  clear  rules  regarding  the  inviolability  of  client-­‐‑
lawyer  confidentiality  and,  consequently,  the  inadmissibility  of  evidence  gained  
via   telephone   tapping   or   searches   in   pursuit   of   information  which   falls  within  
the   scope   of   the   right   of   defence.   Regarding   journalists   and   medical  
professionals,   this   goal   could   be   achieved   by   ensuring   that   the   measures   are  
undertaken  only   if  necessary   in   the  circumstances  of   the  case,  proportionate   to  
the  aim  being  pursued  and,  moreover,  that  the  disclosure  of  protected  sources  is  
limited   to  an  unavoidable  minimum.  With   regard   to   third  parties  who  may  be  
affected   by   the   measures,   the   research   has   shown   that   mutual   trust   could   be  
enhanced  by  ensuring  clear  rules  as   to   the  gathering,  examination,  storage  and  
use  of   the  data  concerning   third  parties  and   ‘necessary  participants’.  Finally,   if  
member   states   agree   on   targeting   a   legal   person   with   the   measures   for   the  
purposes  of  EU  cross-­‐‑border  cooperation,  it  could  overcome  dilemmas  as  to  the  
mutual   allowance   of   the  measure   and  mutual   admissibility   of   gathered   items.  
However,  as  in  the  case  of  third  parties,  the  measures  should  be  accompanied  by  
clear  rules  for  examining,  screening  and  sorting  data  gathered  by  chance.  
The   second   group   of   minimum   standards   to   enhance   per   se   admissibility  
deals   with   procedural   rights   associated   with   the   measures.   The   research   has  
revealed  that  the  mutual  recognition  of  evidence  would  be  enhanced  if  member  
states   could   trust   that   the   gathering   of   evidence   abroad   had   not   violated   the  
fundamental  rights  of   the  persons  concerned,  and  that   the  cross-­‐‑border  context  
of   evidence-­‐‑gathering   would   neither   deprive   individuals   of   their   rights   nor  
reduce   the   accessibility   and   effectiveness   of   these   rights.   According   to   the  
research,   in   terms   of   telephone   tapping   and   house   search,   the   rights   which  
contribute   to   enhancing   mutual   trust   between   member   states   are   the   right   to  
legal  remedies  against  the  measures,  and  the  right  to  be  notified  of  the  measures.      
The   outcome   of   the   study   is   that   mutual   admissibility   of   evidence   can   be  
enhanced  by  ensuring  that  both  procedural  rights  are  granted  to  any  individual  
whose   rights  were   infringed   by   the  measures.   It   would  mean   that   the   person  
who  believes  his  or  her  right  to  privacy  was  infringed  is,  firstly,  informed  about  
the  fact  that  the  measure  was  carried  out,  and  secondly,  granted  effective  tools  to  
pursue  his  or  her  rights,  even  if  the  evidence  has  been  collected  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑
border   context.   It   is   noteworthy   that,   according   to   the   research,   this   common  
standard   can   be   met   even   though   the   manner   of   the   exercise   of   these   rights  
differs   between  member   states,   for   example,   it   is   applied   at  different   stages   of  
proceedings,   in   different   form   of   proceedings   (like   criminal,   civil   or  





‘effectiveness’,  which  can  be  ensured  in  different  ways  within  the  various  legal  
systems  across  the  EU.    
Turning  attention  to  the  second  part,  which  deals  with  minimum  standards  
for  admissibility  of  evidence  gathered   irregularly,   the  research  has  shown  that,  
even   if   all   member   states   were   to   develop   complex   and   protective   domestic  
approaches  to  irregularly  obtained  evidence,  these  domestic  rules  would  not  be  
scrupulously   applied  when   it   comes   to   evidence   gathered   abroad.   Firstly,   this  
follows   from  the   fact   that  member  states  usually   lack  domestic   rules  regarding  
the   admissibility   of   evidence   collected   abroad.   Secondly,   it   is   safe   to   say   that  
member   states   are   usually   more   tolerant   and   flexible   in   their   approaches   to  
foreign  items.  The  lack  of  transparent  rules  concerning  admissibility  of  irregular  
evidence  may   lead   to   evidentiary-­‐‑laundering,   violations   of   fundamental   rights  
envisaged   in   ECHR   or   EU   Charter,   undermine   mutual   trust   and,   as   a  
consequence,   discourage   member   states   from   cooperation.   Therefore,   the  
research   also   investigated  minimum   standards   on   the   basis   of  which   it   can   be  
decided   when   evidence   gathered   irregularly   in   a   cross-­‐‑border   context   from  
telephone   tapping   and   house   search   will   be   per   se   inadmissible   or   non   per   se  
admissible.   After   examining   possible   scenarios   the   research   has   revealed   the  
feasibility  of  basing  common  minimum  rules  on  fundamental  rights  ensured  at  
EU   level.   In   other   words,   the   admissibility   of   certain   evidence   could   be  
determined   by   categories   of   violation   of   fundamental   rights  which   bring  with  
them  different  consequences  in  relation  to  the  exclusion  of  evidence.  Due  to  the  
fact  that  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  are  linked  to  the  right  to  respect  for  
private  life,  it  was  necessary  to  verify  which  violations  of  this  fundamental  right  
would  entail  per  se  inadmissibility  or  non  per  se  admissibility.  On  the  basis  of  the  
EU   approach   to   evidence   gathered   irregularly   and   the   substantial   amount   of  
case-­‐‑law  produced  by  the  ECtHR  the  research  has  revealed  the  lack  of  violations  
of  right  to  privacy  that  would  lead  to  per  se  inadmissibility.  Hence,  the  approach  
to  irregularly  obtained  evidence  drafted  in  this  research  only  contains  minimum  
standards   for   non   per   se   admissibility.   According   to   the   research,   the   decision  
whether   irregular   evidence   can   be   admissible   after   all   would   be  made   on   the  
basis   of   the   balancing   test   testing   the   impact   of   irregular   evidence   on   other  
fundamental  EU   rights,   especially   the   right   to  defence,   in  view  of  determining  
the   fairness   of   the   procedure.   Accordingly,   operating   under   non   per   se  
admissibility   minimum   standards   would   mean   breaking   with   the   domestic  
standards  for  admissibility  of  irregular  evidence  gathered  in  the  EU  cross-­‐‑border  
context   and   basing   the   use   of   irregular   evidence   on   the   balancing   test   of  
fundamental  rights  ensured  at  the  EU  level.    
In   conclusion,   this   research  based  on  a   threefold  methodology  and   focused  
on   two   specific   investigation  methods   has   proved   the   feasibility   of   coming   to  
common   EU   minimum   standards   with   regard   to   both   measures.   Compliance  
with   these   common   EU   minimum   standards   would   enhance   mutual   trust  
between   member   states   in   terms   of   evidence-­‐‑taking,   the   procedural   rights   of  
persons  concerned  and  the  preservation  of  fundamental  rights  ensured  at  the  EU  
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level.  As  this  research  deals  with  minimum  rules,  member  states  would  still  be  
able   to  extend   these  standards   in  order   to  provide  a  higher   level  of  protection.  
However,  mutual   recognition  of  evidence  across   the  EU  would  be  achieved  by  
the   adoption   of   common   minimum   standards,   irrespective   of   upgraded  
domestic  rules.    
The  outcome  of  the  study  on  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  gives  rise  
to   two   further   questions   that   are   relevant   for   future   policy.   The   first   question  
consists   of   whether  many  more  measures   need   to   be   investigated   in   order   to  
come   to   common   minimum   standards   and,   if   so,   which   ones.   The   second  
question   is  how  to  make   these  standards  workable  across   the  EU.  Undeniably,  
there  are  more  types  of  measures  that  require  the  diversity  of  domestic  regimes  
to  be  overcome  and  the  adoption  of  various  minimum  standards  with  a  view  to  
enhancing  mutual  admissibility  of  evidence.  These  types  of  measures  should  be  
selected   on   the   basis   of   their   intrusive   character,   questionable   admissibility   of  
evidence   gathered,   or   expected   differences   between  member   states   that   could  
potentially   obstruct   admissibility   of   evidence.   Given   the   widespread  
development  of  new   technologies,   these   standards   could   in  particular   relate   to  
electronic   evidence.  The   investigative  measures   that  deserve   to  be   ruled  out  at  
EU   level   could   be   subsequently   collected   in   one   instrument   and   adopted   by  
means   of   a   directive   regarding  minimum   standards   for   gathering   of   evidence  
with  a  view  to  enhancing  its  mutual  admissibility.  If  successful,  these  minimum  
standards   could   finally   shape   the   so   far   nonexistent   concept   of   mutual  
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Annexes:   Overviews   of   the   criminal   procedure  
systems   in   the   member   states   investigated   in   the  
research 
  
1. England  and  Wales 
  
The  English   common   law  system   is   the  mother  of   all   common   law  systems  
and   one   of   only   three   jurisdictions   in   the   developed  world  without   a   written  
constitution466.   Despite   the   fragmentation,   multiplicity   of   actors   and   general  
complexity   of   the   criminal   justice   system   in   England   and   Wales,   one   can  
indisputably  notice  that  the  process  is  adversarial  and  based  on  well-­‐‑established  
rules  of   evidence467.  English   criminal  proceedings  are  divided   into   the  pre-­‐‑trial  
phase  and  the  trial.  Collection  of  evidence  is  exercised  at  the  pre-­‐‑trial  phase,  both  
by  the  police  and  the  defendant468.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  England  and  Wales  
the   police   enjoy   considerable   powers   and   extremely   wide   discretion   in   the  
investigation   of   crime.   The   police   have   a   right   to   act   independently   and,   in  
principle,   do   not   have   to   report   their   actions   to   the   public   prosecutor469.   The  
main   sources  of   criminal  procedure   in  England  and  Wales  are   scattered  across  
numerous  statutes  and  examples  of  case  law,  however,  the  most  significant  areas  
of   criminal   procedure   with   regard   to   evidence   are   regulated   in   the   Criminal  
Justice  Act  1987,  Criminal  Procedure  Rules  2005,  the  Regulation  of  Investigatory  
Powers  Act  2000  and  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984.    
It   is  worth   noting   that   there   is   no   right   to   privacy   in   English   and  Welsh   law,  
other  than  as  provided  by  Art.  8  ECHR470.  Until  Malone  v.  UK,  telephone  tapping  
in  England  and  Wales  was  carried  out  despite  the  fact  that  there  was  no  relevant  
law471.   Nowadays,   the   use   of   interception   of   telephone   communications   is  
regulated  by  the  Regulation  of  Investigatory  Powers  Act  2000  (hereafter:  RIPA).  
According   to   the   RIPA,   interception  may   carried   out   with   the   consent   of   one  
party472   or   authorised   by   warrant   without   the   knowledge   of   either473.   It   is  
                                                                                                                            
466   P.  DARBYSHIRE,  Criminal   Procedure   in   England   and  Wales   [in:]   R.  Vogler,   B.  Hubber   (ed.),  
Criminal  Procedure  in  Europe,  Berlin,  p.  46-­‐‑47.    
467   M.  MCCONVILLE,   G.  WILSON   (ed.),  The   Handbook   of   the   Criminal   Justice   Process,   Oxford  
2002,  p.5.    
468  P.  HAUCK,  Judicial  Decisions  in  the  Pre-­‐‑Trial  Phase  of  Criminal  Proceedings  in  France,  Germany,  
and   England.   A   Comparative   Analysis   Responding   to   the   Law   of   the   International   Criminal   Court,  
Baden-­‐‑Baden  2008,  p.  43.    
469   J.R.  SPENCER,  The  English  system  [in:]  M.  DELMAS-­‐‑MARTY,   J.R.  SPENCER  (ed.),  European  
Criminal  Procedures,  Cambridge  2002,  p.  165.    
470  P.  DARBYSHIRE,  Criminal  Procedure…,  p.  79.    
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472  Section  3  Regulation  of  Investigatory  Powers  Act  2000.    





noteworthy   that   intercept   evidence   is   not   admissible   in   courts   and   that  
interceptions  are  permissible  only  for  investigative  purposes.  The  power  to  enter  
and   search   premises   is   set   out   in   the   Police   and   Criminal   Evidence   Act   1984  
(hereafter:  PACE),  however,   some  alternative  search  powers,   supplementary   to  
the  PACE,  are  provided  in  the  Criminal  Justice  and  Police  Act  2001,  Part  2  (Code  




The   French   system   of   procedure   can   be   called   mixed,   a   ‘hybrid   model   of  
procedure   that   represents   a   successful   fusion   of   the   best   elements   of   both  
inquisitorial   and   adversarial   practice’475.   The   French   pre-­‐‑trial   phase   comprises  
two   procedures:   the   ordinary   preliminary   inquiry   and   the   inquiry   of   flagrant  
felonies.   The   organisational   structure   of   the   pre-­‐‑trial   stage   in   France   is  
determined   by   the   nature   of   the   offence476.   Separation   of   procedures   is   linked  
with   the   separation   of   functions   and   authorities   between   the   police,   the  
prosecutor   and   the   examining   magistrate477.   It   is   worth   noting   that   French  
criminal   procedure   provides   for   a   very   strong   judicial   role   in   the   pre-­‐‑trial  
phase478.   The  main   source   of   criminal   procedure   law   in   France   is   the  Code   de  
Procédure   Penale   (hereafter:   CCP).   Collection   of   evidence   is   exercised   by   the  
State  Authority,  which   includes   the  official   investigating  police,   the  prosecutor  
and  the  examining  magistrate479.    
There  are  no  precise  references  in  the  French  Constitution  to  the  protection  of  
communications.  Moreover,  France  had  no  rules   in  this  area  until  1990480.  After  
the  Strasbourg  cases  (Hudvig  v.  France,  Kruslin  v.  France),  provisions  dealing  with  
the  interception  of  communications  were  introduced  in  §  100  et  seq.  CPP.    
Although   there   is   no   express   reference   in   the   French   Constitution,   the  
inviolability  of  the  home  is  protected  as  a  constitutional  value.  Nevertheless,  the  
French   Constitutional   Council   declared   as   constitutional   a   law   permitting  
authorised   agencies   to   enter   and   search   premises   if   the   balance   between   the  
inviolable  home  and   the   fight  against  crime  renders   it  necessary481.   It  has   to  be  
                                                                                                                            
474  P.  OZIN.  H.  NORTON,  P.  SPIVEY,  PACE:  A  Practical  Guide  to  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  
Act  1984,  Oxford  2010,  p.  41-­‐‑42.  
475  R.  VOGLER,  France  [in:]  R.  Vogler,  B.  Hubber  (ed.),  Criminal  Procedure  in  Europe,  Berlin  2008,  
p.  179.    
476  A.  RYAN,  Towards  a  System  of  European  Criminal  Justice.  The  problem  of  admissibility  of  evidence,  
Routledge  2014,  p.  137.  
477  J.  GŁĘBOCKA,  Dział    II.  Francuska  procedura  karna  [in:]  System  Prawa  Karnego  Procesowego.  Tom  
II.   Proces   karny   -­‐‑   rozwiązania   modelowe   w   ujęciu   prawnoporównawczym,   P.   KRUSZYŃSKI,   P.  
HOFMAŃSKI  (ed.),  Warszawa  2014,  p.  230.  
478  P.  HAUCK,  Judicial  Decisions…,  p.  25.    
479  Ibid.,  p.  43.    
480   J.   PRADEL,  France:   Procedural  Nullities   and   Exclusion   [in:]  Exclusionary   Rules   in   Comparative  
Law,  S.C.  THAMAN  (ed.),  Springer  2013,  p.  154.    
481  Ibid.,  p.  152.    
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stressed   that   the   CCP   contains   various   provisions   on   searches   of   premises,  
depending  on  the  nature  of  the  crime  and  the  pre-­‐‑trial  procedure.  The  main  legal  
basis  for  the  measure  is  art.  56  et  seq  CCP,  however,  the  CCP  also  provides  a  less  




The   adversarial   model   of   Irish   criminal   procedure   has   developed   from   a  
common   law   tradition,   however,   many   important   practices   and   rules   are  
founded   on   constitutional   and   statutory   principles.   The   criminal   procedure   is  
not  fully  set  down  in  any  one  document.  The  basic  law  of  the  Irish  legal  system  
is   the   1937   Constitution,   which   includes   strong   provisions   with   reference   to  
evidence   obtained   in   breach   of   constitutional   law483.   The  main   sources   of   Irish  
criminal  procedure  are  the  Criminal  Procedure  Act  2010,  the  Criminal  Evidence  
Act  1992  and  the  Criminal  Justice  (Surveillance)  Act  2009.    
When   examining   the   Irish   regulations   it   is   worth   noting   that   the   Irish  
common   law   system   has   in   general   more   restrictive   rules   governing   the  
admissibility   of   evidence   than   those   in   civil   law   systems484.   Indeed,   its  
evidentiary   rules   are   essentially   exclusionary   in   nature485.   The   rules   are   so  
significant  that  in  some  cases  more  time  is  spent  arguing  over  the  admissibility  
of  evidence  than  establishing  the  guilt  of  the  accused486.    
The   competent   body   to   conduct   a   criminal   investigation   in   Ireland   is   the  
Garda  Síochána.   Judges  have  no   function   in   the   investigation  of  offences  other  
than   issuing   warrants,   including   tapping   and   search   warrants.   Evidence  
gathered  by  either  telephone  tapping  or  house  search,  if  collected  in  accordance  
with  legal  and  constitutional  rights,  may  be  used  as  evidence  during  the  trial487.  
Telephone   tapping   in   Ireland   is  permissible  within   covert   surveillance.  The  
relevant  provision  that  allows  listening  to  conversations  or  making  a  recording  
of   them  is   the  Criminal   Justice   (Surveillance)  Act  2009488.  According   to   the  Act,  
evidence   obtained   as   a   result   of   surveillance  may   be   admitted   as   evidence   in  
criminal   proceedings489.   This   Act   applies   to   members   of   the   Garda   Síochána,  
members   of   the   defence   forces   and   officers   of   the   Revenue   Commissioners,  
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however,   for  the  purposes  of   this  research,   further  analysis  deals  only  with  the  
carrying  out  of  the  measure  by  the  gardaí.    
The  inviolability  of  premises  is  ensured  in  the  Irish  Constitution,  nonetheless  
this   right  may  be   interfered  with   in   certain   cases  and   in  a  manner   specified   in  
law490.   In   Ireland,   however,   there   are   numerous   acts   providing   individual  
procedures   relating   to   specific   offences.   The   general   power   to   issue   a   search  
warrant   in   respect   of   evidence   relating   to   the   commission   of   an   arrestable  
offence  is  set  out  in  the  Criminal  Justice  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1997.  A  
search  warrant  can  also  be  based  on  the  Misuse  of  Drugs  Act  1977,  the  Terrorism  
Act  2000  and  the  Child  Trafficking  and  Pornography  Act  1998491.    
  
4. The  Netherlands  
  
The  primary   source  of  Dutch   criminal  proceedings   is   the  Code  of  Criminal  
Procedure   (Strafvordering   2001,   hereafter:   Sv).   However,   many   norms   of  
criminal  procedure  are  set  out  in  special  laws492.  The  private  lives  of  individuals  
are  protected  by  Art.  10  of   the  Dutch  Constitution,  which  provides  the  right   to  
respect  for  private  life,  except  for  limitations  on  this  right  provided  by  the  law.  
More  specific  rights  with  regard  to  the  integrity  of  homes  and  the  confidentiality  
of  communications  are  formulated  in  Arts.  11–13  of  the  Constitution493.  Measures  
such  as  telephone  tapping  and  house  search  may  be  undertaken  during  the  pre-­‐‑
trial   phase,   which   has   an   inquisitorial   character494.   The   results   of   an  
investigation,  including  the  results  of  telephone  tapping  and  searches,  consisting  
of   written   files,   may   be   used   as   evidence   in   a   trial495.   The   competent   body   to  
investigate   a   case   is   the   police,   under   the   supervision   of   the   prosecutor,  
however,   the   investigative   judge   also   plays   an   important   role   at   this   stage,  
because  he/she  has  the  authority  to  authorise  investigative  procedures  –  such  as  
searches   of   premises   and   telecommunication   intercepts496.   The   investigating  
judge   guarantees   the   equality   of   arms   between   the   defence   lawyer   and   the  
public  prosecutor497.    
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The   measure   is   set   out   within   the   rules   for   secret,   special   powers   of  
investigation,  allowed  only  on  the  suspicion  of  a  criminal  offence  that  has  been  
perpetrated  or  on  suspicion  that  organised  criminal  offences  have  been  planned  
and  perpetrated498.  The  central  provisions  with  regard  to  the  measure  are  set  out  
in  Art.  126m  et  seq  Sv.    
The  ability  and  power  to  enter  and  search  premises  in  the  Netherlands  is  set  
out  in  Art.  110  Sv.  It  is  worth  noting  that  besides  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  Sv,  
there  are  special  provisions  with  regard  to  the  measure  in  the  Algemene  Wet  op  
het  Binnentreden  (The  General  Act  of  Entering  Premises,  hereafter:  GAEP).  The  
GAEP   deals   especially   with   the   situation   where   investigating   officers   enter   a  
premises  only  to  look  around,  without  searching  it.  However,  evidence  gathered  




The  main   legal   source  of   criminal  procedure   in  Poland   is   the   1997  Code  of  
Criminal  Procedure   (Kodeks  Postępowania  Karnego,  hereafter:  KPK),   radically  
modified  by  two  contradictory  reforms,  firstly  in  2015  and  secondly  in  2016.  The  
main  purpose  of  the  2015  reform500  was  to  change  the  fundamental  structure  of  
the   criminal   process,  more   specifically,   to   replace   the   central   role   of   the   court  
with   actions   undertaken   by   the   parties,   especially   the   public   prosecutor,   with  
significant   limitation  of   the   court’s   evidentiary   initiative   501.  However,   the  2016  
amendment502   shifted   back   most   of   provisions   introduced   in   2015   and   re-­‐‑
established  a  more  inquisitorial  model  of  criminal  procedure.    
Polish   criminal   proceedings   are   composed   of   two   main   stages,   the  
preparatory  proceedings  and  the  trial503.  The  organisational  structure  of  the  pre-­‐‑
trial   stage   in   Poland   is   determined   by   the   nature   of   the   offence   and  may   take  
place  in  the  form  of  an  investigation  or  a  less  formal  inquiry.  The  authorities  that  
conduct  the  investigative  proceedings  are  the  public  prosecutor  and  the  police504.  
There  is  no  investigative  judge  in  Poland,  however,  some  specific  decisions  and  
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investigative  measures  taken  at  the  pre-­‐‑trial  stage  are  reserved  for  the  court,  e.g.  
arrest  or  telephone  tapping.  Evidence  collected  during  the  pre-­‐‑trial  stage  may  be  
subsequently  used  in  the  trial.    
Protection  of   communications   in  Poland   is   ensured  by  Art.   49  of   the  Polish  
Constitution.  Any  limitations  thereon  may  be  imposed  only  in  certain  cases  and  
in  a  manner  specified  by  statute505.    
There   is   a   two-­‐‑tiered   regulation   of   telephone   tapping   in   Poland.   The   core  
legal  basis  with  regard  to  the  measure  is  Chapter  26  of  the  KPK  which  deals  with  
surveillance   and   telephone   tapping.   However,   telephone   tapping   is   also  
permissible  in  Poland  as  part  of  covert  surveillance  based  on  secret  methods  of  
investigation   regulated   by   the   Police   Act   of   6   April   1990506.   This   ‘police  
surveillance’   is,   however,   permitted   only   upon   judicial   authorisation.   This  
unnatural  division  of  methods  of  investigation  has  been  widely  criticised  in  the  
Polish  jurisprudence,  especially  after  introduction  of  the  rule  that  all  information  
obtained  as  a  result  of  police  surveillance  may  be  admissible  at  trial  (art.  19.15  of  
the  Police  Act.  This   research  deals   solely  with   the  provisions   laid  down   in   the  
KPK.  
The  inviolability  of  premises  is  ensured  in  Art.  50  of  the  Polish  Constitution.  
Any   search  of   a  house,  premises  or  vehicle  may  be  made  only   in   certain   cases  
and   in   a   manner   specified   by   statute.   Searches   of   houses   are   extensively   and  
precisely   regulated   in   the   KPK507.   It   is   worth   noting   that,   as   in   the   case   of  
telephone   tapping,   the   Polish   criminal   code   precisely   sets   out   the   rights   of  




The   basic   legal   text   regulating   criminal   procedure   in   Spain   is   the   1882  
Criminal  Procedure  Act  (Ley  de  Enjuiciamiento  Criminal,  hereafter:  LECrim).  It  is  
worth   noting   that   the   provisions   dating   from   the   nineteenth   century   are  
expected   to   be   replaced   with   a   complex   amendment509.   Moreover,   new  
regulations   concerning   telephone   tapping   are   provided   by   the   Organic   Law  
13/2015,  October   5   (in   force   since  December  2015)  which   regulates   technology-­‐‑
related   investigation  measures.   In  addition  to   the  LECrim,   there  are  other   laws  
that   also   regulate   certain   aspects   of   the   Spanish   criminal   procedure,   among  
others,  the  1995  Trial  by  Jury  Organic  Law  and  the  1985  Judicial  Powers  Organic  
Law.  In  Spain,  case  law  is  not  of  itself  a  source  of  law  in  its  own  right,  however,  
it   plays   a   significant   role   in   the   interpretation   and  meaning  of   certain,   unclear  
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fortalecimiento   de   las   garantías   procesales   y   la   regulación   de   las   medidas   de   investigación  
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rules,  especially  in  order  to  fill  some  legal  lacunae  and  to  ‘rectify’  the  meaning  of  
some  over  a  century  old  provisions,  as  well.  It  is  worth  nothing  that  both  Courts  
have  been  noticeably  influenced  by  the  case-­‐‑law  of  the  ECtHR510.    
There   is   a   strong   separation   between   the   investigating   and   prosecuting  
authorities   in   Spain.   However,   the   investigative   stage   is   supervised   by   the  
investigating  magistrate  (Juzgados  de  Instrucción).    
The  right  to  privacy  in  communication  is  ensured  in  the  Spanish  Constitution  
(Art.  18.3  CE),  however,  the  same  article  provides  that  it  can  be  limited  upon  a  
judicial   decision.   Accordingly,   relevant   provisions   with   regard   to   telephone  
tapping  are  regulated  in  Arts.  588  ter  a  )  to  588  ter  m)  of  the  LECrim.    
The  inviolability  of  premises  is  laid  down  in  the  Spanish  Constitution,  except  
in  cases  of  flagrant  crime  (Art.  18.2  CE).  The  main  provisions  regarding  searches  
of  premises  are  regulated  in  Art.  545  et  seq.  LECrim.  
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Any effort to gather evidence may prove pointless without ensuring 
its admissibility. Nevertheless, the EU, while developing instruments 
for smooth gathering of evidence in criminal matters, is not taking 
much effort to enhance its admissibility. Due to the lack of common 
rules in this matter, gathering and use of evidence in the EU cross-
border context is still governed by the domestic law of the member 
states concerned. This may lead to situations where, given the 
differences between legal systems across the EU, evidence collected 
in one member state will not be admissible in other member states. 
Due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty opened the possibility to 
adopt minimum rules concerning, among other things, the mutual 
admissibility of evidence, this research investigates the concept of 
minimum standards designed to enhance mutual admissibility of 
evidence in the EU. Through a study of two investigative measures, 
telephone tapping and house search, the author examines whether 
coming to various common minimum standards is feasible and 
whether compliance with these standards would finally shape 
the as yet nonexistent concept of the free movement and mutual 
recognition of evidence in criminal matters in the EU.
Essential reading for both national and EU policy makers, scholars 
and practitioners involved in cross-border gathering of evidence in 
the EU.
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